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ABSTRACT 
The Bush administration has charged that reporters at Al Jazeera and other Arab media 
outlets are biased against the US. Whether or not such an allegation is true, it raises the 
central question of what influences are at work on Arab journalists at this crucial time of 
turmoil in the region and change in Arab media. What are their core values? To what degree 
do religious beliefs and ethno-nationalist attitudes shape their coverage? How do they view 
US policy and other regional and international issues? What do they define as the role of a 
journalist in the modem Arab and/or Islamic worlds? This study analyzes the responses of 
517 Arab journalists who participated in the first broad, regional survey examining attitudes 
and values. It found that Arab journalists see the achievement of political and social change 
as the prime mission of Arab journalism and cited "democrat" as their primary political 
identity. When the views of self-declared "secular" and "religious" Muslim journalists were 
compared, there was little statistical difference in their attitudes on all but issues related to 
the role of clerics in Arab society. 
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TRANSLITERATION 
All Qur'anic translations are taken from The Glorious Qur'an translated by Abdallah Yusuf 
Ali. ' 
Presentation of Arabic words and names generally follows the guidelines of the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, which is based on a modified version of Encyclopedia of Islam, 
though citations will follow the original. Nothing was directly translated from Arabic for 
this work. 
Where possible, the names of individuals are presented in English as they themselves spell 
them, but as those familiar with the Arab world will be aware, even this is not always 
consistent, so the prevailing spelling has been chosen. On the equally-complicated issue of 
the names of news organizations, all newspapers and television channels are presented with 
an uppercase "A" in "Al" and a hyphen, as in Al Jazeera, with the exception of names that 
are stylized, as in AiHurra. 
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SECTION ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY 
AND CONTEXT 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
[W]riting is one of the crafts which help society to live ... 
now perfection in the crafts is relative ... hence 
imperfection in writing is due not to a lack of religion or 
morals but to economic and social causes. 
IBN KHALDUN 
THE PROLEGOMENA2 
1) THE PROBLEM 
"Arabic TV does not do our country justice, " President Bush complained in early 
2006. "They sometimes put out propaganda that just isn't right, it isn't fair, and it doesn't 
give people the impression of what we're about. "3 
Since the satellite channel Al-jazeera first aired a videotape of Osama bin Laden in 
the weeks after the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11,2001, 
the Arab media - and media in other parts of the Muslim world - has been the target of a 
sustained campaign of criticism from the Bush administration charging it with anti- 
American bias. The debate over Arab media "bias" in both the mainstream media and 
Western academia has largely been predicated on the assumption that Arab journalists 
should ascribe to Western journalistic values and mores. Little attention has been given to a 
more fundamental question how do Arab journalists, who are predominantly Muslims, 
perceive their own role and what are the worldviews through which they witness events? 
There are various reports documenting the constraints that govern journalism in the 
Arab and non-Arab Muslim worlds, 4 a growing body of scholarly work examining the 
transformation of media structures, 5 and a handful of limited content analyses of media in 
the region since 9/11, primarily in the popular press 6 However, a huge gap exists in the 
literature when it comes to the profile of Arab and Muslim journalists, their values, beliefs, 
politics, religious worldview, etc. The literature contains no formal survey of Arab or non- 
Arab Muslim journalists, beyond a few limited, country-specific studies. 
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2) PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to measure the views of journalists in the Arab world in 
order to assess the degree to which Islamic values and Arab nationalism shape their 
approach to Western journalistic ideal-types and the mission of Arab journalism in the post- 
9/11 Middle East. Understanding the way in which Arab journalists view their profession 
and the events they cover is a critical step in understanding how public opinion in shaped in 
the Arab world. As William Rugh wrote in his classic study of the Arab news media: 
... the editor's perception of events, which are determined by his own 
experience and his cultural, historic, economic, and social environment, cause 
him to make certain choices in the presentation of news. This cultural bias is 
the main reason for a given medium's particular slant on the news. It leads to 
similarities within a given Arab country and also on another level within the 
Arab world, in the news-handling function of the media. ' 
3) THESIS 
It is the central thesis of this study that Arab journalists at the dawn of the 2111, 
century embody a worldview that combines pan-Arabism - stripped of the Utopian garb of 
Arab nationalism - with a heightened sense of Muslim identity. Further, it is the author's 
contention that while Arab journalists share with colleagues around the world a basic set of 
normative professional values, such norms quickly fall away in the face of empirical 
challenges to their core identity of religion, nationality and ethnicity. This study is a direct 
extension of this writer's earlier work involving the impact of worldview, rhetoric and 
media framing on the deterioration of relations between the West and the Muslim world .8 
The motivation stems from the author's dose observation of Arab journalists and sense that 
many of the accusations and cliches about journalism in the Middle East are based on the 
same kinds of stereotypes and misunderstandings that shape the broader relationship 
between the West and the Muslim world, as detailed in the book cited above. Media, as will 
be demonstrated in this study, play an important part in shaping public opinion. It is 
therefore critical for Western policymakers to have an accurate understanding of Arab 
journalists if they are going to effectively communicate through them to the Arab public. 
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Cultural psychologists point to the existence of cultural "amplifiers"9 and "filters, " 
which "mediate perception, memory, self-concept, and other psychological phenomena, " 
political ideology among them. 10 Operating in a historically-repressive media environment 
that has been shaken to its foundations by the arrival of Al-Jazeera, a plethora of semi- 
independent news outlets, and the internet; in a region on the defensive in the face of US 
and Israeli military action and what are widely perceived as hegemonic attempts to force 
political change; Arab journalists perceive their role in a very different way than their 
Western counterparts, even though they may voice normative aspirations to the (rarely- 
attained) Western journalistic ideal-type of the detached observer. 
The use of the term' journalism" in the title of this dissertation is a conscious one; the 
survey documents the attitudes of a discrete pool of 517 journalists. But, given its 
representative nature (see methodology), I maintain, it is reflective of a trend within Arab 
journalism as a whole. 
4) BEYOND ORIENTALISM 
The mere mention of the words "culture" or "psychology" and "Arab" in the same 
sentence is enough to raise red flags in certain scholarly circles. To argue that culture plays a 
part in shaping the worldviews of twenty-first century Arabs is not to engage in the now- 
discredited Orientalist cultural psychology of an earlier era, which posited the existence of 
an ethnically-monolithic "Arab mind"11 or to suggest, as Edward Said summarized in his 
scathing critique of Orientalism, that Westerners can frame Middle East events through a 
one-sided prism that "obscures what we do, and highlights instead, what Muslims and 
Arabs, by their very flawed nature, are. "12 
Rather than a throwback to simplistic and patronizing theories of cultural 
determinism, cultural psychology in its modem incarnation is a science that recognizes 
culture as a fundamental constituent among the multiplicity of influences that affect how an 
individual sees the world. 13 Culture is a primary influence in the production of systems of 
thought and systems of belief, otherwise known as ideologies and religions. 14 "Indeed, " 
writes Middle East scholar Fred Halliday, "to escape from the simplifications of 'cultural' 
determinism, we need not ignore culture in the name of supposedly more 'material' factors, 
like state and dass, but draw on an informed and creatively theorized analysis of culture, of 
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which latter scholarly category we already have a distinguished body in regard to the 
Middle East . -'Is 
5) APPROACH 
The core of this study involved a quantitative survey of 517 Arab journalists from 13 
countries who were asked to respond to a series of 48 multiple choice questions covering 
topics ranging from basic demographics to views of the mission of Arab journalism and 
attitudes toward a range of international issues16 This was supplemented by more than 60 
formal and informal qualitative interviews with Arab journalists. 
6) RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Qi: What do Arab journalists perceive as their primary mission? 
Q2: What are the attitudes of Arab journalists on key policy issues? 
Q3: Is there a significant difference between the attitudes of Arab journalists 
professing a high level of religiosity and those professing a more secular outlook? 
Q4: How do the stated attitudes of Arab journalists compare to those of the Arab 
public? 
Q5: How do the stated attitudes of Arab journalists compare to those of their 
colleagues from other countries on specific questions of journalistic norms? 
7) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study is built on a theoretical framework drawing on the disciplines of Islamic 
studies, Middle East studies, international relations and media studies. Specifically, the 
theoretical framework rests on Anderson's theory of nationalism, with its emphasis on the 
role of media in shaping "imagined communities; "17 Mandaville's theory of post-Islamism, 
which makes the argument that Islamists in recent years have adopted an approach based 
on "pragmatism and policy" that is synergistic with those of more secular agents of social 
and political change and oriented toward national and local issues rather than the pan- 
Islamic umma; 18 and, from media studies, Shoemaker and Reese's "hierarchy of influences" 
model, which posits that mass media content - and the journalists who produce it - are 
shaped by a multitude of forces. " 
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8) RELEVANCE TO ISLAMIC STUDIES 
"Islamic Studies" is a term that can be defined narrowly - the study of the religion of 
Islam - or broadly to encompass a multiplicity of disciplines that touch on the Muslim 
world. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will adopt the definition used by the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England in its report, "International Approaches to Islamic 
studies in Higher Education: " 
'Islamic Studies' is taken to include the study of Islam and Muslim societies 
in a variety of disciplines and departments, including named Islamic Studies 
programmes as well as Religious Studies, History, languages and literature, 
Politics, Anthropology and Sociology, and interdisciplinary area studies 
programmes in Middle East or South Asian Studies 2° 
In this case, Media Studies is added to that list. Given the dramatic impact that the 
explosive growth of a politicized form of Islam has had on everything from international 
relations to the nature of identity in recent years, the purview of Islamic studies can no 
longer be confined to the walls of the mosque or the pages of Islamic texts. As the 2007 
Siddiqui report put it, "The Islamic Studies syllabus needs to look beyond language and 
classical texts and/or area studies, particularly those narrowly focused on Middle East. "21 
In a very vivid way, Islam now reaches into politics, culture and human relationships 
from Cairo, Egypt to Cairo, Illinois, the Northern Frontier Province of Pakistan to Finsbury 
Park. So, too, must Islamic studies expand its writ into fields once reserved for social 
scientists. Turn on the television these days and it seems that everyone is an "expert" on 
Islam: psychologists, political scientists, legal scholars and just about any journalist who has 
ever visited a mosque. Scholars of Islam cannot afford to cede the stage if they are to make a 
contribution to the development of an accurate understanding of the very real impact Islam 
is having in the modern world. The alternative is for Islamic studies to be sidelined and 
academically ghettoized. But at the same time, the discipline must be prepared to bring 
under its tent theories and knowledge from a wide range of other disciplines if it is to help 
policymakers and the public-at-large contextualize the headlines of the day. 
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This is not just true of Islamic studies. There exists a nascent movement among 
scholars of religion in general to examine all religion outside the traditional boundaries of 
faith, doctrines, histories and orders. As Stewart M. Hoover writes in his introduction to 
Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media, "The approach taken is necessarily cross- 
disciplinary. " Hoover goes on to note that "too much [scholarly] writing and thinking about 
religion and the media has fallen into discussions of the sacrality or secularity of forms or 
practices" and discussions of "mediated religion" or "religious media; " categories that are 
"too narrow and too constraining to contain the rich range of phenomena" at work. 22 This 
writer endorses such sentiments and intends to draw on his background in journalism and 
international affairs, as well as the work of scholars in a variety of disciplines, in an attempt 
to make a contribution to the field of Islamic studies by examining the explicit and implicit 
role that Islam plays in the worldviews of Arab journalists, who themselves play such a 
critical role in shaping Muslim attitudes toward regional and international issues and, by 
extension, Western attitudes toward Islam. 
9) DEFINITIONS 
The terms "Islam" and "Islamism" are not used interchangeably. In places in the text, 
I mention Islam in the context of the religion and/or its influence on journalists. At other 
points I consciously refer to "Islamism, in the sense of the term as it "refers to forms of 
political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political 
order [and] a commitment to the idea that Islam and public life [are] inextricably 
intertwined. "23It is important to note that Islamism is not - necessarily - synonymous with a 
commitment to a trans national Islamic state. One of the twentieth century's most influential 
Islamist thinkers, Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), sought "to 
reform the existing state through an emphasis on what we might term 'social Islam, " and 
was "perfectly comfortable with the idea of pursuing an Islamic social order within the 
framework of the nationalist state. "24 
The Middle East refers to the Arab states of the Levant, Iraq, the Gulf and Yemen, 
along with Iran. 
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10) SCOPE 
This study is purposely focused on journalists working for major print and broadcast 
outlets. It is the intention of this study to examine the attitudes of those working in the 
"mainstream" of Arab journalism, primarily those working for the pan-Arab satellite 
broadcasters, the three largest pan-Arab newspapers and the dominant national media in 
select Arab countries 25 
11) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study constitutes the first substantive cross-border survey of journalists in the 
Arab world, creating a portrait of journalists at a critical moment at which both the region 
and Arab journalism are in the throes of transition. As a result of the broad "footprint" of 
television channels such as Al-Jazeera, Arab media has a substantial influence in the broader 
Muslim world. 26 The study will offer important insights for scholars and policymakers 
interested in Arab/Muslim public opinion and the way it is formed. The study will also 
provide a baseline against which future researchers can track the continuing evolution of 
media in the Arab world. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER II: ISLAM, ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
IDENTITY 
Muhammad was the epitome of all the Arabs. So let all 
the Arabs today be Muhammad. 
MICHEL AFLAQ 
CO-FOUNDER OF THE ARAB NATIONALIST BA'ATH PARTY27 
1) THEORIES OF NATIONALISM 
There are many definitions of the term "nationalism. " One of the simplest is found in The 
Dictionary of International Relations, which states that "nationalism seeks to identify a 
behavioral entity - the nation - and thereafter to pursue certain political and cultural goals 
on behalf of it. In the second usage, nationalism is a sentiment of loyalty toward the nation 
which is shared by people. '28 
At the root of it all, according to sociologist Liam Greenfeld, lays the issue of 
sovereignty: 
Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a "people, " 
which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and 
the basis of collective solidarity. [That] people [is] the mass of a population 
whose boundaries and nature are defined in various ways29 
Ernest Geliner (1925-1995) likewise saw sovereignty at the core of nationalism, which 
he defines as a "political principal, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent. "30 French theorist Ernest Renan (1823-1892) took a more transcendent 
approach to the concept of nation and nationalist sentiment. "A nation is a soul, a spiritual 
principle, " he observed, "a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices 
that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. "31 
There are three broad categories of nationalism in its modem context: "cultural 
nationalism, " in which nation is built on a common culture, as in the Quebecois or the 
Flemish of Belgium; "liberal nationalism, " which emphasizes the ideal of liberal democracy 
and takes practical form in the writings of Zionist Theodore Hertz! (1860-1904), German 
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nationalist Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), and Irish patriots such as Daniel O'Connell 
(1775-1847); and the "triumphal nationalism" of the Prussians and Nazi Germany. 
Any discussion of nationalism is dominated by a handful of towering figures. The 
names Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John Armstrong, Anthony Smith, John Breuilly and Eric 
Hobsbawm are pre-eminent in the field. All but Smith are adherents of the "modernist" 
school of nationalism which maintains that prior to the industrial age, the elites benefited 
from the fragmented nature of the societies they ruled, and thus had no incentive to 
encourage or foster any form of cultural homogeneity. It was only with the rise of commerce 
- and the communications infrastructure required for the spread of commerce - that notions 
of shared identity began to bind peoples into cohesive units we today call nations. 
Not all scholars accept the argument of these "modernists" that nationalism is a 
product of the "modernization" born in the 18th century. Adrian Hastings is among those 
positing a medieval origin tied to the rise of Biblical religion. "If nationalism became 
theoretically central to Western political thinking in the nineteenth century, it existed as a 
powerful reality in some places long before that, " he wrote, placing its birth to England in 
1066. Greenfeld concurs: "The birth of the English nation was not the birth of a nation, it was 
the birth of the nations, the birth of nationalism. "32 
The so-called "primordialists" reach back even further, arguing that the sense of 
identity which we now call nationalism has existed far back into the dim mists of human 
history. Much of the disagreement centers on the core questions of what is nationalism and 
national identity? The pre-modernists point to the Cherokee nation, the Phoenicians and the 
self-perception of groups from the Jews to the Franks as God's "chosen people" as evidence 
that ethno-cultural identity existed long before the 18th century. They hear strains of 
nationalism in the writings of Aristotle and Machiavelli and see its imprint in ancient 
Mesopotamia, on the steppes of Mongolia and the ashes of Joan d 'Arc's pyre. As Irish 
scholar and diplomat Conor Cruise O'Brien put it 
[W]hat is called nationalism is an expression of the primordial attachments of 
an individual to a group, possessing both positive and destructive powers, 
and this is a phenomenon which existed long before the group to which such 
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passionate loyalty was attached became the modem nation-state.... The 
nationalist has his heart in his work.... He acts from the roots of being, of 
human society, from a given earth and clan-primordial attachments. 33 
At the other end of the spectrum are the "post-modernists" or "post-nationalists. " 
These fall into two groups: Those, such as British "Third Way" theorist Anthony Giddens, 
who argue that globalization and the evolution of international politics means humanity is 
moving into a multi-cultural, transnational era beyond the identifications of the past, and 
that the very concept of ethnic identity - and perhaps even the nation-state itself - will soon 
be consigned to the dustbin of history; and a second camp, including figures such as 
Matthew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, who predict nations will be replaced by a new 
tribalism. ' 
According to the modernists who dominate the field, true nationalism, in the sense it 
is used today, can be traced to the breakup of Napoleonic Europe and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and is intrinsically tied to the structures of the "modem" era. "Nations and their 
associated phenomena must therefore be analyzed in terms of political, technical, 
administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements, " according to Eric 
Hobsbawrn. -15 Breuilly goes so far as to define nationalism in terms of opposition to existing 
states 36 
Anthony Smith takes a syncretic approach that meshes the power of myth that so 
dominates the primordialist model with the facilitating power of modernity, describing the 
nation as "a named human population which shares myths and memories, a mass public 
culture, a designated homeland, economic unity, and equal rights and duties for all 
members. "37 For him, ethnicity and cultural community play the critical role in national 
identity, which he believes existed, in some cases, long before the advent of the modem age. 
It is a notion Gellner rejected in their famous 1995 Warwick Debates, when he disparaged 
the idea that 19th century peasants, such as those of modem-day Estonia, were recognized as 
anything more than "people who lived on the land ... just a category without any ethnic 
self-consciousness. "38 
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In part, this comes back to the very definition of nationalism and nation. "Nation, " 
wrote Charles Tilly (1929-2008), is "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the 
political lexicon. "39 Even the modernists acknowledge that there existed many pockets of 
shared identity in the distant past, but this "tribal" identity, they say, does not alone 
constitute a "national identity. " Gellner argued that the mutual awareness of "a shared high 
culture" - as opposed to some more elemental sense of community - is a fundamental pillar 
of nationalism. That, he and other modernists insist, arose only with the advent of 
modernity. "The central fact seems to me that what has really happened in the modem 
world is that the role of culture in human life was totally transformed by that duster of 
economic and scientific changes which have transformed the world since the seventeenth 
century, " he told the Warwick audience, adding: 
[T]he maintenance of the kind of high culture, the kind of medium in which 
society operates, is politically precarious and expensive. It is linked to the 
state as a protector and usually the financier or at the very least the quality 
controller of the educational process which makes people members of this 
kind of culture. This is the theory. 4° 
The role of communication in the formation of national identity was singled out early 
in the emergence of nationalism theory. In distinguishing between "people, " "nationality" 
and "nation" in his classic post-war work, Nationalism and Social Communication, Karl W. 
Deutsch (1912-1992) focused on the transmission of ideas in the formation of a "people, " 
which he defined as "a larger group of persons linked by ... complementary habits and 
facilities of communication"41 
John A. Armstrong, another leading thinker in the field, argues that different 
civilizations, whether Western Christendom or the Islamic world, arrive at the point of 
nation-state from different directions. But at root, he believes, "myth, symbol, 
communication, and a duster of associated attitudinal factors" ultimately combine to 
produce what he calls the "mythomoteur" or "constitutive myth of the polity" in every 
culture. 42Hobsbawm points to such disparate examples as the success of Nazi propaganda 
and the British royal family's Christmas broadcast as evidence of the role of mass media in 
making post-1918 nationalism an element of everyday life. Through the press, cinema and 
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radio "popular ideologies could be both standardized, homogenized and transformed. " 
While this facilitated the effectiveness of mass propaganda, it "was almost certainly less 
significant than the ability of the mass media to make what were in effect national symbols 
part of the life of every individual, and thus to break down the divisions between the private 
and the local spheres in which most citizens normally lived, and the public and national 
one. "`3 
This acknowledgement of the import of communications in the formation of national 
identity most famously finds its expression in Benedict Anderson's concept of the "imagined 
community. " The nation, wrote Anderson in his now-classic text, "is an imagined political 
community: " 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion" 
The word is the fundamental unifying force of Anderson's imagined community. 
"[T]he sacred silent languages were the media through which the great global communities 
of the past were imagined, " he writes, referring to Christendom, the Islamic umma and the 
Chinese civilization, ' and it was the rise of vernacular languages to replace Latin that laid 
the seeds for European ethnic nationalism, which was then fed and nurtured by changing 
economic structures, social and scientific discoveries, and, linking it all, the spread of 
increasingly rapid means of communication. 
Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, 
than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of 
people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in 
profoundly new ways. 46 
And it does not take a major leap of imagination to recognize that what was true of 
European peasants 500 years ago has profound implications for the modem Arab world: 
[A]dvances in communications technology, especially radio and television, 
give print allies [that were] unavailable a century ago. Multilingual 
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broadcasting can conjure up the imagined community to illiterates and 
populations with different mother-tongues. 4' 
Hobsbawm saw the commitment of language to print as an important step toward 
ensuring its permanence. However, he was skeptical of language's role in creating nations: 
"[]]anguages multiply with states; not the other way around. "48That analysis betrays a Euro- 
centric view of nationalism, ignoring nations such as Indonesia, where more than 300 
locally-based languages struggle to exist under the pressure of Bahasa Indonesia, a Malay- 
based trader's language adopted to unify the nation shortly after independence. 49 And it 
appears to fly in the face of the fact that more than 300 indigenous languages are under 
threat of extinction in Africa alone. -50 
Though he traces its impact to a far earlier timeframe, even Hastings acknowledges 
that "by far the most important and widely present factor [in the formation of national 
identity] is that of an extensively used vernacular literature. " Specifically, he wrote, "The 
Bible provided, for the Christian world at least, the original model of the nation. "51 It was a 
function he saw borne out in later manifestations of nationalism: "Every ethnicity is shaped 
significantly by religion, just as it is by language. "52 
The rise of nations per se is not the only outgrowth of the Information Revolution. 
"The new systems of mass communications - radio, television, videos, personal computers - 
are also encouraging much smaller social and political groups and ethnic and linguistic 
communities to create and sustain their own dense social and cultural networks, in 
opposition both to national states and the wider continental or global culture, " according to 
Smith P 
Jean-Marie Guehenno, the former head of UN peacekeeping operations and a 
leading voice of post-nationalist theory, sees this trend contributing to a "Lebanization" that 
threatens even developed nations. This "age of networks" means "territory (spatial 
proximity) is of dwindling importance, " producing a "world that is at once unified and 
without a center. "M 
According to Smith, religious resurgence is one element of this new media-driven 
cultural/political landscape: 
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The spread of global patterns of politics and communications have helped to 
revive the ethnic ties of many communities through the return by many 
people to religion ... [for] ... religious mythologies act as guarantors of the 
redemption of oppressed ethnies or reinstators of by-passed ethnic values and 
life-styles. " 
It is on this issue of religion that Anderson's thesis shows its weakness. He equated 
the dawn of the age of nationalism in eighteenth century Europe with "the dusk of religious 
modes of thought "56 It was an ironic observation, given that much of his empirical research 
was set in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, where religion is today 
wielding a powerful political influence. 
Yet a loser examination of Anderson's analysis of the demise of religion argues for, 
rather than against, his relevance to the twenty-first century Arab world. It is only passing 
that Anderson refers to the importance of Arabic in the emergence of Islam as "one of the 
great religiously imagined communities. " The thrust of his rationale for the waning of the 
"unselfconscious coherence of religion" is Euro-centric, and relates to the role of the 
Christian church. The first factor in the demise of religious influence, he writes, was the 
widening of horizons brought about by the exploration of the non-European world. The 
second was "the gradual demotion of the sacred language itself, " by which, of course, he 
means Latin. But, arguably, little of this applies to the Arab world. Rather than "widening 
horizons, " the colonial age - and more recent developments - produced much the opposite 
effect, a defensive turning inward. And where Europe's Christian Church replaced Latin 
with the vernacular, Arabic lives. Islam remains strong and Arabic continues to be the 
unifying linguistic force precisely because the reasons he cites for the demise of religion - 
exposure to new ideas and loss of the sacred religion - are not true of the Middle East in the 
way they are in Europe. It is a reminder that the theories behind nationalism cannot be 
carved in stone; there is no 'one size fits all' template. 
As Middle East and South Asia scholars Juan Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti observe, 
"The argument that religions are universal and so excluded from playing ... a specific role 
[in formation of national consciousness] is deeply flawed. " Pointing to examples in Pakistan, 
Iran, Afghanistan and India, he adds: 
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Religion, like any other identity, is a field of contestation rather than a stable 
essence, and struggles over the definition and place of religion can be 
variably articulated with a national sense of identity that is itself fluid and 
changing. 57 
Here again, we come back to the role of media. With the spread of satellite television, 
Modem Standard Arabic (MSA) - often called "news Arabic" - is more than ever emerging 
as a bridge that form an overlay above the many varieties of colloquial Arabic heard in the 
region, even as classical Arabic retains its sacred position in the mosque. As Marwan Kraidy 
has written, "Watching Arab satellite television, one often senses a pan-Arab vernacular 
language emerging, heavily influenced by Levantine Arabic, as a kind of pan-Arab lingua 
franca. These developments do point to the emergence of a pan-Arab 'imagined community' 
with converging concerns and a sense of regional belonging. "m 
The post-modernists may be closer to the mark than Anderson when they speak of a 
resurgence of religion, through which non-state actors "inherit the functions that the nation 
filled in the institutional age. "59 To see the functioning of non-state actors who have varying 
degrees of regional allegiances but strong religious credentials, one need look no further 
than the civil society infrastructures of Hezbollah's "human state" in which, according to 
anthropologist Augustus Richard Norton, Shia social associations have become "an essential 
part of the construction of a modern, confident notion of identity, '60 and Hamas, which, 
according to Mandaville, combined the religious legitimacy, social services and social 
authority inherited from its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood, to build "the foundations 
of is political legitimacy. "61 
However, much of what Anderson says about the psychological nature of 
nationalism does resonate with the modem Arab world, especially in the context of the rise 
of Islamic identity. Nationalism, he argues, was neither produced by the erosion of religious 
identity nor supersedes it, but rather can best be understood by aligning it with the "large 
cultural systems that preceded it, " one of which is "religious community. " And, he adds, 
nationalism has always shown a strong affinity with "religious imaginings, " pointing in 
particular to the connection of "the cultural roots of nationalism with death. "62 Gellner also 
saw a "great parallel" between the "scripturalist-puritanism" of the Muslim reformers "and 
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nationalism, in that Islam links the believer to both a far-flung culture and the nation-state 
"which alone is capable" of making "recorded truth accessible to all. "63 
Jorgen Habermas, the essential theorist on the role of the "public sphere" in the 
formation of identity, sees that issue of communication of "truth" becoming ever more 
influential, even as other factors that once contributed to the formation of nations fall aside. 
Writing in the mid-1990s, shortly after the introduction of the European common market, 
Habermas called for a new structure through which to bind citizenry to the political public 
sphere. "This provides a model of a deliberative democracy that no longer hinges on the 
assumption of macro-subjects like the 'people' or 'the' community but on anonymously 
interlinked discourses or flows of communication. " For Habermas, the emergence of a true 
sense of European citizenship depends on "the vitality of the informal circuit of public 
communication. " Media-driven "world citizenship, " he believes, is a logical final stop on the 
continuum. 14 
As noted earlier, nationalism is not a political principal alone. It is also a sentiment. 
"Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, " wrote Hans Kohn (1891-1971), an early 
nationalism theorist, "an act of consciousness; "5 the nation as "the nation as "a community 
of shared sacrifice. "66 In the context of this dissertation, that is important to note. Gellner 
defines "nationalist sentiment" as "the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the 
principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is 
one actuated by a sentiment of this kind"67 and Anderson insists that popular nationalism is 
always mobilized "in a language of self-defense. "' 
That theme of unity forged in the face of the Other makes frequent appearances in 
the various theories of nationalism. After vernacular literature, Hastings identified "[a] long 
struggle against an external threat" as having the most significant effect on formation of 
national identity. "It arises chiefly where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels 
itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or importance. "69 Edward Said 
(1935-2003) tells us "[t]he development and maintenance of every culture require the 
existence of another, different and competing alter ego. " The "construction of identity, " he 
continues, "involves the construction of opposites and 'others. "" 
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The Balkanization of the former Yugoslavia, the war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and the simmering strife between India and Pakistan are all examples of this 
nationalism in the face of the Other. "At the end of the twentieth century, " according to 
Middle East historian Ilan Pappe, "nationalism became the language of opposition, religious 
or not, to the ruling elites and their supporters in the West. "71 The irony, according to Smith, 
is that "the increased power of modem mass communications to amplify and broadcast" 
cultural and historic differences itself "binds many peoples more closely to an ethno-history 
and heritage that they feel may be under threat. "72 
In the "banal nationalism" theory of social psychologist Michael Billig, this 
defensiveness lies lurking just below the surface even in apparently stable and peaceful 
modem nations, ready to erupt in the face of a perceived threat. 3 It is the "deep horizontal 
comradeship" described by Anderson that "makes possible, over the past two centuries, for 
so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings. "74 
It is in this defensive role that Smith believes "pan" nationalisms have their greatest 
impact. While he is dismissive of their political success to date, Smith argues that ideologies 
such as pan-Arabism and pan Africanism help "underpin the national state" by creating 
"border guards" that provide "a new panoply of symbols and myths, memories and values, 
that set the included national states apart ... through opposition to culturally different 
neighbours and enemies. "75 The rapid growth of telecommunications and mass media, he 
believes, leaves open the possibility that "regional associations based on 'Pan' nationalisms 
can generate overarching cultures and identities that compete with, or even replace, national 
state and ethnic identities, "76 an eventuality left open in Anderson's description of the 
"finite, if elastic boundaries" of the imagined community'? and a task Breuill y believes is a 
fundamental function of the nationalist. " 
Perhaps no one is more explicit about the import of the "pervasive" and "crucial" 
role played by the media in the spread of nationalism than Smith. It is, he says, "crystal 
clear" that "[w]hat is actually said" - the message fed through the media - matters little: " 
Rather, 
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It is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, 
centralized, standardized, one to many communication, which itself 
automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective [of 
the] specific messages transmitted. That core message is that the language 
and style of the transmissions is important, that only he who can understand 
them ... is included in a moral and economic community. 79 
2) THEORIES OF ARAB NATIONALISM 
Certain aspects of the various theories of nationalism elaborated above come up 
short when applied to the Middle East. Gellner's focus on the shift from agrarian to 
industrial society is undermined by the fact that, even today, some Arab countries cannot 
yet truly be considered "industrialized, " and certainly were not early in the last century. The 
patchwork quilt of what are essentially tribal allegiances that make up Lebanon, and the fact 
that some readily-identifiable "peoples, " such as the Kurds, do not have their own nation- 
state, would seem to bring into question Smith's emphasis on ethnies - which provide the 
mythologies, culture and "association with an ancient homeland" - in the formation of the 
nation-state (though his caveat that if the nation does not have those ethnies, it must 
while, as Sami appropriate them or risk collapse seems to be borne out in Lebanon),, -81 
Zubaida has pointed out, the "Arabism with an Islamic tinge" of Iraq's Ba'athists - much 
less the fragmented identities that have followed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein - raise 
problems for Anderson's theory that nationalism replaces religion in the nation-state. 81 
However, when applied on the broader stage of "pan-Arabism" rather than nation- 
state nationalism in the Arab world, many of these ideas - married with the common themes 
of language, communication and shared cultures that are found in most theories of 
nationalism - find a ready home. For example, to say that Druzes and Maronites are not 
naturally linked by a shared ethnie or culture, and that it was the imposition of the artificial 
boundaries of Lebanon that produced the somewhat forced shared national identity that 
(sometimes) links them today, is by no means to undermine the idea that, on a much higher 
level, they are part of a shared "imagined community" of Arabs bound by race, language 
and culture. Adeed Dawisha points out that Greenfeld's belief that England was the 
prototype for nationalism has implications for Arab nationalism. "Not only is the English 
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'race' patently mixed, but English as a language emerged from the linguistic influences of 
the various peoples who had invaded and settled the country, " he wrote, a situation that has 
parallels among the Arab peoples-"' 
Though others touched on the region, only one well-known theorist of nationalism 
specifically writes from the perspective of the Arab world. Elie Kedourie (1926-1992), a 
British historian born in Baghdad to an Iraqi Jewish family, took a dim view of nationalism, 
which he called a "principle of disorder" that laid the groundwork for "the tyranny of one 
group over another. " A devout conservative, Kedourie saw nationalism as a dangerous 
ideology that arose from Germanic ideas of national destiny, rejecting the argument of 
Gellner and other modernists that it was a sociological outgrowth of the industrial 
revolution. His 1960 work, Nationalism, darkly predicted that anti-colonial nationalism 
would feed despotic rule in Africa and Asia. 8 He saw Arab nationalism as an artificial 
construct of European influence and later blamed nationalism for turning the Middle East 
into a "wilderness of tigers. "TM 
Kedourie's theory has been widely criticized. Gellner was scathing. "An author 
committed to the view that the ideological or doctrinal history of nationalism is largely 
irrelevant to the understanding of it should not perhaps indulge in debates about its 
intellectual ancestry, " he wrote, 85 but Kedourie continues to have his supporters on the 
political right. 
Unlike nationalism itself, there exists no overarching theory of Arab nationalism. This 
is true, at least in part, because, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, a scholar of Islam and co-editor of The 
Muslim World, tells us, two "streams" of Arab nationalism developed, one in the Mashreq, 
the region between the Mediterranean Sea and Iraq, the other in the Maghreb, or North 
Africa, as "a function of different political, economic and social forces and conditions. " At 
the same time, according to Juan Cole, there has been "little theoretical work done on 
Middle Eastern nationalisms. "11' The topic has primarily been the purview of historians, 
rather than sociologists, anthropologists or political scientists, with the scholarship focused 
on specifics of Arab nationalist and/or nation-state loyalties "with little concern for 
theoretical questions. "118 As Rashid Khalidi noted in the introduction to The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, a plethora of scholarly books and articles examine the history of Arab 
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nationalism in individual countries or sections of the Middle East, such as the Levant and 
Egypt, however, "a comprehensive treatment spanning more than a century and covering 
the region as a whole has been absent. "89Even among the many works of history, he wrote 
elsewhere, 
there has frequently been a failure to analyze the Arab case using 
methodologies derived from some of the more critical recent approaches in 
the study of nationalism. This failure has been linked with an unquestioning 
acceptance of elements of the national narrative - or myths, to put it more 
bluntly - generated by Arab nationalism ... [producing studies] that are often 
partisan and controversial ... [and] surrounded by clouds of polemics 90 
Historians of Arab nationalism, such as George Antonius (1891-1941), Albert 
Hourani (1915-1993), Hisham Sharabi, Bassam Tibi, Philip Hitti (1886-1978), Albert Hourani 
(1915-1993) and Khalidi himself, " disagree on many of the details of the movement's history, 
such as whether it was driven by the Christian bourgeoisie, led by Muslims and Turks or, as 
Kedourie argues, a creation of British military officers. Even some of the basics produce 
dissent. "Just what Arab nationalism meant to its proponents" at its birth in the years before 
World War I "has been difficult to determine, " wrote C. Ernest Dawn, one of the early 
modem scholars in the field. 92 But there is general agreement that early Arab nationalists 
drew on European concepts of patria and patriotism as a means of repelling Western 
designs on the region after the collapse of Ottoman Muslim rule. 
Most important in the context of this dissertation is discussion of the relationship 
between pan-Arab nationalism, Arab nation-state nationalism, and Islamism. It is 
"conventional wisdom" in many scholarly, journalistic and policy circles in the West that 
Arab nationalism and Islamism are warring ideologies. Some observers of the Middle East 
and/or nationalism have argued that the belief systems of the two are fundamentally 
incompatible 93 However, such views are too often based on black-and-white perceptions 
that fail to take into account the complex Realpolitik of the modem Arab world and the 
shifting cross-currents of Arab history. 
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There is no dispute that the ultimate goals of Arab nationalism and political Islam 
are fundamentally different. Arab nationalists seek to erase the lines written in the sand by 
European colonialists and reunite the Arab nation; Islamists ultimately want to restore the 
glory of the Muslim Caliphate, an empire that grouped Europeans, Africans, Asians and 
Arabs alike. But for each, those goals are part of the long-term game plan that can only be 
achieved through tactical victories. Arab nationalism and Islamism are two sides of the 
"Janus-faced" Arab cultural and political identity, and as David Laitin noted in his study of 
political culture, "shared cultural identities facilitate collective action. "N 
The theory propounded by Dawn, who brought the term Arabism into the modem 
lexicon, is that movement owes its existence to Islam. "There is convincing evidence that the 
prevailing ideology of Arab nationalists in the twentieth century was formed in the 1920s, at 
the latest, from Islamic modernist roots, " he writes. "Arab nationalism arose out of the 
failure of its immediate predecessor and its ideological parent, Islamic modernist 
Ottomanism. "95 
Islam is, first and foremost, a religion, but, for many Muslims, it is also "a complete 
way of life"% or, as Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Said Qutb (1906-1966) put it, the "well- 
head" for "any matter that pertains to faith. " 97 Abu-Rabi frames it in more academic terms: 
Islam is both normative and historical; in other words, it is both theological 
and rational. The theological expresses itself as fascination with divine 
mystery, whereas the rational deals with the fascination of human history. 98 
In short, he says, "There are a multiplicity of meanings inherent in the term Islam. 
Islam as text and theology, Islam as human thought; as history; and as one or several 
institutions. "99 In Islam, sacred law (sharia) finds its application not only as a set of religious 
principles, but as direct guidance for daily life. 1°° 
In its political guise, known as Islamism, Islam can also be considered a form of 
religious nationalism. Robert Saunders calls the Islamic umma a post-national political 
identity that is "as profound as any extant nationalism. "101 Islamic revivalist Abul Ala 
Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), the founder of Jama'at-i-Islami who is said to have 
influenced Qutb, 102 described Islam as a "revolutionary concept and ideology which seeks to 
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change and revolutionize the world social order and reshape it according to its own concept 
and ideals. "103 Maududi, a South Asian and, not incidentally in the context of this 
dissertation, a one-time journalist, represents the hard edge of Islamist political thought. Not 
every Islamist seeks to overturn the world order and reunite the umma. The world's Muslims 
are "as diverse as humanity itself" and reflect a host of competing religious, political and 
ideological schools of thought104 Halliday places the term "Islamism" in a modem context, 
explaining that "Islamism serves to articulate the interests and identity of groups that form 
part of a broader political community that may include Muslims and non-Muslims of, even 
where all are Muslims, includes divergent sects of Islam or different linguistic or ethnic 
groups. "105 
According to Abu-Rabi, contemporary Arab thought is "the product of a complex 
intellectual formation" built on three foundations identified by Hassan Hanafi, an Egyptian 
philosopher known for interpreting Islam to the West, as classical Islamic heritage, modem 
Western heritage, and "the present realities of the Arab world. "106 Where Arab nationalism 
owes much to Western concepts of nationalism, Islamism arose from the neo-orthodox Salafi 
movement, which seeks to reform Islam through a return to the traditions represented by 
the "pious forefathers" (al-salaf al-salih) and takes "Islamic revelation as the main criterion 
for truth. "107 Its two main strains, the classical and the Wahabi, respectively trace their roots 
back to the Hanbali school of Islam and one of its leading proponents, Taqi al-Din Ibn 
Taymiyya (1263-1328), and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (1153-1740), who dissented from 
the prevailing Habali doctrine. 108 
Islamists are those who believe, in the definition offered by Graham Fuller, author of 
The Future of Political Islam, "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about 
how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world. "109 And, like 
followers of many other political movements, they have demonstrated a willingness to make 
accommodations and alliances on the road to achieving the ultimate objective. 
Yet within the community of believers there has raged a political and ideological 
debate over precisely what role the religion should play in everyday life, dividing Salafi into 
those who advocate confrontation with the state and those who, as in the Gulf, take a more 
passive approach; as well as another level of division between the confrontationists who 
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advocate violence and those who do not. Overlapping, but not exclusive to the Salafis, is the 
division of Muslims intellectuals into what have been called the fundamentalist and the 
modernist camps. For the fundamentalists, like Maududi, Islam is all-encompassing. 
Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof define "fundamentalists" as those whose agenda is 
"aimed at Islamizing virtually all social institutions. " Their perspective is summed up by the 
manifesto of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, whose leader, Abbassi Madani is 
considered one of North Africa's leading Islamist thinkers. The manifesto sets out as its first 
principle, "Keep to the Islamic Shariah ... which alone allows the treatment of all questions; 
whatever their importance. ""o The modernists include Arabs such as the Syrian Jamal al-Din 
al-Qasimi (1866-1914), who advocated constitutional government and called for an Arab 
cultural and literary revival; Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi 1822-1890), a reformer who served as 
both Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire and Tunisian prime minister; and Egyptian 
Salafist Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who sought to apply reason to the application of 
sharia in societal reforms. They seek to reconcile the Islamic faith with modern political, 
cultural, social and scientific values. As Charles Kurzman explains, 
The modernist Islamic movement pioneered the formation or reformation of 
educational institutions; agitation for political liberalization or 
decolonization; and the establishment of a periodical press throughout the 
Islamic world. "' 
An essay on freedom by Egyptian Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), for example, 
paints a picture of a free and just "watan [nation]" built on a set of rights lifted directly from 
the French Constitution and setting out "natural" freedom, "behavioral" freedom, freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, and political freedom, all of which, he notes, are "consistent 
with the wisdom of the philosophers ... the laws of the Messengers prior to Islam" and is 
"supported by sharia and nature. "112 Such ideas drew the wrath of the fundamentalists, who 
charged al-Tahtawi with abandoning the faith. 
This intellectual debate reached a zenith in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, even as Arabism was coming to the fore. That synchronicity of timing and 
agendas - driven by the same external factors - contributed to the evolution of a "collective 
political identity"113 among Arab nationalists and proponents of political Islam that has 
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ebbed and flowed in the years since, producing short-term political alliances and a long- 
term synergy of interests that belies the notion of ideological movements eternally at 
loggerheads. This expedience finds its voice in the words of Ayatollah Hussein Fadlallah, 
spiritual leader of Lebanese Shi'ites: "Islam is a source of strength for the Arabs and Arab 
nationalism, just as Arabism is a source of strength to Islam. "114 
That same acknowledgment of the confluence of interests between Arabism and 
Islamism can be found in the writings of Sati al-Husri (1880-1968), director-general of 
education in the British Mandate government in Iraq. His 1944 book, Muslim Unity, Arab 
Unity, is considered a key tract in Arab nationalist ideology. Rejecting the regionalists - 
those advocating the formation of nation-states - and the Islamists alike, al-Husri saw Arab 
political unification as an essential first step toward the eventual emergence of a broader 
Islamic umma: 
"[I]t is not possible to advocate Muslim unity without advocating Arab unity. 
... We must not 
forget this truth ... We have, therefore, the right to assert that 
whoever opposes Arab unity also opposes Muslim unity. 
In al-Husri's words could be heard the vivid manifestation of the "myths and 
memories" and the "promise of redemption" of Smith and other nationalist theoreticians: 
The idea of Arab unity is a natural concept springing from the depths of 
social nature. ... It will without any doubt, spread all over the Arab countries, 
to whom it will bring back their ancient glory and primeval youth; it will 
indeed bring back what is most fertile, most powerful, and highest in these 
countries. 115 
The conscious revival of the "glory" of the ancient Semitic empires was evident in 
the instructions of Sami Shawkat, another Iraqi director general of education who preceded 
al-Husri in the 1930s. He told teachers that "history is made up according to the needs of the 
moment, " and ordered them to reach back beyond the "prophetic message" of Muhammad 
(570-632) and recapture "the history of our illustrious Arab nation [which] extends over 
thousands of years, and goes back to the time when the peoples of Europe lived in forests 
and over marshes, in caves and in the interstices of the rock. " Speaking of the Chaldean, 
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Assyrian, Pharaonic and other ancient "Semitic" civilizations, he said, "These empires and 
their dependencies are all our property; they are of us and for us. "16 
Yet al-Husri himself embodied the challenges of the goal of a unified "Arab" nation. 
He is reported to have spoken Arabic with a Turkish accent, at times requiring a translator 
was among those bureaucrats who sought to deny Iraqi citizenship to the Shia, who they 
suspected of favoring Iran over Iraq and Arabism. 117 In al-Husri's Iraq, Sami Zubaida sees 
broader lessons for the application of nationalism theory to the Middle East. "To say that the 
nation is a reality is not to imply that this reality is one of solidarity or loyalty. In fact, the 
situation is quite the contrary, " adding. 
Economic and fiscal administration, education, employment, military 
conscription, the media and social and cultural organization - all make the 
nation a fact or "facticity" compelling on the cognition and imagination of its 
members ... yet not necessarily of their sentiments of solidarity or 
loyalty. 118 
Stripped of their ultimate goals, the immediate political aims of Arabism and 
Islamism are strikingly similar. Some have gone so far as to call them "unseparated Siamese 
twins. "119 The political program of "pan-Islamism" (ittihad-i Islam) outlined by Islamist 
Modernist Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), a Persian, in the late nineteenth century 
sought to mobilize Muslim nations to fight against Western imperialism, sounding much 
like the Arab nationalist agenda of the twentieth century and the broad Arab discourse of 
today. 120 The artificial boundaries imposed by Western colonizers, the creation of the state of 
Israel, the pattern of Western aggression since the Crusades, the hypocritical contradictions 
of Western expressions of morality and political/military actions, Western support for 
authoritarian rulers and the corrupting influence of Western culture, all these complaints 
and more fill the speeches of political Islamist and Arab nationalist leaders alike; 
intellectuals representing each political philosophy feed and nurture the other. The writings 
of Salafist journalist Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1842-1902), for example, are considered "a 
milestone in the emergence of Arab nationalism and the concept of Arabism within the 
Ottoman Empire. "121 His manifestos against Ottoman tyranny, the need for social justice and 
Arabism (in particular, the role of Arabs and Arabic as the cornerstone of Islam), the first by 
a Muslim Arab, struck a chord with Muslim and Christian Arabs. ln 
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The longing for the "redemption of the oppressed" so familiar in European 
nationalism was now vividly apparent in the Middle East. "As Arab nationalism took hold, " 
writes Khalidi, "what had been described for thirteen centuries as the glories of Islamic 
civilization came to be called the glories of Arab civilization; the language and literature of 
the Arabs, always revered and cherished, took on a new and heightened importance; and a 
sense of pride in Arabism that had always existed but had long been dormant was 
consciously revived and actively fostered. "1 
Similarly today, Osama bin Laden's influence stems in large part from his ability to 
give voice to fundamental issues of identity that resonate with the Arab mainstream: the 
occupation of Palestine, Western support for autocratic Arab leaders and the absence of 
political freedom across the region. Modem US policy, he said in his 1996 declaration of war, 
was part of a long history of humiliation. To bin Laden, the "Zionist-Crusade r"124 aggression 
in Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere were an extension of the heroic battles of a 
millennium ago. 
These are the same seminal issues, save the more recent imposition of Western media 
culture, which formed the backbone of the Arab nationalist message. Each strain of thinking 
strives to overcome the "psychology of subjugation, "1 occupation and exploitation that has 
characterized modern Arab history. Robert Jay Lifton says bin Laden represents a 
convergence of psychological and historical forces: 
That kind of model enables us to view al-Qaeda and related movements as 
many-sided, as, in fact, postmodern combinations of disparate elements: 
ancient Koranic doctrine recast and rendered Islamist; long-standing 
historical anger now directed at newly humiliating American incursions in 
the Middle East; contemporary worldwide fundamentalist and apocalyptic 
currents; anti-Western and antimodern impulses that have nonetheless 
absorbed aspects of various Western ideologies as well as advanced 
technologies; and video and cinematic imagery drawing upon universal but 
mainly American-inspired popular culture. 'b 
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George Antonius, author of the first major treatise on Arab nationalism, The Arab 
Awakening, published in 1938, argued that without the Arab literary awakening the rise of 
Arabism would have been inconceivable and that the partnership of Islamism and 
Arabization had produced a "cultural revolution" among a people whose traditions had 
become "hybrid and debilitated. " His description of the "Arab world" as one united by 
ethnicity, shared traditions and language might well have come right out of the works of 
nationalist theoreticians who would follow decades later. '27 "Without a book, the making of 
a nation is in modem times inconceivable, " wrote Antonius, who said the founding of 
schools and the distribution of textbooks in the mid-nineteenth century helped to "pave the 
way [for the rise of an Arab identity] by laying the foundations of a new cultural system, for 
the rehabilitation of the Arabic language as a vehicle of thought. "128 
The best-known of those vehicles was the American University in Beirut, which 
Antonius said provided "the intellectual effervescence" for the Arab revival. Founded as 
Syrian Protestant College by American missionary Daniel Bliss (1823-1916), the mission of 
the school was to impart, as Bliss put it, "the spirit that the Americans had in 1775. "129 The 
university's graduates were among the intellectual authors of Arab nationalism, as historian 
Michael B. Oren has noted, "radically transform[ing] the region's politics" and "prompting 
diverse Middle Eastern peoples to unite into a unique Arab nation. "130 
The spread of what would become Arab nationalism followed much the same 
pattern outlined in Anderson's accounts of European nationalism: "Soon, with the power of 
the state propagating it through the educational system, the media, and other avenues of 
access to cultural and political discourse in a number of newly independent Arab countries, 
the Arab idea was strongly entrenched, " according the Khalidi. 131 Print technology had 
given the empire's new middle dass the ability to "imprint its own intellectual mark" on 
politics and society, according to Ottoman historian Kemal Karpat. 132 But Gellner says there 
was also another factor at work in the Arab world, the synergistic role of the Islamic 
reformers: 
Whilst European Protestantism merely prepared the ground for nationalism 
by furthering literacy, the reawakened Muslim potential for egalitarian 
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scripturalism can actually fuse with nationalism, so that one can hardly tell 
which one of the two is of most benefit to the other. ''' 
It was an alliance-of-convenience that would prove lasting. 
3) THE PUSH AND PULL OF HISTORY 
"The history of the Arabs [shows] they have followed the admonition, 'religion is to 
God and the nation is to the people, " said Halab, an Aleppo newspaper that, on behalf of the 
British, propagandized for Arab nationalism in the northern Syrian city, which had a strong 
orientation toward the defeated Ottoman Empire in the years after the Arab Revolt of the 
first world war. 134 It was all part of the European plan to use the imperial ambitions of the 
Hashemite sharif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali (1852-1931), and his sons Abdullah (1882-1951) 
and Faysal (1883-1933), leaders of the Arab Revolt, to slice up the defeated Turkish- 
controlled Muslim Ottoman Empire and replace it with a new Arab identity and a new Arab 
ideology. 135 
The paper and its masters needed to obscure the religious bond between 
Arabic- and Turkish-speaking Muslims and thereby disengage the newly 
imagined ethnicities from a dependence on Islam ... [which] presages the 
entire postcolonial ambivalence with Islam itself in Kemalist Turkey and 
Ba'athist Syria and Iraq, where Islam both is (or was) a definitive component 
of identity. 
Islam was thus subsumed into, rather than separated from, the emerging "Arab" 
identity, 136as this "imagined community" took shape in the inter-war Middle East. As Dawn 
put it of the early Arabist thinkers, "All talked about fatherland and patriotism, watan and 
wataniyya, but one person could have more than one watan and more than one nation 
(umma). "137 The dualism was possible because Islam is a "discursive tradition" that includes 
aspects of secularism and religion side-by-side. 138All Muslims consider themselves part of 
the greater umma but there is no "Homo Isiamicus, "139no clearly defined species of Muslim 
that is separated from the ethnicities from which its adherents are drawn. "We ... made you 
into nations and tribes, " says the Qur'an (49: 13) and, as cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede 
observes: "We all think according to our own local software. "140 
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It is important to understand precisely what we mean when we use terms related to 
the development of political thought in the Arab world. For the most part, Arab nationalism, 
Arabism and pan-Arab(ism, ist), have been used interchangeably by journalists and scholars 
of the Middle East. 141 The terms all broadly refer to the various iterations - Ba'athism, 
Nasserism, Arab Socialism, etc - in which a linguistic and cultural commonality among 
Arabs manifests itself in the aspiration for political unity in an Arab nation that transcends 
existing nation-states142 More recently, some scholars, such as Shibley Telhami, have argued 
that a "new" Arabism was emerging, born at the grassroots of society and nurtured by the 
region's media, in which Arabs rallied around certain regional causes, such as Palestine. 143 
Arab nationalists have not always been fixated on a pan-Arab political nation. 
During the Ottoman Empire, there were those who aspired to a heightened sense of Arab 
identity within the borders of the Ottoman state. '" Pan-Arabism, Syrian nationalism, 
Egyptian nationalism; these are all manifestation of the Arabist impulse. In his history of the 
rise of the Arab middle dass, Keith David Watenpaugh notes that Islamism emerged in the 
inter-war years in part as a reaction to the division of the Muslim Ottoman Empire into 
separate states and against "the nonsectarian, emancipatory, and bourgeois dimensions" of 
the liberal/Socialist orientation of Arab nationalism. 1*5 However, that did not prelude a 
simultaneous synergetic cooperation as Arabs of the two philosophies sought to crystallize 
their own identities in the new political environment. While his theories about the origin 
and impact of Arab nationalism have been widely criticized, Kedourie's assessment of its 
later development is in line with that of other scholars. "On the level of practical politics, 
then, not only was there no opposition between Islam and Arabism, there was actual co- 
operation, " he wrote. "One can even go further and say that Islam actually gave great 
strength to Arab nationalism ... [and] ... produced a new theoretical amalgam in which 
Islam and Arabism became inseparable. "146 For Graham Fuller, such a synergy is natural. 
"When Westerners talk about political ideals, they naturally hark back to the Magna Carta, 
the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims go back to the Koran and the 
Hadith to derive general principles about good governance (including the ruler's obligation 
to consult the people) and concepts of social and economic justice, " he wrote. 147 The 
principle can be seen in the way in which Islamist modernists of the latter half of the 19th 
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century and first half of the 20th century, according to Charles Kurzman, turned to "a variety 
of sacred sources to establish the legitimacy of constitutionalism. "148 
The principle of ijtihad, which literally means "endeavor" or "self-exertion, " dictates 
that reason and independent judgment are used to articulate the applicable truths of the 
Qur'an that are relevant at any given time and place. 149 This fundamental concept is subject 
multiple interpretations and has been at the heart of Islamic theological debate for 
centuries. l50 The dominant Sunni tradition states that sharia (Holy Law) is "derived" from the 
sacred texts by learned Islamic jurists through "theological reflection and textual criticism 
and interpretation. "151 Thus the "fruit" of Islamic teachings is drawn from the textual roots. 
Both the Sunni and Shia traditions of Islam accept the Qur'an and the Sunna as sources of 
knowledge. To those, Sunnis add the consensus of the Companions of the Prophet and those 
of earlier generations of Muslim scholars. 
The Shia include among the sources of knowledge the twelve infallible Imams, who 
are considered descendents of the Prophet's cousin and daughter. 152 The Shia also add 
another human element to the equation. In contrast to the Sunnis, the Shia recognize human 
intuition as a source of ethical-legal values, based on a "function bond between sacred text 
and rational intuition, " and they posit the infallible doctrine of the Imam, which equates the 
word of the divinely-inspired Imams with that of the Prophet 153 This belief system produced 
the concept of Velayat-e faqih, the Guardianship of the Jurist, through which Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) ruled Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Disagreements over 
the specifics of the sources of ijtihad are not confined to differences between the two main 
branches of Islam. Even among the Sunnis, there is significant debate over the issue of 
interpretation. A conservative minority maintains that the "gates of ijtihad" were dosed after 
the tenth century, with some jurists reluctant to claim the same measure of competence as 
their predecessors, ' and others contend that "the corpus of Islamic law had developed to 
the extent that it was capable of catering to all needs of the time. "15 Writers such as W. B. 
Hallaq, in contrast, maintain that historically "not only was ijtihad favoured by Sunni jurists, 
but those jurists and schools of thought which were opposed to the exercise of ijtihad were 
ostracized from Sunni jurisprudence and, indeed, from Sunnism as a whole, "m while 
Mohammad lqbal (1877-1938) argued that the very notion that the gates of independent 
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reasons had dosed was "nonsense. "157 The argument for the continuing validity of ijfihad 
underpins the demands of those seeking political reform in Saudi Arabiat58 and it can also be 
seen in the broader context of legal reforms across the Muslim world. '-19 "Reading and 
understanding the Qur'an implies the interpretation of it and the interpretation in its turn 
includes the application of it which must be in the light of the existing circumstances and the 
changing needs of the world, " Pakistani Judge Mohammed Shafi wrote in a 1995 legal 
ruling. 160 
For many Muslims, this viewpoint leaves open significant maneuvering room when 
it comes to the application of Islam to the political environment of the day - and when 
assessing the nature of his/her own political identity. Technology has only amplified that 
maneuvering room as traditional mosque-based communications networks have been 
supplanted by the internet and satellite television, where "all manner of organized 
expression, shades of opinion, and positions on subjects both theological and pragmatic can 
now be found. "161 Where ijtihad was once the purview of ulema (religious scholars, from the 
root 'ilm), miriam cooke'62 and Bruce B. Lawrence have written, "migrant engineer 
theologians changed all that by distributing authority among Muslim cybemauts. "1 As a 
result, Muslims began looking at their religion, and themselves, in new ways. 
According to Muqtedar Khan, a central aspect of Islamism is "the search for Islamic 
identity in the modem world. "16* That search for identity is part of a process of 
accommodating other aspects of identity into the "Islamic" self. For an Egyptian, an Iranian, 
an Indonesian, a Pakistani or a Nigerian, that search will, by definition, mean melding an 
ethnic and or nationalist identity into the Islamic whole, producing what Smith calls 
"concentric circles of allegiance. "165 Sudanese Islamist leader and bin Laden ally Hasan 
Turabi use much the same term - substituting "identification" for "allegiance" - explaining 
that Arabism and Islamism are tied together by "a feeling of solidarity as well as by common 
interests. "166 Halliday says that for an Arab, there are at least three separate "forms of 
identity: " 
... 'religious' or confessional (Muslim or 
Christian or, till the 1940s not to be 
forgotten, Jewish); 'pan-Arab', defined in terms of the whole Arab umma or 
nation; and local, defined in terms of particular states ... 167 
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Arabs, said the columnist Samir Kassir (1960-2005), have "a gift for synthesis, " which 
meant that historically "Arab society was able to absorb the cultures of the Islamized 
peoples and not negate them in the process. "368 Contrary to some nationalist teleology, he 
wrote, it is essential to recognize "how much more important Islam was than ethnicity as a 
unifying bond" in Arab history; 169 this acceptance of the role of Islamic tradition from a man 
who charged that modem Islamism had "discredited" Arab culture by uniting its members 
"in a cult of misery and death. "170 
Cultural philosopher Walter Ong famously observed that all human beings are the 
product of their times, since we are shaped by our "sense of identity, if we take sense of 
identity to mean the sense of where one comes from and how one relates to those other than 
oneself, how one fits into what one knows of the universe. "171 Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a 
conservative Muslim cleric who was one of the dosest disciples of Hassan al-Banna, who 
hosts a program religion and society on Al Jazeera, 172 says much the same: 
Culture is not a pure abstract knowledge; it is knowledge and cognitions 
mixed with values and beliefs, embodied in actions, and reflected in arts and 
literatures, which are learned and experienced. It is influenced by religion, 
language environment and cultural and civilizational legacies, as well as by 
interaction, positive and negative, with others. 173 
In its purest form, Islamism may reject nationalism as an artificial source of identity, 
as Khan contends, but few Muslims in the real world are able to so easily shed the more 
prosaic aspects of their identity. If one were to ask a Muslim on any continent to describe 
him or herself, it is unlikely he or she would stop at "Muslim. " Even if Islam ranks as the 
primary self-identity, any description would likely include reference to his/her country, 
ethnicity and possibly even region, village, family and, in the case of a woman, husband's 
family. Each constitutes a separate but interwoven layer of identity. 
Rashid Khalidi argues that those who accept the "reductionist nature" of much 
scholarship on Arab nationalism "which uncritically accepts the grandiose self-assessments 
of the power and pervasiveness of Arab nationalism" are left incapable of explaining the 
"ascendancy of Islamic radicalism and nation-state nationalism in the Arab world. " The pre- 
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World War I Middle East, he maintains, was an "amalgam of local, national, transnational 
and religious loyalties. "' 
And what is true of the individual is equally true of the Volksgeist or collective 
identity of a people. " Egypt provided one example. "Pharaonicism" which tied the country 
to its pre-Islamic past, was "the emotional pivot of Egyptian territorial nationalism. " Yet it 
co-existed with what Gershoni and Jakowski, in their study of Egyptian nationalism, call 
"supra-Egyptianism, which was "a set of cultural and ethnic imaginings based on Islamic, 
Arab and Eastern" concepts. "[W]hile no supra-Egyptian national imagining totally rejected 
the existence of a distinct Egyptian state, " the authors wrote, "all presupposed the existence 
of a larger community to which Egyptians belonged. "16 
Anthony Smith maintains that Muhammad and Moses have become "national" 
leaders. He agrees that nations still lie at the core of political identity but argues that there is 
a duality between religion and nationalist politics, in which one taps the yearning for 
collective salvation beyond this world, while the other feeds on a desire for political 
redemption for future generations. 
It is the achievement of nationalism to have given political expression to these 
twin appropriations by linking the memories of ethno-history and the older 
religious myths of election to the striving for collective territorial recognition 
and political autonomy in the historic'homeland. '"' 
Though Smith was not specifically writing of the Middle East, his comments 
perfectly sum up the "complex and mutually reinforcing" relationship between 
transnational Islam and the modem Middle East state, ITh exemplified by the way in which 
religion has, in recent years, become a driving factor in Palestinian nationalism. 179Even as 
they denounce Arab nationalism in sermons in the mosque, on the Internet and in audio 
cassettes that circulate in the region, radical Islamist clerics can be heard speaking of the 
"Arab world, " the "Arab umma" and the "Arab peoples. "180 
"Even as scholarly traditions of Islam have converged, " says Robert Hefner, in 
contrasting Islamic culture in the Middle East and Asia, "most of what goes on in 
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the national political arena shows the distinctive influence of country-specific state 
structures, alliances, and conflicts. " m 
A series of surveys conducted by Moaddel in 2001 and 2003 found that while 
roughly three-quarters of Saudis, Jordanians and Egyptians considered religion to be the 
most important aspect of their identity, nationality rather than Arab identity was the second 
most common response, with just nine percent of Saudis and Jordanians and one percent of 
Egyptians responding positively to the statement, "Above all, I am an Arab. "182 "It thus 
appears that after religion, territorial nationalism is the distant second most important 
component of identity for the publics of these countries, " the study concluded. 183 
For many Islamists, the Arab world holds a special place in the Muslim cosmology. 
"I want to say that the greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that 
religion grew, and became great through them; their foundation is the strongest, their light 
is the brightest, and they are indeed the best umma, " wrote Rashid Rida (1865-1935), an early 
and influential Muslim Brotherhood figure. IM* Arabic is the language of the Qur'an, Arabia 
gave birth to Islam; the modem Muslim identity cannot be grasped independent of modem 
Arab history. ' Indeed, the heritage of Islam and the Arabs are bound as if by a spiritual 
umbilical cord. 
4) THE POLITICS OF MANIPULATION 
"The language of religion, nation and state are readily conflated within the 
communal discourse of modem politics, and this informs a variety of ideologies used by 
both state and opposition alike, " observes Scott Hibbard, who believes that this helps to 
explain "the ubiquity of religious politics in the modem era. "186For evidence, one need look 
no further than the fact that the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman caliphate at the beginning 
of World War I was proclaimed in the name of Islam by Prince Faysal ibn Husayn, the third 
son of the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca a choice that probably had more to do with crass 
regional politics than faith in Allah. Contributing to this synergy of interests was the fact 
that before the caliphate collapsed, Ottoman authorities were keen to foster Islamic 
solidarity against the same European authorities against whom the nationalists were 
organizing. 187 In his recordings of Arab nationalist rallies in Cairo in 1959, Lebanese 
diplomat and historian Elie Salem found the slogans thick with Islamic sentiment: "On one 
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occasion, every slogan was preceded by the Muslim battle cry, Allahu akhbar (God is greater). 
The Allahu akhbar was followed by proclamations such as these: 'Arab nationalism is a faith, 
a religion; 'Arab nationalism is a struggle against communism; 'Arabism and Islam. "'» 
Juan Cole reminds us that opposition to a colonial or post-colonial Other "allows 
actually diverse local populations to sustain an illusion of relative homogeneity against the 
hegemonic foreigner, adding to incipient 'national' cohesion. "189 His insertion of quotation 
marks around the word "national" distinguishes the structure of the nation-state from the 
idea of the nation, as emphasized by Tibi, Zubaida and others. 190 Charles Smith argues that 
nationalism and nation can be distinguished from the idea of the state, "the latter considered 
a product of historical and institutional developments that might or might not be identified 
with a people who consider themselves a nation, `that "dual identities" are a reality and that 
it is possible for cultural and linguistic affinities to be distinct from national identity. 191 
Notable in the context of this study of Arab journalists, is the fact that it was with the 
founding of the newspaper Nafir Suria by Boutros al-Boustani (1819-1883), following 
sectarian dashes in Mount Lebanon in 1860, that some of the early ideas of Arab nationalism 
were first elucidated, setting the stage for the intermingling of journalism and Arab/Muslim 
politics still seen today. 192 The mission of those early Arab journalists "was defense of their 
liberty, of independence, or Arab unity and of renaissance, " according to Ghassan Tueni, 
one of the most respected figures in modem Arab joumalism. 193 Ami Ayalon, an Israeli 
historian of the Arab media, argues that when someone chose to become a journalist in that 
period, "he in fact chose to join a battle" and journalists of the period "came to regard 
fighting for a cause as their primary objective, conveying information as merely a secondary 
task "94 
Al-Boustani called for "non-sectarian patriotism" and the separation of state and 
religion, drawing on and adapting the concept of watan that Rifaa al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) 
had brought back from Europe three decades before. Maronite Christians and Egyptian 
Copts - academics, journalists and other intellectuals - were among those shaping the ideas 
of Arab nationalism, as well as the nation-state nationalisms of Syria and Egypt. This is a 
dissertation about the attitudes of Muslim Arab journalists, not a history of the Arab media, 
but it is nonetheless worthwhile to point out that Christian Arabs journalists played an 
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important part in developing and propagating the concepts of Arab nationalism. These 
included men like the Syrian Greek Catholic Takia brothers, who founded Egypt's AI Ahram; 
the al-Boustani family, who owned several influential Beirut newspapers; Farah Atun (1874- 
1922), a Syrian Greek Orthodox journalist whose "seminal ideas" are credited with helping 
to introduce "the idea of a common Arab society-, "195 and Yaqub Sarruf (1852-1927) and Faris 
Nimr (1856-1951), American University of Beirut professors who published Al-Mugtataf in 
Beirut until fallout from a commencement speech about Darwinism eventually forced them 
out of the university-196 The pair, along with partner Shahin Makarius (1864-1933), left for 
Cairo where they together published AI Mugattam, a newspaper whose neutral stance would 
later spark "violent expression of the disapproval of the nationalists" who claimed that it 
collaborated with the British against the Egyptian nationalist cause-197 Beirut's Jesuits 
published at least eight newspapers198 and most Palestinian newspapers of the late 191 and 
early 20th centuries were also edited by Christians. '99 
Meanwhile, like Kawakibi, a variety of Islamist journalists also helped to propagate 
the ideas of Arab nationalism. So, too, Islamist activists like Salafi Sheikh 'Izz al-Din al- 
Qassam (1882-1935), head of one of the most famous resistance units of the 1938 Palestine 
revolt, who was also closely associated with the pan-Arabist Istiglal (Independence) Party? 00 
The best example of the "symmetry" of philosophies2ol between Islamism and Arab 
nationalism involves the Muslim Brotherhood - which inspired modem Islamists - and the 
best-known proponents of Arab nationalism, the Syrian Ba'ath Party, the Iraqi Ba'ath and 
Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). The aforementioned "conventional wisdom" 
would have it that the secular Ba'ath was the archenemy of Islam. The historical record 
indicates differently. In the view of the Ba'ath's Orthodox Christian co-founder, Michel 
Aflaq (1910-1989), "Islam was not only a divine religious system, but also an expression of 
the genius of the Arab model. " Ghada Hashem Talhami explains Aflaq's thinking: 
Since the Arab nation is eternal, renewing itself across human history, then 
Arab nationalism is one of its latest manifestations in the current historical 
stage. Thus, nationalism reaches its zenith only when it reunites with 
historical Islam, since both are no more than manifestations of the nation in 
two distinct times? 12 
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As Antonius notes, "Broadly speaking, every country which became permanently 
arabised [sic] also became permanently islamicized [sic]. "203 It can be argued that crass 
politics was behind attempts by the Ba'ath and other Arab nationalist movements to present 
Islam as a central tenet of Arabism. 2m "The beauty of Aflaq and [Ba'ath co-founder Zaki al-] 
Arsuzi [an Alawite] is that they just tweaked God a little to make him a source of 
nationalism and Ba'thi 'al-risala al-khalida' or the 'eternal message, "" according to Syria 
scholar Joshua Landis. 205 Yet, however opportunistic such "tweaking" might have been, 
there is no escaping the fact that the Greek Orthodox Aflaq converted to Islam before his 
death, which would seem to indicate that, for him at least, the connection with Islam was 
more than just an expedient z* Egypt, meanwhile, offered a vivid example of the complex 
and often opportunistic relationship between Islamism and Arab nationalism. There, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, supported Gamal Abdel 
Nasser's overthrow of the monarchy. The Brotherhood's leading philosopher, Sayyid Qutb, 
even became known as "the tribune of the Egyptian Revolution. " "There is no conflict 
between Arab nationalism and Islamic patriotism if we understand Arab nationalism as a 
step on the road, " he wrote at the time. But there was no such understanding on the part 
of the Nasser's Free Officers, with whom the Brotherhood quickly came to blows after the 
coup. The confrontation ultimately led to the arrest of many officials of the Brotherhood and 
Qutb's execution (in the years immediately before his death, Qutb would sing a very 
different tune about the compatibility of Islam and nationalism than at the time of the 
revolution)-08 In Syria, meanwhile, relations between political Islamists and successive 
nationalist regimes209 ultimately led to a bloody pogrom against Syrian Islamists in the early 
1980s, which resulted in the virtual destruction of the city of Hamas. But just as Arab 
nationalism and Islamism have had their fallings-out, so have the various ideological strains 
within Arab nationalism. It was, after all, the Syrian nationalism of the Parti Populaire Syrien 
(PPS) that rejected pan-Arabism in favor of Syrian nationalism the 1930s and the Syrian 
Arab Socialists who sent Aflaq and his compatriots into exile in Iraq in the 1960s. 210 
The ideology of Arab nationalism, as embodied in Egypt, Syria and the Iraqi Ba'ath 
regime, was dealt a body-blow with the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. For Nasser 
and Nasserism, it was, essentially, the end. Scott Hibbard argues that this marked the dawn 
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of a new phase in Arab politics. Struggling to find an alternate basis for legitimacy, Egypt 
and other Arab regimes began courting the Islamists. 
By abandoning secular norms and liberal ideas, state elites sought to use a 
more explicit religious nationalism as a means of mobilizing popular 
sentiments behind a reconceived notion of state authority. 211 
This process was relatively seamless because even though state elites and 
conservative religious activists were in competition, "there was little difference in their 
respective visions of social order. "212 In addition, the trans-border aspirations of the Islamists 
are "rooted in the same communalist orientation of ethnic nationalism. "213 Yet at the same 
time, many within the intelligentsia grew alienated and, writes Egyptian-born, London- 
based Islamist Basheer Nafi, as "the distance between the Arab intellectual and the state ... 
increased, the intellectuals' discourse grew more and more to resemble that of the 
Islamist. "224 
It was also a continuation of the conscious readjustment in national worldview that 
Arab governments had long been engaged as they shifted emphasis between pan-Arabism 
(qaumi) and local identity (qutri) in the pursuit of changing domestic and regional agendas 215 
Egypt was the best example of this. In the 1960s, Nasser became the symbol of pan-Arab 
aspirations. Broadcasting on the Voice of the Arabs, he galvanized Arab nationalists across 
the region. 216 Yet he was, first and foremost, an Egyptian patriot whose regional stance, 
according to biographer P. J. Vatikiotis, was a conscious manipulation of the Arab 
imagination in a quest for regional power. "[I]n the final analysis Nasser's Arab nationalism 
was more of a deliberate choice of state policy that promoted Egypt's leadership in the Arab 
world than an abstract ideological preference. "217 Meanwhile, back in Cairo, writes Dawisha, 
Egyptian, rather than Arab, nationalism continued to be the dominant 
ideology. Its roots dug so deep into the Egyptian soul that even by the end of 
the 1950s, the decade that witnessed the greatest triumphs of Arab 
nationalism under Egypt's own leadership, observers would note Egyptian 
indifference to the Arab identity. 218 
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Dawisha quotes Muhammad Hussein Heikal, Nasser's journalistic confident, as 
commenting that Egypt, the natural leader of the Arab world, 219 "was unable to shift its 
attention from its own soil so that it can look across the Sinai and discover its Arab 
position. " = 
5) MEDIA AND IDEOLOGY 
In the context of the current study, it is important to note that, as in the shifting 
between qaumi and qutri, the flirtation by nationalist Arab governments with political Islam 
beginning in the 1980s meant that the same state-dominated media outlets which had long 
been used to propagate the pan-Arab, Socialist and nationalistic ideals of these secular 
regimes were now required to shift gears and the produce a kind of "ideological re- 
traditionalization, " 1 normalizing the new agenda of what Nasser's successor in Egypt, 
Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), called the "corrective movement. " In Damascus, for example, 
then-Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad (1930-2000) publicly adopted the symbols of Islam by, 
among other things, ordering that state-run television broadcast his weekly visits to the 
capital's largest mosques? 11 
For Sadat, this flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood, even as he made peace with 
Israel, would eventually backfire, forcing him to crack down on Islamist critics. That move 
would cost him his life at the hands of a militant Islamist splinter group headed by Ayman 
Zawahiri, who would later emerge as Osama bin Laden's right-hand man and a principle 
architect of 9/11. Yet, a quarter of a century later, the complex, mutually-reinforcing, yet 
ambivalent relationship between the regime and the Islamists would continue: the 
Brotherhood would control nearly twenty percent of the seats in the Egyptian parliament 
despite the fact that it was officially banned, while some 15,000 people, many of them 
Islamists, were held prison without trial under the country's emergency laws. 
6) A NEW ARABISM? 
"Their god had ... failed, spectacularly so. It had been called Arabism, or Arab 
nationalism, or pan-Arabism, " Israeli academic Martin Kramer wrote in one of the many 
obituaries for Arab nationalism published in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf war, 224 during 
which Saddam Hussein, one of the last of the Ba'athists, held high the banner of Arab 
nationalism. "The authoritarian state, the nihilistic opposition: the middle ground has been 
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scorched, " Fouad Ajami, who had been declaring the "end of pan-Arabism" since the 1970s, 
pronounced as if from on-high. It was all because, Ajami said, the "new classes, half- 
educated and bewildered, [had] sought to simplify the world around them. "= 
But others saw a different future. In 1992, As'ad AbuKhalil wrote of the surfacing of 
an "emotional unity, wihdat ha! (unity of situation)" among Arabs. He saw this unity as the 
kernel around which a new Arab ideology would coalesce, with three "organically linked 
components: Arab nationalism, Islam, and democratization. "2 Subsequent events - 9/11, the 
US invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq war and the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah - 
have only underlined the commonality of interests and shared sense of identity among all 
Arabs? 27 As Arab-American leader James Zogby put it, reporting on a 2006 poll that showed 
a significant downturn in the mood in the Arab world, `The people of the Arab world are 
organically linked not only by geography, history and culture. They are tied by sentiment, as 
well. "228 Whether supporters of democratic change or the political status quo; secularists or 
devout Muslims; all are today on the defensive, rallying in the face of the American and 
Israeli Other, off balance and adrift. "[T]he blurring of Palestine and Iraq has ... swamped 
the self-image of the Arabs of the Middle East - and the image the world has of them - in a 
tide of blood, " the late Lebanese journalist Samir Kassir wrote. 
There today exists a duality of identity, overlapping and often deeply intertwined, in 
which Arab and Islam are inseparable. Says AI-Jazeera reporter Hassan Ibrahim, "Arab 
nationalism and fundamentalism, thanks to George Bush have become the same. The 
invasion of Iraq really galvanized the masses, made them feel that their identity as Arabs is 
being threatened. "° This phenomenon is made more vivid by a heightened sense of Islamic 
identity in some quarters as the old ideas have been discredited and the promises of secular 
government have proven empty. "People have come to identify themselves more as 
Muslims during the last five years in response to the US-led 'war on terrorism, '" confirms 
Diaa Rashwan, an Egyptian specialist on Islamic movements 23' Unity in the face of 
adversity; it is always thus. "There is an implicit consciousness of common notions - an 
underlying framework of language, ideas, and values which, while not always self-evident 
or explicitly expressed, becomes apparent when the shared assumptions are violated or 
attacked, " Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori have observed 232 It is a shared consciousness 
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shaped, in part, by the television screen, as adherents of every ism take part in the 
electronically-shared experience of siege by the Other, communicated via the common 
language of Modem Standard Arabic, which has become "a symbol of pan-Arabism" and 
"the only code of the 'serious' genre of news and debates. "133 The result is what Khalil 
Rinnawi somewhat flippantly calls McArabism2 4- "a pan-Arab, regional expression of Arab 
identity conveyed through Arab transnational television" that invokes "Islamic symbols and 
religious elements"2 - and Israeli researcher Barry Rubin more awkwardly terms "national 
Islamism. "2m 
Halliday sees "immense significance" for the Middle East in this "combination of 
nationalism and religious militancy" that converged "in a composite, or overlapping, 
response to the outside world. " The result, he says, is that Islamists are "more than willing 
to espouse the causes that nationalists" uphold 237 
7) "POST-ISLAMIST" THEORY 
Peter Mandaville's theory of "post-Islamism" provides one framework through 
which to understand the complex relationship between Arabism and Islamism. 238 Post- 
Islamism is most closely identified with French theorists Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, who 
argue that, as in the title of Roy's best-known work, 7-39 political Islam has proven a "failure" 
that has led to a schism between Islamist radicals and the majority of Muslims, undercutting 
the movement's political power, creating new - sometimes mutually-hostile - forms of 
religious radicalism and, at the same time, an increasingly sectarian focus on the 
practicalities of gaining political ground within the confines of the existing nation-state. In 
short, a shifting of priorities from Allah to country. "The Islamist myth was that of the 
unification of the religious and the political; post-Islamism means that both spheres are 
autonomous, " Roy explains 240 
The result, as he describes it, sounds much like nationalism, with the "reinforcement 
of 'imagined identities'" and a struggle for power driven by "the logical of national or ethnic 
interests" alongside the rise of "multiple forms of religious revivalism. "241 In the Middle 
East, this "Islamo-nationalism" can be seen in the precedence of political interest over 
religion in Iran, in Hamas' focus on nation over religion in Palestine, in Hezbollah's political 
alliance with Lebanese Christians and in a host of other examples from Yemeni unification 
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to the disparate attitudes of Islamist groups toward Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In fact, 
Roy and Kepel both trace the splintering of the Islamist movement to the arrival of US 
troops in Saudi Arabia to counter that invasion, just as Roy believes that the second 
Palestinian intifada a decade later "contributed to the blurring of the divide between 
nationalists and Islamists everywhere in the Arab Middle East, and has favoured a renewal 
of Arab nationalism. "2 The ultimate result of this transformation of Muslim politics is that 
Islamist movements are largely nationalist in orientation, have abandoned pan-Islamic 
rhetoric and, by refocusing on issues of democracy and civil society, have inadvertently 
brought about a "de facto secularization" of their societies? 43 
Kepel traces a "trail of decline" as far back as the 1950s when nationalist regimes 
turned against the Islamists and modernity created new pressures, through what he 
describes as the collapse of the Taliban under the weight of its own internal contradictions. 
In the Islamist suicide bombings of the past quarter century he sees only desperation, and 
believes that even 9/11 backfired on the radicals, further undercutting their political 
influence? " Six years after Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam was first published, the resurgence 
of Taliban influence in Afghanistan, the turmoil in Pakistan, the political power Hamas has 
demonstrated at the polls and the military-political ascendency of Hezbollah in Lebanon are 
among many signs that such a doomsday scenario for Islamism may be somewhat 
overstated, leading Kepel himself to recast his predictions. The "gigantic confusion" and 
internal contradictions of the Islamist movement "may have generated the conditions for its 
own obsolescence, " he wrote in an article published in 2000. 
Islamist movements and parties at the turn of the 21st century are striving to 
reinvent themselves as democratic movements, to denounce the repression 
they feel they have been victim to. They now invoke the universal rights of 
man instead of critiquing them with their own substitute visions, and they 
support the previously decried values of the impious West, like freedom of 
expression and women s liberties. 
The "plasticity" that had allowed Islam to adapt through the ages, together with a 
polishing of Islam's "social credentials, " Kepel now predicted, could together "support the 
birth of a new Islamic democracy - an admixture of culture, religion, and political and 
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economic modernity. "245 In a very real way, this debate recaptures the essence of the earlier 
clashes between the "modernists" and the "fundamentalists" just as the new synergy 
between the more "liberal" view of political Islam and that of Arabism represents a 
completion of a cycle that saw them diverge in the era of authoritarian rule from the late 
1950s through the 1980s. 
That is precisely the contention of Peter Mandaville, who sees in the complex array 
of shifting forces not the death of political Islam, but the birth of a "new Islamism, " that is 
the evolutionary product of the transformation of politics in the Middle East and broader 
Islamic world, replacing what Ray Baker, another theorist of the new Islamism, has called an 
"Islam of fear"246 with one that seeks practical solutions to the needs of the body politic: 
The "new Islamists, " with their emphasis on pragmatism and policy rather 
than public virtue, are seeking to redress [the traditional focus on moral 
strictures] by figuring Islam as a discourse of progress and social justice. 247 
While Mandaville readily acknowledges that some Islamist groups cling to a pan- 
Islamist agenda, he argues that overall, Muslim political identities are today "oriented 
primarily towards national or even local concerns. "248 
He is not alone in this assessment. Graham Fuller, Asaf Bayat, and others see political 
Islam in throes of transition, with a new "pragmatic" agenda emerging. In a non-Arab 
context, Turkey's Islamist government, which came to power in the first decade of the 21st 
century, is held up as a living example of the trend 249 "[T]he Islamists have a knack for 
tailoring the message to changing circumstances. Over the last 15 years or so, the message 
has been the failure of the all-providing nation-state, created by the populist-military 
regimes as well as by traditional monarchies, " says Israeli academic Emmanuel Sivan. 150 In 
recent Islamist discourse, according to Halliday, can be heard a code of contemporary 
politics and social order that tracks those of other political movements: 
These needs are evident and secular enough: the desire to challenge or retain 
state power; the need to mobilize dominated, usually urban, populations for 
political action; the articulation of a nationalist ideology against foreign 
domination and those within the society associated with it; ... the carrying 
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out of social and political reforms designed to strengthen the state in the post- 
revolutionary period. '' 
The leader of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood gives credence to that 
view. "[O]ur movement started with daazva, calling the public to join Islam and 
understanding its teachings. That was the early phase of the Brothers' activities, " according 
to Dr. Ishaq A. Farhan, leader of Hizb Jibhih al-Amal al-Islam. "In the second phase, we 
emphasized education and charity work. Now, we are in the phase of political 
participation. f-252 
Where Kepel sees an abandonment of Islam in this emphasis on traditionally secular 
social issues - human rights, free expression, a gradualist approach to power-seeking - 
Mandaville sees a new pragmatism. "Post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic, un-Islamic, nor is 
it secular, " he insists: 
"[M]oving beyond Islamism - like moving beyond the state - means the 
erasure of the boundaries that supposedly constitute 'religion' and 'politics' 
as separate domains in the first place. ... [It] is not an abandonment of 
Muslim politics, but rather [its] reconstitution in forms more suited to a 
globalized world -a world in which ... the state is only one among many 
sites of the politics. 
This alliance is not unknown in the history of nationalism. According to Hastings, 
"religion has produced the dominant character of some state-shaped nations and of some 
nationalisms. " 
8) POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Any discussion of media and the Arab world must factor in the issue of political 
economy, which is inherently bound up in nationalist theories about the role of modernity in 
the formation of "nations. " Political economy is defined as "the management of the 
economic affairs of the state, " and, in at least some descriptions, there are strong parallels 
with Anderson's imagined community, in that "this system links persons otherwise 
independent: strangers rather than relatives" within "boundaries of want satisfaction" that are, 
in essence, the products of a new way of imagining the possible. 
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In the Middle East, some economists have argued that political economy - with its 
complex mix of domestic, regional and global pressures - is at least as important as geo- 
political factors in the "game" being played on the regional stage, and, in fact, often 
underpin those maneuvers. In this "kingdom of international political economy, " as 
Halliday calls it, political and economic considerations function side-by-side in forging 
regional relations. The "national" interest, in the sense of the solid boundaries of nation- 
states, coexists with the more ethereal "imagined community. " "In both regional and extra- 
regional relations power, shared values or 'Arabness' ('uraba) has been at least as important 
as the case for co-operation, " according to Halliday. ' Yet this connection should not be 
romanticized. State-to-state economic relations are often based on coercion, as the 'haves' 
seek to dictate the politics of the 'have nots; the populations of poor nations such as Egypt 
and Yemen harbor deep resentment for the rich sheikhs of the Gulf; and, aside from the 
arguable exception of the Gulf Cooperation Council, regional economic cooperation has 
never shifted from an idea to a reality, with competition between competing business elites 
even undermining cooperation within the United Arab Emirates. The powerful elites, who 
Halliday brutally characterizes as "organized groups of robbers, " have dug in, even as the 
growth of regional corporations, backed by wealthy Arab investors and foreign capital, has 
produced what economists Alan Richards and John Waterbury call "a creeping 
accountability. "25' 
In recent years, transnational Arab media has played an increasingly important role 
in shaping the way Arabs see this complex landscape and their role therein. And those elites 
mentioned above have, in turn, helped shape the way the media presents it all. Robert 
McChesney, one of the preeminent scholars of the political economy of the media, argues 
that media is central to the emergence of a global economy. He says "bogus assumptions" 
that press freedom dynamically emerges when media systems become internationalized 
"fog our ability to see the actual power relations at hand. "251 
McChesney and many of the other leading theorists in the field, such as Edward 
Herman, Noam Chomsky, Herbert Schiller, and Pradip Thomas, write from the perspective 
of the left 159 To them, it is self-evident that media is also a tool of the powers-that-be as they 
seek to cement their political-economic hold. "The conglomerate capitalist control over 
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cultural and communications industries represents and expresses the triumph of private 
profit over collective need, corporate strategy over democratic direction, " according to Peter 
Golding-160 
For McChesney, 
Media fare is ever more closely linked to the needs and concerns of a handful 
of enormous and powerful corporations, with annual revenues approaching 
the GDP of a small nation. These firms are run by wealthy managers and 
billionaires with clear stakes in the outcome of the most fundamental political 
issues261 
McChesney was writing primarily about the US, but media "revolutions" that 
denationalize and regionalize media in the developing world often take on a similar pattern 
that, according to one global study, frequently leads to a "attempts by powerful, regional 
media corporations" to achieve "the transnationalization and conglomeration of cultural 
industries through the ownership of networks, distribution channels and 
production/content. "262 
In the Middle East, corporate media feudalism is producing ownership patterns 
involving cronyism and blood ties that link governments and the emerging media 
conglomerates, which, as Naomi Sakr notes, offer "ruling elites a means to expand their 
power base. "2 In this case, media owners - such as the government of Qatar, mega-wealthy 
Saudi royals and political movements like Hezbollah - do not respond solely, or, it can be 
argued, even secondarily, to the exigencies of the marketplace. 
There is much at stake. The end game in this process strikes directly at the heart of 
nationalism theory, as each country struggles to protect what media law scholar Monroe 
Price has called "its own bubble of identity, " even as traditional notions of place, time and 
space fall away, blurring "traditional boundaries and established notions of community. "1'264 
The international media market is, according to Price, an increasingly interdependent site 
where new rules are emerging that 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 58 
shape common narratives, a space in which ideologies compete and forge 
allegiances that ultimately determine the persistence of governments and 
nations themselves, and an arena where imagery becomes a supplement or 
substitute for force. 265 
Human capital is another element of political economy relevant to any discussion of 
national identity and the Middle East. The mobility that came with the industrial revolution 
contributed to the emergence of new forms of identity as the newly enlarged range of 
employability became what Gellner calls "the natural political boundary" of identity. Today, 
he writes, the regional and global marketplace has produced a class of workers who, no 
matter their nation of birth, "speak each others' language. " Once the "driving force" for 
nineteenth century nationalism, these intellectuals today "move with the greatest ease, with 
the least prejudice" across borders, with important implications for the evolution of 
'national' identity. 266 Writing elsewhere about the dilemmas facing Islam in the modem age, 
Gellner observed, "Occupational diversity and mobility - that is the new order. "267 
That new order can be seen in the huge migrations of blue collar labor from poor, 
heavily populated countries like Egypt, to help build - and keep the sand away from - the 
sparking skyscrapers of the Arabian Gulf, while highly-educated Palestinians, Lebanese, 
Syrians and citizens of the countries of North Africa toil as accountants, managers, engineers 
and journalists in those same skyscrapers. 268 
The result, as anyone who has ever sat on a flight between Cairo and the Gulf can 
attest, is what Anderson called the "countless, ceaseless travels" that contribute to the rise of 
an imagined community-"' 
-0- 
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CHAPTER III: ISLAM, KNOWLEDGE AND COMMUNICATION 
[L]et not the scribe refuse to write: as Allah has taught 
him, so let him write. 
AL-QUR'AN (2: 282)270 
1) COMMUNICATION AND THE QUR'AN 
"Read! " So commanded the angel Gabriel in the first word of the first revelation, 
which was communicated to the Prophet Muhammad in a cave outside Mecca in 610 C. E. 
The instruction is recorded in the 96thchapter of the Qur'an: 
"Read (or Proclaim! ) in the name of your Lord and Cherisher who created - 
Created man out of a (mere) dot of congealed blood: Proclaim! And your 
Lord is Most Bountiful, - He Who taught (the use of) the Pen, - Taught the 
human that which he did not know. " (96: 1-5)271 
Thus were laid the foundations of Islam's intimate connection with the written word. 
The Arabic terms for knowledge, understanding, writing and reading are mentioned in 
almost 20 percent of the verses of the Qur'an, a mass medium known to the world long 
before Gutenberg (140-1468) invented his printing press-272 "Islam realized the religious, 
political and economic importance of information fourteen centuries ago and organized its 
means, stated its goals and exhorted Muslims to make good use of it for the sake of their 
religion and their commonweal, " Abdelhadi Boutaleb, director general of the Islamic 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), wrote in advance of the first 
Islamic Information Ministers' Conference in 1986. E 
'IIm, a derivation of the Arabic root 'to know, ' is "a defining concept of the 
worldview of Islam. "274 It is generally translated to mean 'knowledge (of God)' and, 
implicitly, the communication of knowledge. "'Iim was literally bom in the first breath of 
Islam, " according to Dagmar Glass, who conducted a review of 40 Arabic language 
publications examining Arab-Islamic information concepts, referring to Surah 96, al-Alaq, 
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considered by most scholars to be the first Revelation 2 Explains Ziauddin Sardar, author of 
several histories of information in the Muslim world, 'ilm 
is the pursuit of knowledge as well as the distribution and transmission of 
knowledge; it is the accumulation of knowledge as well as access to 
knowledge, it is data, information, knowledge and wisdom all rolled into 
one. 276 
"In Muslim cultural theory, knowledge is the key to the human condition and the 
power that drives human civilization, " according to Syed Pasha of the State University of 
New York. ' He points out that while the Qur'an does not contain a single reference to the 
sword, the pen is mentioned four times? 78 Along with 'ilm, other aspects of Islamic notions 
of information discussed in the Qur'an and hadith, the collected accounts of the teachings 
and activities of the Prophet, include ma'rifa (knowledge or cognition), aqi (intelligence), ray 
(opinion, view), haqq (reality, fact, truth), khabar and its plural, akhbar (news), da'wa (the call 
to God), and hikma, generally translated as "divine wisdom" but a word also associated with 
the Western concept of objectivity. 
In Islamic society, information has historically been considered not just a commodity, 
but a moral and ethical imperative. 280 Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Halim, the leading information 
theorist at Egypt's al Azhar University and former head of Cairo University's faculty of 
Communications and Journalism, wrote in 1984 that information "provides the people ... 
with the truths of the Islamic religion on the basis of the book of God and the Sunna of his 
Messenger. "281 From the very beginning, the Prophet's own mosque in Medina was more 
than just a center of Islamic learning. 
The Prophet's mosque ... was a spiritual centre for worship, the political and 
military headquarters of the new state where internal and external affairs 
were conducted, and institute of learning where discussions and seminars 
were held, and a social institution where Muslims learnt and practiced 
discipline, equality, unity and brotherhood? 12 
In short, it was the communications hub of the new community. In the mosque's 
courtyard, followers gathered to exchange news and debate political affairs. From there, 
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the Prophet carried out an active flow of communications with the outside world, 284 
dispatching missives to neighboring tribes and conducting diplomatic correspondence with 
the rulers of distant empires. 285 There, too, he received emissaries, meeting them at a place 
today still marked by the Pillar of Embassies. 286 
Lebanese scholar Adub Muruwwa believes "the seeds of [Arab] journalism" were 
planted in Islam's first century? 8' A case can be made that it was within the confines of the 
Medina mosque that the first Muslim journalists began to practice their craft, as a bevy of 
scribes, directed by the Prophet's secretary, Zaid ibn Thabit (610-656), copied down these 
dispatches and, more importantly in the context of the religion, transcribed portions of the 
revelations as dictated by the Prophet Muhammad. 288 They were soon joined by the first 
Muslim broadcasters, for with the growth of that first small community, "transmitters" - 
individuals with powerful voices - were called upon to repeat the Prophet's words for the 
crowds289 In 632 C. E., two months before his death, Prophet Muhammad led what would be 
his last annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which would become known as the "Farewell 
Pilgrimage. " He was accompanied by more than 100,000 of his followers. 290 As he gave his 
final sermon in the valley of Uranah in front of Mount Arafat, 
The Prophet (peace be upon him) appointed a man called Rabi'ah bin 
Umaiah bin Khalaf al-Jumahi, who had a loud voice, to repeat after the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) so as to convey his words to the people. 291 
These were then relayed by others across the crowd. In a modem-day commentary, 
Ziauddin Sardar gave this account of the scene: 
[H]undreds of transmitters were positioned at key spots in the valley of 
Arafat near Makkah. As the Prophet spoke, the transmitters repeated his 
words sentence by sentence so that the whole valley resounded with the 
words of the Prophet and everyone present was able to hear what he was 
saying. 292 
After the Prophet's death, the various disparate sections of the revelations were 
collected "from palm branches, flat stones and the memories of men"293 Traditions disagree 
on which of the Prophet's first three successors - Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar (634-644), 
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Uthman (644-656) or All (599-661) - ordered that the revelations be assembled in one place 
and bound in leather. "The revelations were transcribed onto sheets (suhuf) of equal size, 
presumably made of parchment, which were then gathered in codices (mushaft" according 
to Bloom. 29s However, the result was a series of differing codices - which produced variant 
traditions, though Uthman is credited with canonizing one version and ordering the 
destruction of the others. 297 
Meanwhile, the compilation of the hadith, the accounts of the sayings and deeds of 
the Prophet as reported by his companions, raised an even more complex problem: assessing 
the legitimacy of the accounts as handed down orally through a chain of transmitters. Here 
issues of reportorial credibility, the cross-checking of sources and questions of political and 
ideological bias first enter the Islamic lexicon through a process known as Rijal al-Hadith (the 
study of the reporters of had it/i) 2" 
As Islam spread along the ancient trading routes that linked Arabia with 
Mesopotamia, Damascus and beyond, early forms of Islamic media - or sources of 
information - consisted of public speeches, councils, poetry readings and word-of-mouth in 
the market square. They were soon supplemented by more formal communications, such as 
sermons in mosques and, eventually, handwritten books and contracts, as a culture of 
writing emerged in the years following the Prophet's death in 632,2" producing a 
"momentous change" in which "[w]riting came to play a crucial and pervasive role in 
virtually every aspect of life. "" There emerged a new profession, the warraqeen, who 
combined the functions of scribe, publisher, bookseller and writer. "The end result, " 
according to Sardar, "was a cultural revolution based on the production of books on an 
unprecedented scale: the concept of 'ilm was transformed into a truly distributive 
practice. "301 
By the fourteenth century AD on the Gregorian calendar, these "men of the pen" 
were among the most respected members of Muslim society. 302 However, concerned that the 
spread of the written word was opening the way to misinterpretation and distortion, and, 
some scholars argue, to safeguard their own authority, toward the end of that century, the 
ulema effectively transformed the meaning of'ilm from all knowledge to religious knowledge 
and set in place stringent criteria for who could transmit such knowledge. This is one of 
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several moments in history at which "the gates of ijtihad" are said to have dosed. As part of 
this move, the ulema blocked the introduction of the printing press for hundreds of years, an 
action many scholars blame for the "stagnation" of Muslim culture. 
With the arrival of the first printed Arabic books via European colonizers in the 
seventeenth century and then the first Arabic newspapers in nineteenth century, Islamic - 
and Arab - discourse began to take on a new dimension, °' which was then revolutionized in 
the late twentieth century with the advent of broadcasting, audio cassettes, fax and 
ultimately satellite television and the avalanche of new media that have transformed 
communication, redefined Muslim identity politics and put control of'ilm into the hands of 
anyone with a computer. 305 "All of these media, whether they are traditional and of pre- 
Islamic and Islamic origin or modem and of Western origin, have one thing in common: 
They are all agents of social and intellectual change and have far-reaching effects on society 
and communication, " according to Glass. 306 
2) ISLAMIC THEORIES OF NEWS AND COMMUNICATION 
There exists "a paucity of rigorous mass media theory and models in Muslim 
culture. "307 To the extent that they exist, Islamic perspectives on communication theory 
reflect more diversity than uniformity. The theoretical foundations of modem Arab- 
Islamic information sciences were laid in Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s. Glass divides Islamic 
information theorists into five primary groups: Those who largely base their thinking on 
Western models; those who focus on practical training for journalists in an academic setting; 
those who study media in Islamic history and pre-Islamic times; those who derive their 
theories from classical Arabic sources and advocate an "Islamic conceptualization of 
information, "° and are strongly critical of the communication practices of Arab 
governments; and a final group, which emerged in the 1980s, who advocate "a sovereign, 
independent Arab concept of information. "310 Islamic theorist Abd al-Latif Hamza defines 
i'lam (information) as: 
providing the people with proper news, correct pieces of information and 
firm truths, which help the people to form a correct opinion of an event of 
problem. Furthermore, information is an objective expression of the mentality 
of the people, their inclinations and ambitions 31 
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In this framing, news both informs and reflects society as a whole, thus implying that 
the media must not be out of step with the values and mores of such society (e. g. it should 
not be politically - or, in this case, morally - incorrect). It is a role not far removed from the 
Western theory that the media is a mirror of the public to which it reports. 312 However, it is 
notable that the Islamic approach calls for the media to actively "form" or shape "a correct 
opinion" in the minds of the news consumers, hence a pro-active stance built on a specific 
agenda, in this case da'wa, the Muslim call to follow the straight path to God. Not all Islamic 
information theoreticians agree that information is necessarily the "objective expression of 
the mentality of the people. " Amara Najib and others argue that information can also reflect 
the views of political authorities, who thus twist da'wa into di'aya, nonreligious propaganda, 
with the "correct opinion" being transformed into disinformation. Indeed, the use of 
information as a tool of politics is enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the preface of which states: 
Mass media - radio and television - should be used for perfecting the Islamic 
revolution and in serving to propagate Islamic culture ... and strictly refrain 
from propagating and spreading harmful and anti-revolutionary notions 313 
"The Islamization of information" means giving precedence to da'wa, according to 
Glass, while khabar, which usually translates as "tidings" or "news" (pl. akhbar, the name of 
many Arab newspapers), serves "as the basis of knowledge. "314 Truth and objectivity, as 
defined in the Islamic context, occupy pride of place in this communication paradigm, since 
Islamic information means "clearly expressing the truth (haqq) in a way that attracts people" 
and "objectivity" is defined as "wisdom" (hikma), known as the "divine principle. " In 
addition, the Qur'an decrees that 'ilm (knowledge) is the precise opposite of zann (guess- 
work, speculation, approximation). 315 "Conjecture [zann] avails nothing against truth [haqq]" 
(53: 28). Sayeed al Seini, who has written about the duties of Islamic journalists, says the 
ideas of Western objectivity and multiple sources are not enough. 
Almost any person or event in the news today is subject to numerous 
contradictory stories. Which should we believe, especially in light of the 
highly advanced techniques of deception used today? The situation becomes 
worse if deception is an organized political too1316 
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He says journalists should look to the example of the reporters of the hadith, who use 
multiple sources to ensure the credibility of information. In addition, Seini adds, "Islam 
offers a whole panoply of guidelines to restrain the publication of whatever can unjustly 
harm the innocent or falsify reality. "317 Pasha offers one of the more complete expositions of 
the notion of modem news in the context of Muslim cultural theory, in which the sources of 
news are divided into the Divine and the Other. The criteria for judging news of Divine 
origin, such as the revelations to Moses, Muhammad and other recognized prophets, include 
the truth (haqq) of the news itself, and the veracity of the Rasoot (messenger) or Nabiy (news 
giver). Much the same is true when it comes to news of earthly origin. Pasha sets out five 
criteria for news within the context of Muslim cultural theory: 
1. It must be based on truth unmixed with willful falsehood: "And cover not Truth 
[hagq] with falsehood [baatil], nor conceal the Truth when you know (what it is). " 
(2: 42). 
2. It must be conveyed by journalists of utmost character, competence and integrity 
and it is up to the public to ensure the story's veracity: "0 you who believe, if a 
[Faasiq; person of questionable character] comes to you with any news, ascertain 
the truth... " (49: 6). ('this verse is one scholar Sayeed al-Sein says is of central 
relevance to Islamic concept of news. Pasha quotes a translation of the Surah that 
uses the term "verify. ")318 
3. Because "news has consequences, " reporters must approach stories with "a 
strong sense of responsibility and accountability": "... lest you harm people 
unwittingly, and afterwards become full of repentance. " (49: 6). 
4. "[M]ass media must not make mere suspicion the basis of their reporting. " 
Journalists must avoid "gossip, rumor-mongering, muckraking, innuendo, 
backbiting and character assassination" and the news "must provide nafa 
(benefit) to the people. " 
In some ways, Pasha's precepts address many of the same "sources of error" about 
which Tunisian philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) warned scribes six 
centuries before. These include "partisanship" and "bias; ' "over-confidence in one's 
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sources; " "failure to understand" the real meaning of the subject about which they were 
writing; "a mistaken belief in the truth" of what they were being told; the "inability rightly 
to place an event in its real context; " the "very common desire to gain the favour of those of 
high rank; ' "ignorance of the laws" of nature, which could cause them to believe the 
improbable; and "exaggeration. " On the latter, Ibn Khaldun advises writers to "check up" 
statements and claims and "weigh them up in a fair and critical spirit of inquiry. "319 
Other principles more modem reporters must keep in mind, according to Pasha, 
include the fact that "there are limits ordained by Allah" which must not be crossed (2: 229); 
obscenity must be avoided; ma'roof (good community standards) must be maintained and 
munkar (that which violates community standards) opposed; journalists should reject 
partisanship and "recognize the limits of adversariality, " thus balancing "the people's 
communication rights and freedoms with their communication duties, constraints and 
responsibilities; " and, finally, journalists must serve as "champions of justice and God's 
witness" [an alternate translation of (4: 135)] and recognize their "sweeping global system 
service and social responsibility role involving not only the entire human race, but also the 
other species and the worlds beyond. "320 
In short, according to Pasha, Muslim cultural theory provides a complete handbook 
for "what the mass media should cover, when and how, and what, if anything, they should 
not cover and for how long. "321 Of course, he notes, in the modem Muslim world of 
monarchs, dictators and Western hegemony, there exists "a fault line ... between Muslim 
cultural theory and Muslim reality with regard to political ideology and mass media"322 
Hamid Mowlana identifies another fault line at work in the Islamic world today. This 
one pits two competing "cultural ecologies; " media globalization and the belief systems of 
the Muslim umma. He refers to them as the Information Society Paradigm and the Islamic 
Community Paradigm. The former, first propounded by Japanese scholar Yoneji Masuda in 
the 1970s, envisioned a Utopian "high mass knowledge creation society" built on a 
futuristic, highly-secular nation-state model3B While Masuda's futuristic vision has since 
been watered down, his catch-phrase has been borrowed to characterize the Western- 
dominated globalization of media systems. Its polar opposite is the Islamic Community 
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Paradigm, which Mowlana, a professor at American University in Washington, D. C., 
describes as "a paradigm of revelation and not a paradigm of information. "324 
It is Islam and the theory of tawhid (the unity of God, human beings and the 
universe) that determines the parameters of information, and not the other 
way around ... therefore, information and knowledge are not value-free but 
have normative, ethical and moral imperatives 375 
Through the current dominance of Western media, he sees Western ideas 
bombarding Arabs and Muslims, undermining Islamic values and threatening to fragment 
the umma. "Information and knowledge are not the exclusive property of industrialized 
societies, " he argues. "Indeed, the Islamic Community Paradigm was responsible for the 
information and scientific revolution that characterized the Middle Ages" when the West 
was locked in the Dark Ages? 26The codification of systematic investigation and scientific 
methods, inductive reasoning, and the production of hundreds of great literary works 
contributed to "an Islamic Weltanschauung, a communication and information worldview" 
that has significant "socio-cultural and psycho-normative dimensions" and shapes Islamic 
society. 327 In this worldview, "secularism becomes alien to Islamic social and political 
thought when it attempts to separate religion from politics, ideas from matter and rationality 
from cosmic vision. "328 
One manifestation of that can be seen in the elements of the Palestinian media 
aligned with Hamas, the Islamist party that rose to power in the 2006 elections. A study of 
the main Hamas-backed newspaper, Al-Risalah, found that while it largely avoided overt 
religious preaching, news events were covered through the distinct prism of an Islamic 
worldview driven by Islamist politics: 
This editorial policy reflects the view that Islam is not only a religion, but a 
social, economic, political, and cultural theory as well, and that no dear 
separation can be made between religion and other spheres of life just as 
there is no division between public and private 329 
This approach is in sharp contrast to the Western, secular approach to journalism, as 
will be discussed below. Many Arab and Muslim journalists would also likely object to such 
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an overt linkage of news and religious politics - in fact, attacks on pro-Fatah Palestinian 
journalists in the aftermath of Hamas' 2007 takeover of Gaza were, in part, related to that 
distinction - but the degree to which variations on this theme form a backdrop to coverage 
of events in the Middle East and broader Muslim world cannot be discounted. 
"I believe that we and the Westerners cannot understand each other, " Hojatolislam 
Val. Muslemin Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, advisor to Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei, has 
said, "and the reason behind this is that our structure and grounds as well as our settings 
and objectives are entirely different from those of the West. So the Islamic world is founded 
on conceptual grounds which cannot be believed or followed in the West and vice versa. "= 
Not all - or perhaps even most - Muslims would take such an absolutist view. But it 
is one that reflects the critical role that culture, ideology, ethnicity and religious beliefs play 
in shaping worldviews. Mowlana says this reality "makes communication and information 
concepts subservient to the broader notion of culture and social ecology. "331 Strip away the 
academic language and many of those same sentiments can be heard around the proverbial 
water coolers in newsrooms across the Muslim world. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER IV: BENCHMARKING ANGLO-AMERICAN JOURNALISTIC 
VALUES 
Good journalists should be watchdogs of government 
and those in authority. 
MARGARET GILMORE 
BBC HOME AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT332 
1) THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 
In recent years, officials in the Bush administration have repeatedly contrasted the 
"bias" of Arab joumalists3 with that of the "balance" in the US media. -3m It is for this reason 
that a lengthy review of the literature on American journalistic norms is relevant to a study 
examining the self-perceptions of Arab journalists and their views of the role of Arab media. 
From a Western point of view, the primary benchmark for journalistic professionalism is the 
notion of objectivity, which is considered by some journalists in Europe and the US to be 
"sacred, " though in a far more secular sense than in the Islamic view. Media historian 
Michael Schudson defines objectivity as "the view that one can and should separate facts 
from values. " It is the polar opposite of the Islamic view that "information and knowledge 
are not value-free, but have normative, ethical and moral imperatives. " 
One of the early elucidations of the mission and values of the modem US news 
industry came in the "Canons of journalism, " a code of ethics adopted by the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) at their 1923 convention. The code listed "Sincerity, 
Truthfulness, Accuracy" as core journalistic principles. Under the principle of 
"Impartiality, " the Canon declared, "News reports should be free of opinion or bias of any 
kind. " That approach exemplifies what Hallin and Giles identify as the "liberal" model of 
journalism, characterized by a commercial media, rather than one owned by political or 
governmental interests; limited state intervention; and a strong sense of professionalism, 
centered around the "'the objectivity norm' - the idea that journalists should be politically 
neutral and separated from attachments to political parties and organized social groups. "3 
The belief in the ideals of objectivity - or, if not pure objectivity, then, at least, 
fairness and balance - lies at the heart of the self-view of US journalists, as well as that of 
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many of their Western European counterparts. As veteran newspaper editors Bill Kovach 
and Tom Rosentheil wrote in their classic text, The Elements of Journalism, "Journalism's first 
obligation is to the truth. " "[E]xcellent journalists ... have core journalistic values running 
through them like a stick of rock. they report with impeccable accuracy [and] they know 
instinctively there are two sides to every story, " says Roger Mosey, head of BBC TV News. 340 
Jack Fuller, former publisher of the Chicago Tribune, calls this commitment to objectivity "the 
truth discipline, " which "requires news reports to withhold ultimate judgment on matters of 
value. ", That normative aspiration is often far removed from the empirical reality, as a host 
of studies of US coverage of the post-9/11 era have chronicled N2 
Mainstream American media literally and figuratively waved the flag following the 
attacks of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq as did elements of the British media. 344 Western 
journalists - particularly those in the US and Britain - were also seen by many critics, this 
writer among them, to have framed their coverage of the 2006 Lebanon war in such as way 
that Hezbollah was cast as the aggressor. -us This willingness of reporters to allow themselves 
to become weapons of war3" demonstrates that when covering routine news, journalists 
may approximate some semblance of balance, but, as a study of terrorism coverage found, 
when "society's core values are under threat - such as with physical or political violence or 
terrorist attacks - journalists switch to a cultural narrative that moves the public mind back 
toward the dominant cultural order. "347 
The search for objectivity can be traced back to Max Weber (1864-1920), who argued 
in Science as a Vocation that values are arbitrary and science cannot choose between them. 
Sociologists took up the cry with the rise of "value-free" social science, the goal of which 
was research independent of the researcher's values. 3 The concept of objectivity has its 
roots in Kant (1724-1804) who emphasized the distinction between "pure reason" and 
"practical reason, " and separated the realm of nature from the realm of morals. In Kant's 
new world, "the distinction between facts and values, between what is - the natural, and 
what ought to be - and the moral, became fundamental. "-9 
In journalistic terms, the idea was that the reporter must "stand outside oneself and 
so separate [the reporting] from one's own subjective preferences about what the world 
should be. "° Walter Lippman (1889-1974), an outspoken proponent of journalistic 
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objectivity, said it was essential for the reporter to "remain clear and free of his irrational, his 
unexamined, his or her unacknowledged prejudgments. "351 Yet, from the beginning, 
inherent in the concept of objectivity was a strong element of the subjective: 
[Objectivity] is not just a claim about what kind of knowledge is reliable. It is 
also a moral philosophy, a declaration of what kind of thinking one should 
engage in, in making moral decisions. It is, moreover, a political commitment, 
for the ideal of objectivity provides a guide to what groups one should 
acknowledge as relevant audiences for judging one's own thoughts and 
acts 352 
This "declaration" of "what kind of thinking" one should engage in itself brings to bear 
the particular values of the declarer, and the decision on what is "relevant" can only be a 
subjective judgment. "Objectivity, " says Fuller of the Chicago Tribune, "assumes an 
independence between the observer and the phenomenon observed that simply does not 
exist. " 353 Then there is the more existential question "The 'objective assumption' states not 
that the media are objective, but that there is a world out there to be objective about. "-IM 
Indeed, objectivity is dependent on the shared worldview of those doing the perceiving. 
After all, "information and knowledge are not value-free but transmit, on purpose or not, 
ethical and moral imperatives. "355 In other words, send an Israeli journalist and a Palestinian 
journalist out to cover the same story on the West Bank, and the result is likely to be very 
different, even if both set out to be meticulously balanced. 
The potential for distortion is also embedded in the sense of noblesse oblige with 
which some journalists approach their job, best summed up in the infamous comment by 
David Brinkley (1920-2003), then the anchor of The NBC Nightly News: "News is what I say it 
is. It's something worth knowing by my standards. "356 
2) DEFINING OBJECTIVITY 
The quest to achieve objectivity - or Truth with a capital 'r - is a relatively new 
development in American and European journalism. As late as the 1920s, "'objectivity' was 
not a term American journalists or critics of US journalism used and complaints about the 
lack of balance extend back as far as the industry itself. In the 1830s, author James Fenimore 
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Cooper (1789-1851) engaged in a series of lawsuits against newspapers, which he considered 
"corrupt" and "vulgar": 
If newspapers are useful in overthrowing tyrants, it is only to establish 
tyranny of their own. ... With loud professions of freedom of opinion, there is 
no tolerance; with a parade of patriotism, no sacrifice of interests; and with 
fulsome panegyrics on propriety, no decency? 
From the flag-waving Fleet Street journalists who filed paeans to British troops in the 
Crimea to the famous British correspondent Macdonald Hastings (1909-1982), who said 
during World War Two, "Objectivity can come back into fashion when the shooting is 
over, "a commitment to truth was not historically the strong suit of journalists on either 
side of the Atlantic. 
Even though he once declared that he would prefer newspapers without government 
to government without newspapers, US President Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was also 
under no illusions about the credibility of newspapers of his day. "Truth itself becomes 
suspicious by being put into the polluted vehicle, " he once wrote to an acquaintance. 360 The 
so-called "penny press" of 1830s America was largely bought and paid for by politicians and 
political parties, which not only provided investment capital, but also supported the papers 
through political advertisements. "Journalists, " wrote the biographer of New York editor 
James Gordon Bennett (1795-1872), "were usually little more than secretaries dependent 
upon cliques of politicians, merchants, brokers, and office-seekers for their position and 
bread. "%l That remained essentially true until Horace Greeley (1811-1872) laid the 
groundwork for modem American journalism by founding the New York Tribune in 1841. 
But "objectivity" was still far removed from his mind. His goal, said Greeley, was "a journal 
removed alike from servile partisanship on the one hand and from gagged, mincing 
neutrality on the other. "362 
In his history of journalistic objectivity, Schudson chronicles the sudden and 
dramatic shift from opinion - and exaggeration - to strenuous adherence to what he quotes 
Julius Chambers (1850-1920), managing editor of the New York Herald, describing as, "Facts, 
facts; nothing but facts" and what H. L. Mencken complained was his paper's "craze for 
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mathematical accuracy. "363 Lincoln Steffens (1866-1936), a reporter for the Evening Post, 
recalled that under the new regime, "Reporters were to report news as it happened, like 
machines, without prejudice, color, and without style; all alike. Humor or any sign of 
personality in our reports was caught, rebuked, and, in time, suppressed. As a writer, I was 
permanently hurt by my years on the Post. "3" But eventually, most American reporters 
"saluted an ethic in which non-belief was their pride. "30 
Yet from the first time the mantra of journalistic objectivity was intoned, the 
contradictions inherent in the self-view of Western - and particularly American -journalism 
have been apparent. The New York Times has long been held up as the gold standard of US 
journalism. When Adolph Ochs (1858-1935), then publisher of the Chattanooga Times, bought 
the faltering New York paper in 1896, he set out to revolutionize the industry, laying out the 
Times' philosophy in a lengthy editorial. The paper's mission, he wrote, was to 
... give the news, all the news, 
in concise and attractive form ... to give the 
new impartially, without fear or favor, regardless of any party, sect, or 
interest involved ... nor will there be a departure from the general tone and 
character and policies ... that have distinguished The New York Times as a 
nonpartisan paper - unless it be, if possible, to intensify its devotion to the 
cause of sound money and tariff reform, opposition to wastefulness and 
speculation in administering the public affairs and in its advocacy of the 
lowest tax consistent with good government, maintain individual vested 
rights and assure the free exercise of a sound conscience. 366 
Thus, from the very beginning, protestations of impartiality notwithstanding, The 
Times emphatically had a mission, a "devotion" to a "cause, " which meant it approached 
certain stories with a particular agenda. Yet, at the end of World War 11, which saw the US 
and British media serve as an extension of the military's propaganda arm, "objectivity came 
back into fashion" 367 and was soon "universally acknowledged to be the spine of the 
journalist's moral code. "8 
Today, it is generally recognized that there is no such thing as true objectivity. 369 
"Journalists inhabit a culture of ideas which shape the way they report, select, edit and 
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prioritise news, " wrote Australian journalist and academic Alan Knight. "These ideas 
reproduce and reinforce themselves in the news making process, re-creating apparently 
flexible ways for imagining the world outside the newsroom. "370 
But with that recognition, come new concerns. "The nineteenth-century worry was 
exclusively about intentional shadings of the truth for partisan ends. The concern was about 
the danger of partisan views. The twentieth century added the danger of partial views, the 
inevitable selectivity of facts, the inevitable exercise of judgment in interpreting the real 
world. The nineteenth century worried about journalists' intentions and what they wanted to 
do. In the twentieth century, there is an additional concern about journalists' attentions and 
what they are able to see and do, " according to Schudson. 371 
Critics charge that the conventions of Western journalism are "used to contrive the 
illusion of objectivity, "372 in a "strategic ritual"37 designed to refute charges of bias or 
distortion, 374 thus allowing "journalists to maintain their pretence of dealing in facts and not 
values. "375 Former New York Times reporter John Hess called the quest for objectivity a 
"straightjacket" that produces "bloodless journalism ... no opinions, just the news, extruded 
in strings like sausage that could be cut to fit. "' Thus, the critics say, are masked a host of 
underlying sins while audiences are provide with a distorted view of the world. There are 
many who argue that the best one can hope for is "functional truth, "377 in which the 
journalist tries to put aside any conscious biases but acknowledges that he or she is 
reporting through a personal, cultural, nationalistic or corporate frame. "This is what 
journalism is after -a practical, functional form of truth, " according to Kovach and 
Rosenstiel. "It is not truth in the absolute or philosophical sense. It is not the truth of a 
chemical equation. But journalism can - and must - pursue truth in a sense by which we can 
operate day by day. "378 
However, an array of voices claim that even relative truth remains outside the grasp 
of the mainstream Western media at the dawn of the twenty-first century. "The content of 
the news media inevitably reflects the interests of those who pay the bills, " says former New 
York Times editor Herb Altshull, while sociologist Herbert Gans is among those who 
believe that elite journalists of the national news organizations "help legitimate and even 
glorify the sources and strata from which they report. "380 That is not a new viewpoint. "[T]he 
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Constitution does not guarantee objectivity of the press, nor is objectivity obtainable in a 
subjective world; and ... the question ... really raised is not whether the news shall be 
unprejudiced but rather whose prejudices shall color the news, " wrote Morris Ernst in a 
'friend of the court' brief in the 1937 Supreme Court case Associated Press vs. National 
Labor Relations Board 381 
In a scathing indictment of international coverage in the American media, Tom 
Fenton, former chief foreign correspondent for CBS News, charged that even if they are able 
to compartmentalize their own biases, reporters are subject to the institutional bias of their 
news organizations. "The news gets pre-selected to fit the political message. The home office 
rules over its correspondents, requiring them to acknowledge only the news that fits their 
vision of the world, " Fenton wrote. 2 The British media has come in for much the same 
criticism. Even the vaunted BBC has not escaped, finding itself at the heart of a major 
controversy over reporting about British government policy toward Iraq, which eventually 
cost several of its top executives their jobs. 3 
3) THE CHANGE AGENT MODEL 
There have been a number of movements in the US and Western Europe advocating 
that reporters shed their false "vanity of neutrality"38* and become change agents, seeking to 
drive policy and politics. The "muckrakers" of the Gilded Age who attacked the privileged 
class "made no apologies for advocating change; "the American journalist-participants of 
the Spanish Civil War, who believed in using their craft to stop the evils of fascism; the 
"New Journalism" of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Europe; 7 and 
practitioners of American Tom Wolfe's brand of "New Journalism" in the 1960s, which 
blended fact and fiction in a search for a greater truth, represented some of the best known 
attempts to break out of the "straightjacket" of strict objectivity. 
Even the patron-saint of American television journalists, Edward R Murrow (1908- 
1965) of CBS News, famously deviated from the ideal of neutrality when he took on the anti- 
Communist crusader Sen. Joseph McCarthy (1908-1957) in the late 1950s. "The actions of the 
junior senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay amongst our allies abroad 
and given considerable comfort to our enemies, " Murrow opined on his now legendary See 
It Now broadcast. "'The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in ourselves. "3 In an 
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equally famous departure from that same network's strict commitment to objectivity, 
Murrow's spiritual heir, CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite, strayed into the realm of 
advocacy when, after a visit to Vietnam in the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive, he declared 
that negotiation was the only "rational way out" of the morass. 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, another wave of journalists also rebelled at 
the strictures of objectivity, arguing that they imposed a forced moral calculus when 
reporting war, under which each side must receive equal time and equal weight no matter 
the relative level of responsibility for the violence. Appalled by the slaughter of Bosnian 
Muslims at the hands of the Serbs, and of America's delayed intervention on their behalf, 
CNN correspondent Christine Amanpour and former BBC correspondent Martin Bell were 
among the leading voices calling for what Bell labeled a "journalism of attachment ... which 
cares as well as knows, " driving international policy, rather than simply report its effects. 391 
They aspired to emulate the noted Polish foreign correspondent Ryszard Kapuscinski, 
whose reporting was characterized by empathy for those he covered and who believed 
"truth still could remain hidden under an avalanche of facts. "m 
Meanwhile, in the US, the public journalism movement (also known as civic 
journalism), and the lesser-known communitarians, 393 sought to counter the "determined 
detachment" of the media that some critics claimed was destroying American democracy. 
Proponents of public journalism,, such as Atlantic Magazine editor James Fallows, argued that 
"many journalists are so wedded to the ideal of detachment that they fail to feel any loyalty 
toward their country, their community, their culture and religious institutions, and their 
fellow citizens. This idea of detachment leads these journalists to'even abandon their own 
natural impulses as so much unnecessary human baggage getting in the way of capturing a 
good story. ""5 A frequently-cited example was that of an interview on the topic of 
journalistic ethics with Mike Wallace of CBS News and Peter Jennings (1938-2005) of ABC 
News, in which the two were asked what they would do if they were with a group of enemy 
troops who had laid an ambush for US forces. Would they warn the Americans or film the 
action? Wallace said it was his job as a reporter to cover the event, not intervene; Jennings 
initially replied it was his duty as an American to warn them, then quickly backtracked and 
agreed with Wallace. 
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Proponents of public journalism say such attitudes reflect detachment, elitism, 
negativity and conflict orientation, which they denigrate as "the Four Horsemen of the 
journalistic apocalypse. " Conversely, on the international stage, meanwhile, they criticize 
what Edward Fouhy, a former news executive with all three major US networks, called the 
"bi-polar journalism" that has divided the world into "us" and "them. "m "There is a sense 
in which an adversarial posture becomes an ideology that prevents the sensitive 
interpretation and application of the principles of humaneness, truth telling, justice, 
freedom/independence, and the stewardship of free expression, " explains to Edward 
Lambeth of the University of Missouri School of Journalism. -399 
Public journalists insist that "telling the news is not enough" and believe journalists 
should become "change agents" and "civil catalysts"*()o who "remember that they are citizens 
as well as journalists"4°1 and "transform their journalism into a mechanism for finding 
solutions to public problems. "+02 Strict objectivity, wrote Johns Hopkins University professor 
and former New York Times reporter Herb Altshull, serves the interest of the powers-that-be, 
"for it safeguards the system against the explosive pressures for change. So long as 'both 
sides' are presented, neither side is glorified above the other, and the status quo remains 
unchallenged. "40 Paralleling the public journalism movement are the communitarians, who 
call for "a journalism of outrage" and insist that "reporting must be an instrument of social 
justice. "° "Only a humane and just journalism has the capacity to affirm the 
newsworthiness of the oppressed, " argued Leigh University professor Jack Lule in a study 
of US coverage of the killings of Brazilian street children. ' The tiny "Peace journalism" 
movement, meanwhile, argues that conflict must be framed in terms of potential solutions 
rather than dwelling on body-counts. " 
The idea of such social responsibility is not entirely alien to Western journalism. It 
was a central theme in the Hutchins Commission report, which has been called "the most 
important statement on the media in the twentieth century. "*07The US panel, officially called 
the Commission on the Freedom of the Press, was convened in 1947 by the president of the 
University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins (1899-1977), at the urging of Time founder Henry 
Luce (1898-1967) to examine the relationship between the media and government. The 
report, entitled A Free and Responsible Press, devoted considerable attention to concerns that 
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American minority groups were not receiving adequate coverage in the media of the day. 
Among other things, it recommended that the press should (1) provide a "truthful and 
comprehensive account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; " (2) 
present and clarify "social goals and values of society; " (3) offer a "representative picture of 
the constituent groups of society; " and (3) serve as "a forum for the exchange of 
commitment and criticism. "+08 Cronkite of CBS News once said that American reporters tend 
to "side with humanity rather than authority, "4()9 meaning they back the underdog, a 
perspective supported by a study that found a "majority of the journalists surveyed believe 
their work should be a force for social reform. "410 Put more simply, in the vernacular of the 
newsroom, the job of a journalist is to "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable. "411 
But many scholars argue that even if those ideals ever really took hold in the US 
media, they quickly became lost in the battle for audiences and ratings 412 Writing in a tone 
bordering on despair in the mid-1980s, Lambeth of the University of Missouri School of 
Journalism surveyed a global landscape in which "news ... often brings pain, 
disappointment, and a frustrated feeling of individual impotence. "413 He quoted a colleague, 
who he said, succinctly captured the spirit of the times: 
Regularly, punctually, monotonously, our newspapers and radio and 
television stations relay listings of hazards, disasters, misdoings and 
undoings. Helplessly drawn to any dramatic situation, unanalytical 
accomplices in the zone of thought, journalists ... propagate notions which 
they poorly understand and discard those they assume others may 
misunderstand or refuse to tolerate. Preoccupied with the performance of 
individuals occupying official positions, journalists ignore the background.... 
They point us toward no detours but diligently cover our collisions"' 
In response, Lambeth laid out a framework of principles for journalism ethics that 
went beyond the "social responsibility" model of the Hutchins Commission. These included 
(1) the "principle of truth telling, " which involves "a habit of accuracy, of checking and 
rechecking to establish the accuracy of questionable information; '415 (2) the "principle of 
justice, " which involves a newsroom "climate conducive to high ethical standards" and a 
commitment to the "watchdog" responsibilities of the media to, in the words of the ASNE 
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code of ethics, "bring independent scrutiny to bear on the forces of power in society; "416 (3) 
the "principle of freedom" that involves both tenaciously safeguarding freedom of the press 
and avoiding "tangible threats" to journalistic independence and moral authority, whether 
"newsroom policies inimical to wider public needs" or being "co-opted" by news sources-417 
(4) the "problem of humaneness, " by which Lambeth meant the moral balancing act 
between the duty to report and the duty to help fellow human beings, whether it involves 
individuals - such as the decision not to shed the journalistic observer status and help 
victims of a car crash - or nations, such as debate over whether journalists should inform 
authorities if they learn the location of a terrorist suspect; 18 (5) and the "principle of 
stewardship, " by which Lambeth meant journalists must take seriously their unique role in 
society to "monitor the condition of justice within or between institutions" and "help keep 
the wells of public discourse unpoisoned. "419 
In many ways, journalism in the US and Britain has come full circle. The dominance 
of "objective" reporting was challenged in the 1930s and 1940s with the rise of "interpretive 
reporting, " which argued that facts alone cannot provide a fair and comprehensive 
understanding for the audience. "Show me a man who thinks he is objective and I'll show 
you a man who's deceiving himself, " said Time publisher Henry Luce, whose magazine 
married news with a heavy dose of interpretation and opinion*m The proponents of public 
journalism and their allies are doing the same today, harking back to the days when a 
nineteenth century reporter approached the news not as an impartial observer, but "as a 
participant who spits on his hands, rolls up his sleeves, and jumps into the fight "421 
That push and pull between impartiality and engagement is constantly at play in 
Western newsrooms. Indeed, partisan flag-waving in time of conflict has been the norm, 
from the American Revolution, during which the press played a major role in stoking the 
fires of rebellion, and the aforementioned Crimean war, to the present day. 4n Yet, public 
journalists and the like are the minority. In the prevailing ideology of British and American 
newsgathering, "A journalist is detached, and the story is the thing" and "[t]he truth, rather 
than an agenda" is the goal. 4n As renowned White House correspondent Helen Thomas 
observed, "It is the job of reporters and editors to ask the tough questions of those in power 
and to act on the answers with trust, integrity, and honesty guiding their judgment "424 
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Much the same is seen in the self-view of the BBC where, as BBC World Affairs Editor John 
Simpson put it, "First and foremost, there is a powerful tradition of objectivity and lack of 
bias in British broadcasting. "tn 
A certain sense of moral superiority is embedded in such an attitude. In his 
newspaper creed, E. W. Scripps, founder of the Scripps Howard media dynasty, wrote that 
the Bill of Rights was "a grant of freedom to the people; and we feel as journalists we are the 
trustees of this freedom. "*7A "A newspaper is like a church, " Washington Post columnist 
David Ignatius wrote in a novel about journalists. "It is built by ordinary sinners, people 
who in their individual lives are often petty and corrupt, but who collectively create an 
institution that transcends themselves. "*27 A study of US journalism textbooks found them 
pervaded by a "belief in the morality and righteousness of journalism. " So uniform was the 
message, journalism educator Bonnie S. Brennan reported, that the result was a prevailing 
"ideology that elevated the role of journalist to an almost sacred commitment and continued 
to reify a belief in the watchdog function of the press. "*28 However, the "sacred" has often 
proven to be profane. In a historical study of investigative journalism, Mark Feldstein found 
that this "muckraking" model "has proved to be cyclical, " waxing and waning with the 
political winds 4" 
4) THE MISSION OF JOURNALISM 
The prevailing view of the mission of journalism as articulated by many British and 
American reporters was summed up by Kovach and Rosentheil: "The primary purpose of 
journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self- 
governing. "° This definition is in line with the broader self-view of American and British 
journalists that they are serving the public good. In his study of broadcast interview 
techniques, Stephen Clayman found that American reporters use this notion that journalism 
serves as a "tribune of the people ... not only as a normative ideal that journalists strive for, 
but also as a strategic legitimating resource. "t31 Yet increasingly, Western reporters are 
questioning whether the goal of serving society can be achieved by continuing to stand aloof 
from the world they cover. Writing in 1971, Johnstone found what he called two "pure" and 
competing ideologies of journalism a 'neutral' "nothing-but-the-truth" approach, in which 
journalists were messengers of information, and the 'participant' "whole-truth" orientation, 
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in which they played a more active role in covering the news. Most journalists, he reported, 
subscribed to elements of both. 432 A study of American journalists in the mid-1990s found 
them to be "less clinically detached than they were once expected to be. "& As the BBC's 
Simpson put it, journalists are not required to be "moral eunuchs, blandly laying out 
different views as though they have equal value. "u* 
Building on the studies cited above and others, *15 researchers David Weaver and G. 
Cleveland Wilhoit, both of Indiana University, surveyed 1,600 US journalists in 1982. They 
found that the reporters harbored "seemingly contradictory conceptions of their role (i. e. 
they were both 'objective' informers and 'subjective' interpreters). "436 When they replicated 
their study a decade later, "a third of all journalists fully embraced both the interpretive and 
the disseminator roles. "*37 Still, few were likely to subscribe to Henry Luce's defense of Time 
magazine's partisan coverage of the 1952 US presidential election that "it was Time's duty to 
explain why the country needs Ike. Any other form of journalism would have been unfair 
and uninvolved. "4m 
Journalists tend to nurture a certain romantic view of themselves as men (or women) 
of the people. In his classic book on the 1972 US presidential election campaign, author 
Timothy Crouse offers a glimpse of this fantasy self-portrait by quoting Dan Rather, then a 
well-coiffed White House correspondent who would go on to earn tens of millions of dollars 
as anchor of The CBS Evening News: "The average journalist, myself included, is a whiskey- 
breathed, nicotine-stained, stubble-bearded guy... " Crouse wryly notes that, "Rather was 
wearing a beautifully-tailored blue suit and he gave off the healthy glow of a man who has 
just emerged from a hotel barber shop. I had never seen him smoke and I doubt whether, on 
a typical day, his strongest exhalation could budget the needle on a breathalyzer. "4" 
In contrast, critics have painted a portrait of US journalists as "a generation of 
vipers"° - cynical elitists, disconnected from the majority of Americans in terms of politics, 
lifestyle and religion. The scholarship may not use such loaded rhetoric, but much of it does 
bear out the hypothesis that American journalists do not, for the most part, represent the 
people for whom, and to whom, they report. Beginning with Leo Rosten's benchmark 
survey of the Washington press corps in 1937, M1 a series of studies« have documented "a 
wide disparity between the attitudes of journalists and the general public, with the former 
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consistently to the left of the latter. "«3 A 1985 Los Angeles Times survey of 3,000 reporters 
across the country, which asked the same questions on a range of political, social and 
economic issues as appeared on a national survey of the public, reported that, on average, 
there existed a 25 percent gap between journalists and other Americans! " Both in terms of 
how they perceive themselves on a liberal-to-conservative scale, and how they voted in past 
presidential elections, the majority of surveys in the latter half of the twentieth century 
found reporters to be overwhelmingly liberal and/or supportive of the Democratic Party. 
Weaver and Wilhoit documented something similar in several surveys. By 2003, they found 
that while journalists had become slightly more conservative, they were still less likely to 
consider themselves politically on the right (25%) than was the general public (41%) and 
more likely to identify with the left (40%) than the public at large (17%)445 The public 
perceived the same. A 2007 survey found that 83 percent of American voters believed the 
media was biased in one direction or another. '" 
In a widely debated study of American journalism, Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman 
and Linda Lichter painted a portrait of an industry disconnected from the public to whom it 
reported: predominantly white and male, highly educated, well-paid, largely drawn from 
upper-middle dass families in urban centers "at a distance from the social and cultural 
traditions of small-town middle America. ""7 Most controversially, the team employed a tool 
of psychology, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), in an attempt to "probe the collective 
psyche of the media elite""8 and measure the underlying values and "unavoidable 
preconceptions" that shape how journalists approach the news. "9 Administered during 
hour-long interviews in 1980 with 238 journalists at America's more influential media 
outlets, the test involved exposing the reporters to a series of unlabeled photographs and 
asking them to speculate on what the images contained. The theory of the test was that "the 
subject reveals some of his innermost fantasies without being aware that he is doing so. " m 
"The social world journalists created from the TAT pictures, peopled by brutal 
soldiers, corrupt businessmen, and struggling underdogs, tells us something about how they 
view the world around them, " the researchers reported. *, The personality traits thus said to 
have been revealed, the team concluded, emphasized an ambivalent relationship with 
power, narcissism, low need for attachment and concern for personal intimacy. "These traits 
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seem highly relevant to several aspects" of modem journalism, they observed, including 
"emphasis on power, competition (including the electoral 'horse race'), and the adversarial 
style increasingly adopted by journalists, to the negativism and resistance to criticism that 
many attribute to the profession. "452 In a blistering criticism of the study, media scholar Herb 
Gans accused the team of skewing their data to fit a conservative political agenda. "They 
report data in ways that turn journalists into opinionated proponents of ideas implied to be 
unpatriotic, " Gans wrote in a lengthy rebuttal published in the Columbia Journalism Review. 453 
The debate over liberal vs. conservative tendencies in the media continues to this 
day. "The kind of external pluralism that characterizes the press in other systems, where 
news organizations reflect ideological tendencies, has mostly disappeared from the US 
press, " Hallin and Giles wrote in 2005. +54 Dueling books by former CBS News correspondent 
Bernard Goldberges and Eric Alterman, media columnist for The Nation and a fellow at the 
New School University, made competing claims about conservative and liberal biases in 
the news industry. Meanwhile, the rise of openly conservative news organizations, such as 
Fox News, The Weekly Standard and The Washington Times, a "Foxifieation" of some other 
cable channels with what some critics call "ideologues in seats that were once filled by real 
news reporters, ""457 and the appearance of avowedly liberal outlets such as Air America radio 
network and Democracy Now, signaled "a return of a partisan voice"*m and appeared to 
undermine Hallin and Giles view that the US media was becoming less, rather than more, 
polarized. While the majority of American journalists still ranked fairness among their most 
important values, almost half expressed the concern that journalists too often let their own 
ideological views bleed into their coverage 4" A 2007 survey found that fully 83 percent of 
the US public said the media was biased one way or the other. 0 
5) RELIGION AND THE US MEDIA 
The majority of surveys of US journalists in the twentieth century have found that 
they exhibit a highly secular orientation. "Exactly half eschew any religious affiliation, " 
Lichter et al reported. Only eight percent said they went to church or synagogue weekly and 
86 percent said they rarely or never attended religious services. 46l That manifest itself in 
complaints that, "Religious faith and, in particular, orthodox traditional faiths have been 
slighted by academic and journalistic elites. "462 By late in the century, those numbers 
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appeared to be changing. A 1995 survey by Rothman and research partner Amy Black, 
which replicated the earlier Lichter et at study, found that the number of journalists denying 
a religious preference had dropped from 50 percent to 22 percent, and those reporting that 
they never attend religious services was down from 50 percent to 40 percent. Still, when 
compared to other elite groups, "members of the media and the television and movie elite 
[remained] the least likely to attend religious services. "40 
The 2002 survey by Weaver et al found that journalists "were far less likely to 
practice any mainstream religion than the public at large. "4 4 One-third of the journalists 
surveyed reporting that they did not practice any religion and another 10 percent indicating 
identifying themselves with a religion other than Protestants, Evangelical Christians, 
Catholics or Jews, for a total of 44 percent declaring "other or none, " versus 20 percent in the 
2000 US Census. "When it comes to the importance of religion or religious beliefs, US 
journalists were also not in step with the larger society, " according to Weaver et al *ý The 
percentage of journalists rating religion and religious values "very important" was almost 
half that of the general public (36% vs. 61%), although 36 percent of journalists rated religion 
as "somewhat important" versus 37 percent in the general population. *66Similar findings a 
decade earlier led Weaver and Wilhoit to question the conclusion in their own 1982 study 
that "US journalists were more reflective of the general society than removed from it. "*67 
Likewise, even though 85 percent of the reporters surveyed in 2002 said they were brought 
up in a religious denomination, only 35 percent said that religious upbringing was 
influential as a source of their journalistic ethics ("religious upbringing" came twelfth on a 
list topped by "newsroom learning" and "family upbringing"). 
Despite such findings, a case has been made that religion - or, at least, religious 
values - form an unspoken backdrop in the American newsroom. Several authors have 
argued that the investigative reporters of the "muckraker" era were strongly influenced by 
Judeo-Christian values, 469 which others claim remain at the root of modem journalistic 
values 470 However, even sympathetic observers concur that "there is still a powerful 
uneasiness about religion"+n within American newsrooms, which have been called "citadels 
of secularism. "472 A 2001 study of journalists in the US and Canada found a "strong general 
religious orientation, " with almost three-quarters of those surveyed reporting that religion 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 85 
was important or very important to them, but a deep sensitivity to overtly mixing those 
beliefs with their journalism or connecting journalistic values directly with Judeo-Christian 
teachingS. 473 
Time and again, the respondents indicated a uniform predilection for 
applying religious values in their professional life as long as they were 
expressed in what could be termed journalistic, as opposed to, religious 
language. 474 
Critics have charged that, until recently, this secular orientation in the US media has 
produced a dearth of religion coverage, making it 'the greatest story never told. ' At least one 
poll showed that Americans rank religious news second only in importance to education, 47s 
yet the "role religion plays in America and the world has been a well-kept secret in most of 
the nation's newsrooms, " according to syndicated religion writer Terry Mattingly. 476 He 
argues that the problem is not that reporters are anti-religious; it's that they are irreligious. 
He calls it "a bias of worldview. "477 
6) IDEOLOGY OF JOURNALISM 
Weaver and Wilhoit's landmark series of studies has become a benchmark for 
assessing journalist attitudes around the world. The team identified four core functions - or 
"belief systems" - within American journalism that they said remained constant in the 
decade between the first and second surveys: "Interpreters, " who tended to work for larger, 
corporate-owned media; "Disseminators, " were found in all branches of the media and were 
frequently political moderates-to-conservatives committed to formal journalistic training 
and audience research; "Adversarialists, " who felt strongly about the traditional 
government "watchdog" function of the media; and the emerging category of "Populist 
Mobilizers, " often "small-media, community-oriented idealists, " whose influence was on the 
rise. 478 Journalists ranked "getting information to the public quickly" (likely driven by 24- 
hour live cable television and the internet) and "investigating government claims" at the top 
of their list of priorities, followed by "avoiding stories with unverified content" and 
"providing analysis of complex problems. " As in an earlier study by Hugh Culbertson of 
Ohio University, the pair found the traditional adversarial function well down on the list of 
priorities *79 
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Journalism's majority culture, then, framed its basic purpose in terms 
resonant with the old recommendations of the Hutchins Commission ... 
[M]ost journalists in 1992 appeared to have a 'belief system' that reflected the 
Commission's goal of investigating 'the truth about the fact[s]' and providing 
'context which gives them meaning. 'm 
Thomas Hanitzsch of Ilmenau University of Technology in Germany defines 
professional ideology as "the more or less conscious views shared by either all members of a 
particular profession or a subpopulation of this profession. "481 Scholars have mixed views on 
the degree to which journalism is an ideology or even how strong the sense of "profession" 
is among them. 2 Journalists have been found to identify themselves more closely with their 
profession than with the companies - or even the medium - for which they work. *0 But in 
their 1992 study, Weaver and Wilhoit concluded that, "The institutional culture of 
journalism, never particularly strong, was weaker ... than a decade previous. "484 Journalists 
remained "deeply divided on many questions of journalistic practice. " 
And what was true in America, with its long history of independent journalism, was 
echoed and amplified in newsrooms around the world where those questions were reflected 
through the prism of different cultures, traditions and political philosophies. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER V: 
. 
JOURNALISM AROUND THE WORLD 
It is too much to ask [reporters] to make impartial, quality 
news if they are underpaid. 
ULIN NI'AM YUSRON 
INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS ALLIANCE (INDONESIA)486 
1) ANOTHER VIEW 
A substantial body of literature provides evidence that not all journalists share the 
avowed mission and values of Anglo-American journalists. In the early 1990s, American 
political scientist Thomas Patterson and German communications scholar Wolfgang 
Donbach surveyed journalists in the US, Britain, Sweden, Germany and Italy and asked 
them to place political parties and news organizations in their own countries on a left-right 
scale. Europeans saw journalism covering the entire spectrum of political viewpoints, while 
the Americans saw news organizations occupying a narrow band between the Democratic 
and Republican parties 487 
Beyond the "liberal" model of journalism that dominates the US, Hallin and Giles 
described two other dominant models: the "polarized pluralist" model of southern Europe, 
characterized by a high degree of political parallelism in which "journalistic professionalism 
... is not as 
deeply rooted, " writers and editors are "political actors above all, " news 
organizations are frequently "controlled by actors outside of journalism, " and "a journalism 
of ideas" prevails in contrast to the "journalism of information"m 
In northern Europe, meanwhile, the researchers reported the dominance of what 
they called the "Democratic corporatist model, " in which a commitment to press freedom 
combines with a strong sense of social responsibility. The name comes from the label given 
to the political structure that rose in most of the smaller northern European countries in the 
early twentieth century. Under this model, political parallelism is combined with a high 
degree of journalistic professionalism. Journalists see themselves as representing civil 
society and believe "it is their responsibility to report the news from a point of view. "+n 
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Hallin and Giles argue that the differences between the systems had been reduced in 
recent years under the influence of globalization and the growing influence of the American 
"liberal" model. They see "a considerable degree of homogenization of media systems" that 
is producing "a common culture of journalism. "490 In Europe, they point to the 
"secularization" of European societies and the "decline of peoples' attachments to separate 
religious and ideological 'faiths' and of the social organizations once connected with 
these. "491 However, they note, efforts to develop a politically neutral media in southern 
Europe have largely failed and the multi-party - rather than two-party - system in most 
northern European countries is largely mirrored by the structure of the media And, as noted 
above, even the US has been slipping away from the ideals of a separation of press and 
politics, "Changes in market structure are leading to a re-emergence of political parallelism 
in the media, and in that sense a convergence toward the pattern of the European media 
systems, ' they wrote. 492 Meanwhile, French researcher Aralynn Abare McMane reports that 
there are signs of a movement in the media of France to separate news and opinion, but 
journalists continue to diverge from their American brethren on issues like investigative and 
adversary journalism-493 Style, as well as substance, is an issue. A study of Danish television 
found that the "personality-driven techniques" of Anglo-American television presenters 
were "repugnant" to some Europeans 494 
If there are differences in approach among US and European journalists, the 
distinctions between how journalism is practiced in the West and the rest of the world are 
often even more profound. 
2) MEDIA THEORIES 
The fundamental framework through which Western media scholars have viewed 
global journalism is that of the Four Theories of the Press. Originally published in 1956, the 
book was a creature of the Cold War, neatly dividing the world's media into authoritarian, 
libertarian, communist and social responsibility systems. 495 "The press always takes on the 
form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates, " the 
authors wrote in their introduction. 
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Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of 
individuals and institutions are adjusted. ... Thus, in the last analysis, the 
difference between press systems is one of philosophy. 496 
Fifteen years later, Merrill and Lowenstein reduced the number of systems to two, 
arguing that all systems fall somewhere on spectrum of liberal to totalitarian49 , but several 
other scholars instead added categories to the original four. "revolutionary, "developmental, " 
"Western" (Hachten); 498 "development" and "democratic participant" theories (Denis 
McQuail); 99 and a "social democrat" model that legitimized public intervention (Robert 
Picard). 500 
The notion that American-style democracy was essential to a free press was at heart 
of the Four Theories, just as it was the basis for the Hutchins Commission recommendations. 
As Curran and Park said of Four Theories, "the most striking feature about this book ... is 
how little its talented authors needed to know. They display some knowledge of the early 
American and Russian media, and of the American Colonial and early English press, but 
little about any other media system. "501 
The tone of "American Exceptionalism" - the idea that it is America's duty to bring 
democracy and light to the world5o2- can also be found in some more recent media analyses. 
"American journalism rests on a value and belief system that has been developing for more 
than 200 years. Other nations certainly do not have the foundations on which to place such 
an institution, " argues Margaret Blanchard Yet the example of Mexico would seem to 
belie that assumption. There, the transformation of the media largely preceded the political 
liberalization of the mid-1990s, "despite harassment and resistance from the old regime. "504 
Curran and Park are among those academics arguing for new ways of understanding 
international media systems that takes into account seemingly inexorable march toward 
media liberalization. "° Altshull divides global journalism into three broad systems: the 
"market press" of the West, driven by profit; the "communitarian press" of the former 
Soviet bloc, built on the principles of Marxism and Leninism; and the "advancing press" of 
the developing world, which evolved out of the framework of UNESCO's efforts in the 
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1960s to create a "new, more just and more effective world information and communication 
order. "506He writes of the existence of a "belief system of advancing journalism: " 
These ideas (or rather these articles of faith) include belief in the press as a 
unifying force; belief in the press as an instrument of social justice and a 
device for beneficial social change; and belief the press is properly an 
instrument of two-way communication. 507 
3) MEDIA THEORY IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD 
As in the US, the reality of journalism in other parts of the world has often fallen far 
short of the ideal. While Western organizations such as the Ford Foundation set up 
institutions designed to establish a development press based on Western-style notions of 
objectivity and independence, those ideals did not always fit the view that the media should 
drive development, not question it-508 In fact, development journalism has been called "one 
of the first major attempts to break away from Western concepts of news. "° In the Western 
perspective, the media sits firmly in what Jurgen Habermas labeled "the public sphere, "510 
the space between the economy and government, where public opinion is formed. In its 
most idealistic form, journalism acts as "as kind of public square where ideas and issues are 
discussed openly in a common search for truth"511 In the development model, media is 
closely aligned with the government. Ghanian leader Kwame Nkrumah saw the African 
newspaper as "a collective educator -a weapon, first and foremost, to overthrow 
colonialism and imperialism, and to assist total African independence and unity. "512 Many 
journalists themselves shared the view of Vivek Goenka, chairman of the powerful Indian 
Express newspaper, that the media should "don a steering mantle when the need may arise" 
in order to serve society and the nation. 513 Altshull quotes one Nigerian reporter as asking 
him: "Why should we be like you? What have your ethics and morality brought the world 
beside injustice, cruelty, and war? "spa 
This perspective was behind UNESCO's efforts to create a "new world information 
order" that would reverse the north-south flow of information from the developed to the 
developing world. Its proponents mocked media theorist Marshall McLuhan's notion that 
television had created a "global village. " In an examination of US and Indian coverage of 
Iran's Islamic revolution, John V. Vilanilam observed: 
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If there were 100 residents of this global village, only one would get the 
opportunity for education beyond school level, 70 would be unable to read 
and write. Over 50 would be suffering from malnutrition, and over 80 would 
live in sub-standard housing. Six of the 100 would hold off the entire income 
of the village. How would these six live in peace with their neighbors without 
arming themselves to the teeth and supplying arms to those willing to fight 
their side? 51S 
In South and Southeast Asia, where development journalism holds sway, audiences 
give state-run TV and radio channels high marks for trustworthiness. 516 News consumption 
patterns tend to indicate that large segments of the general public in those regions hold a 
similar view. But there are also contradictions. In the Philippines, birthplace of 
"development journalism, " reporters suffered severe repression under the regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos5'7 and today work in an environment that Reporters sans Frontirres says 
is second only to Iraq in danger to journalists 518 "Development journalism" has spawned a 
variety of theoretical children, each adopting and translating the broad themes of 
responsibility and social justice to fit their own specific cultures and political systems, such 
as the Singapore model in which the media is a partner of government in building the nation 
and instilling "Asian" or Confucian values. 
4) DEVELOPMENT JOURNALISM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 
The Pancasila press under Suharto's New Order regime in Indonesia, the world's 
most populous Muslim country, embodied many of the concepts of development 
journalism. Pancasila refers to the reigning ideology of the Suharto era, which consisted of 
five principles designed to unify the far-flung island nation of more than 300 ethnic 
groups 519 "The Indonesian press was supposed to be 'free and responsible, " writes Janet 
Steele of George Washington University, in her study of the country's leading independent 
magazine. "Yet unlike the Western concept of press freedom, which emphasizes freedom 
from government control, press freedom in the New Order was understood to mean freedom 
to assist the state in carrying out programs for social and economic development. "520 Steele 
says it is likely the guidelines for the Pancasila press came from the American Hutchins 
Commission report, which stressed media responsibility: 
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In the New Order, "responsible" meant adhering to a set of guidelines 
prohibiting the reporting of anything that was likely to inflame ethnic, 
religious, racial, or group (class) tensions 521 
One of the problems with the literature of media theory, as noted by some critics, 522 is 
that it is predominantly produced from a Western-centric perspective. Even the most 
commonly-used measures of press "freedom, " such as the widely-cited Freedom House 
report, 523view conditions through a decidedly Western prism S24 Contrast Steele's implied 
criticism of the Indonesian system with the explanation provided by an Indonesian 
academic, Onong Uchjana Effendi, who explains that the Pancasila press is not 'free from' or 
'free to, ' but rather 'free and' -because it is free and responsible. This "functional freedom, " as 
journalist-scholar Jakob Oetama put it, means reporters have the freedom not to harm 
society. 525 Indonesia is a consensus-oriented culture in which the president is seen as the 
ultimate father-figure of the national family. In that spirit, the Indonesian Press Council's 
1974 guidelines said it was the responsibility of the press to "hold high the national 
consensus" and to cooperate with community and government in a manner "inspired by the 
family principle. "526 Australian Angela Romano's qualitative survey of 65 Indonesian 
journalists, conducted in the final years of the Suharto regime, found that the majority of 
"were fired by a desire to improve their society. "527She identified five major roles emerging 
within the group: 
[W]atchdog who scrutinizes and critiques the powerful ... agent of 
empowerment who seeks to enlighten and strengthen the masses ... nation 
builder who aims to build unity and develop the nation's social and physical 
infrastructure ... defender of the truth ... [and] entertainer. 528 
The majority saw no contradiction between the roles of Pancasila journalist and the 
self-perception of "watchdog" expressed by half the sample. What they did object to was the 
aggressive way in which that watchdog role manifests in Western journalism. "I do not wish 
to be a fierce watchdog, " one journalist told Romano. "I wish to be like [the Prophet] 
Muhammad and to spread a good agenda. Muhammad was not fierce. "529 But they also 
objected to the reality of "freedom" under the New Order, with 80 percent complaining 
about restrictions on press freedoms, which included censorship, self-censorship, the closing 
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of newspapers and physical attacks. Still, some saw these restrictions as an unfortunate 
necessity. "I do not think the political system is developed enough to encompass the truth, ' 
said another reporter- m 
A separate survey of 385 Indonesian journalists conducted by Hanitzsch three years 
after the collapse of the Suharto regime reported somewhat different findings, ", By that 
point, many of the overt controls had been lifted from the Indonesian media sector, with a 
dramatic increase in the number of journalists and news outlets 532 Indonesia's media was by 
then rated "partly free" by Freedom House, " though journalists continued to be subject to 
criminal prosecution, threats and persecution at the hands of both business interests and 
individuals who object to their reporting. " Indonesian journalists "see themselves as neutral 
and objective disseminators of news, not as political actors and agents of development, " 
according to Hanitzsch. The journalists rated highly such values as neutrality and the need 
to "support disadvantaged people. " "[S]upporting national development" was considered 
"extremely important" by less than 25 percent of the sample. However, the findings were 
anything but clear-cut. Hanitzsch reported that journalists on commercial media outlets - 
the vast majority of respondents - were both "more skeptical of the government [than those 
on government-owned outlets] and subscribe to the tradition of objectivity, [and] [alt the 
same time, they are more willing to do good for society and its people. "55 
The survey also revealed that almost 57 percent of the Indonesian journalists 
accepted the so-called "envelopes" of cash that are a staple of the relationship between 
reporters and sources in Indonesia, "because they do not see any evidence of being 
influenced or pressurized" by the bribe. &m Such incentives are a common practice in many 
countries of the developing world, where journalist salaries are notoriously lows' and, as in 
Indonesia, a sudden explosion of media outlets in the initial liberalization phase mean few 
are economically-sustainable-5-18 Hanitzsch also found notable differences in responses 
between journalists in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, and those in other parts of the 
country, as well as variations in responses among specific ethnic groups. Such results, he 
argues, underline "the variety of cultural forces in journalism" and keep "us aware of the 
overly simplistic nature of any attempt to explain variation in journalism culture by a single 
variable (e. g. gender or race). "-' in 
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Indonesian journalists, whom Hanitzsch labeled "educated but timid watchdogs; ' 
are not alone among journalists in Muslim-majority countries in pairing certain Western 
journalistic ideal-types with their own cultural values. Across the Strait in Malaysia, where a 
combination of draconian press laws and widespread ownership of media interests by state- 
owned holding companies led one US press group to rank the country among the ten worst 
places to practice journalism, Ml Mindy McAdams of the University of Florida found a wide 
discrepancy within Malaysia's news industry between the normative aspirations for 
Western journalistic values and the empirical reality: 
The working journalists profess the same "missions" as Western journalists: 
They go on and on about truth, public accountability, objectivity, "afflict the 
comfortable, comfort the afflicted. " They say "watchdog" and "gatekeeper. " 
They share our language about values and use it in the same way we do ... 
[but] they all admit that they carefully self-censor to avoid retaliation. 
McAdams, who spent a year in Malaysia on a Fuibright journalism fellowship, said 
that as in Indonesia, bribes were de riguer. She said Malaysian journalists justified the system 
of government controls because Malaysia was a "special case" with a special history, a 
reference to relations between the ethnic Malay majority and the Chinese minority. 542 
Malaysia was one of three countries where a content analysis by Brian L Massey and 
Li fing Arthur Chang detected the noticeable impact of "Asian values" and development 
journalism in news repoTting. -543 In examining artides from ten online newspapers, Massey 
and Chang reported that "harmony" and "supportiveness" were the dominant themes in 
domestic coverage. This was most noticeable in the Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, the 
latter two Muslim-majority societies. "The press freedom limits in these three countries may 
be coincidental to journalists' role conceptions, or the restrictions could represent the 
codification of a dose state-press relationship that has arisen naturally from a mutual sense 
of patriotism, " they said. -'144 
However, Massey and Chang found as much emphasis on conflict and confrontation 
in the foreign coverage carried in the news outlets of those three Asian countries as they 
detected in the Western media. The team speculated that this might be the government's 
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way of both implying the superiority of "Asian values" and letting the journalists exercise 
their professional impulses in a way that doesn't threaten the domestic status quo: 
It could be that conflict and critical reporting are accepted under normative 
Asian-values journalism when they are directed at the "other. " ... [T]he mark 
of professionalism on the international stage for Asian journalists could be 
the similarity between their reporting of a foreign news event and that of 
their Western counterparts who are also covering it. P 
5) DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ARAB JOURNALISM 
Supporting the economic and social development of Arab society is one of the pillars 
of Arab journalism. Arab media scholars generally propose three main theories to describe 
the prevailing media system: developmental, social responsibility and "dependency, " the 
latter referring to the region's dependence on Western media system models. In reality, 
developmental and social responsibility approaches to journalism are dose - and usually 
overlapping - cousins, particularly when it comes to the Arab world. From the earliest days 
of the Nasser's Free Officers revolution in 1952 the Egyptian press was "regulated so that it 
promoted the government's developmental aims by writing about governmental projects 
and encouraging people to buy locally manufactured goods, " according to Arab journalist 
and scholar Noha Mellor. 
Egyptian media scholar Basyouni Hamada argues that social responsibility is the 
best model for the Arab world because, he says, while it is the job of media in the 
developing world to serve both national development and political stability, government 
ownership of the media is not necessary for that to take place M7 In contrast, Farouk Abu 
Zeid says development theory offers the best model for Arab media. But his reasons 
underline the fact that the debate may obscure a distinction without a difference. He defines 
khabar as "an account that describes accurately and objectively an event or idea which affects 
and meets the interests of the majority of readers while contributing to the development of 
society. " Journalists surveyed in As-Said Bekhait's study of Egyptian news values were in 
synch with that view, reporting that they felt a social responsibility toward their country. 
However, a critical question is how and when that feeling of responsibility is put into 
practice. The journalists admitted that they skewed their coverage to fit the priorities of their 
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newspaper's owners, be it the government, political parties or other special interests. M9 
Therein lies the inherent reality of Arab media, the "development of society" has 
traditionally translated to mean the glorification of real or imagined triumphs of the regime, 
and the journalist's "responsibility" is toward preserving the status quo .m 
Muslim thinkers have always been scathing about such "false news" spread by 
governments via journalists who have neither "knowledge" ('ilm) nor authority (sulta). The 
Muslim Brotherhood's leading theorist, Said Qutb, was dismissive of the Arab media, 
claiming it neither influenced, nor was influenced by public opinion, but was simply a 
mouthpiece for corrupt regimes; 51 thus failing the first test of haqq (truth). "Circulate 
knowledge and teach the ignorant, for knowledge does not vanish except when it is kept 
secretly, " Umar ibn Abdul Aziz (682-720) wrote to Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Hazm (d. 
737), according to the hadith (1: 3: 98). w2 However, it can be argued that the banning of 
printing by the ulema (religious scholars) was itself an "illegitimate monopolization of 
knowledge, '50 violating that precept and setting the precedent for state control of media in 
the Arab world. 
Social responsibility is a guiding principle of scholars such as Sayeed al-Semi who 
advocate an Islamic approach to journalism, but it is in the context of the journalist's duty to 
support the concept of amar bi al-Maruf wa nahi an al-munkar (commanding the right and 
prohibiting the wrong). Mohammad Siddiqi of Western Illinois University notes: 
Throughout Islamic history many institutions as well as channels of mass 
communications such as mosques, azan, and Friday khutba have used this 
concept of social responsibility to mobilize public opinion and persuade 
individuals to work for the collective good of society in general and for their 
own individual pursuit of good in this world and the hereafter. 555 
Siddiqi defines news as "the reporting of events in a way which fulfils the needs of 
Muslim society" and leads to "peace and stability in conformity with the moral and ethical 
principles of Islam. "&% He says Islam offers "a strong tradition" on which reporters can 
draw, including "critical evaluation of the sources of news, " sound methods of verification 
and documentation, and a commitment to context and faimess. u7 American Muslim convert 
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Abdullah Schleifer, a long-time Cairo bureau chief for NBC News and journalism professor 
at The American University in Cairo, says Western norms of journalism - that the public has 
"the right to know" and that "nothing is sacred" - are "inherently anti-Islamic" 
"What is news [to Western journalists]? Peace, stability and continuity is not 
news but conflict, contention and disorder is. Respectability and moral 
conformity (an Islamic virtue... ) is not news, but erupting scandal is. 
Schleifer, who later became Washington, D. C. bureau chief for the Arab satellite 
channel Al Arabiya, says Islamic journalism offers an alternative that 
Encourage[s] good and discourage[s] evil by providing "news" written in a 
professionally acceptable, objective style that honors truth; that encourages 
the belief and practice of Islam and discourages practices and beliefs that 
deny Islam.. 558 
But Schleifer warns Islamic journalists against the pitfalls of tunnel-vision: 
The specific danger of "Islamic journalism" to date is that the journalist 
substitutes the life and activities of the various Islamic movements for the life 
and activities of the much broader Islamically conscious society. -"19 
Opposing the Islamic theorists are those who argue for a more secular Arabization of 
the region's media. In place of religion, figures such as Rasim Mohammed al-Dammal of 
Cairo University and Ulaiwa Hasan emphasize the need to end both state media monopolies 
and the dominance of Western information channels in the Arab world, restructuring media 
systems to enhance Arab solidarity and bolster cultural mores. 560 
6) INTERNATIONAL MEDIA VALUES 
Journalism has been defined as "a set of cultural practices. "561 But the Western model 
does not always take into account the possibility of journalistic sub-cultures governed by 
varying values, norms and mores as influenced by the broader cultural practices of the 
society in which the journalist functions. Comparing the results of journalist surveys in 21 
countries, Weaver concluded that while, "There are strong national differences that override 
any universal professional norms or values of journalism around the world. "%2 On specific 
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journalistic ideal-types, the surveys found a general agreement on the need to get 
information to the public quickly (as noted above, a top priority for American journalists), 
but there was "considerably less agreement" on the need to investigate government claims, 
with countries that did not have a long history of democratic governance giving the 
"watchdog" role a low priority. Journalists also expressed "considerable differences" on 
issues such as the analytical function of the media, the need to entertain the public, reporting 
practices and ethics, such as the use of confidential sources and paying for information, and 
the importance of reporting accurately and objectively. 
Even among those who did rate objectivity highly, there was a tendency in follow-up 
questions to express the belief that reporting facts alone was not enough. That was 
particularly true among those who have experienced a period of political change. Describing 
the differences in responses between younger Spanish journalists and those who grew up 
professionally under the Franco regime, Maria Jose Carrel and Antonio Pique of the 
University of Navarra noted a pattern which may have implications for other emerging 
democracies: 
Journalists who have undergone the process to democracy fully established 
as professionals are more advocate than impartial, interpretive than factual, 
and more supportive than critical. They are more likely to identify with a 
party than young journalists and to be committed to certain beliefs. They 
regard as important influencing the public and championing ideas and 
values 5" 
The perspectives are many. Almost half of all Polish journalists surveyed did not see 
political or business activities as a threat to objectivity, though a majority espoused the ideal 
of objectivity; Brazilian journalists "seemed to embrace the interpretive/investigative and 
the adversary roles much more than did US journalists; "and where Mexican journalists 
conceived their profession as active and adversarial, Chilean journalists saw themselves as 
"neutral reporters and entertainers of the public, " while their Ecuadorian colleagues 
exhibited a more "developmental journalism" orientation. M7 Columbian journalist Maria 
Cristina Caballero has written that "journalism in countries like mine can go far beyond 
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reporting and writing. It's about more than getting scoops. It's about trying to help create an 
environment in which peace is possible. "-w 
Based on surveys in Tanzania-%9 and Nepal= in which journalists were asked to rank 
a list of 31 functions, Jyotika Ramaprasad and James D. Kelly theorized that journalistic roles 
fell into two major categories, development journalism and democracy 
building/entertainment, which the authors labeled "libertine" or "free press" versus 
"developmental. "5n "Libertine" contained such major categories as evaluating and 
analyzing policy, while "developmental" involved supporting government development 
efforts and using news as "social good. " When a sample of 108 Bangladeshi journalists was 
asked to rank those functions, the result indicated that "Bangladeshi journalists consider 
libertine functions more important than development functions. " But there was a narrow 
margin between the two. "Provide information in a timely manner, " received the highest 
ranking, as it did in the US surveys, but the second-highest number of responses went to, 
"Use the media to advance the social development of the country, " a distinctly 
"developmental" function. The journalists were asked to rate the importance of various 
functions then indicate how frequently they actually carried them out. As is so frequently 
the case, the researchers found "a gap between perceived importance and actual practice for 
most functions. "572For example, "Examine government policies and decisions critically" was 
ranked high in importance by the journalists, but they indicated it was actually implemented 
only 65 percent of the time-573 The authors speculated as to the reason for the gap: 
In developing countries where control of the press by political leaders has 
been the norm, criticism of policies and practices has not become common 
practice. ... Even journalists have some difficulty in directly criticizing leaders 
given the tradition in many of these societies of respect for or awe or fear of 
authority as well as indirect communication styles. 574 
As for the readiness of journalist to accept development functions "as part of their 
jobs, " the authors note: 
[D]evelopment is an important economic sector in developing countries and 
its vocabulary permeates discussion. ... Journalists cannot possibly escape 
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this influence. ... Extending the expectation of communication of 
development messages to the news media is not as much of a stretch in local 
thinking as it might be in the West. 575 
In a small study by Xiaoming Hao, 34 journalists from 29 countries were asked to 
sort 50 opinion statements about journalistic functions. He found that while all generally 
"agreed about the importance of the freedom of the press, journalistic autonomy and news 
media's public service role and watchdog function, they disagreed on government-press 
relations, press ownership and how to handle abuses of press freedom. "576 The author 
concluded that although "the cultural distinction was not absolute in determining how 
journalists landed on the factors, it was the only significant variable in explaining the 
formation of the factors. "577 
A study of Brazilian journalists found them practicing a mix of journalistic 
approaches. "Brazilian journalists perceive themselves as emulating an American 
journalistic model, but they also appear to be driven by some of the old French journalistic 
elements, such as the tendency to produce a more opinionated, partisan journalism, " the 
author reported. 
It is possible that Brazilian journalists are seeking a Brazilian interpretation of 
the American model just like the French journalists have been seeking a 
French interpretation of the American model 578 
The author quoted one leading magazine editor as stating that Brazilian journalism 
was "imitating the appearance but not the substance of American journalism"579 
The gap between normative aspirations and empirical reality was evident in a study 
of Chilean journalists, which revealed "a wide breach or contradiction" between what 
Chilean journalists "understood as important values for journalists [and] their commitment 
to those values. " m While the journalists ranked veracity, critical thinking and independence 
as ideal-types, 58' their perception of how those values were exercised in real life revealed an 
"attitude of dependency and passivity. "5v South African journalists revealed an even more 
basic problem prevalent across the developing world: "interviewees stated that" 30 to 60 
percent of reporters "lacked the ability to develop a story or identity story ideas. " The 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 101 
South African media is still trying to emerge from the apartheid system, in which Black 
journalists were given few opportunities. On the eve of independence, Nelson Mandela 
decried the state of the media. "It is dearly inequitable that in a country whose population is 
overwhelmingly Black ... the principal players in the media have no knowledge of the life 
experience of that majority, " he told an international press gathering. su A decade later, the 
aforementioned study found a lack of analytical and critical skills, a lack of creativity, 
enterprise and personal accountability. Though South Africa presents an extreme example, 
the struggle to build a foundation of professionalism is a common one in countries emerging 
from authoritarian rule. 
In Eastern Europe after the collapse of Communism, "the explosive growth in the 
number of [media] outlets created a plethora of journalistic positions for which no new, 
trained, professional cadres and leaders were available "m The new elite of journalism 
emerged from among the intellectuals of the anti-Communist underground press - 
joumalist-polemicists carrying with them a tradition of advocacy and "doing their best to 
advance the cause of their own political and personal views. " -46A poll of Polish journalists 
conducted in 1990 found them espousing Western ideal-types such as impartiality, 
objectivity, enterprise, ingenuity and courage, but, according to Karol Jakubowski of Polish 
Radio and TV, those ideals "were soon found to be lacking" as the old Communist press 
system was dismantled and Polish journalists embarked on a long search for identity in the 
free-for-all that followed. 587 Those same "malformed structures of public communication" 
existed in Hungary as it made a similar transition. An absence of training; bribery, due in 
part to poor pay; cronyism; and sensationalism all remained huge challenges a decade after 
the yoke of Soviet rule had been thrown off. While a formal code of ethics was produced, in 
reality "ethical standards and the concept of the journalists' role in society [were] in 
disarray. "-Im 
Indeed, Peter Gross observes that across Eastern Europe, "the lack of a clear sense of 
the professional values underlying journalistic enterprise" has led the region's journalists to 
exhibit a lack of respect for verifiable information, mislead themselves into believing they 
are "discoverers of truth" rather than "providers of accurate, verifiable, balanced, complete 
facts; " see themselves as "sociopolitical and cultural leaders; " and refuse to cooperate with 
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fellow journalists. The perception among journalists was that of the media as "counter- 
power" to the government, rather than adversary or watchdog, with an "absence both of a 
consensus on journalistic values, roles and standards" and of objective joumalism. 589 
7) ARABISM, ISLAM & JOURNALISTIC IDENTITY 
At first glance, the theoretical functions of information in the Islamic context are 
strikingly similar to the norms of Western journalism. Islamic journalism theorist Mari 
Makdur offers this definition of the requirements for news in the Islamic press: News should 
(1) be useful and relevant; (2) create knowledge; (3) contain objective images of events, 
thoughts and phenomenon; (4) be free from opinions; and (5) should harmonize with the 
Islamic faith. 590 
There have been relatively few surveys that examine the self-perceptions of Arab 
journalists. In a 1987 study, Mohamed Kirat of Indiana University surveyed 75 Algerian 
journalists to assess their professional characteristics and attitudes toward various 
journalistic norms. He concluded that, "Algerian journalists conceive of the role and 
philosophy of the press within the Algerian context "591 That included a strong 
developmental journalism framework, with priority to the promotion of social change and 
economic development 592Fully one quarter of the journalists defined news as, "Events that 
have something to do with the government, " indicative of the strong government influence 
on Algeria's media system. 5 In another example of the gap between the normative and the 
empirical, 45 percent of the journalists surveyed said it was extremely important or very 
important to criticize the government when needed, which "contradicts the realities of 
Algerian journalism in practice. "5% 
Algeria is an Arab socialist state shaped by its bloody revolution against the French. 
That history was reflected in the fact that more than 73 percent of the journalists said it was 
extremely important for the media to "counterattack foreign propaganda, " yet they 
perceived their second most important function to be one in line with Western journalistic 
norms: "Get the information to the public quickly. " In many other ways, the Algerian 
journalists differed from their Western counterparts, with large percentages seeing it as their 
job to "educate and form a modem Algerian citizen" (69%) and "enhance the objectives of 
the social revolution" (56%). 
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Religion plays an important role in the self-image of the Algerian journalist. Almost 
half saw it as their duty to "enhance the Islamic values among the population" (48%) and 
"religious training" came second only to "newsroom learning" as the most important 
influence in shaping their ethics595 (notably, newsroom learning also rates at the top of 
influences cited by US journalists) 596 
The importance of religion was also emphasized in a survey of journalists working 
on seven Saudi newspapers carried out by Abdulkader Tash in the early 1980s. He found 
that nearly all of the 149 journalists responding to his survey viewed the enhancement of 
Islamic principles of the Saudi people as an important function of the media. 5 7 Propagation 
of Islamic values was also cited as a top priority by 65 percent of newspaper journalists 
surveyed in Kuwait at about the same time, with large majorities on two of the five papers 
holding that view. 598 However, spreading Islamic values still fell ninth on the group's overall 
list of priorities, after such functions as concentrating on news which is of widest interest, 
influencing public opinion, investigating government claims, getting information to the 
public as quickly as possible, and helping achieve the goals of government development 
plans. -,, w As in Algeria, the journalists in Kuwait - the majority of whom were Muslims but 
not Kuwaitis - listed religion and family upbringing as "extremely influential" in shaping 
their ethics, but ranked more senior journalist role models as the number one influence. 6WIn 
a separate study, chief news editors at government-run Kuwait Radio and Television denied 
that their religious beliefs influenced selection of news for broadcasts, but fully one-third 
said their "personal values and opinions" did shape story choices, 601 raising questions about 
to what degree religious beliefs and personal values can be separated in a Muslim society, in 
which Islam is said to provide a "complete system of life for the Muslim community in all its 
details. "601 
Beyond religious considerations, the Saudi journalists expressed the need for a 
balance between the needs of the public and the needs of the government and showed little 
enthusiasm for complete independence. Freedom of the press was rated as the single most 
important need by only 20 percent of the Saudis, about the same number who said more 
professionally-qualified Saudi journalists were needed, and Tash noted that many of the 
more sensitive questions on the survey were left unanswered. In contrast, the newspaper 
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journalists in Kuwait said they would be willing to publish confidential government 
documents without permission and leaned toward a participant press function6m They also 
expressed a much higher regard for their profession than the Saudi journalists. Part of the 
reason for this difference may lay in the fact that Kuwait has had a relatively free press since 
its "liberation" from the Iraqis in 1991, and the majority of journalists there are from Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria and other parts of the Arab world, thus under different kinds of constraints 
from the Saudi nationals operating in a tight-controlled press system where the news media 
follow the "official line. "60 
Not surprisingly, the story for the chief editors at Kuwait TV and Radio was very 
different. The chief editors avoided news stories that they considered to be against the 
interests of Kuwait, the Arab world or "friendly countries, " religiously- or morally- 
unacceptable; propaganda for Iraq or Israel; lacking news value; or for which they didn't 
have adequate resources (e. g. video). Only the last two would likely be sufficient reason to 
kill a story in a Western newsroom. The editors also confirmed what was already obvious to 
their audiences; 96.6 per cent agreed with the statement, "I put news about the emir or the 
crown prince in the first portion of the newscast. "6v But such strictures are not limited to 
government-owned news organs. The Kuwait TV and radio findings were in keeping with a 
1988 study of newscasts on government-owned stations in four Arab countries, which found 
that to editors on the government channels, "news had to be ideologically oriented. " In the 
view of the editors on the government-controlled stations, "news is not neutral. " They 
"ideally sought a balance between the good and the bad, the hard and the soft news. In 
practice, however, domestic news concentrated on the official and the positive. "69 
The role of Arab nationalism in shaping the self-identity of Arab journalists was 
evident in a series of surveys of Arab journalists who took part in training sessions 
organized by the BBC World Service Trust. The 150 media workers surveyed indicated 
strong agreement with the statement that journalism ethics are "mostly determined by the 
ideological and political inclinations" of the news organization for which they work (Syrians 
74%; Lebanese 44%), while half of the Egyptian journalists said they thought the private 
media in their country focused "on the commercial aspect even if it comes at the expense of 
editorial integrity. " Tellingly, 70 percent of the Egyptian journalists said they did not 
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depend on the Egyptian media as their primary source of information about local issues. 
Almost the same number of Lebanese said local reporting was characterized by "political 
bias of news media organizations, " a view with which 41 percent of Syrian journalists 
agreed. 
The Syrian regime has been in a constant state of confrontation with Israel for a half- 
century, and 76 percent of Syrian journalists said it was their job to preserve "a nationalistic 
momentum through a defined media strategy. "610 Roughly two-thirds of the journalists said 
the US position on Palestine was the issue that most affected media attitudes toward the 
United States and the same percentage of the Syrians also said "constant bias against the 
American presence no matter what happens on the ground" characterized Syrian coverage 
of the Iraq conflict. It has been argued that a free press can only exist within a democratic 
system. The Arab journalists appeared to agree, overwhelmingly endorsing the statement 
that, "A democratic regime is essential for a free press" (Syrians 61%; Lebanese 60%; 
Egyptians 61%). However, it is important to remember that many authoritarian regimes in 
the Arab world portray themselves as "democratic. " The code of ethics adopted by Egyptian 
journalists in 1972 called democracy "the only healthy and sound framework for practicing 
political liberties"611 even though the country has effectively been a presidential dictatorship 
for a half-century. 612 
The primacy of Palestine as a marker of Arab identity was also apparent in 
Ramaprasad's survey of Egyptian journalists, conducted with Naila Nabil Hamdy of The 
American University in Cairo. 613 The pair replicated Ramaprasad and Kelly's Nepal study, 614 
with the addition of six statements specific to Egypt's Arab and Islamic heritage. "Support 
the cause of the Palestinians" recorded the highest mean score (4.74 on a five-point scale) 
and "Defend Islamic societies, traditions and values" drew a 4.53 score. Other top responses 
included "Preserve Arabic culture" (4.38), "Strengthen spiritual and moral values" (4.26), 
"Spread a message of pan-Arab unity" (4.16), "Cultivate nationalism/patriotism" (4.24) and 
"Use the media to advance the social development of the country" (4.22). However, two 
functions closely associated with Western journalistic mores ranked second and third: 
"Provide information in a timely manner" (4.72) and "Provide accurate information" (4.68). 
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An analysis of the 36 questions revealed that those grouped in the category "Support 
Arabism/Values" far outscored the other three categories, drawing a 4.50 on the five-point 
scale (the other categories were "Sustain Democracy" (3.90), "Provide Entertainment" (3.78) 
and "Support Government/Country" (3.29)). "Egyptian reporters are socialized into 
considering supporting Arabism/Islam as a basic function of journalism along with 
providing timely and accurate information, " according to Ramaprasad and Hamdy. 615 
When the team examined actual performance of the various functions, "Support 
Arabism/Values, " which is not present in a Western journalistic milieu, was the category of 
functions journalists were most often able to perform and "Sustain Democracy, " the 
dominant media function in Western democracies, was rated last. "Support 
Government/Country, " the group of functions most often associated with the developing 
world, came in third, after "Provide Entertainment, " another function associated with 
Western journalism. The pair concluded: 
Egyptian journalists consider supporting the government, which was the crux 
of the acrimonious debate over journalism during the UNESCO-situated 
debate on the New World Information Order, only average in importance. It 
is support for the Palestinian cause, Islamic values, pan-Arabism and such 
that takes center stage with these journalists 6'6 
Arab and Islamic values also play a large role in the various ethical codes of 
journalism in the Arab and broader Islamic worlds. In an exhaustive comparison of the 
codes of Arab and non-Arab Muslim majority countries and those of European nations, 
German scholar Kai Hafez found that a "deep divide between the European and some Arab 
and Islamic codes exists with respect to the role tradition, mores, and religion play in 
journalism ethics. "617 
... sensitivity to personal rights in Oriental codes is accompanied by much 
lower degree of freedom when it comes to news touching upon interests of 
the state, the nation, or religion. 618 
The Arab and Islamic codes espoused many of the same normative journalistic 
values as those of Europe, speaking of the need for "adherence to objective reality and 
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truth" (Federation of Arab Journalists), a "commitment to the requirements of ethics, 
reliability and truth" (Egyptian Press Syndicate), and the requirement that news reporting 
be "fair and objective" (General Assembly of the Committee of the Press, Pakistan). There is 
also much talk of "freedom. "619 But they come with conditions. 
Although ideas of freedom have entered formal media ethics in the Middle 
East and the Islamic world, only a minority of documents limit the 
interference into freedom to cases where other fundamental rights (e. g., 
privacy) are touched, whereas the majority would have journalists accept 
political, national, religious, or cultural boundaries to their work. 62° 
In an article presenting an Islamic perspective on journalism ethics and 
responsibility, Siddiqi observes that "[T]he meaning and values assigned to concepts such as 
news, truth, objectivity, freedom, people's right to know, and facts, may change according to 
particular circumstances or according to the needs and priorities of a particular society at a 
particular time. "621 Turkey's press charter is unique in that it endorses censorship in the 
name of freedom: 
Nothing that restricts freedom of thought, conscience or expression or is 
damaging or offensive to public morals, religious sentiments or the 
foundations of the institution of family shall be published 622 
The Saudi Arabian Media Charter declares that "the mass media oppose destructive 
trends, atheistic tendencies, materialistic philosophies and attempts to divert Muslims from 
their faith" and guarantees freedom of expression "within the framework of Islamic and 
national objectives and values. "6n Its "guidelines" go on to say that the media's job includes 
"the promotion of the idea of obedience to God, His Messenger, parents and guardians and 
preservation of the established order" and the protection of "the higher interests of Arabs 
and Muslims. "624 
Hafez observes that ethics codes in Middle Eastern and Islamic world "often reveal a 
defensive culture, calling on journalists to protect themselves, their audience, and society 
from dangerous foreign influences, " including that of the foreign media. The 1980 Islamic 
Mass Media charter, adopted at the first Islamic Media Conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, 
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represents one of the most conservative approaches to journalism in the Muslim world. It 
contains an unyielding injunction: "Islamic media-men should censor all materials which are 
either broadcast or published in order to protect the ümmah from influences which are 
harmful to Islamic character and values. " Such a draconian approach to journalism is 
rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslim journalists and contradicts other ethical 
codes of Arab and Islamic countries . 625 In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the most recent code of 
ethics in Indonesia's Alliance of Independent Journalists is one that most closely resembles 
Western codes. 
With the exception of the Islamic Charter, Hafez found that countries on the "Islamic 
periphery" imposed fewer conditions than those in the Arab heartland, a fact that would 
appear to underscore the effect of localized political systems and ethnic or national identity 
on macro-level mores. Arab codes contained widespread references to the need for 
journalists to safeguard "national identity, " the "Arab nation" or "Arab homeland" and 
defend "patriotic values. " It is the duty of journalism to render "a cultural, social, patriotic, 
national and humanitarian service" and "mobilize public opinion in defense of the country, " 
says Lebanon's code, adopted before the civil war. Egypt's 1996 code demands "adherence 
to the patriotic and moral values of the Egyptian society. "626 
Interestingly, a 10-nation poll carried out in the spring of 2006 found that public trust 
in media was highest in Indonesia (88%), followed by two other Muslim-majority countries, 
Nigeria (86%), Egypt (74%), and India (82%), which has the second-largest Muslim 
population in the world. In all those countries (except Egypt, where the question was not 
asked) trust in media dramatically out-ranked trust in government. While almost 90 percent 
of Indonesians said the media strikes the right balance between freedom of speech and 
respect for cultures, the response in the other three countries was in the 60-70 percent range 
and, again with the exception of Indonesia, only 41-47 percent of those surveyed in Nigeria, 
Egypt and India agreed that "journalists are able to report freely. "6v 
Neither the Arab nor the broader Islamic world is a monolith. Each is made up of a 
wide array of cultures, traditions, belief systems and etl nicities. So, too, the ethical codes of 
those regions. Hafez reports that 
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even though various Arab and Islamic codes reveal a strong tendency toward 
traditionalism, they draw upon different secular or religious Islamic legacies 
that are dearly shaped by the national or organizational interests of those 
who designed [them]. While "tradition" is usually expected to refer to a fixed 
canon of historical habits, ways of thought, and so on, there is, in fact, no 
consensus on the contents of tradition among different journalistic codes of 
the Middle East and the Islamic world. 628 
8) GLOBAL JOURNALISM 
So to what degree do journalists around the world share a basic set of norms and 
values? Writing of the evolution of Nigerian journalists 30 years ago, Peter Golding argued 
that "professionalism is induced in the form of an ideological convergence, a necessary 
emulation of the objectives and definitions of ... foreign media. "6" But, as documented 
above, that convergence is not always a smooth one, given "the complicated cultural, 
political and socio-economic structure in which the journalist operates. "° Some scholars, 
such as Alex Edelstein, believe that the very concept of professionalism "is a culture-laden 
concept that cannot be applied usefully to the Third World journalist" who faces "structural 
barriers to the attainment of this status. "' Others go so far as to say that even American 
journalists cannot be consider to be part of a "profession" in its strictest sense, because 
"there is no system of abstract propositions to which new recruits are exposed and without 
which they cannot practice. " 632 In short, anyone can call him or herself a journalist, and in 
this age of bloggers and "online journalism", anyone does . &u 
Then there is the argument that journalism should, in fact, evolve in synch with the 
political and cultural milieu in which it operates. African media scholar Francis Nyamnjoh 
makes a strong argument that there is an essential conflict of value frameworks between 
Western media norms - and those of the liberal-democratic societies they represent - and 
the community consciousness of most African societies. 
Almost everywhere, liberal democratic assumptions have been made about 
the media and their role in democratization and society, with little regard to 
the histories, cultures and sociologies of African societies. The difficulties of 
media in action must be understood not only as failures but also, and more 
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importantly, as pointers to the very inadequacies of the liberal democratic 
model in Africa. 634 
In the context of Eastern Europe, Gross believes that while the Western ideal-values 
of journalism might be something which journalists in societies in transition will eventually 
adopt, in the meantime 
the media need to play still other roles: they need to serve as socializers, as 
champions of a democratic political culture, and, to that end, as teachers and 
mobilizers (in the larger sense of the word) and not simply guard dogs and 
disseminators of information 
In comparing the results of surveys of journalists in 21 countries, predominantly 
from the West and developed world, Weaver ultimately concludes that the absence of 
agreement on the norms and values of journalism prevent the emergence of "universal 
occupational standards. "6m Similarly, in terms of the developing world, Romano observes 
that: 
"With so many different definitions of development (or liberation or human 
development or emancipation or good governance) and how it should be 
achieved, and so many different socio-political systems in the developing 
world, it would appear not merely difficult, but in fact futile to attempt to 
devise a coherent, universal development press model' 7 
When Kirat compared his own Algerian results to surveys of American, Nigerian 
and Saudi journalists, he found that "each group of journalists conceives of the role of the 
press according to the peculiarities of its country. " Merrill sees a unifying trait among 
journalists, but it is, on the surface, a dark one. "In spite of varying moral and religious 
values around the world, there is one dominant perspective that affects every press system's 
ethics: Machiavellianism. " 
This might be national progress or supremacy; it might be achieving political 
party objectives; it might be cooperating with or contending with 
government; it might be making profits for the institution or individual 
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person or family; it might be propagating certain perspectives or values. But 
whatever the purpose, the desire is to succeed ... using whatever means will 
work. 639 
While he acknowledges "slivers of moral concern" among journalists, Merrill worries 
that the media, "as part of Big Business in its giant corporate and internationalized power, 
has become a kind of mental and emotional form of Leviathan that oppresses and 
exploits. " "O He and others warn of the danger involved in forcing Western values and mores 
on emerging media systems: "[I]t is counterproductive or even dangerous for the West to try 
to impose on all countries a libertarian journalism. Certain countries, due to international 
power circumstances, may for a time be drawn to a free press, but it might be contrary to the 
natural national or regional realities. "641 Yet Merrill betrays a streak of Orientalism when he 
argues that because "[m]ost of these countries are still dose to tribalism ... centralization of 
power is important and ... Machiavellianism in government, and by projection, in the mass 
media is not a negative. ""2He might want to run that theory past the 125 journalists 
imprisoned around the world in 2005, or the families of the 338 reporters killed in the 
decade ending that year. However, his basic point stands: not every journalist puts the 
American system on a pedestal. 
g) JOURNALISTIC IDENTITY 
Journalists - like everyone else - are shaped by a complex mix of factors which 
together mold their worldview; so, too, their news organizations. And as this writer 
documented in his study of post-9/11 polarization of attitudes between the US and the 
Muslim world, those worldviews ultimately shape their reporting. The effect of the 
audience to whom they are reporting also has a substantial impact on shaping coverage. "To 
survive, a newspaper must reflect a specific audience, " according to Chicago Tribune 
publisher Fuller. "It must share with its readers a sensibility and a set of interests, tastes and 
values. -6" Those "values" may vary slightly between cities and regions in the US or Europe; 
they are likely to vary dramatically between cultures, such as those of the Judeo-Christian 
West and the Muslim world. "Moral discernment and behavior are based on internalized 
values arising from past choices and experiences, " according to Sidney Callahan" 
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In an examination of the literature on professional identities among journalists 
around the world, Indiana University professor Mark Deuze concludes that while the 
existence of journalism schools on every continent and international academic journals 
about the industry would seem to suggest that journalism as an object of practice and study 
is based on "a consensual body of knowledge [and] a widely shared understanding of key 
theories and methods ... [a]las, this is not the case'. "' 
Although the ideology of journalism is an approach widely used in the 
literature, only rarely has it been adequately defined and operationalized to 
fit immediate concerns in a pragmatic way ... only rarely do their 
approaches, understandings or philosophies meet "7 
However, Deuze cites his own examination of national news cultures in three 
European countries, "8 Australia and the US, as well as another four-country study, 649 to 
endorse Dahlgren's notion of a "dominant ideology" of journalism. Deuze concludes: 
What these overall findings and conclusions suggest is that journalists in 
elective democracies share similar characteristics and speak of similar values 
in the context of their daily work, but apply these in a variety of ways to give 
meaning to what they doP' 
Deuze goes on to set out five ideal-typical values of "journalism's ideology, " based 
largely on the core norms and values of American journalism as cited above by Kovach and 
Rosentheil: (1) public service, (2) neutrality or objectivity, (3) autonomy, (4) a sense of 
immediacy, (5) and a sense of ethics and legitimacy 652 The ideal-types are in line with 
Weaver's contention that journalists around the world are bound by a common desire to 
operate in an environment free of censorship, government and corporate pressures, editorial 
autonomy and an environment that fosters professional growth&" 
However, since it is empirically based on Western journalistic cultures in "elective 
democracies, " Deuze's model is not necessarily applicable elsewhere in the world. And, as 
noted above, even in the US that American ideal-type is rarely attained. According to the 
authoritative State of the News Media report in 2006, roughly half of all journalists felt 
American journalism was "going in the wrong direction, " plagued by a tendency to avoid 
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complex issues (86%), sacrifice accuracy for immediacy (50%), timidity (56%) and sloppy 
reporting (52%). 6m Such findings lead some scholars, such as Beate Josephi, to ask, "[Wjhy 
should a model stay a model if it is so far removed from what is actually practiced in 
newsrooms around the world? "655 
10) THE CULTURE OF JOURNALISM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
For all the talk of the "culture" or "ideology" of journalism, Thomas Hanitzsch 
argues that there have been few attempts to elaborate on precisely what a journalistic 
"culture" consists of in the international realm "'[Jjournalism culture' has become an 
increasingly vague concept, inviting misunderstanding and theoretical ambiguity, " he 
says. '57 This is, in part, because the bulk of cross-cultural journalism research has been cross- 
national rather than at the macro-societal systematic level. Stephen Reese of the University 
of Texas-Austin concurs: "Comparing across systems yields different insights than 
comparing within and calls for crucial distinctions between the phenomenon of interest and 
its surrounding structural context "58 
Reese has proposed a "hierarchy-of-influences" model for understanding what he 
calls "the global journalist. " This involves taking into account the individual attitudes, 
training and background of the journalist; the routines of his/her job; the goals and policies 
of the organization for which s/he works; the other institutions with which the journalist 
comes into contact; and an "ideological" perspective that examines how all of the above 
interact "within a web of organizational and ideological constraints. "59 
Reese adapts this approach from a theory of the same name he developed earlier 
with Pamela Shoemaker. That original hierarchy of influences model was built on the basic 
assumption that, "Mass media content is a socially created product, not a reflection of an 
objective reality. "660 The approach posits that the influences on media content can be ranked 
hierarchically from ideology and system-level factors down to the characteristics of 
individual media workers, with each level subsuming the one below. Elements of this 
hierarchy include the background, personal attitudes and role of the journalist; the routines 
of the journalistic job; organizational influences such as ownership, degree to which it is 
profit-driven, management style, and proximity of the corporate ownership to the news 
organization itself and the "community" it covers; "extramedia" influences such as 
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relationship to sources, advertisers and government, and the size and characteristics of the 
organization's area of coverage. Finally, drawing on Gramsci's theory of hegemony, 661 
Shoemaker and Reese factor in "ideological" influences, such as relationship with society's 
elites, perception of what is accepted by society and what is "deviant, " and, in international 
news, the prevailing sense of the relative political, economic or cultural relevance of a 
country to the one in which the news organization is based 662 
The original work was fairly Amero-centric, with many references to the US 
newsroom, and observations - e. g. "[T]elevision coverage will be more ideologically 
charged than the print media, " and 'The journalistic routine of objectivity overrules an 
individual's tendency to communicate his or her opinion"", - that are questionable at best 
when discussing journalism in other parts of the world, but its broader theoretical 
components can readily be adapted to the international media landscape. 
In the Arab context, for example, the shift from direct government ownership of 
television channels to more (semi-) independent models has had a profoundly liberating 
effect on the style of coverage. But, as Sakr has documented, the dominance of oligarchies on 
the regional level and cronyism on the local/national level means the practice of journalism 
is wildly uneven. 664 Other elements of the model also ring true: Distance from the scene of 
news events gives the pan-Arab channels far more freedom than terrestrial news 
organizations; economic pressure from investors and advertisers is a daily reality for many 
Arab editors; and the idea of a dominant media narrative - or "news frame""5 - about what 
is accepted and what is "deviant" can be seen on the pages of newspapers and television 
screens on almost any given day. It was that flexibility that enabled Reese to adapt the 
model for what he describes as a "sociology-of-media" approach that investigates "the 
structural context of journalism on the international stage. " 
Simplifying the original hierarchy-of-influences structure, Reese posits five key levels 
that influence the process of gathering and disseminating news. The most basic is the 
individual level, which acknowledges that, first and foremost, the "power to shape news is 
held by the individual journalist, whose attitudes, training and background are studied. " A 
second factor Reese takes into account are the routines involved in the collection and 
processing of news, which, he says, limit the ability of journalists to "act on their beliefs and 
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attitudes. " At the organizational level, the model focuses on who wields power and how it is 
exercised. Who makes decisions? How are they enforced? What are the boundaries of the 
organization and do journalists voluntarily choose not to cross them? In other words, do 
they self-censor? The extra-media level examines the way news organizations are 
subordinated to larger interests, whether that involves networks of corporate relationships, 
socio-political ties, or other "systematic, patterned, and ongoing ways media are connected 
with their host society. " And finally, the ideological level pulls together all the other strands 
to reach a conclusion about "how media symbolic content is connected with larger social 
interests. "w 
Reese acknowledges that a lack of agreement on journalistic values and quality 
complicates implementation of the model, but insists it minimizes the Western biases he 
says have undermined cross-national research: 
[E]ach country may be considered a laboratory for press performance, as we 
evaluate the conditions that contribute to enhancing professional autonomy 
and good journalism. 667 
However, "good" journalism is a normative concept when applied to the global 
stage. Reese fails to overtly take into account the impact of societal culture, ethnicity, 
religion and related factors on journalistic ideology; though one could argue it is implicit in 
the catch-all term "attitudes. " He mentions culture parenthetically, but never acknowledges 
that an essential divergence in worldviews - shaped by culture, religion, family, politics and 
a host of other factors - may also have a fundamental impact on the journalist's professional 
ideology. Barbie Zelizer is among those who has noted the importance of factoring in culture 
to analyze a journalist's "own sense of self" and what is important to him/her. 
For that, we turn to back to Thomas Hanitzsch. Building on his work in Indonesia 
and drawing heavily on Shoemaker and Reese, Hanitzsch produced a framework for 
mapping the culture of journalism in "diverse cultural contexts" by approaching the field 
through the prism of cross-cultural research, which studies ideas, practices and artifacts. In 
this case, that refers to the values, attitudes and beliefs of journalists, their methods of 
production and the product of that process. "Journalism culture becomes manifest in the 
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way journalist think and act; it can be defined as a particular set of ideas and practices by 
which journalists, consciously or unconsciously, legitimate their role in society and render 
their work meaningful for themselves and others, " according to Hanitzsch. 669 
In the process of producing news, he sees journalism culture manifest at three levels: 
" The cognitive, which is the "foundational structure" upon which the perception 
and interpretation of news and news work takes place; 
" The evaluative, which drive the "professional worldviews" or role perceptions of 
journalists, and the "occupational ideologies" of journalism, such as objectivity 
and investigation; and, 
" The performance level, the largely "unconscious structures" such as reporting 
methods and news formats, that make up the professional practices of journalists. 
Hanitzsch distinguishes between the terms "ideology" and "culture" in his 
observations about how journalists operate. He equates ideologies with the professional 
practices and values that Deuze has called the "cultural cement"' of journalism. But, he 
insists 
[j]ournalism culture is more than ideology; it is the arena in which diverse 
professional ideologies struggle over the dominant interpretation of 
journalism's social function and identity. 671 
He proposes a multidimensional taxonomy that, similar to Shoemaker and Reese, 
divides the (1) "institutional" roles of the profession, which are built around the prevailing 
culture of the newsroom in which the journalist operates; (2) the "epistemologies" or beliefs 
of the journalists on issues such as objectivity; and (3) the "ethical ideologies" of the 
journalist, most specifically the "moral values" that "are inevitably culture-bound. " The 
approach ultimately yields a seven-dimensional structure for analyzing the constituents that 
produce the worldview of the journalist, no matter where s/he operates: 
Although the various dimensions of journalism culture do more or less 
surface in all nations and media organizations, the relative importance of 
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these dimensions is likely to vary [revealing] a universe of diverse and 
coexisting worlds of journalism 672 
11) MODELS FOR A 'GLOBAL JOURNALISM ETHIC' 
There has been much written in recent years about the emergence of a "global ethic" 
of journalism. Many of these articles are produced by Western academics safely ensconced 
in the ivory towers of North America and Europe and are peppered with unyielding 
dictates: Journalists "should" do this, they "must" do that, they are "required" to act in a 
certain way. Such prescriptions for a "new" journalism are thick with "paradigms, " 
"hierarchies" and "models, " often drenched in a sauce of cultural imperialism. 673 Sidney 
Callahan, for example, would seem to believe that journalists operate in a world of moral 
absolutes: 
"The universality of ethical standards of journalism exists because ethics and 
morality are a universal human enterprise based on the discovery of 
universal moral truths by human beings with a common human nature 
always and everywhere. ... The human family is one. Evolutionary 
psychologists assure us of "the psychic unity" of human beings who share 
pan-species characteristics. ... There can be many versions of the golden rule 
in different religions and in different philosophical systems of morality. 674 
A few go so far as to envision a media Utopia in which the borderless footprint of 
television is populated by a new breed of borderless journalists who report not through the 
prism of their own cultural worldview, but rather affect a "cosmopolitan attitude. "675 
Stephen Ward sketches out a set of three "imperatives, " to whit: "... to act as a global agent, 
to serve world citizens, and to enhance nonparochial understandings. "676 
Roberto Herrscher would impose a Universal Code that includes a provision to "deal 
with the treatment of ethnic groups, sexes, minorities, religious and sexual persuasions, and 
other groups" because "[f]or the journalist, all people are equal. " '"The easiest experiment, " 
he writes, is to see if an article about a woman, an Indian, a gay man, or a Muslim would be 
written in the same way if it dealt with a White, Protestant, straight man. "677 "Easy, " in the 
West perhaps, but not in a Muslim society where the story about the woman, by dint of 
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culture and mores, would likely not take the same tone, 678 and the article about the gay 
would probably not be written at all. 
"A global ethics is a bulwark against undue influence of parochial values and social 
pressures on journalism, " according to Ward 6w But Saleh el-Saybehmi, political columnist of 
Khaleej Times in the United Arab Emirates told researchers Shakuntala Rao and Scow Ting 
Lee, "A discussion of media ethics is useless here where every bit of news is tightly 
controlled. The mere discussion of ethics implies the existence of some degree of freedom to 
make choices. We don't have that "681 Added an editor on the Gulf Nervs who did not want his 
name used: 
And what use would such a code be to me? The broadcasting code we have 
says we cannot criticize even the seventh cousin of the Sheikh ... If the code 
includes 'tell the truth' and if we are to tell the truth, we will be put to 
death-611 
The reporters with whom the researchers spoke expressed suspicion that there was 
some tie between the search for a global ethic and 9/11 and that they would be required to 
"sit and cry" about American dead when "there is no one to cry" about Arabs who are 
killed, "especially in the American media. "60 The researchers reported: 
These journalists were generally concerned that any discussion on global 
media ethics would be dominated by Western interests and particularly by 
the interests of American media to promote a certain viewpoint. ... The 
postcolonial suspicion among journalists is a complicated mix of negative 
reactions toward Western interests who have historically "told us what to do" 
and governments of their own nations who have made frequent attempts to 
sabotage free exchange of information 
"American communication scholars of press-government relations begin most of 
their studies with a basic premise, that Western-style libertarian press theory is what the rest 
of the world should accept, " according to Merrill. Such a viewpoint, he continues, is "not 
only an arrogant and ethnocentric one but also betrays a stultifying view of reality. " 
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Cultures are different. The values that shore up such cultures are different. 
Citizen expectations are different.... [Yet] [t]he communication scholar or 
researcher is largely defined by ethnocentric forces that push away conflicting 
assumptions and articulate even basic hypotheses in the familiar and 
confining ethnocentric formulations. 615 
As noted above, much of Western media theory is based on the assumption that 
political "freedom" is a requirement for journalism to be practiced. Of course, to date that 
"freedom" and what constitutes "journalism" have largely been defined by the West. Most 
existing trans-national codes of ethics, such as those of ASEAN, the Arab Federation of 
Journalists, the Islamic Media Charter and the International Principles of Professional Ethics 
in journalism, do not even mention freedom of expression, "probably because it is hard to 
find a consensus on freedom issues among organizations with varying political 
backgrounds, " according to Hafez. 686 
The very issue of the corrupting influence of Western-style media "freedom" has 
helped alienate many living in the broad sweep of the Muslim world, producing what 
Pakistani scholar Akbar Ahmed calls "the restless generation" now coming of age in Muslim 
societies: 
It has grown up with the media and feels familiar with American culture. It is 
ambiguous about what it sees: it cannot live by the American standards it 
observes, yet paradoxically, it wants them. It also feels contempt for much of 
what it sees on television (particularly sex and violence) and believes it to be 
representative of American society. Frustrated, it finds its only legitimate 
sense of identity in its own traditional civilization, which is Islam. This 
generation therefore emphasizes its Islamic identity by rejecting the West "7 
The impact of television violence and explicit sexual content, the negative health 
consequences and psychological impact of advertising, the triumph of sensationalism and 
infotainment over serious news, the way in which media jingoism has paved the way to war 
and a host of other media effects have been extensively documented in the scholarly 
literature and mainstream media around the world . 6m Akbar Ahmed of Cambridge calls this 
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the "demon" media, in reference to jean Baudrillard's The Evil of Images; "The media have 
aspects of a demon because they're almost like a demon lover. you're seduced by them, can't 
get away from them. " In the process, he says, "all the traditional values, " including "the 
most central unit in Muslim societies, " the family itself, are being undermined by "the box 
... in the comer. "689 
Yet the assumption that American journalism trumps all other models remains at the 
foundation of much of the scholarship on international journalism. In response to Rao and 
Lee's questions about the efficacy of a global journalism ethic, the journalists they spoke 
with proposed their own set of "universal" ethics: Respect Others, Tolerance for Religious 
and Cultural Diversity, Freedom and Independence, and Tell the Truth with Restraint 690 
That last item alone, "truth with restraint, " reflects the yawning gap in self-perception that 
exists between US reporters and their colleagues in other parts of the world. Such a 
disconnect should be no great surprise. Cultural psychologists tell us that the "influence of 
values and of economic prosperity imply that a number of Western political axioms cannot 
be applied to non-Western countries and are not very helpful as global guidelines. "691 
Citing Rao and Lee, South African scholar Herman Wasserman goes a step further, in 
proposing a postcolonial revision of existing media theories "to renegotiate the orthodox 
media ethical frameworks inherited from Western societies and contextualize it within the 
current historical, (geo)political and cultural junction" of the developing world. 6n Under 
Wasserman's framework. 
1. The media's "watchdog" role would be focused not only on government but also 
on "the effects of globalization and the configuration of geo-political power; 
2. Western frameworks for ethical conduct of the media would be "hybridized" 
with local cultural value systems, recognizing "the fluid notion of identity" in 
"newly dominant" postcolonial identity discourses, with media textbooks being 
written from the point of view of those "on the margins of power" and media 
institutions providing "a space from where the subaltern can speak; " and, 
3. Normative media theories would be adjusted to "rectify the blind spot" toward 
the impact of economic power on the state and the media itself. 
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Around the world, media scholars are grappling with new models that take 
economic, political, social, cultural, religious and a variety of other factors into account when 
evaluating what Westerners often perceive as "imperfections" in the media, while 
responsible journalists, consciously or not, seek ways to integrate their own unique 
perspectives - and the realities of the world in which they live - into the normative values 
Western journalists have long held up as the Holy Grail. 
Reporting on developments in the former Soviet bloc, deBeer and Merrill observed 
that those countries have shaken off the trappings of the old system and "have edged 
toward a new but uncertain kind of journalism. "693 It is a comment that is equally applicable 
to the Arab world, a region in the midst of violent upheaval and systematic change. 
-0- 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 122 
CHAPTER VI: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -A SUMMARY 
Urgent questions remain unanswered ... their address 
rests in the spaces between disciplinary frames and the 
interpretive communities that embody them. 
BARBIE ZELIZER 
GOING BEYOND DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES694 
As noted in the introduction, this dissertation is, by definition, interdisciplinary. It 
approaches the study of Arab Muslim journalists from the direction of Islamic studies, but 
must accommodate a variety of factors touching on multiple disciplines, including Islamic 
studies, international relations and media studies. 
Therefore, to reiterate the point made in the preceding chapters, I am adopting a 
multidisciplinary framework that includes the following: 
1. Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" theory of nationalism, which 
offers a system and vocabulary for understanding the role of communications in 
shaping "nations" in all senses of the word; 
2. The theory of post-Islamism, specifically as elaborated by Peter Mandaville, a 
structure that provides insight into the evolution of Muslim politics and the 
"overlapping consensus" between Arab Islamists and those of other political 
persuasions; and, 
3. The "hierarchy-of-influences" model of Shoemaker and Reese, supported by 
Hanitzsch's multidimensional structure of journalism culture. Together, these 
provide a context for examining and understanding the manifold influences that 
are shaping attitudes among journalists in the Arab world. 
While not every element of these theories necessarily applies to the Middle East of 
the twenty-first century, they together provide us with a framework for understanding the 
forces at work among Arab journalists, as reflected in their responses to the survey at the 
core of this work. 
-0- 
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SECTION Two: ARAB MEDIA 
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CHAPTER VII: EVOLUTION OF THE ARAB MEDIA 
"As long as you don't write about the king, the military, 
religion or sex you can cover anything you want. " 
SAMEN AL MAHARIQ, JORDANIAN JOURNALIST695 
1) JOURNALISM UNDER SIEGE 
The Arab media is deep in the throes of change. It is a complex and often painful 
process, driven by regional rivalries, steeped in domestic political intrigue, and too often 
marred by physical violence. 
"Anyone who tells you they are not scared silly is lying, " retired An-Nahar publisher 
Ghassan Tueni, the living symbol of Lebanese media independence, said in the autumn of 
2005 as we sat in his office overlooking Beirut's port and newly reborn downtown 6% 
Lebanon - and its media - had been experiencing a renaissance after decades of internecine 
violence during which most of the country's polarized media outlets were willing weapons 
of civil war. Now media was once more on the firing line, this time in a confrontation over 
Syrian influence in Lebanon. 
As we spoke, a leading Lebanese television anchor, Mai Chidiac, lay fighting for her 
life after an assassination attempt, and in the An-Nahar newsroom down the hall stood a 
silent memorial to one of the paper's columnists, Samir Kassir, blown up when he turned 
the ignition key of his car a few months before. "We built this glass tower as a symbol of the 
new Lebanon, " Tueni said. "Now it has become a fortress under siege. I'm waiting for 
someone on one of those ships out there to fire a rocket through my window. " Two months 
later, his son, An-Nahar publisher Gibran Tueni, was dead; his armored sports utility vehicle 
torn apart by a remote- controlled car bomb. The assassins struck less than 24 hours after the 
heir to the journalistic dynasty had returned from Paris, where he had been in self-exile after 
being warned he was at the top of a hit list. The Tueni assassination sent a chill through the 
Lebanese media, but for journalists there, fear was nothing new. "For years we had this 
paranoia for us journalists, " said Tania Mehanna, a reporter at the privately-owned 
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). "Every time you get into your car before you 
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turn the key you think it is the last time. Then you have another kind of pressure, which is 
the phone call which you get from the politician or from some kind of faction where they 
want to stop what you filmed during the day or they put pressure on the TV station not to 
run the story. "697 "I do not say anything related to politics, hate politics, " explained Hadia 
Sirrow, a reporter for the newspaper Al Mustaqbal. "But you feel that you are involved too. 
So we're in this house and we are scared. "698 
Media has always been a tool of power, nowhere more so than the Arab world, a 
region in which every country but three - Kuwait, Lebanon and Egypt - were ranked as 
"not free" on the 2008 Freedom House press freedom survey. 699 "There's much to 
demonstrate in the last six or seven decades that media were accomplices in the general 
political cover-up of the truth, " according to Lebanese Information Minister Michel 
Samaha. And as Jamil Mroue, publisher of Beirut's Daily Star told a Dubai gathering in late 
2005, the media continued to serve as "tools" of political structures in which "control is the 
name of the game. "0t 'The Arab media is still very much state-owned and state-controlled, " 
agreed Anwar Gargash, a political science professor at United Arab Emirates University. 
"The way forward is to break the chains of the media. "702 
As the levers of media control, and thus the power to shape perceptions, slowly- 
very slowly-began to shift away from governments at the dawn of the twenty-first century, 
Arab journalists were being buffeted by an array of competing forces - some lethal - as they 
attempted to redefine themselves and their profession. "Profession" That word alone 
epitomized the sea-change underway in a region where reporters had too often served as 
apologists for dictators and autocrats or sold their souls for an envelope of cash. Most Arab 
journalists remained subject to pressures that ranged from subtle political 'guidance' to 
threats of imprisonment and death, as the assassinations and attempted assassinations of 
journalists in Lebanon so vividly demonstrated. Yet in newsrooms across the Arab world, 
journalists were exhibiting a newfound sense of professional purpose. 
This writer is part of a generation of American reporters who flocked to journalism 
schools in the early 1970s. Vietnam and Watergate had inspired us to believe we could 
change the world. That same sense of excitement could be found among aspiring young 
Arab reporters - the journalistic children of the Al Jazeera generation. "I can't criticize from 
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within my country, " wrote one of my journalism students at The American University in 
Cairo, explaining why she wanted to report for the Arab satellite channels, "but journalism 
allows me to criticize from outside and begin to make things different. " Even many of the 
elders of Arab journalism had a new view of themselves and their mission. "We can't say 
the government changed the media, we changed the media, " said Hassan Amr, a long-time 
reporter for Egypt's official press who helped found an independent newspaper called Al- 
Fajr (The Dawn) to signify that a new day has arrived. "We face pressures but enjoy a lot of 
freedom now. Even in the [government-controlled] national newspapers, there is a lot of 
change taking place. "M It is "an exciting and disgusting" time to be a journalist, LBC anchor 
Tania Mehanna told me. 704 
Everywhere the rules were in flux; everywhere reporters struggled to maintain their 
equilibrium on the constantly shifting sands. In Egypt, where media regulations adopted in 
1995 were referred to by journalists as the "Press Assassination Law, '70 the 2005 election 
campaigns brought a slight loosening of the reins on media, but in its wake, scores of 
journalists-including women-were attacked, beaten, threatened or jailed. "Egyptian 
journalism, " says Osama al-Ghazli Harb, chief editor of AI-Siyasah AI-Dawliyah, "'is 
developing on a tortured journey due to political manipulation. "7w In Iraq, the deadliest 
place in the world for reporters and home to scores of new media outlets, journalists were 
being killed for being perceived as too close to the government, too dose to the resistance or 
too dose to particular political parties. "Sometimes they target journalists just to scare 
journalists in general, " according to Al-Arabiya Executive Editor Nabil Khatib. Militant 
groups ran their own pseudo-news agencies and one motive for the attacks was to make it 
impossible for other news organizations to operate. "They are supplying the media [with 
information and footage] and they pressure you in a way to impose their agenda on you, ' 
Khatib explained. "Of course we refuse, because we do not want to be used by any party 
whoever it is - so we pay the price. "707 The tactics were effective. By the spring of 2007, Al- 
Arabiya had lost 11 staffers to Iraq's violence, several in targeted assassinations, and was left 
relying largely on local freelancers. "You feel that you are covering the war as if through 
glass, " said Khatib. 
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In less violent locales, the risks were different, but still very real. Saudi Arabia's AI- 
Watan went through four editors in three years as news executives tried to interpret 
conflicting signals from within the House of Saud, even as the number of journalists 
detained in the Kingdom continued to climb. That wasn't the only consequence of straying 
from the party line. For example, a religious court ordered journalist Mansour Nogaidan of 
the daily Al-Riaydh, to receive 75 lashes for "calling for freedom of speech and criticizing 
Wahabism, " Saudi Arabia's strict interpretation of Islam. He refused to report to the police 
for his punishment And across the region, many journalists were paying the ultimate 
price. In all, at least 72 Arab journalists were killed between 2001 and 2007, only some of 
them in the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine. Examples included Algerian newscaster Murad 
Belqasem, 43, stabbed in his apartment; Kuwaiti writer Hidaya Salem, 65, shot to death 
parking her car; 29-year old Libyan writer Deif Al-Ghazal, who had his fingers cut off and 
was stabbed multiple times in various parts of his body before he was shot dead; Sudanese 
writer Mohammad Taha, 50, tortured and killed for writings that were considered offensive 
to the system and the community; and Palestinian Khalil Ziben, 59, known for his 
controversial writings over the Palestinian internal situation, who was killed as he was 
about to get in his car early one moming. 7(v 
In May 2007,1 received the following email from Palestinian journalist and student 
Mohammed Omer, who was born and raised in a refugee camp outside the border town of 
Rafah in Gaza, from where he continued to report: 
I'm scared, i was almost killed or at least bleeding till death. three militants 
were dosing all roads and they sudden, they said to me stop during the 
curfew, i stop and then the masked-men open fire under my feet hitting the 
ground under my feet. i thought I'm killed, and i could not explain or scream 
as the shooting was louder than my scream, so I said: "No, don t do that, stop 
stop, please" oh, i was in tears, this is the first time I'm begging someone not 
to kill me, and then the other guy who's also militant was standing in my side 
and said, we don't want to kill him, lets shoot him in his legs and leave him 
bleed. I said, what? why? and then he said, your ID, I show it with the press 
card and then they let me go. I was scared that they would shoot at me once I 
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turn my back, but alhamdllah this didn't happen, I was scared, scared, scared 
to death this was not pleasant experience, and they were doing this, as I got 
stuck and could not find transport back home, so I went walking in the 
streets. I'm scared to death those are just evil and terrible people. I don't wish 
to be in that position again i can't stand in my feet anymore, I feel pain and 
scared. those [gunmen] are working for preventive security, which is working 
closely with Israelis. I was wearing my bullet proof vest, but this didn't 
protect me enough. today, more than 10 were killed and tens were injured, 
many by Israelis, but still some by Palestinian dashes between Hamas and 
Fateh. they don't want this to be reported. I didn't tell about this to my 
mother, she will be scared again! 
sad greetings! 
Mohammed71o 
In September 2008, this email arrived: 
Dear Lawrence, 
sorry for not being able to keep in touch lately, but it's due to mistreatment 
and torture that I had to go through. 
Mohammed71 
"I am not exaggerating when I say the Arab press is witnessing one of the worst 
periods of its life, " Salaheddine El Hafez, vice editor-in-chief of Egypt's Ai Ahram newspaper 
and secretary general of the Arab Journalists Association, told a press freedom conference in 
late 2006. "The margins of freedom for the Arab press are severely limited and we have 
evidence of that in our daily lives. "712 That was the view of a top official of the leading 
government-controlled newspaper in the Arab world. Imagine then the perspective of those 
in the so-called "independent press, " - so called because in most Arab countries, they, too, 
depended on the government newspapers for printing, distribution and, in some cases, 
advertising. The result can be seen in Figure VII-1. It shows the front page of The Daily Star 
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Egypt the day after an opposition rally in 2007. Figure VII-2 is a close-up of the anti- 
government message that was written on the protestor's placard before the paper was sent 
to the printing plant run by the government-controlled Al-Ahram, where the message was 
whited out, leaving only the empty placard. From there, the paper was distributed by Al- 
Ahrarn's delivery trucks to the nation's news stands, which are also owned by Al-Ahram. 
"We didn't know (about the censorshipl until we saw the sprinted] copies; what were we 
supposed to do, ask that they all be returned to us? " Daily Star publisher Mirette Mabrouk 
ruefully asked later. 713 
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Even the so-called "media free zones" - such as the Media City complexes in Dubai 
and Cairo - which were supposed to allow news organizations to operate unhampered by 
local government control, proved to be something less than completely "free". Abdel Bari 
Atwan, the editor-in-chief of London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which is a thorn in the side of 
the Saudi government, says he was refused permission to set up in Dubai's Media City, 
home to many of the region's pan-Arab satellite channels. His paper was also suffering from 
an ongoing advertising boycott by the region's advertising agencies, which are largely 
owned by, or answerable to, the Saudis. It was the same boycott that prevented A1-Jazeera 
from reaching profitability, even though it has the highest news ratings in the Middle East 
and was regularly ranked as one of the best known brands in the world. "Once we have 
advertisement in our newspaper, there is a phone call [to the advertiser] from the Saudi 
`-P c? Is Kefaya teal ui of 
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ministry of information. 'Why do you publish advertisement in a hostile newspaper, ' [they 
ask the advertiser]. You have to watch yourself because we could cause problems for your 
business in our country. ' Even on the internet they blocked our site in Saudi Arabia, " 
explained Atwan, who claimed his paper was $200,000 in debt as a result. 71* 
It may have been true that, as Al-Jazeera anchor M'Hamed Krichen put it to me, "We 
no longer have presidents or leaders as prophets" and governments no longer had "the 
monopoly on truth, " but those governments - and the men who led them - still controlled 
many of the purse-strings, which meant to a large degree, they continued to control the 
message and the messengers. " 
2) JOURNALISM IN THE LEVANT 
Lebanon has always been the region's media Tower of Babel; its highly ideological 
press representing-often bought and paid for by-a range of Middle East governments and 
political movements. As the new century dawned, that was still true. What began to change 
in the spring of 2005 was the way reporters looked at themselves and each other. The media- 
led popular uprising against Syrian occupation that year produced a shared sense of 
mission. Journalism itself - briefly - began to emerge as a new ideology. "We feel we can no 
longer just represent some, we must represent all, " I was told by a young reporter with the 
traditionally pro-Syrian newspaper As-Safir, which was reevaluating its own mission 
following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. But life at the hard edge of media 
independence can be dangerous. Journalist May Chidiac learned that in the fall of 2005 
when her left arm and leg were blown off by a bomb placed under the seat of her car. An 
anchor and talk show host at the privately-owned Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, she 
had been an outspoken critic of Syrian involvement in Lebanon. The bombing was seen by 
journalists as a clear message to all those who dared use the media to attack the Damascus 
regime. 
Driving down the coastal highway from Jounieh to Beirut after a televised media 
solidarity rally a few days after the attempt on Chidiac's life, anti-Syrian radio talk show 
host Rima Njeim fielded serial phone calls-one hand on the wheel of her BMW, the other 
on the phone-as her producer, Johnny el-Saddik, told me of the endless death threats 
Njeim received from what Lebanese reporters had come to call "the unseen hand. " Warned 
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one email: "We know where your children go to school. " Unlike Njeim, many reporters in 
Lebanon no longer drove their own cars for fear of what might happen when they turned 
the ignition key. Some were also censoring themselves. "I think my life is more important 
than any other thing, " Caroline Beaini, Beirut correspondent for Abu Dhabi TV, told me 
later that same day. "Even if I am a journalist, that does not mean that I should die for the 
cause. The cause is not worth enough to die for. " 
In a twisted kind of way, the attacks on reporters in Lebanon were a compliment to 
the growing influence of Arab journalism. In the weeks before his assassination, former 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had been called in by Syrian President Bashar Assad and 
ordered to either force Beirut based An-Nahar, arguably the most respected mainstream 
daily in the Arab world, to end its criticism of the Damascus regime or to sell his 20 percent 
stake in the company. 716 Hariri opted to sell. "Bashar al Assad could not understand that 
Hariri could never make us stand with him [Assad], " Ghassan Tueni recalled of the incident. 
It was not the first time the Syrian leader had tried to force the paper to shift its stance. In 
one of the small glassed-in offices off the An-Nahar newsroom, a Lebanese flag lay draped 
over the chair of Samir Kassir as a memorial to the outspoken, anti-Syrian columnist whose 
white Alpha Romeo had exploded in a ball of flames the previous spring. "I still can't 
believe it, " whispered reporter Roula Mouawad as she paused before the glassed-in office. 
Kassir's likeness was etched on a plaque beside the door, along with the dates: 1960-2005. 
"We have to fight for them, and the next, " Mouawad said later over coffee, referring to her 
fallen colleagues, "because there will be a next. "Subsequent events would bear her out. 
The attacks also highlighted the degree to which journalism and politics overlap on 
this new Arab media landscape. Gibran Tueni was a leader of the anti-Syrian bloc in 
parliament, Chidiac's program was a showcase for anti-Syrian politicians, just as her station, 
LBC, was a key media voice of the anti-Syrian opposition, and Kassir was a rallying figure 
within the Kifaya (Enough! ) movement, which targeted the Syrian presence. In him, fellow 
columnist Rami Khouri later said, "converged the job of a journalist and someone in the 
business of political and cultural mobilization. "' Meanwhile, across the border in 
Damascus, journalists like Michael Kilo, who would be jailed by the Assad regime in 2007 
for "weakening national sentiment, " openly campaigned for a radical overhaul of Syria's 
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Lebanon policy. 718 None could be said to be "pure" journalists in the strictest modem 
Western definition. Rather, their profile more closely resembled those of the journalistic 
change agents of early US history, such as Thomas Paine. 
But Lebanon was just one front in a broader war between the press and power in the 
Middle East as the first decade of the twenty-first century reached its mid-point. Other types 
of battles were being fought between journalists and the powers-that-be elsewhere across 
the Arab world. "Arab rulers, regardless of their differences, agree on one thing - all of them 
consider the Arab press to be their sworn enemy, " according to Jamal Amer, editor-in-chief 
of Al-Wasat in Yemen, 719 where RSF warned of a "climate of violence" which "will inevitably 
encourage journalists to censor themselves. "To 
"Every authoritarian regime has agents everywhere so they can influence our 
reports. They control the television and the elections process by TV, " said Hassan Amr of 
Egypt's Al-Fair. They could also throw offenders in jail, or worse. Journalists who pushed 
the envelope in this atmosphere tried their best to protect each other. "I secure myself by my 
documents, my position, " Amr explained, and journalists made sure government officials 
knew that "there are other people who will scandal them, attack them, if they attack you. 
You know this kind of blackmail. " But, as countless jailed reporters could attest, such tactics 
provided only limited protection. Ultimately, Amer conceded, `they can do anything. "721 
Another example of the tug-of-war between government and media was Jordan, 
where King Abdallah was trumpeting media reform as a harbinger of greater political 
reform. However, as elsewhere, media liberalization in Jordan was proving to be a matter of 
one step forward, one step back, with jailings, muzzlings and "dose monitoring" of 
journalists by the security services a fact of life. m A panel discussion about media reform 
organized by the Jordanian government at an international conference in Amman in the fall 
of 2005 turned into a free-for-all as Jordanian journalists mocked the government's decision 
to scrap the ministry of information and repeal a key press law. "You eliminated one law but 
there are 22 others on the books that can send us to prison, " one reporter shouted at then 
Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher. Eighteen months later, Jordan's parliament 
passed a new press and publications law that included jail terms for any journalist who 
"insult[s] religious sentiments and beliefs" or "slanders or libels" any individual n4 
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"Goverment and security interference have dwindled on the surface ... but prior 
censorship remains like a phantom that controls the media scene, " the Center for Defending 
Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) said in its 2006 report on Jordan. "Despite government 
promises to support the freedom of media, [it] moved in the opposite direction. "7 At about 
the same time the report was published, Jordanian authorities seized all videotapes of an Al- 
Jazeera interview with the king's uncle, Prince Hassan bin Talal. An Arab journalist with 
close ties to the Jordanian palace told me state security had been monitoring the interview 
via bugs planted in Prince Hassan's office, then raced to the airport to intercept the Al- 
Jazeera team. The Al Jazeera reporter, Ghassan Ben Jeddou, said Jordanian officials told him 
that the tapes were seized because the prince's comment "could affect Jordan's diplomatic 
relations with Saudi Arabia. "T 
Saudi Arabia was, after all, no fan of Al-Jazeera or a free media. RSF named King 
Abdallah to its list of "Predators of Press Freedom, " along with Libya's Muammar Gadaffi, 
Syria's Bashar al-Assad, and Tunisia's Zine el-Abdine Ben All. While most other Gulf 
countries were making slow progress on media reform, Saudi Arabia remained near the 
bottom of the list because of what RSF claimed was a total absence of free media. In place of 
independent news organizations were "only organs that spout government propaganda: "727 
The grip of the Saud family and its Wahabi ideology depends on rigid control 
of news. No laws protect freedom of expression so journalists dare not 
criticise the regime and self-censorship is the rule. 728 
In a 2007 interview, Shams Ahsan, national editor of The Saudi Gazette, told the Arab 
Press Network that, "Freedom of the speech does exist and Saudi Arabia is beginning to 
offer a good environment for journalists" in which once-taboo subjects like human rights 
and women's rights could be discussed in the media. Ahsan insisted there was no 
censorship as such, but, he acknowledged, "There are certain issues we cannot write about. 
We do not write anything against Islam and we do not attack members of the royal family. 
We know our limits and in a way practice self-censorship. There have been troubles when 
red lines have been crossed. "7 One example: London-based A1-Hayat, the largest circulation 
daily in the Arab world found itself in the strange situation of being banned in Saudi Arabia 
in September 2007 when it reported on links between certain Wahabi clerics and a Saudi 
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extremist who was a key player in Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The paper was owned by Prince Khaled 
bin Sultan, the son of the Saudi crown prince, demonstrating that no news organization was 
immune. 
For the Saudi press, the "red lines" around forbidden stories extended well beyond 
the country's borders. Criticism of Saudi and allied Arab leaders was verboten, but so too 
were stories that put other Islamic countries in a bad light. Former Arab News columnist 
Fawaz Turki claimed he was fired after writing about alleged massacres carried out the 
Indonesian army in East Timor. "You don't write about atrocities committed by an Islamic 
government - even when they're already documented in the history books - and hope to get 
away with it, " he said in an article in The Washington Post 731 Journalist Mona Eltahawy had a 
similar experience. The US-based Egyptian was a regular columnist for the pan-Arab daily 
Asharq AI Awsat, owned by the same Saudi publishing company as Arab News. Generally in 
the Arab world, English-language newspapers are able to be much more critical than their 
Arabic counterparts because they are inaccessible to the majority of the population. 
Eltahawy discovered that her criticisms of the Egyptian regime were being published in full 
on the paper's English language website, targeted to Western readers, but softened 
considerably in the Arabic-language newspaper. This passage, for example, appeared in the 
English version of her article about the Egyptian elections, but was missing from the Arabic 
version: 
When women huddle in a corner out of fear of these same security forces, we 
have to ask are we in Egypt or in Iraq, from where Arab media daily beam 
pictures of Iraqi women huddling in fear and anguish from American 
soldiers? 
When thugs (more often than not hired by the government) holding up 
swords and machetes stand between voters and polling booths, dearly 
challenging anyone who wants to vote to get past them and their weapons 
first, what else is there to conclude other than that the Egyptian government 
is at war with its own people? 732 
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When Eltahawy complained about the editing, her column was summarily dropped 
and the editors stopped returning her calls and emails. "The major red lines at Asharq Al- 
Awsat could be quite simple - in descending order they were the Saudi royal family, Saudi 
Arabia's allies in the Gulf (Qatar, a rival, was considered fair game) and then Saudi Arabia's 
other Arab allies, " she wrote later of the incident. "Within such a hierarchy of red lines, the 
Egyptian regime can indeed pull rank and demand that Asharq Al Awsat silence a critic. "733 
She recalls receiving some advice from a friendly editor when she started writing for Asharq 
A[ Awsat: "He said not mention any leader by name and do not say 'the president' Say 
'Arab government, ' [he told me] and that usually passes [the censor]. " The paper was also 
sensitive about stories touching on the ruling Assad family of Syria, due to tics of marriage 
between the Assad family and the House of Saud. 7* But religion remained the most sensitive 
issue. For example, Shams, a pioneering newspaper aimed at young people and launched in 
2005 lasted three weeks before it was temporarily shut down after reproducing one of the 
controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, first published in Europe. 
Elsewhere in the Gulf, the media was operating under strictures less visceral, but 
equally real. "What kind of pressures do you face? " I asked the editor of one Gulf paper 
after chatting about the attacks on Lebanese journalists. "None; " he replied. "We don't 
report about political issues. "m Complained another senior Gulf editor: "Our press is 
infected with the self-censorship virus. "737 One Egyptian journalist who had spent years 
working for newspapers in the Emirates told me he asked himself "two or three times what 
will be the reaction" before filing a story. "We have our own personal censorship. " He had 
good reason to be cautious; three times he had been dragged into court. 'This is a way to try 
to make me more polite as a small child has to be a polite, " said the reporter, who asked that 
his name not be used. "It was a very simple local news story. What if I wrote about some 
politics, or some political problems or what if I give some ideas about terrorism or about 
military or about security, the matters that really put journalists in serious cases? "7 The 
pressure did not come from governments alone. Othman Mahmoud al-Sini, editor-in-chief 
of the Saudi daily Ai-Watan, said Saudi journalists were "in the cross-fire" as they tried to 
push the boundaries. "Our difficulties are not from the government. The censorship is not 
like before. It is not strict, because if it were strict all audience will go to the TV or Internet 
websites. The margin is wider, but not that wide. It is like a pipe. Our difficulties are from 
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the society. Some people, because they are against changes, they are very strict or 
conservative, so we must we fight the pressure, we fight sometimes the attacks from the 
society. " 
There was contradiction wherever you turned. Bahrain issued licenses for its first 
private television and radio stations, Egypt pointed to the media as evidence of political 
liberalization, and Tunisia hosted the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society (which 
RSF called "a farce"), 740 but despite those seeming positive signs, the Arab Network for 
Human Rights Information accused all three of "implicating opposition, activists, and 
journalists in cases, detaining them and imprisoning them, and physically attacking them, 
passing through coercive disappearance and ending with the most degrading violations, 
such as framing criminal cases against those opposition forces, attempting to defame their 
reputations and spreading fear amongst citizens to prevent them from participating in 
public affairs. "741 As a sign of just how bad things were in the region, and how disconnected 
government rhetoric was from reality, the 2005 UNDP Arab Human Development Report listed 
Egypt and Tunisia among just five Arab states that "assure" the right of journalists "to 
obtain information and news legally. " Yet, it continued, "in some Arab countries, " including 
Egypt, "the state of emergency [which curtailed press freedoms] has become permanent and 
ongoing, with none of the dangers to warrant it. "742 RSF ranked Tunisia and Egypt in the 
bottom 20 on its 2005 World Press Freedom Indcx, 7*3 and Freedom House singled out 
Tunisia - along with Libya, Syria and the Occupied Territories - as "of particular concern "M 
A year later, Egypt had clawed its way up to 133 of 168 countries on the RSF list745as a result 
of a slight easing of controls during the 2005 elections, but a subsequent damp-down made 
that seeming progress illusory, leading the Committee to Protect Journalists to name the 
country to its 2007 "Backsliders" list of 10 countries where press freedoms had most 
deteriorated-746 
Meanwhile, RSF called Iraq the "graveyard of freedom" for journalists, with more 
than 175 reporters, camerapersons and other media workers killed in the five years since the 
US invasion, 7 7 many in targeted assassinations, such as that of Atwar Bahjat, a courageous 
female correspondent for Al-Arabiya (previously a reporter at Al Jazeera), who, along with 
her cameraman, was executed in cold blood on the side of a road as she tried to cover the 
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aftermath of a massive bomb that destroyed one of the holiest Shiites shrines, killing 130 
Iraqis. Violence was the greatest danger to reporters, but the country's "democratic" 
government77 posed another kind of threat, waging a systematic campaign against 
independent media. The government expelled Al Jazeera (which had also, at various times, 
been banned from operating in 17 other countries,?? 9 including Tunisia, which closed down 
the Qatar embassy in late 2006 in response to Al-Jazeera's reporting), 750 temporarily shut 
down the Baghdad bureau of the other main Arabic satellite news channel, Al-Arabiya, 
charging its correspondents with inciting "sectarianism" and "violence; '751 shuttered 
numerous other media outlets; barred reporters from covering parliament; 752 and even 
issued an order banning journalists from the scene of bombings? 
The contradiction between the Iraqi government's professions of "democracy" and 
its approach to media freedom was the kind of incongruity apparent across the region. 
While some Arab heads of state, including Egypt's Mubarak, spoke against the jailing of 
journalists, the Arab Press Freedom Watch said at the end of 2004, "Sadly none of their 
words have become deeds. "7% The situation was little different two years later, when the 
Cairo Institute for Human Rights reported that monitoring of news organizations during 
elections in Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Palestine found that, "Subordination of media to 
politicians more than to professional standards was a problem observed in all four 
countries. "m Even where a modicum of progress was being made, there was no assurance it 
would last. Gamal Hasanain, a cartoonist for one of Egypt's aggressive opposition dailies, 
learned that when he published a cartoon mocking the involvement of one of Egypt's 
opposition political parties in the 2007 legislative elections. His bosses were not amused, 
since the party he had mocked happened to own the newspaper for which he worked. 
Hasanain was suspended for a month. m6 
Over in Syria, which had long maintained draconian control over the media, the 
government allowed the establishment of the first private newspaper and the first private 
satellite TV station, AI-Sham. But the day that station was scheduled to air its first newscast, 
the Information Ministry ordered it shut down. The government said it was all a 
bureaucratic snafu; but others speculated it had something to do with the fact that another 
channel, run by a businessman dose to the president, was also about to launch. Either way, 
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Al-Sham's owners said the temporary closure cost them millions of dollars. "We [Sham TV] 
are the pioneer and the sacrificial lamb. It has been difficult but now everyone can follow 
our lead, " the station's director, Mamoun Bouni, told reporters tm7 Similarly, the launch of 
Jordan's first private TV station, ATV, was suspended on the eve of launch in the summer of 
2007 when the government-run Audio-Video Commission called a halt for what it termed 
"technical reasons, " which observers suspected had more to do with the channel's potential 
to undercut government-owned Jordan TV than anything to do with technology 7% 
In its first Media Sustainability Index for the Arab world, the international media and 
civil society NGO IREX measured a market basket of factors that contribute to a sustainable 
free press and found that only six Arab countries had crossed the Rubicon into the realm of 
"near sustainability. "m But that progress was by no means secure. In its 2007 report, 
Freedom House reported that even the "modest improvements in press freedom in the 
Middle East and North Africa over the last several years" had "reversed, " leaving the 
Middle East at the bottom of the world's ranking of press freedom. Said Freedom House 
Executive Director Jennifer Windsor. 
The Middle East and North Africa are home to some of the most repressive 
governments in the world, and these governments have found a way to limit 
citizens' natural craving for free expression and unfiltered information. While 
there have been some changes in the past few years, ultimately we've also 
seen some real pushback on the part of governments. 760 
Adding to the challenge was the growing suspicion and animosity between religious 
sects. This was particularly pronounced in Iraq, where membership the "wrong" branch of 
Islam could - and did - get reporters killed; but it also played out in increased Sunni-Shia 
tensions across the region, as well in more localized schisms, such as between Muslims and 
Coptic Christians in Egypt. An impromptu poll of Arab news executives at the 2007 Arab 
Broadcast Forum found that a majority felt that the current sectarian divisions in the Arab 
world were making their job more difficult. ' 
3) HISTORY OF CONTROL 
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After its early, pioneering years, Arab journalism "lost its soul, " according to 
Ghassan Tueni, and `journalists became civil servants. "7USince the end of World War 11, 
government control had been the hallmark of media in Arab countries, where "muzzling 
and suppression ... manipulation and co-option"7' by regimes that "claimed a monopoly 
on truth"7"* became the norm, news organizations were mouthpieces for governments and 
political movements, and the media was traditionally viewed with suspicion and little 
respect. Looking at the Middle East in the 1970s, William Rugh, a former US ambassador in 
the region and expert on the Arab media, divided the Arab print media into three 
classifications: the "mobilization press, " controlled by revolutionary governments like those 
in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Sudan; the `loyalist press' of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Palestine, 
which was largely privately-owned but beholden to the government; and the "diverse press' 
of Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen, which was relatively free and reflected a 
diversity of views, but was subject to more subtle pressures. 765A fourth category of Arab 
print media was the offshore pan-Arab press. Up until the early 1970s, Beirut was the media 
capital of the Arab world. Its rough-and-tumble mix of politics and religion covered the 
entire spectrum of Arab opinion, from the Arab nationalism and socialism of the Nasserites, 
Ba'athists and Palestinians to the Saudi-backed monarchists and Islamist sympathizers of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. All these views were represented in the pages of the 
country's lively media. But the same political crosscurrents that fed the debate also fueled 
the communal violence that would take hold in the early 1970s and tear the country asunder 
for the next two decades. As documented in this writer's account of that conflict, 766 the 
battles of the Middle East were fought out on the soil of Lebanon. Journalists were among 
the countless victims. Assassinations of editors, newsroom bombings, kidnappings and 
threats from the plethora of competing factions, and the governments that sponsored them, 
silenced the voices of debate. Many newspapers shut down. 
Beirut's loss was London's gain. The Arab world's most respected newspaper, Al- 
Hayat, stopped publishing in 1976 after 13 bomb attempts on its offices (its founder had been 
assassinated in 1966). Eleven years later, it reopened in London, joining the Saudi-owned 
Asharq Al Awsat, which, since 1977, had been edited in Britain and printed in the Arab 
world. The Saudi royal family soon bought controlling interest in Al-Hayat via Prince Khaled 
bin Sultan, who would become known in the West as the Saudi military commander during 
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the first Gulf war, Operation Desert Storm. London was also base for the third of the leading 
pan-Arab dailies, Al-Quds AI Arabi (Arab Jerusalem). Reflecting the Arab media's reliance on 
political sponsors, the Palestinian paper carried few advertisements and received funding 
directly from various Arab sources 767 
While it maintained a broadly pro-Saudi line, the opinion pages of Al-Hayat were 
"among the most varied and open fora for debate in the Arab world. "768 And although the 
move from Beirut to London took Al-Hayat out of the direct line-of-fire of the Lebanese 
conflict, it did not shield its staff of some 300 journalists from other pressures faced by their 
colleagues at papers based in the Arab world. In early 1997, the paper's offices in New York, 
Washington, London and Riyadh were the targets of letter bombs that the then-editor 
believed were ordered by Egyptian Islamist Ayman Zawahiri. The militant, who would later 
emerge as Osama bin Laden's right-hand man, was apparently upset that the paper had not 
run an interview with him, something that would have likely upset Egyptian authorities and 
could have had repercussions for the paper's distribution there. Militants weren't the only 
threat. Governments could also reach out and touch the offshore papers. In the spring of 
2004, the Beirut bureau chief of Asharq Al Awsat was convicted in absentia (he had fled the 
country) and sentenced to a year in prison for "disturbing national security and harming the 
president's dignity" after the paper reported that there had been an assassination attempt on 
the life of then-President Emil Lahoud. 769 In a telling commentary on the state of the Arab 
media, Al-Hayat saw fit to note in its article about the conviction that, "Despite occasional 
pressure from authorities in recent years, the Lebanese press remains one of the Mideast 
region's freest "T70 
The offshore print media and their counterparts in a few Arab countries may have 
enjoyed some modicum of leeway, but radio and television remained firmly in government 
hands. According to Muhammed Ayish, chair of the College of Mass Communication at the 
University of Sharjah, "the concept of television journalism, as a set of distinctive 
professional values and practices, was virtually nonexistent in Arab world television. "7" As 
Rugh told a Senate panel in the spring of 2004, 
Most Arab broadcasting laws prohibited criticism of the head of state, 
defamation of religion, or undermining public order. Additional taboos were 
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observed by broadcast editors based on local custom and political 
circumstances. Arab broadcast audiences therefore had access only to news 
and commentary officially approved by their respective governments, unless 
they could tune in to the Voice of America, BBC, Radio Monte Carlo or 
CNN772 
Whatever their classification, Rugh told the senators, "Arab information media have 
always been closely tied to politics. " While the policy has been used to cloak a variety of 
other motives - not least, that of keeping authoritarian regimes in power by stifling dissent - 
the most oft-cited reason for muzzling the media was the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Arab governments have been able to justify explicitly and implicitly their 
influence over the mass media as necessary either while the country is "at 
war" with Israel, or politically confronting Israel's policies. Because of the 
degree to which the Arab-Israeli dispute has become the central issue in Arab 
foreign policy and a matter of Arab patriotism, this justification is difficult to 
oppose-"3 
Steeped in a culture of perennial confrontation shaped by the conflict with Israel, the 
patriotic fervor so often seen among reporters in countries at war became a permanent 
fixture of the Arab media. "Whether the government controlled the media directly or 
influenced them indirectly, " Rugh reported in an earlier study, "editors were more likely 
than usual to make an effort to support their government in the national interest during the 
conflict "74 Many journalists voluntarily subscribed to concept of "responsible freedom, " 
in which the interests of the state - and the Arab nation - superseded all other 
considerations. Those interests could be defined in many ways: 
They involve anything that can be considered a threat to the ruling 
institutions and their interests, including negative statements about religions 
or beliefs, Arab nationalism and its struggle, values, and national traditions776 
Thus, from an early point, Arab journalists were expected to toe the party line, often 
in a quite literal sense. "The press is an authority whose function is to guide people and 
actively participate in building their society exactly as does the People's Assembly, " Egypt's 
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Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, then editor of Al-Ahram, wrote in 1960 to justify Nasser's 
nationalization of five major publishing houses. "' 
It had not always been thus. In fact, just a few years earlier the political neutrality for 
which Al Ahram was then known was perceived by one researcher as "an extremely hopeful 
sign for the future of Arab journalism. "778 That observation was made by Thomas 
McFadden, a former US diplomat in Beirut who carried out a survey of journalists in 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt in 1951 and 1952. It was a time of optimism in the 
profession, a brief period of media liberalization between the end of colonial-era restrictions 
and the advent of draconian government controls that would arrive with Ba'athism in Syria 
and Iraq, Nasserism in Egypt and the ascension to the throne of King Hussein in Jordan. 
McFadden was swept up in the sense of the possible then pervading Arab newsrooms. In 
the Arab media's coverage of the region's governments he found "more criticism and it is 
more vehement than is the case normally in most advanced democracies. "7" 
Based on responses to questionnaires he distributed in newsrooms, McFadden 
concluded that "Arab editors believe the role of the press in society should be to fight for 
political causes. This is much more important, they think, than objectively to inform the 
Arab public" 
He identified five priorities of Arab journalists: (1) To fight against imperialism; (2) to 
fight against Zionism; (3) to fight for Arab nationalism and Arab unity; (4) to fight against 
government corruption and weakness; and, (5) to fight for the reform, modernization and 
democratization of Arab society. 780 
While suffering from a preponderance of opinion over fact and a shortage of 
resources, McFadden observed that the Arab media business had evolved to a point where 
many newspapers were no longer dependent on political subsidies and he noted that such a 
development marked the rise of objectivity in the US media. "It can be predicted confidently 
that similar developments will occur in Arab journalism, " McFadden wrote. "This day 
appears to be approaching on the Arab scene much more rapidly than anyone would have a 
right to expect. "781 
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But that era of relative freedom would end with the wave of revolutions that swept 
the region a few years later. Al-Ahram, in which McFadden had so much hope, would 
emerge as the ultimate government mouthpiece. Soon, Morocco to Yemen, the press was 
regarded as a tool of nationalism and politics. 7 To stray was unpatriotic; firing was the least 
of the penalties. Dissenting journalists were fined, imprisoned, or, in some cases, executed. 
Publications were regularly shuttered. As Ibrahim Nawar, head of the Arab Press Freedom 
Watch (APFW), has observed, "Freedom of expression is not something on offer in the Arab 
world. It has to be fought for. "783 Hoda al-Mutawa, who worked for a time as a presenter on 
Bahrain television, recalls being summoned by the minister of information and ordered to 
stop discussing some of the issues she had raised on the air. When she tried to object, the 
minister waved his hand to silence her, sighed and said, "Hoda, why do you want to make 
life difficult for yourself? Just say, 'OK' like everyone else. " The conversation was over. 
"They speak to you as a father to a child, " she says! " 
As AI-Hayat had discovered, the pressure came not only from governments. 
According to the London-based APFW's 2001 State of the Arab Media report, "Clans in Yemen 
and Kuwait, criminal gangs in Algeria and Egypt and Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria all 
took part in the offensive against the freedom of speech [which was] a common 
denominator in all Arab countries. "m That was underlined by the report's list of more than 
50 "free speech victims" the previous year, a litany of assassinations, attempted 
assassinations, imprisonments, interrogations, beatings and fines. The list was accompanied 
by a compendium of 15 publications in Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Sudan that had 
been forcibly dosed, confiscated or taken to court. 786 The resulting self-censorship that 
pervaded the Arab media was exacerbated by the fact that, according to Hussein Amin, 
chair of the department of journalism at the American University in Cairo, "most Arab 
authorities do not publish a list of subjects that they do not want to be covered, leaving the 
reporter in a state of confusion. "787 
The Arab-Israeli conflict may have been the cover, but for many govemments, 
survival was the real issue in attempting to control what their populations saw, heard and 
read. In May of 2004, as the Bush administration was unveiling its blueprint for democracy 
in the Middle East and Arab leaders were preparing to gather for a summit to discuss, 
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among other things, political reform, the APFW held its third annual conference under 
telling title, "Freeing the Arab Media from State Control. " The final communique was stark 
reading for supporters of press freedom, highlighting "the strong linkage between the 
hostile attitude of the state towards the freedom of expression and the press, and its deep 
rooted tendencies to resist public pressure for change and democratic reform of Arab 
societies in response to the wide democratization in the whole world. "7" 
Beyond the issue of government control was the existence of a cash culture in which 
reporters - particularly in the "diverse press" of Lebanon and a handful of other Arab 
countries - were paid to write certain stories by competing political or business interests. 
"One of the major problems here is that conflict of interest is not considered to be a 
problem, " Magda Abu Fadil, the director of the Institute for Professional Journalists (IPJ), 
told an interviewer. "This is a major, major problem. Journalists cannot be credible if they 
accept money, free trips, gifts and favors. "7 This same phenomena existed in many non- 
Arab Muslim countries (as well as elsewhere in the developing world), and was seen in the 
common practice of companies handing out envelopes of cash at news conferences just to 
get reporters to show up. The king of Morocco annually hosted a television broadcast on 
which he ostentatiously handed over government subsidy checks to executives of the major 
newspapers. 
For those members of the economic elite who owned satellite dishes, the only real 
alternatives to the local media were the news broadcasts of CNN International and the BBC, 
while less-privileged citizens were left to rely on the shortwave broadcasts of the Arabic 
service of the BBC World Service, the Voice of America and a few European broadcasters, 
thus ensuring that Arabs and Muslims saw not only the world, but their own region, 
through the dominant frame of the Western media. To a large extent, this was even true for 
those depending on domestic news sources. With few exceptions, the Arab and non-Arab 
Muslim media was completely dependent on Western news organizations when it came to 
covering the rest of the world - and their own region. Carefully-vetted wire copy from news 
agencies like the Associated Press (AP), Reuters and Agence France Press (AFP) provided 
stories from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, as well as other Arab capitals, while 
television viewers saw the world through the prism of the major US networks, CNN, BBC, 
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and a few other Western television news agencies, such as Reuters Television and 
Associated Press Television, that supplied the videotape for Arab broadcasts. 
This then was the situation when, in the 1990s, Saudi entrepreneurs close to the 
government set up the first private cross-border Arab satellite television operations. The 
goal was to counter the influence of the Western broadcasters then beaming signals into the 
Middle East, as well as smuggled videocassettes of Western programs and movies, which 
offered the only alternative to government-controlled television. While illegal in many 
countries, satellite dishes - which had been shrinking in size - began to sprout like desert 
mushrooms on rooftops across the region in the late 1980s, even as "state broadcasting 
monopolies and strict government censorship remained the norm in most Arab states and 
Iran. "° Just how strict, was demonstrated with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Viewers 
relying on Saudi state television for their news would not even have known war had broken 
out. The state broadcaster failed to mention the invasion of the neighboring emirate for more 
than 48 hours. It was the equivalent of a French TV station ignoring a German occupation of 
Belgium. For those with satellite dishes, all eyes turned to CNN. 
Egypt was the first to introduce Arab satellite broadcasting in order to convey its 
official position during the first Gulf war. But Nilesat was a government-controlled 
operation, little different from the fare on terrestrial state-run TV. Nine months later, two 
well-connected Saudi entrepreneurs flipped the switch on the Middle East Broadcasting 
Center (MBC), ushering in the era of private satellite broadcasting in the Arab world. While 
MBC was "very serious about Arab news, " according to a consultant who worked with the 
owners at the time, and brought in a group of "first-class" British and Lebanese news 
people, f1 coverage of Saudi affairs was handled with kid gloves. MBC was soon joined by 
the Arab Radio and Television Network (ART) and Orbit, both originally based in Rome, 
and Lebanon's LBC International and Future Television. But when it came to news, these 
new channels were anything but independent operations. One of the two Saudi partners in 
MBC was King Fahd's brother-in-law; the other partner later joined with another member of 
the royal family to found ART. Orbit was controlled by the son of the Saudi crown prince; 
LBC was founded with the help of another Saudi sheikh; and Future Television was created 
by Lebanese businessman Rafiq Hariri, who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia and was 
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related by marriage to the Saudi royals (he would later become the Saudi-backed prime 
minister of Lebanon, helping that nation recover from 15 years of civil war, before dying in a 
massive car bomb in 2005). 
Critics of Saudi domination of the region's media denounced the "eunuch-like 
condition" of Arab journalists and other Muslim intellectuals who had sold out to the high 
salaries. This "media control, " observed Abdelwahab el-Affendi, a Sudanese scholar at the 
University of Westminster's Center for the Study of Democracy, was not confined to the 
Middle East, but rather 
it constitutes a malaise that is most acutely manifested in the Arab heartlands 
of Islam, but which has gripped the whole Ummah (the World Muslim 
Community) in its tentacles. The impact of this phenomenon reverberates all 
over the land of Islam ... '92 
There was then, compelling evidence for el-Affendi's grim portrait of the state of the 
Muslim media in 1993: 
They have managed to force independent voices from the Muslim world 
using market manipulation, bribery and sheer intimidation ... The result is a 
blanket dark age extending from Indonesia to the Atlantic with long shadows 
falling over London, Paris, New York and other centers of Muslim exile. 
Debate is stifled, publishing is stymied and free thinking all but eliminated in 
the Muslim world. 793 
This dominance of the channels of communication by the political and economic elite 
affected the ways in which information spread in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and 
the very nature of the information itself. Since they worked for organizations seen as 
government mouthpieces, journalists commanded little respect among the public or within 
the governments they served. For the most part, investigative reporting was non-existent; 
challenging official statements or policies was unheard-of. There were no awards for 
uncovering government malfeasance and few Western-style journalism schools. As Hussein 
Amin of the American University in Cairo journalism program has written: 
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The central purpose of mass communication programs in the Arab world is to 
prepare generation after generation of semi-educated journalists whose job it 
is to promote the "achievements" of the state. ' 
With media quality suspect, Arabs in particular turned to quantity. It is difficult to 
convey to those who have not visited the Arab world - especially places like Beirut, 
Damascus, Amman and Cairo - the degree to which a hunger for information pervades all 
discussion. Many Arabs skim several newspapers a day as they try to piece together a 
coherent picture of the news; the radio is always on, switching from one newscast to 
another. In past decades, the distinctive jingle of Radio Monte Carlo's Arabic newscast quite 
literally echoed through the streets. With the advent of satellite TV, the television provided 
constant background noise in coffeehouses and grocery stores. To a degree seen in the US 
only during times of national crisis or catastrophe, Arabs are fixated on the events that 
constantly buffet their turbulent region. In Jordan, for example, 83 percent of people say 
they watch TV news. That's more viewers than entertainment programs attract, the exact 
reverse of the US, where less than 50 percent regularly tune in to television news . 795 
The manner in which the media reflected official thinking, along with the absence of 
formal training, meant there was little space for Western-style notions of journalistic 
accuracy and objectivity to take root. Thus even coverage of issues of no consequence to the 
government was frequently rife with inaccuracies, innuendo and falsehoods - some of them 
bought-and-paid-for, some the result of sloppy or lazy journalism. Put simply, if a reporter 
was expected by the government to print articles he or she knew were not true, there was 
little impediment to adopting a similar approach on other stories. In the West, the journalists 
who are most respected are those considered paragons of objectivity. Conversely, in the 
Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world, the most respected journalists are known 
not for unbiased reporting, but for their opinions. This was based on the logic that while the 
news stories on the front page could not be trusted, the opinion columns offered insights 
garnered from the writer's access to the corridors of power. For example, the Arab world's 
best-known journalist, the former editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily AI Ahram, 
Mohammed Heikal, was a close friend of Gamal Abdel Nasser at a time when the Egyptian 
president was seen as the father of Arab nationalism. Heikal's columns thus offered a 
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window on the thinking of the region's most powerful leader. "When all is said and done, 
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal remains a legacy of journalism at its best, " Al Ahram opined in 
2007, illustrating the degree to which the distinction between opinion and fact continued to 
blur. 
Beyond that was the very basic issue of a woeful lack of training. "Many working 
journalists lack the basic skills that would enable them to identify the right story, develop 
story ideas and investigate interesting and informative stories within a complex 
environment, " according to a report prepared for the British Council in Cairo. "Young 
journalists often lack direction in their places of work and the competitive nature of the job 
market pressures professionals into conforming as opposed to carving out the space for new 
skills and innovative coverage. "m Nakhle El Hage, the chief editor at the Saudi-owned 
satellite channel Al-Arabiya, went so far as to say that "500 well-trained Arab journalists 
would be enough to change the standard of the Arab media. " It was not a new problem. 
"[W]riting is one of the crafts which help society to live ... now perfection in the crafts is 
relative ... hence imperfection 
in writing is due not to a lack of religion or morals but to 
economic and social causes, " the Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun had written six century 
before. 
Given the local media's lack of credibility and the general suspicion of Western 
sources, what el-Affendi and others have called "a counter-culture" of "unofficial news 
channels" emerged, in which rumors and conspiracy theories ran rife. As a result, countless 
unsubstantiated stories - some worthy of the National Enquirer - ricochet through the Middle 
East every day. For example, riots once broke out in Khartoum after word circulated that 
foreigners were causing the penises of Sudanese men to disappear by shaking their hands. 
One victim "felt his penis melt into his body, " Al-Quds Al Arabi reported. 8 Some of the 
conspiracy theories are, to a Western mind, equally bizarre. During a spate of bombings in 
Baghdad, The New Yorker quoted a local cleric who had heard "John Kerry is behind this so 
Bush will lose his Presidency and look bad in front of the world. "801 Other rumors are based 
on long-standing myths, such as the story that the Wahabi sect of Sunni Islam was an 
invention of the British as part of a divide-and-rule strategy, an idea first suggested during 
the colonial era in an apocryphal memoir of a British soldier entitled Confessions of a British 
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Spy and repeated by Iraqi Shiites during the US occupation. 802 An American professor living 
in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s wrote that one was "likely to feel he lives amid a vast 
rumor, whose centre is nowhere and whose circumference is everywhere. " So all- 
pervasive were the rumors in Iraq during the first year of the US occupation, for example, 
that Coalition authorities began putting out a newsletter called the Baghdad Mosquito to swat 
away all the ill-founded stories. 
Many of these rumors, frequently repeated and given new life in the press, reflect a 
set of stereotypes about the US that are, in many ways, the mirror image of those that 
Americans hold about Muslims. As noted by political scientist Mark Tessler, who has 
carried out several surveys in the Middle East, "some citizens in Arab and Muslim countries 
embrace stereotypes every bit as disturbing as our own" Central to these stereotypes is 
that of the "crusader-Zionist conspiracy" in which "the Western demon [is] bent on the 
eradication of Islam. "8 Though relatively little scholarly work has been done on portrayals 
of the US in the media of Arab and Muslim countries, there is substantial anecdotal evidence 
of bias for anyone who has ever picked up a newspaper in the Muslim world. Writing in an 
Israeli publication, journalist Adel Darwish argued that anti-Americanism in the Arab 
language media is "all-encompassing, " and includes selective showing of negative images of 
the US, selective language, exaggerated headlines, use of rumor and conspiracy theories in 
the place of facts, selective reporting, and the selective editing of translated articles from the 
Western media. 
In a study of Arab media coverage of the Arab-Israeli wars, William Rugh noted that 
while there was "less politically-motivated distortion in the Arab media" in 1973 than 1967, 
a key theme involved US support for "the Zionist entity. "w7Likewise, an examination of 
post-9/11 political cartoons from the Muslim world, revealed a pattern of themes that 
include the US as "deceptive" and the moral equivalent of bin Laden. 8m 
4) ARAB SATELLITE BROADCASTING 
With the arrival of Al-Jazeera in 1996, the very nature of Arab journalism began to 
change. Based in the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar, the news and information satellite channel 
was part of the liberalization effort launched by the new British-educated emir, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifs al-Thani, who had ousted his father in a bloodless coup the previous 
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year. Without Al-Jazeera, Osama bin Laden might never have achieved the mythic status he 
would come to enjoy. As the fireside radio chat was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
"bully pulpit" - the means through which he reached the American people - during World 
War II, so too did the Qatar-based satellite channel serve as bin Laden's bully pulpit as he 
launched his military and propaganda assault on the US Under any circumstances, the 
bombing of the World Trade Center would have shaken American at its foundations. But, as 
the roundups of top bin Laden lieutenants and the dismantling of much of al-Qaeda's 
infrastructure would later demonstrate, the Saudi exile's greatest threat lay not in individual 
terrorist operations, but in his role as an icon around which the forces of anti-Americanism 
could rally. 
Ironically, given later accusations of bias and unprofessionalism, Al-Jazeera's 
original news team were almost all veterans of the BBC's Arabic television service, which 
had just withdrawn from an ill-fated joint venture with Orbit TV when it became clear that 
the BBC and the Saudi royal family - not surprisingly - had different ideas about what 
constituted journalism. The Al-Jazeera team was given a $140 million subsidy by the emir 
and a mandate: launch an independent television station free from government scrutiny, 
control, and manipulation. The staff proceeded to do just that. According to author Naomi 
Sakr, "It soon made up for lost time, astonishing viewers with uncensored political coverage 
quite different from any Arabic-language television programming previously seen. "8 The 
channel's staff saw themselves as agents of democratic change in a region trapped in the 
grip of autocracies. One official in the Clinton White House called it a "beacon of light, '810 
and Israeli cabinet minister Gideon Ezra told the Jerusalem Posh. "I wish all Arab media were 
like Al-Jazeera"811 
Not everyone was enamored. "Using the Western style, we have broken many 
taboos, " Ibrahim M. Halal, then Al-Jazeera's chief editor, told The New York Times. "Of 
course, we upset most other Arab countries. "812 To say the least. Arab rulers across the 
region were shocked by this new, largely unfettered approach that, as Mohammed el- 
Nawawy and Adel Iskandar note in their book about the channel, was considered "nothing 
short of heresy. "813 Virtually every Arab government criticized Al-Jazeera. The Saudis were 
particularly incensed. Al-Jazeera not only impinged on their near-monopoly of satellite 
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channels, but the station had the temerity to give voice to those who would question the 
House of Saud. As one Saudi newspaper wrote: 
The poisonous ideas that are conveyed via the Western satellite channels are 
easy to handle because the viewer knows the thought they are trying to 
convey in advance. However, when this poisonous thought is conveyed via 
an Arab satellite channel, it becomes all the more dangerous because it is 
concealing itself behind our culture. 814 
Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Bahrain and Kuwait all dosed Al Jazecra 
offices, denied its reporters visas or temporarily withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. 
Al Jazeera exhibited a "lack of professionalism and neutrality when dealing with Kuwaiti 
issues, " a senior Kuwaiti official told reporters when that country expelled the channel's 
reporters for the second time. 815 Egypt boycotted an Arab summit in Qatar because of its 
anger at Al-Jazeera over interviews with Egyptian Islamists. Even at the height of the US 
invasion, Saddam Hussein expelled one Al-Jazeera correspondent from Baghdad and 
banned another from reporting, prompting the influential station to flex its muscles by 
ordering a complete work stoppage by its Baghdad team, thus denying the Iraqi leader 
direct access to its 35 million viewers. Across the region, governments and individuals alike 
were shocked when Al-Jazeera began to interview Israeli officials to hear their side of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. Such an approach was in keeping with the station's motto: 
"Opinion, and other opinion. "816 
The impact on the average viewer was profound. Where Arabs once patched 
together their view of current events through a plethora of news media, Al-jazeera became 
the touchstone. As Nadia al-Saqqaf, editor-in-chief of the Yemen Times explained, "In Yemen, 
we hear about what is happening in our country through Al Jazeera or CNN before it gets 
reported on the local TV. Sometimes it never does. "817 
The age of government monopoly of information and Western media imperialism 
was coming to an end. For the Arab public, the world would never look the same again. For 
Arab journalists, the impact was, if anything, even more dramatic. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER VIII: SATELLITE TV AND ARAB DEMOCRACY 
AI-sihafa [journalism] is an essential tool of democracy ... 
for it sounds the people's pain and hope in the rulers' 
ears. ... Freedom is the source of light for al-sihafa and 
the objective desired by writers and thinkers who know 
how to employ it and defend it. 
RAFIQ AL-MAQDISI 
FANN AL-SIHAFA (THE CRAFT OF JOURNALISM), 1946818 
1) MEDIATING REVOLUTION 
The red and white banners of Lebanon's anti-Syrian protests in the spring of 2005 
were a testament to the transformational power of the Arab media revolution. The color 
scheme was made-for-TV by a team of Lebanese advertising executives who, like the tens of 
thousands who poured into the streets, were inspired by Ukraine's televised Orange 
Revolution. Arab television coverage of Lebanon in turn helped propel embryonic pro- 
democracy movements from Egypt to Bahrain, whose mantra Kifaya (Enough! ) became a 
media catchphrase. 
Without Al Jazeera and the new constellation of Arab satellite broadcasters, it is 
unlikely there would ever have been a "Cedar Revolution, " as a Bush Administration official 
quickly dubbed the spontaneous protests that ended Syria's 29-year military presence in 
Lebanon. 819 The assassination of popular former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was the spark 
that lit the fires of protest, but plenty of other Lebanese politicians had been murdered in the 
past, often at Syria's hands. Anyone protesting faced a similar fate. What was different this 
time was that the Arab world was watching. It was an unprecedented event: Arabs standing 
up to a dictatorial regime. Syria had once wiped out a significant portion of the population 
in one of its own rebellious cities. But that massacre had taken place far from the probing 
eyes of the world back in the days when Arab reporters did what they were told. Al Jazeera 
had changed the rules of the game. Bashar Assad - who forlornly demanded that TV 
cameras "zoom out" to show the Beirut crowds weren't as large as reported - recognized 
that the new media landscape had altered geopolitical realities. 
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On the surface, Lebanon would seem to bolster the notion that media is the "arsenal 
for democracy, "820 Yet its impact can easily be overstated. Political scientists like to note that 
journalists - and those who study them - tend to have an inflated sense of the media's 
influence. That's particularly true when it comes to talk of television and emerging 
democracies. There is a strong case to be made that the unblinking 24/7 lens of the Arab 
media provided an electronic safety net to the crowds assembled in Martyr's Square to 
demand Syria's withdrawal; but so, too, did the political cover resulting from Bush 
administration pressure on Damascus that had - almost coincidentally - been building in 
preceding months. 
Television did not drive out the Syrians, any more than it gave birth to some new 
form of Lebanese democracy. A complex confluence of events - mediated by television - 
produced the withdrawal. And freed of the Syrian presence, Lebanon quickly settled back 
into political gridlock built on an outdated power-sharing arrangement that had not 
substantially changed in more than half a century, then once more descended into violence 
in the summer of 2006. As for a democratic "domino effect" among all those countries 
watching the Lebanon protests on television, two years later, not one of the Middle East's 
entrenched regimes had changed. 
TV cannot alone create change. It is an agent of change - more specifically, a tool used 
by the architects of change. There is a broad and deep literature documenting the fact that, 
even in the US, where journalists see their mission as that of defending democracy, 82' the 
media rarely leads public opinion, but instead reflects it. m "The error, " wrote J. Herbert 
Altschull in his seminal work on the power of the media, "is to fail to recognize that the news 
media are agencies of someone else's power. "823 Political scientists maintain that this is 
particularly true in the period before democracies take root. This argument can be found as 
far back as the now-dated Four Theories of the Press, which argued that media is shaped by, 
rather than shape, social and political structures . 824 Those theories were developed in an age 
of Cold War confrontation,; its authors were writing from a worldview that saw a 
geopolitical landscape in which democracy was pitted against totalitarianism. Perhaps most 
importantly, in the context of a discussion of media and democracy, the "footprint" of the 
television signal in those days largely followed national boundaries. The arrival of trans- 
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border television, particularly in a part of the world where governments always controlled 
the airwaves, introduced a huge new variable into the equation. As Naomi Sakr as pointed 
out, "people gain a different sense of their own potential when they can use electronic media 
to overcome restrictions on social interaction that are imposed by physical space. "825 Yet the 
core truth remains, the media both shapes'26 and mirrors public attitudes. ' That's as true in 
the Middle East as in the West. "Arab writers and columnists have a tendency to affirm 
populist notions, whether they're good, bad, factual or false, " according to Abdul Rahman 
al-Habib, a columnist with Saudi Arabia's Al-Watan newspaper. 'They write what people 
want to hear. They write not to educate or challenge the readers' notions, but rather to 
affirm the readers' pre-conceived opinions and views. "128 
Most political scientists subscribe to the view that a free press that helps citizens to 
understand policy decisions is an essential element of democracy. But it does not, in and of 
itself, produce democracy. The actual political effects are "varied and highly conditional. "829 
Shanto Iyengar has demonstrated that media can "prime" audiences by highlighting some 
issues and ignoring others, as well as "frame" stories in such a way as to contextualize an 
issue to bolster a particular viewpoint 830 but, as one study of media in Eastern Europe 
concluded, these effects are less likely to influence public opinion and attitudes than to 
reinforce them-83' Legal scholar Monroe Price is among those who emphasize the complex 
relationship between media and the emergence of democracy. His 2002 co-edited volume 
brings together analyses of political transformation in ten nations in transition, 
demonstrating that while media liberalization can be a facilitating factor in the emergence of 
democracy, it is neither a requirement nor sufficient alone to bring about political 
transformation. The factors that form the relationship between media and democracy are 
many and varied. In short, "the conventional wisdom is most commonly found to be 
inadequate or simply wrong. ""' 
Even when media does help to produce change, it does not necessarily produce the 
kind of change democracy advocates in the West might hope for. Witness Hamas' 2005 
victory in Palestine. "For every society in which a 'people's power' revolution is helped 
along by international cheering squads and satellite television, " wrote Catharin Dalpino, 
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"another is daily becoming more cosmopolitan while adhering to traditional (and often 
authoritarian) practices: " 
That may be true, but there are also signs that Arab television is not only emerging as 
the new battlefield of ideas, but it may even be supplanting at least some of the traditionally 
more bloody battlefields of the Middle East. Witness Beirut in the waning months of 2006. In 
an earlier era, the assassination of Christian leader Pierre Gemayel would likely have been 
the spark that ignited a new round of civil war. But instead, hundreds of thousands of 
Lebanese supporters of the so-called March 14 Movement took to the streets in a televised 
reprise of the rallies that forced Syria's withdrawal. Then, in answer days later, hundreds of 
thousands of Hezbollah supporters staged their own mass protests, likewise transmitted 
live, 24/7 across the region and around the world. For the moment, the power of the camera 
had trumped the power of the gun. 
2) RESTRUCTURING THE ARAB MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
There has been a television revolution in the Arab world, of that there is no doubt. 
Arab satellite television news was born in the early 1980s with the Middle East Broadcasting 
Centre, owned by Saudi interests, and took its current form with the arrival of Al Jazeera in 
1996. It was an answer to CNN, the BBC and other Western channels flooding the airwaves 
of the Middle East. Those channels had monopolized coverage of the 1990-91 Gulf war. For 
Arab governments, satellite TV was an attempt to take back some control of the message, 
even if it meant that long suppressed ideas might also seep in. 
The arrival of Arab satellite television brought urban renewal to McLuhan's "global 
village. " No longer did all the world view events through a Western lens. But neither 
could Arab governments any longer control the televised message. Most of the cliches that 
have been written about Al Jazeera and its successors are true: The genie was out of the 
bottle; with their fingers in the electronic dike, Arab governments tried vainly to stem the 
flow of information, with only limited success. Al Jazeera reframed - and in many cases 
created - the debate. By serving as a forum for diverse - and once rarely-heard - views, the 
Qatar-based channel and its imitators provided an outlet where otherwise there was none, 
establishing "a common, core Arab narrative. "135 But that electronic revolution has yet to be 
matched by even the beginnings of a political revolution. Satellite TV's grand opening of the 
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marketplace of ideas was an important first step in the process of democratization, but it 
was just that -a first step. 
Hazem Saghieh, a columnist with the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, once told an 
international editors gathering that "Al Jazeera is the most influential [political] party in the 
Arabic World "836 It has also been suggested that Middle East reality shows like Super Star 
and Star Academy, on which viewers vote for their favorites, have offered Arabs their first 
real taste of democracy. &37 Both these observations are vast oversimplifications. What has 
arisen on Al-Jazeera and its successors, like Al-Arabiya, Abu Dhabi TV, LBC, Future TV and 
the rest, is a forum for discussion, offering debates that are "a verbalization of Arab publics' 
critiques of government. "m On some level, these broadcasts acts as a safety valve, releasing 
the pent-up anger within the Arab body politic without overtly threatening governments. 
News programs meanwhile, shine a spotlight on some of the worst excesses of the region's 
regimes. "For democratic institutions to survive and flourish, there has to be a source of 
trusted information, " writes Philip Meyer. But mass communication does not equal - or 
necessarily produce - mass democratization. "There remains a large gap between an 
informed citizenry and an empowered citizenry, " according to Rami Khouri, editor-at-large 
of Beirut's Daily Star. &1° For evidence, one needs look no further than Iraq, with its plethora 
of media outlets and paucity of political stability. 
"Democracy may be a political system, but it is also a social ethos, " argues Fawaz 
Turki, a former Arab News columnist fired for criticizing governments in the Muslim world. 
"How responsive can a country be to such an ethos when its people have, for generations, 
existed with an ethic of fear - fear of originality, fear of innovation, fear of spontaneity, fear 
of life itself -- and have had instilled in them the need to accept orthodoxy, dependence and 
submission? "M1 
That is not to say satellite television channels - and the journalists who staff them - 
do not have an impact. "There is no Kijaya if there is no TV, " in the view of Abdulwahab 
Badrakhan, long-time senior editor at Ai-Hayat. "2 Television, says Al-Jazeera senior 
producer Samir Khader, is "part of the revolution. "813 In places like Tunisia, where the 
government and its cronies control all mass circulation media, "people in different towns 
and villages in Tunis who can't know what happens in their country are able to know those 
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things and this creates a new public opinion in our society. It is a very new situation that 
makes a pressure on the government, ' says Rashid Khashana, editor of a free opposition 
newspaper. "' Giselle Khouri, who hosts a Beirut-based program on Al Jazeera's rival, Al- 
Arabiya, privately-owned by Saudi interests, believes a watershed for the Arab media came 
during heart-wrenching coverage of the death of Mohammed al-Durra, a 12-year old 
Palestinian boy whose final moments, shielded by his father as they were trapped under a 
hail of Israeli gunfire, were caught on videotape by a Palestinian cameraman and shown 
around the world .m "I guess this is the point where the Arab media realized the importance 
of Arab media and Arab television, " she told me later. "Because the opinion mondiale 
changed - their opinion about terrorism, about the Arab world, about being a victim. " 
The "demonstration effects"' of satellite TV coverage of the anti-Syrian marches in 
Lebanon and Egypt's Kifaya (Enough! ) movement inspired Jordanian protestors to emulate 
in their own demonstrations the visual props of the Lebanese movement, while government 
opponents in Tunisia adopted a rallying cry reminiscent of Egypt's Enough! But the facade of 
change falls short of real change. "In spite of the exaggerated importance attributed to pan- 
Arab satellite TV stations as agents of political change and the near-neurotic fixation of the 
American administration on Al-Jazeera, these TV channels have yet to show a single case in 
which they played a major role as the vehicle of change, " researcher Hanna Ziadeh 
observed. "7 
The 2005 Egyptian elections demonstrated the gulf between the act of reporting on the 
democratic process and the production of a democratic result. The fact that Egyptians and 
other Arab viewers of satellite television were able to see bloody images of baton-wielding 
thugs driving opposition voters away from the polls, hear human rights officials denouncing 
the results, or watch as opposition presidential candidate Ayman Nour was taken away to 
prison, did nothing to halt the abuses or prevent the Mubarak regime from declaring the 
vote "completely fair. "m The elections "helped to open up public debate in the country, " 
Human Rights Watch concluded, "[blut the main features of decades-long authoritarian rule 
remain in place, making a truly free and fair election at this moment beyond reach. "849 Real 
democracy requires the infrastructure of civil society. In Egypt, that is embryonic at best. In 
many other parts of the Arab world, it is virtually non-existent. As one study of the media 
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and political evolution in Eastern Europe concluded, "democratization through the media is 
highly improbable, if not outright impossible. "m As for infotainment and other forms of 
pseudo-democratic participation, charges of vote-rigging and manipulation on Arab TV 
reality shows have led some commentators to draw parallels with actual elections in the 
region, where regimes "cook the results" if they don't like them. Marc Lynch has noted, 
"Like Al-Jazeera's online polls, reality TV gives the illusion of participation and democracy, 
but it is easily manipulated and has no real impact on the world. "151 
The same might be said of news and talk stations. There, Arabs can vent their 
political emotions without - necessarily - endangering the region's political status quo. 
While, in theory, satellite television can mobilize publics, this presumes a unified agenda 
around which the channels are seeking mobilization. AI Jazeera's "vision and mission 
statement" declares that the channel "aspires to ... support the right of the individual to 
acquire information and strengthen the values of tolerance, democracy and the respect of 
liberties and human rights. "152 Even if one accepts the notion that Al-Jazeera's raison d'etre is 
democratic change, some find it much harder to argue that the region's other satellite news 
powerhouse, Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya, shares that goal, much less their many and varied 
competitors among the 200+ channels on the Arab satellite spectrum However, Al-Arabiya's 
Giselle Khouri rejects doubts that the channel is advocating for change. She says the seeming 
contradiction between the Saudi ownership and an agenda of change is just part of the 
inherent "schizophrenia" of the Arab world-853 As Kai Hafez observes, "the democracy 
agenda remains discontinuous and reactive. "85' Some of that reactivity comes from 
government television stations, which have been forced to respond to the avalanche of new 
- sometimes unwelcome - ideas pouring into their countries via satellite. "If you do not talk 
[about these issues] on your local channels, another channel will talk about it with the 
wrong information. This is more difficult if the public knows about these issues the wrong 
way and it sticks to their minds, " explains Mohammed al Gamsha of Saudi TV. "Then it is 
difficult to correct it. " 
Arab satellite channels represent an array of interests that span the ideological 
divide; from Hezbollah's Al-Manar to the Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC), founded 
by Lebanon's right-wing Christian Phalangist Party and now financed by a group of 
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Lebanese and Saudi investors. 6 "Arabs [have] proved that they have different voices, " says 
Giselle Khouri of At-Arabiya. &57 The strength is that channel-surfers in the Middle East can 
get a taste of a diverse range of opinion. The weakness is that everyone has an ideological 
axe to grind. 
Lebanon itself is a microcosm of this discontinuity. A cacophony of opinions has 
always characterized the Lebanese media landscape, where news organizations were largely 
bought and paid for by paymasters representing the entire spectrum of Arab political 
thought. 8,18 Recent years have witnessed an ebb and flow of that politicization. The lead-up 
to the Hariri assassination saw what Nabil Dajani, chairman of the Department of Mass 
Communication at the American University in Beirut, calls a "re-feudalization of the public 
sphere" in which the media in general, and television in particular, "reflect[ed] and in turn 
reinforce[d] the characteristics and contradictions of Lebanon's political and tribal 
confessional society. "1159 That gave way to the aforementioned emergent sense of unity 
following the assassination campaign against reporters, which then collapsed in the face of 
the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006 as various media outlets initially took 
up positions for and against the Shi'ite militia, then coalesced in opposition to the mounting 
Israeli attacks that would claim more than 1,000 lives, and eventually splintered once more, 
assuming positions reflecting the heightened tensions the war produced among the 
country's various political and feudal factions. "Lebanon does not have a free press, " argues 
Dajani. "Wealth, power and sectarianism are intimately intertwined in the Lebanese media, 
and knowledge plays no mediating role. " Instead: 
What we find today in Lebanese television is a distinct imbalance between 
public interest and the interest of the political, financial and economic forces 
in the country [and] [t]elevision's new divisions advance the larger agenda of 
the tribal/sectarian authorities of which they are a small part 860 
Despite the communal tendencies, Hanna Ziadeh credits Lebanon's domestic 
television channels with "creating a democratic space, of establishing a greater relationship 
of trust and identification with the fractured Lebanese public than any pan-Arab TV is able 
to establish with the national sub-divisions of their pan-Arab public. """ However, that credit 
may be premature. The Lebanese media may be free of overt government controls, but as 
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Dajani points out, "[f]reedom of expression by the media does not bring about democracy 
except when access to all media channels is made possible to all Lebanese groups. True 
democracy cannot be achieved when the media serve as advocates, limiting access to some 
factions and denying this access to others. " Television helped the masses in Martyr's Square 
achieve with the Syrians what the "national resistance movement" achieved against the 
Israelis in the south in 2000 and Hezbollah repeated in the summer of 2006: they drove out 
an invader. Changes to the political structures that would make Lebanon a more 
representative democracy are likely to be equally hard-won. That became evident in the 
post-war power struggle between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. 
In the previous three decades, such confrontations quickly resulted in armed conflict. 
An argument can be made that 24/7 pan-Arab television coverage of Hezbollah's mass rally 
and subsequent sit-in encampment outside the prime minister's office provided the Shi'ite 
group with a form of political leverage previously available only through the barrel of a gun. 
But the limits of this new virtual political sphere quickly became apparent. As regional TV 
channels grew bored with the interminable (and largely sedentary) sit-in, the eye of the 
camera shifted away to other, more "interesting" stories. It was not long after that the first 
armed clashes took place, quickly followed - on the eve of the anniversary of Hariri's 
assassination - by the bombing of two busloads of civilians, an act which - amplified by 
television - sent a shudder through Lebanese society and the Arab world as a whole. The 
old ways still had their place. Yet the following day, tens of thousands of Lebanese were 
back in Martyr's Square to mark Hariri's death, as pro-government politicians played to the 
live television cameras that they knew were once more carrying their message across the 
region and around the world. 
3) IMPACT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL MEDIA 
Ironically, the source of satellite television's influence is also its Achilles Heel. Pan- 
Arab TV functions as a political change agent on a regional, rather than national, level. Al- 
Jazeera and the others focus on pan-Arab issues, such as Iraq, Palestine and major stories 
like the Lebanon crisis. Purely domestic topics are largely outside the purview of these 
channels. "The local issues are the primary issues that touch the human directly, just like 
life: education, poverty, unemployment, and corruption. And these issues are not dealt with 
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closely on satellite channels for many reasons, " says Jaber Obeid, a presenter at Abu Dhabi 
TV. `Unfortunately some of the satellite channels run after broad headlines like Palestine 
and Iraq. But when it comes to dealing with political participation and plurality in a certain 
country, they do not deal with issues like that - like corruption and unemployment -that 
concerns the citizen directly. "861 Yet the terrestrial channels do not tackle them either. 
"There is huge amount of information that is missing because the local stations will 
not provide it to the viewer and we do not provide it to the viewer because it is local, " 
explains Al-Arabiya news chief Nabil Khatib. "Things that would make the Arabs better 
citizens by knowing more about their own realities they are not getting it from anywhere. So 
there is a huge portion of important data that is missing from their consciousness and this is 
negatively affecting any democratization process. "8 
"On the local level we ignore the local aspects of interest to the people, such as 
raising children and educating them and leave these national issues for larger issues such as 
Iraq and Palestine, " confirms Abd el-Latif el-Menawy, head of news at Egypt TV. "This is 
one way that some of the state owned channels use to escape, because of their inability to 
tackle local topics. Most of [my] colleagues working in the local media lack the concept of 
local news. "164 Aside from Lebanon, those local stations are controlled by the very 
governments that have so much to lose in the event of change. "We cannot afford to be 
objective, " Hussein Jamal, the head of political programming in Kuwait television, candidly 
told a group of colleagues. "Redlines are drawn around political issues" that are both 
regional and local. 
The issue of the Sahara, the issue of relations between one country and the 
other, a local internal issue between the opposition and the government, the 
issue of the elections. Look at the television channels; if you allow a candidate 
in the elections to appear for 30 seconds, then you should also show the other 
candidate. And this is why we gave up the candidates. We tried not to deal 
with these political issues. m 
In every Arab country, television reporters face the same challenge so succinctly 
explained by Tarek Abdel-Gaber, director of www. masrelyoum. com and former 
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correspondent for Egypt TV: "Domestically, there are instructions about things. """ For 
Palestine TV, according to director general Bassim Abu Samaya, "The politician is the one 
who decides if the media will follow up on the political issues or the economic and social 
issues. "86' Samir Khader of Al-Jazeera recalls that when he worked at Jordan TV, so 
pervasive was the notion that they were working as an extension of the government that 
staffers were not allowed to call themselves journalists. "It was forbidden, " he told me. 868 
That same psychology exists at some government owned newspapers. "If you look at media 
locally within the state, the journalist look upon themselves as officials paid by somebody, 
mainly by the state, and not as journalists, free people, holding their heads up and doing a 
profession, " says Aref Hiijawi, director of programs at Al Jazeera and former head of the 
Media Institute at Birzeit University on the West Bank. 869 
And then there is the fact of overt repression. The assassination of journalists in 
Lebanon; The jailing of journalists in Syria; The legal, physical, and psychological 
harassment of journalists in Egypt; The Middle East is still a place where journalists can, as 
in the case of one outspoken Saudi editor, be arrested for "harboring destructive 
thoughts. "870 When Libya's most prominent political prisoner was jailed after he called 
Mu'ammar Qaddafi a dictator in an interview with the US government satellite channel 
A1Hurra, a Libyan security official explained, "He's mentally disturbed and we're worried 
he will cause a problem for us. "871 A report by the Arab Network for Human Rights 
information chronicled a campaign against journalists in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain that 
included detentions, physical attacks, disappearances and "the most degrading violations, 
such as framing criminal cases against those opposition forces, attempting to defame their 
reputations and spreading fear amongst citizens to prevent them from participating in 
public affairs. "m For Palestinian journalists, the challenges can be particularly complicated. 
"First, there are the families and the society, " explains Al Jazeera's Hiijawi, "because the 
authority has been broken down by the Israeli occupation so the families are masters of the 
society. You can not criticize a minister, not because he is a minister and the authority is 
behind him or any of the security apparatuses, no, it is because his family is big. Number 
two, I would say is the militias, and they are in abundance now. Number three is our 
heritage. You have also other countries you can feel their pressure. And then there are the 
religious people who have become very powerful. "873 
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There is a symbiotic aspect to the relationship between Arab satellite television 
channels - particularly Al-Jazeera - and democratization movements in the Arab world. 
Television news audiences rise and fall with the shifting tides of world events. Arab satellite 
channels covered the and-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon and subsequent mass rallies 
because they were good - telegenic - stories. Not incidentally, they were also good for 
ratings. Put simply, big news is good news for 24-hour television channels. CNN's 
reputation was made with the 1990-91 Gulf War, when its reporters were among the only 
Western journalists in Baghdad during the US bombardment. The fledgling channel saw its 
ratings skyrocket during the conflict, only to drop down to pre-war levels after the conflict 
ended 874 Similarly, Al-Jazeera's reputation was cemented after 9/11, with its exclusive access 
to tapes from bin Laden and high-profile coverage of the US invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, just as Fox News in the US seized huge market share with its unabashed flag-waving in 
the months and years after 9/11 m 
Critics have accused Fox and other US channels of sensationalizing and fear- 
mongering in order to keep news interest - hence ratings - high. ul The democratization 
movement in the Arab world provided Arab satellite channels with a story of continuing 
interest for their pan-Arab audiences at a time when the daily drumbeat of bad news from 
Iraq was producing conflict overdose in Arab viewers. The kifaya story, like Hezbollah's 2006 
battle with Israel, also reinforced the self-view of the television journalists themselves: "The 
powerful images from the streets resonated with the core Al-jazeera identity and narrative: 
the Arab people fighting against the repression and corruption of Arab regimes. "87 Arab 
media have become players in the drama, a parallel to the "accelerating trend" among US 
correspondents who construct "themselves as both reporting on and constituent of media 
events. "878 
4) MEDIATING CHANGE 
Media is power, nowhere more so that in the Middle East. By controlling the 
messenger while fostering some perception of media independence, Arab governments can 
at least attempt to control the nature and pace of change. At a major Saudi-financed 
conference on the media in Dubai in the fall of 2005, I asked the president of the Arab 
Thought Foundation, Prince Bandar bin Khaled al Faisal, why a nation that was, after all, a 
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feudal monarchy with no pretensions to representational democracy, would finance a 
gathering on media freedom, itself an historic precursor to democracy. "Journalism is a part 
of change, " said Bandar, the owner of Saudi Arabia's AI-Watan newspaper and grandson of 
the late King Faisal. "And this conference is an effort to say, 'OK, maybe we should expedite 
the process a little bit because we really do have a lot to lose. " 
It was easy - and dangerous - for outsiders to romanticize the Arab media 
revolution. Yet all Arab satellite TV channels had red lines that surrounded their coverage. 
For Al-Arabiya, that involved "terrorism and anything to do with religion and religious 
politics" a senior news executive told me. For Al Jazeera, the sensitivity involved Qatari 
foreign policy. In the complex evaluation that took places in the newsroom and at the upper 
reaches of Al-Jazeera's management before controversial stories were aired, the essential 
question became, 'Will this have a negative impact on Qatar's foreign policy? '° Al-Jazeera 
put Qatar on the global map and gave the Qatari royal family an important weapon in the 
regional geo-political equation - as did the shift of the US central command from Saudi 
Arabia to Doha. But the Qataris walked a fine line in exercising that influence as well as the 
need to maintain stable relations with fellow Arab countries and the US One Al-Jazeera 
staffer quoted Sheik Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani, the Qatari royal who ran the growing Al- 
Jazeera empire, as telling the staff on at least one occasion, "Do you think the Emir likes 
getting angry calls from the President of the United States? "1181 Another sign of the link 
between Al Jazeera and Qatari foreign policy came in the late spring of 2007 when Wadah 
Khanfar, the Palestinian director general of the Al Jazeera group of channels, was removed 
from the corporate board and demoted back to his earlier position as managing director of 
Al-Jazeera Arabic, reportedly for his pro-Hamas sympathies, which conflicted with Qatar's 
support for the Fatah faction of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas .m 
The new board also included a former Qatari ambassador to the US, Hamad Al 
Kuwari, and Mahmoud Shammam, the editor of the Arabic edition of Newsweek and critic of 
AI Jazeera's coverage, leading to daims by Khanfar's defenders that the channel was about 
to be silenced. "The evidence is dear that the US government is using its influence in Qatar 
to try to neuter the station's independence, bring it to heel and shift its coverage in a pro- 
western direction. If it succeeds, it would be a disaster for the Arab world and its chance to 
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shape an independent and democratic future, " Galloway wrote London's Guardian 
newspaper. 80 As the above anecdote illustrates, not only was there no guarantee that 
satellite television would help spur democratization, but the reality indicated that the rise of 
satellite television was not necessarily a harbinger of the emergence of greater media 
freedom in the Arab world. Rather, what was emerging was a corporate feudal model of 
media ownership, with television shifting from government control to the control of 
powerful business interests closely aligned with - or part of - existing authoritarian regimes. 
"I'm completing against countries, not companies! " Mohammed Alayyan, publisher and 
chairman of the independent newspaper Al-Gad and CEO of ATV in Jordan, complained-114 
"Unfortunately, " said Nabil Khatib, executive editor at Al-Arabiya, "this is the game. This 
will continue until the public will have its own mechanisms to defend itself and to push us 
media to be set free and respect the ethics. This will take time. "8115 As Ali al-Ahmed, director 
general of Abu Dhabi television put it, "Many channels are there for profit; others are there 
because the owner wants a channel. "16 
It was a natural extension of a similar system of control in the pan-Arab print media. 
"Al-Hayat is not a commercial project, " the paper's then number two, Abdulwahab 
Badrakhan told me in 2005. "lt is in the first place a political project, like Asharq AI Awsat. 
Asharq Al Awsat and Al-Hayat never jmake] money, and you can understand that because 
you can consider us as public relations. "11' Hussein Shobokshi, whose reporting appeared 
both in Asharq Al Awsat and on Al-Arabiya, said these Saudi dominated outlets all put out 
"a beautiful display, a strong progressive product, " but ultimately media owned by this new 
generation of Arab media moguls "all wear the straight hats of the government or semi- 
government. " Echoing the comments of Prince Bandar, Shobokshi said the reform agenda of 
Arab journalists had Arab leaders on the defensive. "That is why they want to own the 
media as well. They are so nervous because they see it as a catapult of change, but they want 
to control the catapult of change. "Im The emir of Qatar didn't finance Al-Jazeera to get a 
membership card at Washington's National Press Club. He did it for the same reason he 
invited the US Central Command to set up shop outside Doha-to make himself a player in 
the region. That's also why the Saudis and Emiratis were building media empires in the 
Gulf, Jordan's King Abdullah was talking up media liberalization and Syrian intelligence 
and its Lebanese minions were - all evidence suggests - killing journalists. `' And as Sakr 
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has pointed out, the growth of these new politically-powerful media conglomerates has not 
yet produced structures that would enable journalists "to collaborate across companies or 
borders to defend their right to report. "890 
In their landmark study of American journalism, veteran editors Bill Kovach and 
Tom Rosenstiel warned that, "We are faced with the possibility that independent news will 
be replaced by self-interested commercialism posing as news. "891 In the Arab world, there 
was an additional danger. that independent news would be still-borne. Economic 
sustainability is one of the greatest challenges to media organizations in countries 
transitioning from an authoritarian model to a free press. The tendency is for a plethora of 
media organizations to spring up in the first heady days after deregulation, fragmenting the 
market and making it difficult for anyone to make money. As Russia exemplified, the 
survivors are frequently gobbled up by business tycoons - usually cronies of the 
government-of-the-day - and the rest are susceptible to economic coercion, becoming 
mouthpieces for political parties and special interests. 192 The Arab world in the first decade 
of the new century showed the signs that it might be in the process of skipping that 
intermediate, free-for-all step. The development of Arab media stood in stark contrast to the 
pattern elsewhere, such as Hungary, where "[m]edia globalization favors highly 
concentrated Western interests in alliance with powerful domestic corporations. "893 In the 
Arab world, outside investment was generally not required. So a purely-home grown 
industry was emerging, but it was one that replaced the government-controlled media 
feudalism of old with a form of corporate feudalism, in which wealthy individuals closely 
aligned with - or part of - governments built vast media empires. Unlike in the Balkans or 
Africa, virtually unlimited capital in the Middle East meant that poor, scrappy journalistic 
entrepreneurs were few and far between. Idealistic startups like Jordan's first private FM 
station, Ammanet, a spin-off of an innovative Internet radio station based in the West Bank, 
were exceptions to the rule of corporate feudalism. The overwhelming number of pseudo- 
independent media outlets in the region were owned or heavily-influenced by members of 
royal families, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and its cousin MBC; tools of mega-rich would- 
be politicos and influence peddlers, such as Hariri's Future TV and Gen. Michel Aoun's OTV 
in Lebanon; or bully pulpits for political parties and preachers of every stripe, from a 
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channel run by the Egyptian Wafd Party to the "moderate" Islamic entertainment channel 
Al-Resalah (The Message), owned by Saudi billionaire Walid bin Talal. 
"Do private media and channels exist - and I mean by 'private' that they are 
independent from the authority of the audience or the ruling authority? " Bassim Abu 
Samaya, director general, Palestinian Radio & TV, asked rhetorically at a gathering of Arab 
broadcasters. "No. This does not exist. There are no private channels independent from the 
funding and the authority of the funding sides. And in many cases it is an economic 
corporation or institution that controls the sovereignty of this channel or that one, in one 
way or another. "89* "All the media represent a political party or religious party, " Michel 
Murr told me in the fall of 2005 05 The Lebanese Christian tycoon was in a position to know. 
He was in the process of re-launching Muff TV, the anti-Syrian station dosed down by 
Lebanon's pro-Syrian president several years before. 
This corporate feudalism particularly dominated in the Gulf media It was 
epitomized by Saudi Sheikh Waleed al Ibrahim, whose sister was married to King Fahd. His 
MBC group launched the first "private" Arab satellite channel and controlled Al-Arabiya, 
the main rival to Al Jazeera. m "The private sector in the Arab world still considers itself in 
alliance with monarchies and with regimes. It will not confront them, " according to Khatib 
of Al-Arabiya 897 While they were officially "independent, " the way in which Sheikh 
Waleed's channels were highly responsive to Saudi political interests was demonstrated 
with coverage of the 2006 Lebanon war. In the early stages of the conflict, when the Saudi 
government was criticizing Hezbollah for provoking the Israelis, Al-Arabiya's coverage was 
low-key, downplaying the story apparently in order to avoid stirring up Arab public 
opinion in support of the Shi'ite militia and, by extension, its Iranian sponsors. 898 The same 
was true three years earlier in the case of Jihad on Horseback, a documentary about the Darfur 
crisis directed and produced by a Lebanese member of the MBC staff. Sources at the channel 
told this writer that the program, highly critical of the Sudan regime, was killed after the 
direct intervention of King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia. As IREX concluded in its Media 
Sustainability Index, 
Money available for media business investment has allowed outlets to better 
professionalize and access to new technologies ... [but] ... These oil-rich 
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countries have demonstrated the ability to develop a media industry without 
loosening press freedoms beyond points the threaten the governing 
monarchies and regimes of the region. 899 
"In general the rule of the game is that there is no black or white. There is always a 
grey area, " said Khatib, referring to the restrictions within which the pan-Arab satellite 
channels worked. 
It would not be realistic to say our colleagues in the newsroom there are no 
redlines. There are redlines everywhere, sometimes for totally different 
reasons. There is no dear law. And there is no ethics that are accepted or 
agreed on. For example, it is known that nobody will go and investigate 
[issues like] where or how this fortune of money rewards of oil is being 
distributed. You will not see it on Al Jazeera about Saudi Arabia, because if 
they say it about Saudi Arabia somebody will say it about Qatar. So they will 
not say and we will not say it. So it is a great step forward to have non- 
governmental media, but it is still far from realizing and its political role and 
social role. 900 
Khatib told me that it was understood within A1-Arabiya that he would push the 
envelope until owner Sheikh Waleed al Ibrahim received a call from someone in a position 
of power telling them to back off. Then, he explained, he and senior management engage in 
a carefully choreographed dance. Khatib gave the example of the channel's coverage of 
Egypt: "He would call us, saying "What you have on Egypt? I am getting phone calls from 
the President's office, ' and I would say, 'We have so and so, ' and he says, 'That is OK. ' 'OK' 
means for me that is OK [and the story stays on the air]. Then in 6 or 8 hours he [calls again 
and] says, 'I called and ordered you to stop it ' Only then is the piece pulled off the air. "He 
needs to maintain some relationship with them [the Saudi royal family]. "901 
Ghassan Tueni, patriarch of the dynasty that controlled Lebanon's An Nahar 
newspaper, was contemptuous of such antics. "Today there is no Arab media, " he told me in 
2005. "Audio visual [TV] is theatrical. These politics are theatrics. The premium media is 
either owned by governments or controlled by them, " he said, adding that it was impossible 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 169 
to have serious news organizations "built on sand. " He had no more respect for the many 
journalists working for government-owned or controlled media outlets. "Why do you want 
a civil servant in Egypt to risk his life for what he is going to write? He is going to get his 
salary anyway. " 902 
It all came back to power and how it is leveraged. Arab satellite television might 
have been helping to fuel political reform but it also remained a prisoner of those reforms. 
The Egyptian elections provided an example of how this corporate feudalism affected 
would-be democratization efforts. In an attempt to maintain what many observers called the 
facade of democracy, the Mubarak regime imposed an equal time rule on the influential 
news broadcasts at Egyptian state television, requiring that Mubarak's main challengers for 
the presidency receive the same amount of on-air exposure as the president. But the media- 
savvy consultants brought in by Mubarak's son, campaign manager and heir-apparent, 
Gamal Mubarak, quickly arranged an end-run on the rules. They approached Ahmed 
Bahgat, the owner of Dream TV, a four-year old Egyptian satellite station, with a deal that 
gave Dream the exclusive rights to broadcast Mubarak's rallies. As a result, the Mubarak 
campaign gained access to one of the largest television audiences in Egypt without the need 
to offer equal time. At the same time, just months before the campaign began, an advertising 
agency owned by another businessman with dose ties to the ruling National Democratic 
Party (NDP) purchased the rights to Dream's advertising time, then refused to sell 
commercials to opposition candidates. As journalist Charles Levinson wrote of the incident, 
"The experience with private satellite channels such as Dream, operating in the shadow of 
authoritarian regimes, cannot replace a truly independent media. "m Still, the picture was 
not all dark. Mahmoud Abdulhadi, who headed Al-Jazeera's training arm, believed the 
media moguls were ultimately in for a surprise. "You cannot say that if you have money and 
you have this tool [Arab media outlets], you can control journalism, " he said. Now that the 
free press genie was emerging from the bottle, he believed, it would be impossible to force it 
back ins 
5) TELEVISION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Television alone cannot make revolutions. It takes people. While "an important 
learning process is underway" as Arab audiences watched political events unfold on their 
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television screens, journalist Rami Khouri argued that there remained a "massive center of 
largely apathetic ordinary citizens who watch all this on television, concerned mainly by 
taking care of their families. That apathy was complicated by television's tendency to feed 
society's short attention span by rapidly shifting from crisis to crisis906 The result is what 
British scholar Andrew Hoskins calls the "collapse of memory, " a state in which memory 
"both thrives and falls in the instantaneity of twenty-first century news. "907 A year after the 
"Cedar Revolution, " which so energized proponents of political change, the death knell of 
Arab democracy was already being sounded. Writing in the spring of 2006 of US efforts to 
counter the influence of Iran through democratization elsewhere in the region, Michael 
Young, the Lebanese opinion editor of The Daily Star, observed that, "The bulwarks of US 
policy in the region, the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are moribund, and their ability 
to be flexible, democratic, legitimate, is negligible. "908 
But one thing had changed: The way Arab journalists viewed their own role in the 
process and the possibilities for the future. As the assassinated columnist Kassir put it not 
long before his murder: "Thanks to a handful of journalists, we have indeed re-conquered 
our freedom of opinion and expression-if not yet fully our freedom of information. " 
-0- 
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CHAPTER IX: COVERING DARFUR -A QUESTION OF IDENTITY 
"The dead don't talk and they don't have 
representatives. " 
Euns KHOURI 
GATE OF THE SUN9()9 
There was no story that better demonstrated the limits of the freedom of information 
in the Arab media, or the degree to which ethnic and religious identity shaped coverage, 
than the conflict in the Sudanese province of Darfur. Nor was there an issue more 
controversial among Arab journalists themselves. Not Iraq, where, by the winter of 2008, 
more than 100 Arab journalists had lost their lives since the US invasion; not Palestine, 
where journalists were caught between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Fatah and 
Hamas; not Lebanon, where reporters continued to be caught in the cross-hairs of rival 
factions and governments. 
In Darfur, ethic Arab militias were preying on ethic African tribes in what President 
George Bush had labeled a "genocide. "910 The conflict was a hot-button issue in Arab 
newsrooms not because of the physical danger involved in reporting the story, but because 
the issue struck right to the heart of the mission of Arab journalism and the self-identity of 
those who practiced it. Two gatherings in the spring of 2007 provided a window on the 
internal debate among Arab journalists as they struggled to rationalize their coverage of the 
conflict. The first took place in Cairo, when 50 journalists from across the Arab world came 
together to discuss the challenges and limitations to their reporting; 911 the second, two 
weeks later, at the annual convention of Arab broadcasters in Abu Dhabi. 912 The central 
issue: "The Arabs see the victims are not Arabs, and we don't care, " Khaled Ewais, Al- 
Arabiya's political producer, told the Cairo gathering. 913 Fayez el Sheikh Saleik, Khartoum 
correspondent of Al-Hayat, concurred: "Sudan is a marginal country when it comes to the 
Arab region. " Some pointed to an even more insidious issue: In other regional conflicts, 
Arabs were the victims. In Darfur, Arab militias were the perpetrators. That was not a 
popular topic among governments or among Arab journalists. "The media are directly 
responsible for this crisis, " an angry representative of the Liberation Front of Darfur told 
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those assembled in Cairo. While few of the journalists were willing to go quite that far, there 
was widespread acknowledgement that Darfur was the biggest untold story of the Arab 
world. 
"Arab journalists are working within non-democratic systems, so you can't expect 
them to talk about Darfur, " said Saleik of Al-Hayat. The Arab media was "ultimately very 
interconnected with the ruling system" according to Ahmed Hissou, a Syrian journalist 
working for the Arabic service of Germany's Deutsche Welle radio, and Arab governments 
"do not accept any internal crises, whether religious or ethnic. " As a result, said Kamal al- 
Gizouli of the Sudanese writer's union, when they do report on Darfur, Arab media "are 
talking only about sovereignty when the real issue is the rights of people to live in peace. " 
The numbers were grim. At that point, more than 250,000 dead; 2.5 million internally 
displaced; four million in need of relief assistance. "Why is there no debate in the Arab mass 
media? " asked Nadim Hasbani, Arab media officer for the International Crisis Group. 
Amani Tawil of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies offered one explanation: 
"Selective information. " Television, she said, "reflects the special agenda of each 
government in the Arab region, " while newspapers "have a tendency to marginalize stories 
about other Arab governments. " Until the recent Saudi initiative on Darfur, Arab regimes - 
and thus most Arab media - had a hands-off approach to Sudan. Non journalists like 
Roland Marchal of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales in Paris and Khaled 
Mansour, spokesman for the World Food Program, praised some Western coverage - 
including that of the BBC and New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof - for putting a 
human face on the Darfur conflict by focusing on the plight of individuals. Al-Hayat was 
also singled out as "indefatigable in its continuous coverage of the events in Darfur. " But the 
overwhelming message was that when most Arab media bothered to report on the crisis, 
they focused on political machinations, not human impact. "Arab media coverage is like a 
person on a plane looking down, " said Sudanese Member of Parliament and political activist 
Salih Mahmoud Osman, while Western coverage portrayed the pain of the victims. 
But it wasn't the "experts" alone who were critical. This writer had never heard a 
group of Arab journalists so brutally frank in public about the pressures and pitfalls of their 
own coverage. "We Arab journalists, sorry to say, deal with Darfur as governments do, " 
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said Tahir el-Mardi, Khartoum correspondent for Al Jazeera. "We have 22 agendas on 
Darfur [for the 22 Arab countries] and the West has one. Arab journalists, to say the truth, 
are entangled in political issues. " Mohamed Barakat, political editor at the Egyptian daily 
AI Akhbar, said that in the Arab world, all politics truly were local: "There is an agenda 
which is local according to the country in which it takes place. " Others pointed to the 
constant talk of Zionist plots and Western conspiracies in Arab coverage of Darfur, the 
preoccupation with "strategic Arab interests, " and what one political editor called the 
"fantasies" about a Western oil grab, all of which came at the cost of reporting on the human 
toll. Al-Gizouli of the Sudanese writer's union said the history of Arab journalism was to 
blame. An entire generation of journalists and intellectuals had been weaned on the notions 
of Arab mobilization and confrontation in the face of the imperialist and colonialist 
aggressor. That legacy was heard loudly in the Darfur coverage. "There is no voice but the 
battle with Israel and the imperialists. That is what has been fed to the Arab intellectuals. If 
there is no role for Zionists, [the Arab reporter] creates it from his own imagination and 
Zionism means conspiracy, the main gallows on which hangs the conscience of the 
journalists. " 
"The Arab journalist is an offspring of his environment, " agreed Hissou of Deutsche 
Welle "We had imperialism and Zionism with double-standards. Arab officials say Bush is 
jeopardizing Sudan, so Arab journalists must accept this conspiracy. " He read a series of 
excerpts from Arab coverage that, he claimed, demonstrated that the reporting "is heavily 
freighted with ideological and political assumptions that ... imperil our journalistic 
neutrality. " Hissou quoted Al-Hayat's influential columnist Jihad Khazen as writing that the 
Bush administration and the Israel lobby were using Darfur "as a smokescreen to hide other 
crimes, from Palestine to Iraq" and Hissou claimed that while Al Jazeera had given 
substantial coverage to Darfur, "it has invited Arab analysts, writers, and physicians to 
ridicule all reports transmitted by the global television networks on the various acts of 
murder, rape, and forced displacement. " El-Mardi of Al Jazeera's Khartoum bureau 
countered by saying that the channel covered the crisis "in an objective manner" and "any 
topic concerning policy in Sudan has the opinion, the facts and the counter-opinion. If it 
does not, it does not go to air. " However, he added, "Darfur is a political issue in the first 
instance" and "there is a very thin line between the professional journalist and the political 
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person. " Ewais of Al-Arabiya presented data showing that Arab media devoted a small 
fraction of the amount of time and space to Darfur as it does to crises like Iraq, Palestine and 
Lebanon, while the Western media gives it significantly more attention. Salih, the Sudanese 
MP, said covering Darfur "doesn't prevent us from discussing the humanitarian suffering in 
Darfur as well. ""If we say there are violations of human rights in Darfur, we are not 
denying violations by Israel and the US in Iraq and Palestine, " agreed AI-Gizouli. Still, he 
lamented, "It is very hard to put Darfur on a par with Arab stories. " 
"I know, sometimes the story is complex and difficult to communicate, " Khaled 
Mansour of the World Food Program told those gathered, "but the Arab media's coverage of 
the humanitarian side of the conflict has been very weak" when compared to that of 
Western news organizations. For many newspapers, money was a big issue when it came to 
Darfur. Several Egyptian editors said their publications simply did not have the resources to 
cover the crisis properly. But others pointed out that the pan-Arab newspapers and satellite 
TV channels had plenty of money and a level of professionalism that had brought a human 
face to other regional tragedies. "Al-Jazeera focuses on the human side in Palestine, " said al- 
Gizouli. "So you have to ask why they don't do the same in Darfur. There is a double 
standard on human feelings. Al Jazeera is operated by Arabs so they show sympathy for the 
Palestinian and Iraqi people and show the dead babies there, but when it comes to Darfur, 
they don't. They want to show Arabs always as victims. " 
At times the debate grew heated. Some journalists in the audience objected to the 
constant criticism. A divide began to arise between the foreign experts and black-skinned 
Sudanese journalists one side, and, on the other, print reporters from Egypt and other Arab 
countries. "We are here to participate in a discussion about developing better coverage, not 
to have scorn heaped on us, " an Egyptian editor snapped at one speaker. "I have traveled to 
Darfur; I am not here to listen to criticism. " Yet the comment opened a far-ranging 
discussion about the fact that many Arab news organizations get - and report -a distorted 
view of Darfur because they visit as part of tours arranged by the Sudanese government 
which, according to Sudanese columnist Alhaj Warrag, took the view that "everything in 
Darfur is a conspiracy of the Zionists" and imposed "redlines" on its own media that meant 
Sudanese reporters could not cover anything about violations of human rights, police or 
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security. " "I am an Arab and a Muslim and I was nearly ready to accept this, " he said. Then 
he went to the camps "and I met someone who watched his sister being raped by the 
Janjaweed [Arab militiaj. 'Barakat ofAl Akhbar said guided tours and journalist visits as part 
of official delegations "pave the way for getting to Darfur but you are besieged by the 
agenda of this particularly diplomatic mission which means you cannot flee. " The other 
problem was that such visits present a skewed view. "Most of the journalists invited by the 
Sudanese government go to camps in good condition, that seem like the Hilton hotel, but 
Western journalists go in through Chad and see the real situation, " said el-Mardi from Al- 
jazeera. 
As with the Western media, Arab journalists faced huge logistical hurdles in 
breaking out of the guided tour approach to covering Darfur. Saleik, the Al-Hayat Khartoum 
correspondent, recalled that for a July 2004 visit to Darfur, he went on a cross-Africa odyssey 
from Khartoum to Nairobi, to Lagos, to Chad, and finally into Darfur. "The nature of the 
crisis is different from Iraq or Palestine, " he told the gathering. "In Darfur, you can walk a 
long time in the desert to reach the news, but in Palestine its easy. "Then there's the issue 
every reporter ultimately confronts: How important is the story to the editor and the reader? 
-Palestine and Lebanon was the priority, ' Saleik recalled of his coverage in past years. "We 
sent many stories from Darfur, but they didn't get published. ""What is news? " asked 
Hassan Satti of Asharq Al Awsat. "That's a complicated question. There is the problem of 
who compiles the news; the psychological and mental structures and cultural and religious 
dimensions. Coverage is with the spirit of the editor and he can fall victim to his traditions. 
If it is news, you shouldn't take a point of view but if you are going to eat, some people will 
select the best food. Each editor or journalist has his internal censor. "As one Egyptian 
journalist whispered to me in an aside, "You need to know who you are working for. " He 
also said that when he tried to write stories about Darfur from Cairo, his editor would ask 
suspiciously, "Why are you writing this? What is your motive? " 
The most emotional attack on Arab media coverage of Darfur came from Nabil 
Kassem, producer/director of Jihad on Horseback, the Darfur documentary commissioned by 
Al-Arabiya's parent company MBC three years before but cancelled after pressure from 
Saudi Arabia. Kassem, who still worked for Al-Arabiya, was bitter about what he called 
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"fantasy" reports in the Arab media that Arab tribes were forced to flee attacking Africans 
and claims that the refugee camps were Zionist propaganda. " The Arab tribes fleeing from 
the Africans, where are they? " he asked. "Then I went to the camps the Arab media said 
didn't exist. " Kassem said he left his objectivity in the dust of the Darfur desert. "I am 
speaking as a humanitarian, not a journalist who is neutral, " he told the gathering. "How 
can anyone go and see millions of displaced people and remain balanced? " 
"Until now, I cannot forget what I saw. I left women and children lying there dying. " 
With tears in his eyes, he confronted the Egyptian editor who had earlier bristled at criticism 
of Arab coverage and boasted that he, too, had visited Darfur. "Did you sec that? Did you 
see them dying? " Kassem challenged the startled journalist. "Then why didn't you write it? I 
am in a rage. Arabs should be ashamed having one million Muslims begging for help. 
Shame! " Nabil Hasbani of the International Crisis Group said Al-Arabiya largely abandoned 
Darfur coverage for several years after the documentary was pulled. Most of the channel's 
reporting was confined to pieces filed by UN correspondent Talal Haj. There was "no 
information from the ground, " which "left the audience thinking the UN controls the crisis" 
and thus, it's not an Arab issue. Al Jazeera also largely ignored the crisis until its coverage 
"changed drastically" between 2004 and 2006. In the previous year or two, Al-Arabiya's 
coverage had likewise dramatically stepped up. "We run very critical coverage of Darfur 
now. We don't care who we offend, " one executive of the channel told me. Why then, I 
asked, had Jihad on Horseback been killed and other Darfur reporting abandoned? "Back 
then, " he said with a sardonic smile, "we cared [who was offended]. " " That A1-Arabiya's 
news executives shared the dais with producer Kassem said much about the change of 
viewpoint. 
Darfur was also on the agenda at the Arab Broadcast Forum in Abu Dhabi two 
weeks later. "I think we have less coverage from Darfur, print and broadcast media, I think 
sometimes we editorialize many issues in this part of the world, we feel that this is part of 
our pan-Arab world and we feel we should keep hands off this, " a representative of Kuwait 
TV told his colleagues 914 Samir Sabbah, head of Middle East media for Reuters TV, 
concurred: "If you watch any Arab station any night you will have reporting on Iraq, on 
Palestine, but it is rare to see news about Darfur. So no there isn't enough. " The debate 
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between those who tracked the Darfur issue and those who covered it, which began in 
Cairo, continued in Abu Dhabi. And once more Al-jazeera was in the crosshairs. "Al-Jazeera 
sees itself as voice of Muslims and Arabs in the world, but why don't they implement this 
policy in Darfur? Why don't they tell us it's Muslims killing Muslims? " asked Hasbani of 
ICG. There was a general acknowledgement from Arab broadcasters that Darfur suffered 
from the same subtle racist overtones that colored US coverage of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
perception that, in the brutal newsroom maxim, it's just 'more flies on black faces; ' just 
another interminable African conflict. In fact, James Zogby, president of the Arab American 
Institute, unveiled a new survey that found that more than 80 percent of the Arab public in 
four Arab countries believes pan-Arab satellite channels should devote more coverage to 
Darfur. 915 "The myth that Arabs don't care about Darfur is just that, a myth, " Zogby told the 
broadcasters. 
That may be so, but some Sudanese journalists were still skeptical that their Arab 
colleagues would give Darfur more than a glancing look. In Cairo, columnist Warrag used 
Auschwitz as an analogy for Arab media denial of the reality in Darfur. "Can you imagine 
having your village burned and people say nothing happened to you? " "We shouldn't kid 
ourselves any coverage of the conflict fraught with practical issues. It's often dangerous, it 
saps resources and access is difficult. But it's a story we must cover, " CNN's Nasser told the 
Abu Dhabi gathering. Andrew Simmons of Al-Jazeera English said Western and Arab 
journalists alike - "regardless of your branding" - were obligated to devote resources to 
covering the conflict. "We have a responsibility to our viewers to analyze, explain, to further 
the political debate over Darfur. " 
For Simmons, a British journalist, and Nasser, an Arab working for a leading US 
network, such an approach was self-evident. But it was far more problematic for Arab news 
organizations that operated at the pleasure of their governmental and corporate masters, 
such an approach was far more problematic And for Arab journalists, stepped in a culture 
in which Arabs were the victims - rarely the aggressors - it was an approach that challenged 
their very self-view. Which underlined the ultimate question, raised in Cairo by an angry 
and frustrated representative of the Darfur Liberation Front: "Arab mass media talk about 
journalists being killed in Iraq. But why don't you send journalists to be killed in Darfur? " 
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The debate over Darfur encapsulated in one story the many conflicting pressures that 
determine what makes it into the newspapers and onto the television broadcasts of the Arab 
world, and what does not. Herein lay the many levels of Shoemaker and Reese's hierarch-of- 
influences. Darfur did not fit the script and thus many Arab journalists felt they could not, 
or should not, cover the story. 
Ideology was the overarching factor shaping coverage; a desire not to "keep hands 
off" this "part of our pan-Arab world" and a recognition that the bloodbath in Darfur was 
"an offspring of our own environment. " Here were the issues of "confrontation and 
mobilization" that had long defined the Arab media. Arabs were at war, according to this 
thinking, and a mobilization press had no business undermining the cause because, after all, 
there was "a thin line between a journalist and a political person. " Extra-media influences 
were also dearly at work. The ability of the president of Sudan to pick up the phone and kill 
the story demonstrated, in spades, the truth to the theory that "The more economic and 
political power a source has, the more likely he or she is to influence news reports, "916 and 
the fact that the main shareholder in al-Arabiya's parent company was willing to kill the 
story demonstrates both the power of ownership. The comment that "newspapers 
marginalize stories about other governments" could have come straight from Shoemaker 
and Reese's hypotheses. As the Egyptian journalist told me, "You need to know who you are 
working for. " 
Beyond politics, the cost of coverage also underlined the import of political economy 
in the journalistic equation. 'Evens that are congruent with media routines are more likely 
to be covered than discongruent events, " according to Shoemaker and Reese, and, given the 
logistical difficulties of coverage, Darfur was the very definition of discongruent. 91 The fact, 
as the Zogby survey showed, that the Arab public cared little until they knew the victims 
were Muslims made it easy for the media to ignore Darfur, since the public's appetite is 
another factor influencing media content. 
But at root of the lack of Darfur coverage was the self-view of the journalists 
themselves. Shoemaker and Reese's hypothesis that "People who are similar to a journalist 
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will be covered differently from people who are dissimilar"918 was played evident in the 
glaring lack of headlines in the Arab media. The protagonists in the conflict were part of 
their "imagined community. " The victims, in terms of ethnicity, were an Other. 
-0- 
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SECTION THREE: RESULTS 
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CHAPTER X: METHODOLOGY 
Believing that the Arab region is a homogenous unit and 
that development of the news genre has gone through a 
unified process is a misconception. 
NOHA MELLOR, THE MAKING OF ARAB NEWS919 
1) APPROACH 
This study is modeled in part on a series of profiles of American journalists led by 
Weaver and Wilhoit beginning in 1986920 Like that work, it is based on a survey 
administered to a select group of journalists, in this case Arab journalists working for the 
leading pan-Arab and national news organizations. Unlike Weaver and Wilhoit, which 
primarily focused on questions directly related to the demographics, working conditions 
and perceived role of journalists, this study expands the scope to include attitudes toward a 
range of international issues being covered by Arab journalists in the post-9/11 era. 
The main research tool for this study was a 48-question multiple-choice survey921 
administered to Arab journalists in 12 Arab countries, 922 as well as Arab journalists based in 
the UK, US, Europe and elsewhere but working for Arab news media distributed in the 
Arab world (as opposed to those primarily serving Arab emigrant communities). The survey 
was designed to provide data that would allow a number of cross comparisons, including 
Arab journalists and US journalists; Arab journalists and journalists from other developing 
world countries; and Arab journalists and their own populations (the latter relates to the 
accusation common in the US that journalists do not represent the people to whom, and 
about whom, they are reporting923). Only a select portion of this data will be analyzed for the 
purposes of this dissertation. 
For the initial draft of the survey instrument, questions were drawn from the 
following sources: 
" Those asked of US journalists: Weaver and Wilhoit, 92* the 2004 edition of the annual 
State of the News Media survey produced by the Pew Research Center for the People and 
the Press; 925and Hess' study of Washington, D. C. reporters? m 
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" Those asked of the general public in the Middle East and broader Muslim 
world: The 2004 version of Zogby's six-nation Impressions of America survey, 927 the 
2002 Gallup poll of the Islamic world ,, 928 the Arab world portion of the World Values 
Survey, 929 and Moaddel's surveys in Egypt, Iran and Jordan 93o 
" Those asked of journalists in the developing world: Ramaprasad ; 31 Ramaprasad 
and Kelly, 932 and Ramaprasad and Rahman933 Other questions were inspired by studies 
of Indonesian journalists conducted by Romano, 934 Steele m and Hanitzsch. 936 At a later 
stage, when the survey had been tested and was about to be finalized (detailed below), a 
set of questions from the then-newly-published Ramaprasad and Hamdy survey of 
Egyptian journalists was included 937 
Over the course of several months, duplicate or overlapping questions were 
eliminated, unclear or culturally inappropriate language and framing was altered, 
additional questions were formulated and, ultimately, many questions were eliminated due 
to practical limitations of space/length. The initial draft, which included both multiple choice 
and Likert scale questions, was then reviewed for methodological soundness by 
psychologist and survey researcher Jeremy Ginges, Ph. D., then of the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan (where the author was then a visiting professor) and 
now on the faculty of the New School in New York. Dr. Ginges also inserted several 
questions for his own research purposes that are not discussed in this dissertation (see 
Appendix D). The English-language version of the survey can be found in Appendix A. The 
Arabic translation can be found in Appendix B. 
2) SURVEY FORMAT 
It was the intent from the beginning to administer the survey in both online and 
hard-copy versions. This was done in order to reach as broad a sample of Arab journalists as 
possible. There is both a physical and political aspect to this. There were obvious limits to 
the researcher's ability to administer or oversee surveys across the Arab world. In addition, 
survey research is highly constrained in many Arab countries. That is particularly true when 
dealing with either political issues or the media Some countries ban surveys entirely or 
impose draconian regulations. Where a researcher may not be able to physically administer 
a survey, participants are able to receive information about the survey via email and log 
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onto the survey site, thus bypassing official sanctions. In addition, the researcher found that 
some participants perceived that Internet-based surveys provided them with an added layer 
of anonymity. 
3) VALIDITY OF ONLINE SURVEYS 
The online aspect of this survey has been paired with the administration of a paper- 
and-pencil version. Such a pairing is recommended by researchers who take a cautious view 
of online surveys. However, even those researchers concede that it is today generally 
accepted that "proof of concept that on-line and off-line tests can be equivalent has been 
established, so it is no longer a major research priority"938 and "Internet research is 
inherently no more risky than traditional observational, survey, or experimental 
methods. "'939 Epstein and Klinkenberg concluded that "because research has demonstrated 
that translating a measure into a computerized format does not necessarily change its 
reliability and validity, new Internet based investigations need not be so focused on 
demonstrating the equivalency of paper-and-pencil instruments to computerized versions 
that are identical in every other way. "94° 
The State of the News Media survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, which is 
one of the measures being used for comparative purposes in this study, was carried out 
through both telephone and online questionnaires. 941 Likewise, one of the leading US survey 
research firms, Zogby International, conducts many of its highly respected polls using a 
combination of telephone/face-to-face and online interviews 942 
4) SURVEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Various options were considered for the survey infrastructure. Ten different 
available survey tools were considered (Appendix 3). Conversations were held with the 
University of Michigan's online team, which proposed to build a turn-key system. The 
challenge became creating an infrastructure that combined all of the key elements needed 
for this survey, most critical among them the ability to mount a survey in right-to-left Arabic 
script. The draft survey included open-ended responses, which added an additional 
complication; some services were able to handle right-to-left script in the questions 
themselves but not in responses. As a result, open-ended questions were eliminated and lists 
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of options for respondents to rank were included instead for questions such as "Greatest 
Threat" to the Arab world. 
Another factor in the selection was the fact that it was very important that the 
infrastructure automatically saved responses. Some systems saved once the survey was 
completed and submitted, others as each page was completed, and still others as the 
question was answered. Given that a high dropout rate was anticipated as participants 
reached what might be considered more controversial questions (an expectation that was 
borne out), it was vital that the responses be saved as they were completed. The University 
of Michigan team endeavored to build such a site, but ultimately failed to resolve the right- 
to-left script issue. Several other extant infrastructures were tested, but each failed to live up 
to their promises. Ultimately, an infrastructure known as Surveymonkey. com was selected. 
Despite initial claims, it eventually proved unable to handle Arabic script responses to the 
open-ended questions (the results were gibberish), so those questions were transformed into 
multiple choice, based on the predominant responses in the comparison Arab public surveys 
that were being replicated. 
5) PROTECTION OF SUBJECTS 
Complete anonymity was assured. Though it would have been useful to have a 
record of participants for later follow up surveys, a decision was made not to request names. 
The online infrastructure was set in a way to avoid planting "cookies" or collect email 
addresses. The infrastructure did record IP addresses, but only the most sophisticated 
technology, beyond the means of the researcher, would allow the source to be tracked back 
to a specific computer (the IP addresses did allow a record to be created of the countries 
from which online participants were logging in, providing a more complete geographic 
profile of the respondents). The only identifying questions included those that asked 
reporters to indicate whether they were based in the Middle East, South or Southeast Asia or 
the West, to allow the possibility of comparing geographic influences. An informed consent 
declaration was included on the first page of the survey, both in hardcopy and online (see 
Appendix 1 and 2). 
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6) HUMAN SUBJECT APPROVAL 
A request for approval to conduct human research, including a report on proposed 
methodology and copy of the draft survey, was submitted to, and eventually approved by, 
the University of Michigan's Institutional Review Board. 
6) ADMINISTRATION OF HARD-COPY SURVEYS 
Journalists in each of the target countries were hired to both administer the survey 
and to encourage fellow reporters to take part in the online version. The use of "natives" of a 
given culture to administer questionnaires "in order to gain entry into internal networks" 
off-limits to foreign researchers is common in anthropology and international survey 
research. 943 In this case, the efficacy of such an approach was relevant both in terms of Arab 
culture and the closed professional culture of journalism, in which there exists a strong esprit 
d'corps, or in-group solidarity. It is recognized that such solidarity enhances group 
acceptance. 944 In addition,, local-hires were able to conduct survey work in places where the 
candidate could not (e. g. Syria). However, this did create a different set of issues. In an ideal 
world, the survey would have been administered in a completely anonymous manner; 
survey administrators reading out the questions to participants whom they did not know 
and writing down the answers 945 Given the issues of "native" access noted above, this was 
not possible. In most cases, those administering the survey knew the participant personally 
or professionally. As a result, participants were given the survey to complete themselves 
and provided with an envelope into which it could be sealed to provide some level of 
anonymity, should they so choose. 
7) COOPERATION OF ARAB MEDIA OUTLETS 
The candidate's ties with many Arab journalists who are now in senior editorial 
positions date back more than 25 years. That, as well has his current high-profile position as 
director of the leading television journalism training center in the Arab world, made 
possible direct access to leading decision-makers in the industry. As a result, he was able to 
secure the cooperation of the most influential pan-Arab media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, 
Al-Arabiya, Al-Hayat, Asharq AI Awsat, and At-Quds Al Arabi, as well as the Washington, 
D. C. Arab Journalists Association. This was arranged during visits to the Al-Jazeera 
newsroom in Doha, the Al-Arabiya newsroom in Dubai, and the headquarters of the three 
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pan-Arab dailies, all based in London. An earlier visit to Washington secured the 
cooperation of the US-based group. These organizations either provided email lists for their 
reporters/members or agreed to send out an email from a top editor with an embedded link 
to the survey site encouraging staff to take part. The discussions with the Saudi-owned pan- 
Arab newspaper Asharq at Awsat resulted in agreement that the survey would not include a 
question specifying the news organization for which the participant worked. This was to 
alleviate the editor's concern that we would try to contrast his staff with those of the paper's 
competitors. Likewise, it was agreed that we would track whether the journalist was based 
in the Arab world or abroad, since he felt (and the researcher hypothesized) that Arab 
journalists based in the West would espouse values closer to those of Western journalists 
than their colleagues living in the Arab world. 
8) TESTING OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The candidate tested the survey instrument among Arab journalists prior to general 
distribution. An early draft version was shown to several top editors, who suggested minor 
amendments but generally approved of its structure. A more extensive test was conducted 
in the fall of 2005 at the European Commission's EuroMed and the Media conference at the 
Dead Sea in Jordan. Copies were distributed to approximately 40 senior Arab journalists 
from across the region. It produced significant negative feedback related both to political 
questions and those involving religion, particularly those related to standard markers of 
religiosity-946 
"Why do you want to ask me about the American occupation of Iraq? About what is 
terrorism? " Noureddine Fridhi, Brussels correspondent for the MBC Group, challenged me. 
"Drink Wine? Why do I drink wine? Why I go to the mosque? If I say I don't like Bush or bin 
Laden, does that mean I think the two are the same? " continued Fridhi, who I had known 
for many years. "With all my friendship to you, I can tell to you this is a database for the 
Americans to have and record our concepts; how we are believing or not believing, thinking, 
etc. "947 
As a result of that and similar responses, a number of questions were eliminated and 
the order of the survey was restructured to put what appeared to be the most controversial 
questions toward the end in order to gather potential data prior to expected drop-outs (in 
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many cases, this did not help with the hard-copy versions, since some reporters skimmed 
the questions before deciding whether to answer. See later section on unique challenges of 
the survey). 
9) SURVEY VERSIONS 
Several iterations of the survey instrument were produced. The order of questions in 
instruments labeled A, B, C and D were varied. Arabic and English versions of each were 
created (translations were checked, double-checked and back-translated for accuracy). When 
the online infrastructure was built, 13 different databases were created. Four were dedicated 
to the pan-Arab media (one of each letter-versions); four for "national" media, e. g. media 
serving individual - rather than pan-Arab - audiences (one each of the letter-versions); four 
in English (one each of the letter versions); and one specifically designed to track graduates 
of the television journalism program run by the candidate (for internal purposes unrelated 
to the dissertation). 
The online tool was set up in such a way that participants given the link for the pan- 
Arab survey would be randomly directed to versions A, B, C or D of the pan-Arab version, 
participants given the link to the "national" survey would be randomly directed to versions 
A, B, C, or D that recorded their responses in separate databases from those answering the 
pan-Arab version, etc. The goal was to allow the possibility of cross-comparisons of the 
various participant groups by the candidate or later researchers doing secondary analysis of 
the data (e. g. pan-Arab journalists vs. those working for "domestic" news organizations, or 
Middle East-based journalists vs. those based in Europe or the US, about whom there has 
been little scholarly investigation beyond a few works produced before the Arab satellite 
revolution9`1). 
10) DEFINITIONS 
In their landmark study, Kovach and Rosenstiel defined journalism as "the system 
societies generate to supply ... news. "949 But in an electronic age in which humankind is 
bombarded by information from a plethora of sources, journalism is "disappearing inside 
the larger world of communications. "9 ° 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab . ]oumalism/pg. 188 
This is a study of journalists; it is thus imperative to define what constitutes a 
journalist. It is not as simple a task as might be imagined. Kovach and Rosenstiel spent two 
years, conducted two surveys of journalists (from which the annual State of the News Media 
report grew), held 21 public forums attended by 3,000 people and heard testimony from 
more than 300 journalists, all in an effort to determine how journalists themselves define 
their role. It is a complex issue; even more so in a region such as the Arab world, where the 
profession itself is in the throes of revolutionary change. For their survey series, Weaver et al 
defined journalists as those who have "responsibility for the preparation or transmission of 
news stories or other timely information - all full-time reporters, writers, correspondents, 
editors, news announcers, columnists, photo-journalists and other news people. "951 
For the purposes of this work, we built on that definition to include part-time and 
freelance reporters, since a significant portion of Arab journalists work for more than one 
news organization in an effort to cam enough money to survive. The definition of 
journalism for the purposes of this survey thus became individuals whose primary source of 
income and/or professional avocation is the production of articles for Arab media outlets. 
"Arab" is defined as a national of one of the 22 member states of the Arab league. 
11) SELECTION OF MEDIA 
There were two criteria for selection of target media for the sample. The top priority 
was the main pan-Arab print and television media. Surveys were distributed to all of those 
outlets (below). On the national level, the six-to-eight largest circulation newspapers in each 
country were the primary target. The practical issue of access then became a major factor. 
Working within the above parameters, the journalist-researchers drew on their network of 
contacts to gain access to the target media. This was not always successful, given politics, the 
pressure of news events (the conflict in Lebanon for example), local restrictions (e. g. Syria), 
personal relationships and other factors. 
Certain journalists were purposely excluded from the sample, among them 
journalists working for avowedly Islamic news organizations. Such outlets are overtly 
committed to the propagation of Islam and are thus not representative of the majority of 
major media organs. 952 The inclusion of employees of such outlets would likely compromise 
the effort to create a portrait of the "mainstream" of Arab journalism. Nor did the survey 
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seek out writers contributing to the estimated 63,000 blogs in the Middle East953 There exists 
no widely-accepted definition of a "journalist" in the New Media context, since anyone with 
a computer has the ability to establish a site and produce content. Web sites and blogs have 
become the modem equivalent of the soapbox at Hyde Park Corner. While audiences are 
increasingly seeing bloggers as a journalistic force, 954 various studies have shown that there 
is a lack of professionalism, a lack of quality and standards, uneven credibility and a 
preponderance of opinion rather than factual reporting on New Media outlets 955 In the 
West, bloggers run the gamut from the editors of Foreign Policy magazine to 14-year old 
girls; likewise in the Arab world. Even among the serious, politically-focused bloggers, 
many share the sentiments of Sandmonkey, the nom d'web of an Egyptian blogger, who told 
this writer, "I'm not a journalist and I don't want to be. I'm a guy with an opinion. "956 
However, as noted earlier, the Arab media is in the throes of change. The Internet is one of 
those theaters of change. Chafing at restrictions in the traditional media, some journalists are 
turning to the web, which Asharq Al Awsat writer Souad Groohs has called the venue for the 
"victory over censorship. "957 The growing number of online reporters and bloggers 
imprisoned across the Arab world958 is evidence that the comment might be somewhat 
hyperbolic, but the fact remains that many journalists, publishing both under their own 
names and under pseudonyms, find a degree of freedom online absent in the traditional 
media. In some cases, as in Egypt, traditional journalists are both authoring blogs and 
tipping other bloggers to stories they cannot cover, so that they can then report that the 
blogger reported the story, creating safe ground for themselves. The lines between 
"traditional" journalism and "new media" thus blur. Therefore, while Internet journalists 
were not directly sought out for participation, it is likely that some of those taking part write 
for both tradition and web outlets. 
The sole exception to this approach was Syria, where' journalists, writers and human 
rights activists are brutally repressed by a formidable security apparatus. "959 This situation 
means that the Internet has become the sole venue for journalism with even a modicum of 
independence beyond the viselike grip of the government. Approximately 25 online sites 
dedicated to political news - as opposed to opinion - currently exist in Syria 960 They are 
operated by a group of part-time would-be journalists scattered around the country who 
both write for their own sites and cooperate on national stories, such as coverage of 
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parliamentary elections, serving as a de facto national news network, aggregating their 
content on the largest of the sites, A114You. com. Though few have an education in 
journalism, they are aggressively dedicated to producing factual reportage and disdain 
those who simply post their own opinions online. "The Internet is the only window for 
Syrians to feel freedom of speech. If I could get a license, I would print a newspaper, but I 
cannot, " said Ayman Nour, editor of A114Syria. eom. "They [online writers elsewhere in the 
Arab world] can get a license, but all they want to do is blog. "%t For this reason, Syrian web 
journalists were consciously included in the sample, while most others were excluded. 
12) DISTRIBUTION 
As noted above, direct coordination took place with the top editors of all of the 
dominant pan-Arab news organizations. For media serving purely "domestic" Arab 
audiences in individual countries, the six-to-eight largest news organizations were 
identified. Several approaches were then taken. 
1) The candidate sent an email, in both English and Arabic, to his extensive list of 
Arab journalist contacts (see sample size below) across the region, filtering out 
those who did not work for major news organizations. The email contained a link 
to the national iteration of the survey and included a request that the reporter also 
forward the email to his own colleagues. A follow up was sent a month later. 
2) The Egyptian research assistant had worked in the Mubarak presidential 
campaign during the 2005 elections and had possession of the campaign's media 
email list. This was used to distribute the survey to 200 domestic Egyptian 
journalists. The involvement of the research assistant at this level did not 
compromise data security in that, a) respondents used the online infrastructure 
and did not send responses via email, and b) other Egyptian journalists were 
included in the candidate's own email distribution which meant that the universe 
of respondents was larger than just the assistant's list (and expanded to an 
unknown degree via forwarding). 
3) Hardcopy distribution took place through several means. The Egyptian journalist- 
research assistant (who was compensated) and a fellow journalist sought access to 
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the newsrooms of the largest Egyptian domestic media outlets. In addition, they 
distributed copies to other journalistic colleagues who worked for major news 
organizations as defined above. 
4) Journalist-researcher assistants in Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Bahrain and Yemen 
were identified through the personal contacts of the candidate and the Egyptian 
research assistant. They were enlisted to carry out the survey in their home 
countries, using the same criteria. Those in Lebanon, Syria and Morocco were paid 
a small stipend. In the end, the journalists in Bahrain and Yemen concluded it 
would not be safe to distribute hard-copy surveys so they distributed email links 
to the online infrastructure to select colleagues. 
5) In fall 2006, the Egyptian research assistant was dispatched to the United Arab 
Emirates where he distributed hard-copy surveys to major news organizations 
and individual reporters in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi. 
6) An email distribution was made to graduates of the graduate television journalism 
program at the American University in Cairo in the fall of 2006. 
13) TIMELINE 
Distribution of links to the online survey began in early May 2006. The final hard- 
copy versions of the survey were returned in February 2007. One major hindrance involved 
Lebanon Distribution of the surveys in the summer of 2006 was impeded by the outbreak of 
the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Ongoing disruptions, including a series of assassinations and 
the resulting political crisis made it difficult both for the local reporter-researcher to 
distribute the surveys and to get the attention of journalists long enough to have them 
complete the instrument. 
Sample Size: The survey garnered an aggregate of 517 individual responses, 186 via 
the online infrastructure and the balance in hard-copy surveys. In comparison, 435 editors 
were polled for the 2007 New. miom Barometer, a global survey on the future of newspapers 
carried out by Zogby International for the World Association of Newspapers and Reuters, 962 
and 547 US journalists and news media executives were interviewed for the widely-cited 
Stare of the News Media survey carried out in 2004 by the Pew Research Center for the People and 
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the Press on behalf of the Project for Excellence in Journalism. To put the relative size of 
the samples in context, based on national census figures, there are an estimated 116,148 full- 
time journalists in the US964 and 10,870 news organizations 965 Pew and Weaver therefore 
sampled 0.5 percent and 1 percent of US journalists respectively. 
There are no reliable figures on the number of practicing journalists in the Arab 
world. However, the Egyptian Journalist Syndicate, de facto licensee for journalists, has 
approximately 6,000 members, and about another 500 journalists work outside the 
syndicate's jurisdiction. Egypt has a total population of 72.8 million and about 500 media 
outlets? " That is roughly one-quarter of the Arab world's population and one-quarter of its 
media outlets. Using that ratio as a guideline and extrapolating the figure for Egyptian 
journalists across the region, by the most liberal estimate the total population of Arab 
journalists is unlikely to exceed 26,000. Our sample therefore represents approximately 2 
percent of the total journalist population. 
A total of 738 copies of the paper-and-pencil survey were physically distributed in 
five countries (Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Lebanon and Morocco). Of those, 383 
were completed and returned, for a response rate of 51 percent, with a broadly even 
distribution across regions (Figure 1). Another 20 completed surveys were confiscated by 
Syrian authorities (see below). A link to the online survey was also included in the paper- 
and-pencil version, so it is possible some individuals exposed to the print version opted 
instead to complete the survey online. 
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FIGURE 3: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
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Given the viral effects of email 967 it is impossible to determine how many Arab 
journalists were exposed to the online survey. Therefore, traditional response rates for the 
online portion cannot be provided. The survey was directly emailed to 634 individuals. 
Twenty-eight were returned with undeliverable addresses, for a total email distribution of 
606. These included staff at the AI-Arabiya satellite channel and the related MBC network 
and journalists at Al Hayat, AlQuds Al-Arabi. Also included in the number are the 60 editorial 
employees at Al-Jazeera to whom the editor-in-chief of that channel distributed a link and 
about 25 staff at Asharq Al-Awsar, who were similarly emailed by their editor. As noted above, 
186 individuals submitted online survey responses, for a known online response rate of 
approximately 31 per cent. 968 
For reasons cited above, a high dropout rate was expected, the pattern of which will 
be discussed in the results chapter. As such, it was decided that it would not be appropriate 
to automatically discard any incomplete surveys, as advocated by some survey researchers. 
Instead, responses were counted if the respondent completed the initial demographic 
information and at least the first question that followed, which asked about self-identity. 
This, in the view of the candidate, was the most essential question on the survey. In the end, 
30 surveys which did not meet the above criteria were discarded, producing a net n=517. 
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14) UNIQUE CHALLENGES 
Several unique factors impact on the response rate figure. It does not include the 
number of potential survey participants who were approached about taking part and, for 
various reasons, refused or the number of potential participants who the researchers were 
unable to approach. Twenty surveys completed by Syrian journalists in the northern city of 
Aleppo were discovered and confiscated by the police when the Syrian assistant's bag was 
searched as he was about to board a bus back to the capital. Personal connections were key 
to administering the survey in all participating countries. That was particularly true in Syria, 
which is ranked near the bottom on most indexes of press freedomý%9 For example, the 
Syrian assistant was unable to directly canvas state-run newspapers because he had not 
obtained a license to from the Ministry of Information, which he knew would not have been 
forthcoming, 970 but friends helped him gain unofficial access to various newsrooms, 
including that of AI-Baath, the newspaper of the ruling party. He had previously been 
warned by individuals close to state security that the survey could cause him problems 
because it involved outsiders trying to gauge Syrian attitudes? 7l 
In the UAE, there were several issues, among them the majority of journalists 
working there are not Emiratis. Of the balance, many are non-Arabs, primarily Pakistanis 
and Indians. Among the Emiratis - who the research assistant actively sought out - and 
other Arabs, primarily Egyptians and Palestinians, there was significant resistance and 
suspicion. Charges that the survey was a CIA or State Department attempt to collect 
intelligence were common in several countries, but one incident recounted by the Egyptian 
assistant in his after-action report underlined just how deep that suspicion ran. At issue was 
the name of the television journalism center the candidate heads at The American University 
in Cairo: 
One of the Egyptian journalists participating in the survey in the United Arab 
Emirates asked if the Adham Center belongs to Sheikh Kamal Adham the 
head of Saudi Intelligence. I said the center was founded by a donation from 
Kamal Adham. In response the man said Kamal Adham was enlisted as one 
of the most cooperative Arab figures with the US intelligence. Also in the list 
was King Hussein of Jordan. The man reluctantly continued answering the 
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survey and then submitted it while asking about the Rockefeller institution 
and if it is of any kind military or related to the intelligence. 972 
Other surveys were completed, but then the participants had second thoughts: 
In some instances, like in Al-Bayan newspaper, some journalists motivated 
others not to participate. In a number of cases they refused to return the 
survey after answering it because they felt the information included in the 
survey should not go in public, even if anonymously. 973 
Fully 200 of the surveys that had been left at news organizations in the UAE were 
returned untouched for a variety of reasons, from time demands and lack of interest to 
political reactions. The research assistant found that it was necessary for him to actually sit 
with reporters while they completed the form or they would be forgotten. 
In some ways, the responses of those who refused to take the survey, or dropped out 
part-way through, were as interesting as the completed surveys themselves. The 
predominant concern centered on the idea that the project was a front for American 
intelligence. "This survey is serving and funded by the American side and we do not 
cooperate with such sides, " one Syrian journalist wrote in the margins of the paper. "This is 
our concept and we do not give it up. " While their bosses who knew and trusted the 
candidate endorsed the survey, many young journalists familiar with neither the candidate 
nor the research assistants were suspicious. Even personal connections were not always 
enough. A young Egyptian reporter who assisted in distributing the survey said she was 
repeatedly accused of working for the US State Department or the CIA. In the UAE, the lead 
Egyptian assistant reported, "The majority of the comments were about my belonging to an 
unspecified intelligence agency. " In Syria, the chief editor of the newspaper Baladna, a youth 
tabloid launched in 2004, told the Syrian journal-researcher to "take this survey somewhere 
else. No one here can accept it. " Claims that the survey was somehow serving US interests 
had been raised as survey work in Egypt was beginning in the summer of 2006. An Egyptian 
opposition newspaper, Al-Wafd, published a straightforward interview with this candidate 
and followed up several days later with a column attacking the project as a tool of the Bush 
administration. 
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Few such comments were heard in Morocco, where 80 percent of reporters 
approached agreed to complete the survey. While some participants observed that the 
survey focused more on political issues than journalism, the main objection was the absence 
of "North Africa" as an option in the question about region in which the participant was 
based. Even so, the journalist administering the survey there found he did not need to 
follow up to press reporters to participate, nor did he need to stand by while they completed 
it. 
15) CODING AND ANALYSIS 
The candidate created a codebook and database template for each of the four letter 
versions of the survey. Data from the online infrastructure was poured into these databases. 
Two Egyptian research assistants were employed to code the hard-copy versions. Each 
coded their assigned surveys and then traded so they could check each other's work. The 
candidate then adjusted the order of the responses for the randomized questions so that all 
data could be combined into a single database for analysis. 
16) QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
The candidate carried out more than 60 qualitative interviews with Arab journalists 
to supplement and add texture to the quantitative results. Fifty-five of these interviews were 
directly quoted in the work. The majority of these interviews were conducted face-to-face, 
while a small number were conducted by telephone or email. Most were recorded with a 
digital audio device and later transcribed. These were supplemented by dozens of informal 
conversations with journalists, about which notes were made at the time or soon after. In 
many cases, initial interviews with a senior journalist took place either at conferences or in a 
newsroom. Some of these were also directly quoted. Several of these journalists then acted as 
"guide" for the researcher, providing access to other journalists from his/her publication and 
the journalistic community-at-large. The use of such guides is common in ethnographic and 
anthropological research. 974 The collection method involved unstructured, open-ended 
interviews, which are known to provide a greater breadth of data than formal structured 
interviews that work from a prepared script 975 A core set of questions involving journalistic 
self-identity, political attitudes and views of the role of journalism in the modern 
Arab/Muslim world formed the heart of these interviews. However, the open-ended format 
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allowed for elaboration on aspects of particular concern to the individual journalist (e. g. an 
interview with the editor of a newspaper in the Emirates talked about his publication's 
avoidance of political issues). 
17) COLLABORATION 
The survey was carried out in association with Dr. Jeremy Ginges of the New School 
for Social Research in New York, who was, as noted above, a colleague of the candidate at 
the University of Michigan, where they were both members of the faculty when the project 
began. Dr. Ginges' role was largely confined to issues related to the survey instrument itself, 
including review of the survey structure, recommendations for randomization of questions 
to ensure validity in terms of survey research methodology, and insertion of his own 
questions not discussed as part of this dissertation (see Appendix 4 for statement from Dr. 
Ginges). It should be emphasized that this is not a survey methodology dissertation. The 
survey is being used in the context of analysis of the data, complimented by extensive 
qualitative research directly carried out by the candidate. While the candidate played a 
central role in development and administration of this survey, the analysis of even 
secondary data collected by other researchers is a common basis for Ph. D. dissertations in a 
variety of social science fields, including political science, 976 therefore the involvement of 
others in methodological development and administration does not affect the primary 
analysis by the candidate. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER XI: SURVEY RESULTS 
'The Arabs are a natural group in the world. " 
IBN KHALDUN 
THE MUQADDIMAH977 
1) BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS 
Journalists responding to the survey represented a geographic cross-section of Arab 
journalism, drawn from Egypt (29 percent); the Levant (18 percent); Saudi Arabia, the Gulf 
and Yemen (29 percent); and North Africa (19 percent); with the balance based in outside the 
region. Forty-five percent worked for daily newspapers and slightly more than 23 percent 
for television stations, with the rest spread among magazines, radio stations, news agencies 
weeklies and the Internet. Slightly more than half of those news organizations were 
privately-owned and just under a quarter owned by governments, with the balance owned 
by political parties, individuals or "other. " 
Roughly 65 per cent of the respondents described themselves as editors, 15 percent 
as reporters, nine per cent as assistant editors or producers, just under five percent as TV 
presenters, and just over six percent as "non-editorial. "9n More than 70 percent of the 
respondents work full-time, 20 percent are freelancers and eight percent work for more than 
one news organization. Nine-two percent of respondents are based in the Arab world, with 
the balance in Europe and the US and one respondent each based in South and Southeast 
Asia as correspondents for news organizations in the Arab world. 
Approximately 30 percent of respondents have been working in journalism for more 
than a decade, another 20 percent from five to ten years, just under a quarter from three to 
five years, and the remainder less than two years. Thirty-eight percent had a bachelor's 
degree and the same number had attended but not graduated from university; fifteen 
percent had a master's degree, 1.6 percent had a doctorate, while in contrast, six percent had 
graduated secondary school and 0.4 percent had only graduated from primary school. Of 
those who attended college, 61 percent took at least some journalism courses. While percent 
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of respondents had a journalism degree about the same number had no training before 
being hired as a journalist. 
The journalists responding to the survey were overwhelmingly young. Three- 
quarters were 25-years old or younger. Sixty percent were male, half those sampled said 
they were married and about the same number had at least one child. Twenty percent of 
respondents earn less than $250 per month and another ten percent said they make less than 
$500 (Figure 4). It is worth pointing out that the original survey instrument listed $100-$249 
as the lowest income range, but some respondents to the paper-and-pencil version of the 
survey wrote in the margin "under $100. " A total of more than 40 percent of respondents 
make less than $1,000 per month, with another nine percent earning between $1,500 and 
$2,500. At the other end of the spectrum, 21 per cent reported making between $2,500 and 
$4,999 per month, with six percent in the $5,000 to $7,499 range and just under four percent 
earning more than $7,500 per month. The responses reflected the vast gulf in income 
between the majority of working journalists in the Arab world and the elite, who primarily 
work for the pan-Arab satellite channels, with 61 percent of television journalist reporting 
salaries of $2,500 per month or more. In contrast, 45 percent of those earning less than $500 
per month work in the print media. 
FIGURE 4: MONTHLY SALARY 
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RELIGION: Almost 90 percent of respondents identified themselves as Muslims. Of the 
Muslims, when asked "Which best describes you? " 33 percent chose "religious, " 36 percent 
Monthly Salary 
"secular, " and the balance selected "Does not apply" (Figure 5). 
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FIGURE 5: RELIGIOUS IDENTITY'" 
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2) ISLAM, ARAB NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY 
Like many Arab news organizations, the two major pan-Arab satellite television 
stations wear their Arab identity on their sleeve. Al-Jazeera's mission statement defines it is 
an "Arab media service with a global orientation. " Likewise, the mission statement of rival 
Al-Arabiya makes clear its self-view is also firmly embedded in the Middle East; declaring 
that it is "an Arabic station, from the Arabs to the Arabs, delivering content that is relevant 
to the Arabs. " It further vows "to remain true to the voice of the Arab world, to the world, on 
a regional and international level. "%1 In fact, this issue of Arab identity provoked a major 
controversy within Arab journalism circles as Al-Jazeera prepared for the 2006 launch its 
English-language channel. Al-Jazeera's ultimate boss, Qatari Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al 
Thani, hired a British managing director, Nigel Parsons, who proceeded to fill the 
management ranks, as well as many of the on-air slots, with British, US, Australian and New 
Zealand nationals, provoking accusations that they were actively discriminating against 
Arabs. Attitudes were further polarized by Parsons' comments about the new channel's 
"global" perspective. "We might as well buy a new channel in the US, " observed Mahmud 
Shammam, the Washington, D. C. bureau chief for the Arabic edition of Newsweek, at a media 
gathering in Doha. The comment prompted a roar of applause from staff members of the 
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Arabic channel. "[Al-Jazeera English] will not have Arabic characteristics and that's a big 
challenge. "982 
The question of self-identity lies at the core of this survey. More than any other 
barometer, the way in which journalists see themselves speaks volumes about their view of 
their place in society and the role of their profession. As a first step toward gauging that self- 
perception, respondents were asked, "Which one of the following do you think is most 
accurate? Above all, I am a... " Options included national identity (e. g. Egyptian, Saudi, 
Jordanian, etc. ), Muslim, Arab, journalist, or "other. " In describing the question to Osman 
Mirghani, deputy editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab daily Asharq Al Awsat, during a meeting to 
enlist the paper's cooperation with the survey, he touched on why identity is such an 
important question. "The culture we are trying to build in this newspaper is one in which 
people identify themselves as journalists, " he told me. "We cannot deny that this is an 
Arabic daily newspaper but the perception we are trying to build is that this is an 
international newspaper. We have a good mix of people from all over the Arab world. They 
start from saying I have this position or these religious traits. We say this is a newspaper, 
and people should behave in that way that the news people do and hence, if we can build 
that culture and then to identify themselves as journalists, then to a great degree we free 
their minds of the bias. "m 
In fact, almost 48 percent of those completing the survey chose, "Above all, I am a 
journalist, -" while the response, "Above all, I am a Muslim, " came a distant second at 22 
percent. Just under 11 percent said, "Above all, I am an Arab; "national identity (e. g. 
Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi, etc. ) was primary for 8.5 percent; and just under 11 percent 
chose "other". When cross-tabulated against religious self-identity, almost half (47 percent) 
of those who identified themselves as "religious" Muslims chose "Above all, I am a 
Muslim. " In comparison, 52 percent of self-declared "secular" Muslims and 60 percent of 
those not declaring (hereafter referred to as "undeclared") chose "Above all, I am a 
journalist. " That response was also selected by more than 3 percent of the self-declared 
religious Muslims (Figure 6). 
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FIGURE 6: PRIMARY IDENTITY 
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When asked what political philosophy best described them, more than 28 percent of 
"religious" Muslim journalists chose "Islamist" as their primary political identity (Figure 7). 
Significantly, however, a larger percentage (35 percent) of those self-described religious 
Muslims chose "Democrat. " This was also the overwhelming response among "secular" 
(68.5 percent) and undeclared journalists (61.4 percent). Interestingly, a larger portion of 
"religious" journalists chose "Arab nationalist" as their primary political identity (21.1 
percent) than did "secular" journalists (15.1 percent) or undeclared (9.4 percent). 
In terms of geographic identity, almost half of the "religious" journalists said they 
belong first to the Muslim world; however, another 33 percent of them linked their primary 
identity to the Arab world (Figure 8). The Arab world was also the primary geographic 
identity for the "secular" journalists (38 percent), 17 percent of whom chose "Muslim world" 
first. The figures were roughly the reverse for the undeclared journalists, 31 percent of 
whom identified first with the Muslim world, while 20 percent said Arab world came first. 
National and local identity was in the teens for both the latter groups, and in the single 
digits for the "religious" journalists. 
National Muslim Arab Journalist Other 
ID 
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FIGURE 7: POLITICAL IDENTITY 
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3) THE STATE OF ARAB JOURNALISM 
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Challenges: There was a large degree of unanimity among religious, secular and 
undeclared journalists on the question of the greatest challenges to Arab journalism today. 
Respondents were asked to rate a series of nine potential challenges on a 4-point Likert scale 
that ranged from "completely insignificant" to "most significant. " The three groups agreed 
on the top six challenges, with only marginal differences in the exact ranking (Figure 9). 
Religious journalists put the lack of professionalism among journalists as the top challenge, 
followed by (the lack of) journalistic ethics, corruption, government control of media, media 
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ownership, and violence against reporters. Self-described "secular" reporters ranked 
government control number one, but otherwise agreed with their "religious" colleagues on 
the remainder of the top six rankings. The most significant difference involve the challenge 
of pressures against reporters from religious groups, with "secular" and undeclared 
journalists ranking it ahead of corporate pressures and threats from the US against Arab 
journalists and "religious" journalists putting it dead last. 
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Journalist Roles: At the heart of any discussion of journalists and their profession is 
the question of how they perceive their mission. Othman al-Sini, editor of the Saudi 
newspaper Al-Watan, put his finger on the essential question being asked in many 
newsrooms: "I wonder if media should be change-makers or reporters of change? "9M 
Respondents were asked to complete the following sentence, "It is the job of a 
journalist to... " They were then provided with a list of 21 journalistic roles and asked to rate 
them on a 4-point Likert scale from "completely insignificant" to "most significant. " By an 
overwhelming margin, all three sub-groups ranked "encourage political reform" as the most 
significant role for Arab journalists today, with a combined total of almost 86 percent of all 
journalists ranking it number one. Likewise, all three sub-groups ranked "educate the 
public" as the second-most important role (Figure 10). 
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FIGURE 10: JOURNALIST ROLES 
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While the exact ranking varied, all sub-groups also agreed on three of the remaining 
six roles: Serve as a voice for the poor, encourage civic engagement and use news for the 
social good. The key difference among the top six self-declared roles involved Palestine. 
"Religious" journalists ranked "support the Palestinian cause" (73 percent) and "protect 
Islamic tradition" (64 percent) as among the "most significant" roles of Arab journalists 
(Figure 11). This was in sharp contrast to the 46 percent of "secular" journalists and 43 
percent of undeclared journalists who gave Palestine the same weight and the 17 percent of 
"secular" and 22 percent of undeclared who identified "protect Islamic traditions" as "most 
important. " In the place of Palestine, which was ranked twelfth by "secular" journalists and 
eleventh by undeclared respondents, and Islamic tradition (respectively 19th and 18th out of 
21 roles), those two groups included "support national/regional development" and 
"transform society, " though each in a slightly different order (Figure 12 and Figure 13). 
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FIGURE 12: SECULAR TOP 8 
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FIGURE 13: UNDELCARED TOP 8 
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There were also significant differences between the responses of "religious" 
journalists and their "secular" and undeclared colleagues on three other journalistic roles. 
Almost 64 percent of "religious" journalists said protecting Islamic traditions was a "most 
significant" journalistic role, compared to just 17 percent of "secular" journalists and 22 
percent of undeclared respondents. Likewise, "religious" journalists gave more importance 
to encouraging spiritual values among their audience than did "secular" or undeclared 
journalists, though the difference was less pronounced. While it might be expected that 
those defining themselves as religious felt those two categories more important than their 
colleagues, more surprising is the fact that, by a significant margin (50 percent vs. 37 and 24 
percent respectively), "religious" journalists also gave more emphasis to the job of 
defending Arab interests than the others (Figure 14). 
Olle perspective aii agreed on: It is not the job of a journalist to Support the 
government or the interests of their employer. As detailed in Chapter V, Rugh's classic 
typology divided the Arab media into the Mobilization Press, Loyalist Press, Diverse Print 
Media, and Transitional Media. But in all of these, with the exception of Lebanon, serving as 
a mouthpiece for their respective governments was a key function. 985 "Nongovernment 
sentiment was sometimes expressed, but only after it was filtered through trusted editors, " 
Rugh wrote-986 The survey reveals that, in the perception of Arab journalists, that role is 
dramatically changing. While the empirical reality in many Arab newsrooms, particularly in 
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the government-controlled media, is that governments and the powerful still call the shots, 
the "mouthpiece" function is now at the bottom of the list of perceived roles among Arab 
journalists, "religious" or otherwise, with the roles of supporting government policy or 
working on behalf of the employer's interests garnering single digit endorsement. 
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Objectivity: Al-Jazeera's Code of Ethics states that its reporters must "fdlistinguish 
between news material, opinion and analysis to avoid the pitfalls of speculation and 
propaganda. "987 In many ways, how to achieve this ideal without the media being reduced 
to parroting official pronouncements is one of the great conundrums of journalism. 
Responses to the questions on this topic reflected the degree to which Arab journalists are 
struggling with the gap between normative aspiration and empirical reality. 
On the controversial issue of objectivity, the overwhelming majority in all three sub- 
groups agreed that a journalist should always be objective (Figure 15). However, 94 percent 
of "religious" journalists, 92 percent of "secular" journalists and 92 percent of undeclared 
journalists said it was also the job of a reporter to "interpret" events. When it came to the 
question of whether journalists should include their own opinion in stories, all three groups 
were undecided. "Religious" journalists and the undeclared group were each split about 50- 
50, while a slight majority of "secular" reporters disagreed with the notion that reporters 
should include their own opinions. 
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Political Activism: More than 70 percent of journalists in all three groups agreed that 
it is permissible for a journalist to actively engage in political activities, with "religious" 
journalists exhibiting a slightly higher level of agreement (78 percent) than the other two 
groups (Figure 16). Roughly the same percentages agreed that journalists may take part in 
protest demonstrations (72 percent, 74 percent and 68 percent respectively). All three sub- 
groups were in agreement that satellite television has had a major impact on journalism in 
the Arab world. 
Media Freedom: The Arab journalists exhibited conflicted attitudes toward the state 
of Arab media. On one level, they gave themselves high marks, with 90 percent of 
"religious, " 85 percent of "secular" and 81 percent of undeclared journalists agreeing with 
the statement, "My news organization is doing an outstanding job. " However, the uneven 
and uncertain state of media reform across the region was reflected in the fact that about 50 
percent of each group said they only "partly agree" that the Arab media is becoming freer, 
(Figure 17), and 75 percent of "religious" journalists, 60 percent of "secular" journalists and 
71 percent of undeclared partly or completely agreed that, as an individual, they were 
"personally freer to do my job. " 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 210 
FIGURE 16: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
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FIGURE 17: MEDIA FREEDOM 
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Media performance: The Arab journalists were highly critical of their US colleagues, 
with 62 percent of "religious, " 48 percent of "secular, " and 65 percent of undeclared 
journalists saying their "completely disagree" with the notion that "US coverage of post-9/11 
US foreign policy has been completely objective, " and about half in each group rating US 
media fairness as "poor" (Figure 18). 
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As critical as they may have been of the Western media, the Arab journalists were 
also critical of themselves, with the majority disagreeing with the statement, "Arab media 
coverage of post-9/11 US foreign policy has been very objective" (Figure 19), although 
"religious" journalists were somewhat less emphatic (29 percent said they "completely 
disagree" with the statement). 
FIGURE 19: POST 9/11 COVERAGE 
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"Religious" Muslims were also less critical of Arab media fairness, with just 35 
percent rating it "poor, " versus 58 percent and 61 percent respectively for "secular" and 
undeclared journalists (Figure 20). The same was true when it came to Arab media 
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independence; 53 percent of the "religious" journalists rated Arab media independence as 
"poor, " versus 72 percent and 79 percent respectively for "secular" and undeclared Arab 
journalists (Figure 21). All groups had a dismal view of the fairness of the US media (Figure 
22), but American reporters did receive high marks for professionalism, with 58 percent of 
"religious, " 71 percent of "secular" and 55 percent of undeclared journalists rating it "good" 
or "very good, " while just 34 percent of "religious, " 25 percent of "secular" and 14 percent of 
undeclared journalists gave similar ratings to the Arab media (Figure X23). 
Across the board, the European media received the top marks for professionalism 
and scored substantially better than either Arab or US media when it came to fairness (44 
percent "good" or "very good") and independence (53 percent "good" or "very good") 
(Figure 24). 
FIGURE 20: ARAB MEDIA FAIRNESS 
70 Arab Media: Fairness 
t0 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Poor Moderate Good 
Am- &I 
Very good DN 
R Religion, 
  Secular 
Undeclared 
n=40c 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 213 
FIGURE 21: ARAB MEDIA INDEPENDENCE 
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FIGURE 23: MEDIA PROFESSIONAUSM 
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Balance: The idea that individual reporters, or at least the news organizations for 
which they work, must strive for balance in their coverage is a fundamental principle taught 
in journalism textbooks the world over. However, there is a wide disparity of opinion on 
just what it is that should be balanced. "In order for newspapers to be beneficial to society, " 
Lebanese newspaper publisher Boutros al-Boustani wrote in the late nineteenth century, 
they must avoid publishing stories that "violated ... the right principles. "988 Arab League 
Secretary General Amr Moussa unwittingly touched the raw nerve at heart of this debate in 
late 2005 when, in his opening comments at an Arab Thought Foundation conference on the 
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media in Dubai, he declared that journalists must strive for a balance between being 
"respectful and truthful. "N9 The comment raised eyebrows among Western and Arab 
journalists alike and discussion in the hallways quickly turned to definitions of "respect" and 
"truth" - and where the balance between them lies. As Peter David, foreign editor of The 
Economist, noted during a panel shortly after Moussa's speech, for many reporters, truth 
must come before any consideration of respect. m Khaled al-Maenna, the influential editor of 
Arab News, had a similar view. "I think our role is to portray the truth, " he told me. "To 
resist authority, not to respect it in the way Amr Moussa said. If you respect authority, you 
become a part of the government. You become a tool of the government. Our role is to 
respect the truth"991 However, the Danish cartoon controversy, which broke at about the 
same time, demonstrated that the line between respect and truth was not immutable or 
universal. Arab journalists, outraged that European newspapers had published what many 
saw as blasphemous caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, wrote of the need for the West 
to respect Islam, while some Western journalists waved high the banner of freedom of the 
press, as in the headline "Europe Can Take Pride in Defending Cartoons, " which appeared 
over an opinion column in The New York Times. 992 
Prince Bandar bin Khaled alFaisal, head of the Arab Thought Foundation and 
publisher of the Saudi daily Al-Watan, says the definition of "respectful" or "responsible" 
journalism is in the eye of the beholder. "I think a government official in Syria would 
probably I mean responsible as the party line. But in another society, responsible would 
mean [adhering to] social values. It means different things to different people, just as the 
word 'democracy, ' I am afraid, in this part of the world means different things to different 
people. "993 That was evident two years later when Iran put restrictions on Al-Jazeera's 
correspondents and anti-Jazeera Shiite protests broke out in Baghdad after the channel aired 
comments critical of Iraq's Grand Ayatollah All al-Sistani. "We affirm that the policy of Al- 
Jazeera is based on respecting religious and public figures. There was no intention at all to 
offend his Eminence Sistani, " the channel's general director Wadah Khanfar said in a 
statement. 
Approximately 80 percent of journalists in all three sub-categories either completely 
or partly agreed with the statement, "Journalists must balance the need to inform the public 
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with the responsibility to show respect. " The only difference was that "religious" and 
undeclared journalists were slightly firmer in their conviction than their "secular" colleagues 
(Figure 25). 
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Journalist practices: As noted earlier, Arab journalists see the lack of professional 
ethics, corruption within the profession and a general lack of professionalism among the 
greatest challenges to Arab journalism. In the Middle East, as in other emerging media 
markets, an "envelope culture" is pervasive, in which individual journalists or their news 
organizations frequently benefit financially from the stories they publish. A "Cash for 
Editorial" survey by the International Public Relations Association found that only 40 
percent of PR practitioners in Africa and the Middle East agreed with the statement, 
"Editorial copy appears as a result of the editorial judgment of the journalists and editors 
involved, not through any influence or payment by a third party. " About 80 percent of those 
surveyed by IPRA said journalists seldom or never refused free travel or products, 60 
percent said it was common for favorable stories to be published in return for ad purchases 
and 40 percent said journalists commonly accepted payments to print press releases 99s 
Kuwaiti journalist Hussain Abdul Rahman goes so far as to suggest it is impossible to expect 
unbiased election coverage in the Arab world due to the frequency with which journalists 
are bribed by candidates to provide favorable coverage. 'They are taking money from the 
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candidates and the parties. This has been happening all over the Arab world, " he told a 
seminar in Qatar on election coverage. 
An example on a very different level is the practice at Egypt's leading daily, Al- 
Ahram, that gives top editors a percentage of all advertising sold, a situation that leaves 
advertisers expecting positive coverage in return for their advertising dollars. 997 
Exacerbating this situation are the woefully poor salaries offered by most Arab news 
organizations. Beginning reporters at Egypt's leading government newspaper are in the $80- 
to-$90 a month range and only slightly better at the private papers, while the monthly salary 
for a newly-hired journalist at state-run Egypt television and radio is just $35,9" and the 
official salary for top editors is often measured in the hundreds, rather than thousands, of 
dollars. "Sometimes people try to buy your support, " says Magdy Salmaan, a young 
reporter with Egypt's independent daily Al-Masri Al-Youm999 Even in Saudi Arabia, the 
average starting salary for a reporter is about $920 a month. Journalists there jokingly call it 
'the beggar's job; ' "You come up short either way, " says Arab News Executive Editor 
Somayya Jabarti. "Low pay and trouble getting serious stories published. "1ooo One poll found 
that 40 percent of Arabic-language journalists said they would reprint a press release in 
return for a gift. 100' "It's the whole structure of the job, " says Jabarti. "If they are well paid 
and well-trained, they won't need" the gifts or envelopes. 10m 
That "envelope culture" extends to newspapers themselves. "We are offered millions 
from many, many governments, " says Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab 
Palestinian daily Al-Quds AI Arabi, a perennial thorn in the side of the Saudi and Egyptian 
regimes. "The Saudi government offered. Kuwaiti government offered. Some governments 
offer because we are outside the Saudi cloak. " Atwan claims he does not accept those offers, 
but adds, "I do not want to compromise my editorial independence. Through now we 
managed to survive, but for how long, I do not know. "Ix That aspiration to independence is 
- in theory, if not in practice - shared by the majority of journalists surveyed. Respondents 
universally rejected the statement, "It is acceptable to take money to write favorable stories, " 
with nearly 90 percent of "religious" and undeclared journalists saying it is never acceptable 
and slightly fewer "secular" journalists taking the same hard-line stance. There was 
somewhat more ambivalence among all three groups at the statement, "It is acceptable to 
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take travel money from people or organizations that are the subjects of stories, " with 
"secular" journalists again taking a somewhat more liberal view (Figure 26). The 
ambivalence may be traced to the fact that it is common practice for companies holding 
news conferences to provide "taxi money" to Arab journalists whose news organizations 
might not otherwise send a reporter. All three groups also opposed the idea of writing 
favorable stories in return for advertisements ("never" selected by 74 percent, 73 percent and 
81 percent respectively). 
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In his typology of Arab media, first outlined in the late 1970s, William Rugh, a 
former US ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, observed that "Arab 
information media have always been closely tied to politics; " and for editors the relationship 
"to the regime in power is a very important political factor. "" When those words were first 
written, direct government control and a weak economic base drove that relationship. A 
quarter of a century later, the dynamics of the Arab media have become more complex with 
the rise of semi-independent, pan-Arab satellite television channels, which, as documented 
earlier, have influenced the print media. The intrinsic tie to politics remains, though, in 
many respects, it has taken on a very different nature. There is now a two-way flow, as 
reporting begins to influence regional - and, to a lesser extent, Arab domestic - policies, as 
much as media are influenced by the architects of those policies. 
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Since the worldview of the media gatekeepers helps to frame the way in which 
stories are presented to the public, even in the absence of any overt or conscious bias, ], )(), " it is 
important to understand how journalists themselves perceive the major issues of the day. 
Respondents were thus asked a series of questions related to the international landscape as it 
affects the Middle East. 
Regional Issues: Respondents were provided with a list of 11 issues that had been 
identified as top concerns in various surveys of the Arab public. They were asked to rate 
their relative importance. All the journalists surveyed agreed on the top four issues facing 
the Arab world: political reform, education, poverty and human rights, though each sub- 
group prioritized them in a slightly different way (Figure 27). "Religious" and "secular" 
journalists said political reform was the most important issue, while undeclared journalists 
ranked it fourth, putting education as the top priority, followed closely by poverty. The 
areas of greatest difference induded Palestine, Iraq and the economy. Almost twice as many 
"religious" journalists than "secular" journalists believe Palestine is a "most important" 
issue, and the gap between the two on the Iraq conflict is almost as large. "Religious" 
journalists ranked Palestine and Iraq as fifth and sixth most important respectively, while 
they came in sixth and eighth for "secular" journalists and sixth and seventh for the 
undeclared. Where undeclared journalists put "economy" fifth on their list of priorities, it 
was eighth for the others. 
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Regional Threats: "Religious" journalists and their colleagues were sharply divided on 
the question of the greatest threat to the Arab world today, when the ever-present issue of 
Israel is excluded (Figure 28). 10°6 Twice as many "religious" journalists (31 percent) saw US 
policy as the primary threat compared to the six other options. "Secular" and undeclared 
journalists gave precedence to the lack of political reform in the region, which "religious" 
journalists ranked second. Both "religious" journalists and undeclared put the economy as 
third, while "secular" and undeclared journalists put more emphasis on human rights (18 
percent and 17 percent) than the "religious" sub-group. All sub-groups put "terrorism" near 
the bottom of the priority list, out-ranking only "globalization. " 
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Political Reform: The consistent emphasis among Arab journalists on the need for 
political reform was again apparent in reaction to a question which asked them to choose 
from three responses: 1) "The way Arab society is organized must be radically changed; " 2) 
Arab society must be gradually improved by reforms; " and, 3) Arab society is not in need of 
change. " Virtually all of the journalists agreed that change is required (the percentage who 
said it was not in need of change was so low as to not be statistically significant) (Figure 29). 
By a margin of two-to-one, the "religious" journalists were more likely to seek gradual 
change (68 percent) over radical change (27 percent). Likewise, the majority of "secular" 
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journalists preferred gradual change (60 percent) to radical change (37 percent), while the 
undeclared were more evenly divided (53/42). 
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America and Americans: Just as "religious" journalists saw a greater threat to the 
region from US policy than did their colleagues, so too did a larger number of them (55.9 
percent) choose "very unfavorable" in response to the statement, "My attitude toward the 
US is... " compared to the others (33.8 percent and 39.8 percent) (Figure 30). A substantially 
larger portion of "religious" journalists also had the same "very unfavorable" response to, 
"My attitude toward the American people is... "than did their colleagues; however, overall 
"religious" journalists were roughly divided between very unfavorable/somewhat 
unfavorable and very favorable/somewhat favorable (52.8 percent vs. 47.2 percent) (Figure 
31). There was no such ambivalence when it came to the statement, "My attitude toward US 
policy is... " All three sub-groups demonstrated a highly negative view, the only difference 
being that slightly more "religious" journalists were "very unfavorable" (77 percent) than 
the other two groups (62 and 70 percent) (Figure 32). 
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FIGURE 30: ATTITUDE TOWARD US 
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FIGURE 32: US POLICY 
My attitude toward U. S. policy is... 
90 
80 --76 8- 
65 
70 
61 6 
60 
50 -- - 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
n="7 
O Religious 
  Secular 
Q Undeclared 
That same trend was seen when the journalists were specifically asked to respond to 
the statement, "The US plays a positive role in the Middle East. " More than 80 percent of all 
those responding disagreed, and, following the previous pattern, "religious" journalists 
were more emphatic ("completely disagree" vs. "somewhat disagree") in that view than 
their "secular" colleagues (Figure 33). When the statement was reversed to say, "The US 
plays a negative role in the Middle East, " the responses reflected the same pattern, with 72 
percent of "religious" journalists, 52 percent of "secular" journalists and 60 percent of 
undeclared choosing "completely agree. " 
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FIGURE 33: US ROLE 
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Terrorism: There have been various accusations from Washington that Arab 
journalists glorify certain acts of terrorism aimed at Americans and Israelis. There has also 
been criticism of the way in which certain acts of violence carried out by the US and Israel 
are framed in the Arab media. Respondents were asked to rate four highly-publicized 
incidents of violence and indicate whether they thought each of these constituted an act of 
terrorism. They included the US siege of Fallujah, Iraq in the spring of 2004; the bombing of 
a disco in Bali in the fall of 2004 that killed dozens of Australian tourists and Indonesians; 
the on-camera beheading of US contractor Nicholas Berg by insurgents in Iraq; and the 
Israeli siege of Ramallah in the spring of 2002. A substantial majority of journalists identified 
all four as acts of terror. More than 90 percent of the "religious" journalists said Fallujah and 
Ramallah were acts of terrorism, but the percentage of "religious" journalists who identified 
the Bali disco bombing and Berg execution as terrorism was in the 70s. "Secular" journalists 
were just the opposite, with about 92 percent pointing to Bali and the Berg execution as acts 
of terror, and 79 percent and 76 percent respectively identifying Fallujah and Ramallah as 
terrorism. Undeclared journalists followed the same general pattern, those the percentage 
differences were narrower (Figure 34). 
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FIGURE 34: ACTS OF TERRORISM 
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The December 2004 tsunami that killed at least 200,000 people in Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka and India came at a time when America's popularity in the Muslim world was at a 
then all-time low. The US and Western countries reacted with a substantial outpouring of 
official and private aid and logistical support. Much the same occurred 11 months later 
when a devastating earthquake shook Kashmir killing more than 75,000 people. Many in 
Washington saw the disasters as an opportunity; a chance to use relief aid as a tool of public 
diplomacy. Washington policymakers gave big play to a poll that tied tsunami relief to an 
increase in favorable attitudes toward the US among Indonesians. '0(rPresident Bush's boast 
that Indonesians "see a different America now, "1008 simply fed suspicions the aid was an 
attempt to buy goodwill. Yet such linkage was quickly enshrined in US foreign policy, 
culminating in what Karen Hughes, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, dubbed 
"the diplomacy of deeds: " 
Americans should know we are giving the gift of hope to thousands of people 
whose names we will never know. And I will continue to advocate we do 
even more, because the diplomacy of deeds serves our own national interests 
and the people of every nation. 10°9 
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But as John Brown, a former Foreign Service officer and senior fellow at the 
University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy observed, "it cannot 
automatically be assumed that ostentatious public displays of what the Bush administration 
considers good deeds or charity (and Hughes' handlers certainly make sure that her help- 
the-suffering-world actions are covered by the media) are always appreciated by the people 
for whom they are intended. "logo 
Tsunami and Kashmir earthquake aid were not the only elements of this new 
"diplomacy of deeds. " Responding to studies and public opinion polls that indicated US 
support for authoritarian leaders in the Arab world and the lack of rights for the Palestinian 
people were root causes of both terrorism and anti-Americanism among the broader Arab 
public, the need for democratic change in the Arab world became a central theme of Bush 
administration Middle East policy, while Washington also put new emphasis on the need 
for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
To test the impact those efforts were having among the journalists through whose 
prism Arabs view such policies, respondents were asked a series of questions about 
Indonesian tsunami aid, US calls for Arab democracy, and the question of Palestine. 
Tsunami Aid Following on from the negative views of US policy, the survey found 
that Arab journalists, particularly the self-declared "religious" Muslims, are largely cynical 
about actions the Bush administration says are designed to help Arabs or Muslims. Sixty 
percent of the journalists polled completely or somewhat disagreed with the statement, "The 
US gave tsunami aid out of a sincere desire to help" (Figure 35). Once more, "religious" 
journalists held the strongest negative view, with 40 percent of them choosing "strongly 
disagree. " "Secular" journalists were more undecided, with 46 percent partly or completely 
agreeing with the statement, while 40 percent of the undeclared reporters also giving the US 
the benefit of the doubt. 
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FIGURE 35: TSUNAMI AID 
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Just over 60 percent of the journalists also agreed that the aid was "an attempt to 
generate Muslim support" (Figure 36). In this case, slightly more "secular" and undeclared 
than "religious" journalists supported that view, while fully a quarter of the "religious" 
journalists completely disagreed. Meanwhile, a majority of journalists agreed that, 
"Whatever motivation, " the aid "was a noble and good thing" (Figure 37). But in this case, 
far more "secular" (72 percent) and undeclared journalists (63 percent) supported that view, 
which was largely rejected by almost half of the "religious" journalists, of whom 30 percent 
"completely" disagreed and 15 percent "somewhat" disagreed. 
Democracy: US statements of support for democracy in the Arab world were met with 
near unanimous cynicism by the journalists polled. Almost 90 percent of the overall group 
disagreed with the statement, "The US supports the spread of democracy because of a 
sincere desire to help Muslims" (Figure 38). Just 5.3 percent of the "religious" journalists 
gave any credence to that statement, while 76 percent of them completely disagreed, along 
with 52 percent of "secular" journalists and 66 percent of the undeclared. 
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FIGURE 36: TSUNAMI SUPPORT 
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FIGURE 37: TSUNAMI AID NOBLE 
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FIGURE 38: DEMOCRACY SINCERE 
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There was a willingness to accept that not all is black-and-white when it comes to US 
policy. The largest portion of the journalists polled said they only "partly" agreed with the 
notion that US statements calling for democracy were designed, in part, to counter anti- 
Americanism (Figure 39). Almost half the "secular" journalists took that view, along with 37 
percent of "religious" and 32 percent of undeclared journalists. Meanwhile, more than one- 
third of all three sub-groups partly or completely disagreed with the statement. There was 
no clear-cut view on the statement, "Whatever the motive, " US support for democracy is "a 
noble and good thing. " More than 58 percent of "religious" journalists were vehement in 
their rejection of the statement, but more than a third of them "partly" or "completely" 
agreed. "Secular" journalists split 49/51 percent disagree/agree and just under 60 percent of 
undeclared journalists disagreed with the idea that US democracy support was "noble and 
good. " 
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FIGURE 39: DEMOCRACY - ANTI-AMERICANISM 
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Palestine: There was little difference in the stance of each of the sub-groups on the notion 
that stated US support for the creation of a Palestinian state reflects a "sincere desire to help 
the Palestinian people. " All three overwhelmingly disagreed, the only difference coming in 
the degree of disagreement (Figure 40). Seventy-eight percent of "religious" journalists said 
they "completely" disagreed that the US was trying to help the Palestinians, while a quarter 
of "secular" and 15 percent of undeclared journalists chose to "partly" disagree. Sixty-five 
percent of all journalists said the real motive was to reduce anti-Americanism in the region, 
with little difference among the sub-groups. 
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FIGURE 40: PALESTINIANS - US SINCERE 
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More than half the "religious" journalists "completely" disagreed with the 
suggestion that, no matter the motive, US support for a Palestinian state was "noble and 
good" (Figure 41). In contrast, almost 30 percent of "secular" journalists "completely" 
agreed the US policy was a good thing. 
No matter whether they disagreed on the ultimate value, there was little debate 
among the journalists polled over the question of whether the Bush administration was 
"genuine in its expressed desire to create a Palestinian state. " The dominant view: No, it is 
not. Seventy-eight percent of "religious" journalists and more than 81 percent of "secular" 
journalists "completely" disagreed with the suggestion that the desire for a Palestinian state 
was genuine (Figure 42). Only the "secular" journalists showed any willingness to consider 
that possibility, with 22 percent saying they "partly" or "completely" agreed. 
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FIGURE 41: PALESTINE POLICY - NOBLE 
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FIGURE 42: BUSH GENUINE 
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"Secular" journalists were slightly more willing to negotiate over the controversial 
question of whether Palestinians who fled what is now Israel will eventually be allowed to 
return to their ancestral homes (Figure 43). A third of "secular" journalists and slightly fewer 
undeclared journalists said the issue can be negotiated as part of a comprehensive peace 
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agreement, and idea rejected by 93 percent of the "religious" journalists. "Religious" 
journalists also took a harder line on the US invasion of Iraq; 90 percent said it was 
"unacceptable" no matter what ultimate benefits accrue, while roughly one-third of 
"secular" and undeclared journalists said that, despite its problems, the US presence "can be 
acceptable if it results in freedom and democracy for the Iraqi people" (Figure 44). 
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Attitudes toward the Iraq invasion held true for US involvement in the broader 
region as well. Asked about the Arab right to act freely without interference from the West, 
70 percent of "religious" journalists said Western interference "should never be allowed, " 
while 59 percent of "secular" journalists and just under 52 percent of the undeclared said 
"some Western interference is permitted if it leads to important benefits" for the region 
(Figure 45). 
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FIGURE 44: IRAQ OCCUPATION 
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6) RELIGION, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
Participants were asked a series of questions related to the role of religion in Arab 
society. It was here that the differences between the self-declared "religious" Muslim 
journalists and the others were most distinct. 
Clerics: When asked whether, generally speaking, religious authorities were 
providing adequate answers to the moral problems of the individual, almost 59 percent of 
"religious" journalists said "yes, " while almost 74 percent of "secular" journalists and 56 
percent of undeclared journalists chose "no" (Figure 46). 
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FIGURE 45: WESTERN INTERFERENCE 
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FIGURE 46: CLERICS - MORAL PROBLEMS 
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A similar pattern could be seen on the question of whether the clerics were 
addressing the problems of family life, with 60 percent of "religious" journalists saying they 
were and 63 percent of "secular" and 53 percent of undeclared selecting "no"(Figure 47). 
The gap was less pronounced on the question of whether the clerics are meeting the spiritual 
Some permitted 9 leads to benefits Should never allow 
Yes No DN 
n=393 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 236 
needs of the public, but even there 50 percent of "secular" journalists said they were not 
(versus 39 percent who said they were) (Figure 48). Interestingly, even "religious" 
journalists were far from enthusiastic in their support for the clergy, with 35 percent saying 
the religious authorities were not meeting the spiritual needs of the people. On the question 
of whether religious authorities were providing adequate answers for the social problems 
facing the region, "religious" journalists were split 43/48 percent yes/no, but the other two 
groups were strongly negative, with 81 percent of "secular" and 68 percent of undeclared 
journalists answering "no" (Figure 49). 
FIGURE 47: CLERICS - FAMILY LIFE 
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FIGURE 48: CLERICS - SPIRITUAL NEEDS 
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FIGURE 49: CLERICS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
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Moral Values: "Religious" journalists hold a view diametrically opposite that of their 
colleagues on the issue of whether belief in God is a requirement in order to have good 
moral values. Sixty percent of them said belief in God is necessary, while about the same 
percentage of "secular" and undeclared journalists indicated it is not (Figure 50). 
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FIGURE 50: GOD & MORAL VALUES 
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God & Politics: There is equal disagreement on the question of whether politicians 
who do not believe in God are fit for office. Just under 50 percent of "religious" journalists 
hold that view, which is rejected by 72 percent of undeclared journalists and 50 percent of 
those who call themselves "secular" (Figure 51). Eighty percent of the journalists held the 
view that religious authorities should not influence how people vote, with only 16 percent of 
"religious" journalists and negligible percentages of the others disagreeing (Figure 52). 
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FIGURE 51: POLITICIANS & GOD 
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FIGURE 52: CLERICS & VOTING 
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There was significant difference in how the three sub-groups replied to the 
statement, "Government should make laws according to the wishes of the people, even if 
they contradict sharia. " Just under half the "religious" journalists disagreed with that 
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statement (and 27 percent agreed), while 76 percent of "secular" and 70 percent of 
undeclared rejected the idea that national laws must be dictated by religious law (Figure 53). 
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Pressure from religious groups - whether protest marches, boycotts or threats of 
physical violence - are among the many obstacles Arab journalists must negotiate. While 
substantially fewer "religious" journalists acknowledged the threat than did "secular" or 
undeclared journalists, fully 20 percent of the "religious" journalists singled it out as among 
the "most significant" challenges to Arab journalism. In one such incident in Bahrain, 
Salafist groups and the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood "declared war" on the 
country's leading newspaper, Ayyam, because of its alleged "liberal" leanings. "The Islamist 
groups have been calling in their speeches at the mosques to lead campaigns against any 
newspaper that clashes with their demands and direction in order to scar their image, their 
advertising market and annual subscription rates, " according to the pan-Arab website 
elaph. com. 101 Halfway around the world, the chief editor of the radio station Kantor Berita 
Radio 68 H told this writer that his newsroom had repeatedly been stormed by Islamists 
angry at the station's reporting. Othman al-Sini of Al-Watan says that in Saudi Arabia, the 
greatest pressure on the media comes not from the government, but from reactionary 
elements of society. "If I write an article about the war in Iraq, about what the terrorists are 
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doing there, I find a lot of people against me, " he explains. "If I talk about reform or 
enlightening I find a lot of people they are against this. If I write one about women driving 
cars or cinemas, I do not find any problem from the government. But the conservatives are 
very deaf people, so they fight us. "1012 Fear of backlash from religious conservatives, says 
Hassan Ibrahim, leads to self-censorship on issues of religion. "I believe there is still a very 
pervasive feeling in the Arab media that reporters need to pander to fundamentalists and to 
Islamic causes, " he explains. So for example if a reporter is to ask a Saudi Arabian about the 
role of the Mutawa' [religious police] in the Saudi life, they would have to start by saying, 
'We all realize that it is good in Islam for all to observe the rules. ' You have to first to explain 
to the audience your Islamic credentials. Even a reporter with a slightly more daring or 
secular agenda will make sure he is not offending their beliefs. To me, this is really sad. "1013 
-0- 
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CHAPTER XII: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
"Only tribes held together by group feeling can live in the 
desert. " 
IBN KHALDUN 
THE MUQADDIMAH'°14 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: 
WHAT DO ARAB JOURNALISTS SEE AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION? 
1) OVERVIEW 
Modern Arab news organizations and the modem Arab state were both born from 
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. As noted earlier, Arab media have been a vehicle for the 
spread of Arab nationalism, Arab culture and the Arabic language itself. 1015 But, since the era 
of government control dawned in the mid-twentieth century, the chief professional 
allegiance of most Arab journalists has been to the individual nation-state - not the "Arab 
nation" as a whole - and their primary mission has been to support the status quo. This 
survey finds that mission is changing. 
While only about half of all journalists surveyed specifically identified "agent of 
change" as among the most important journalistic roles, the reality is that nine of the top ten 
roles they did most often identity (Figure 54) are all functions of change or agenda setting: 1) 
encourage political reform (86 percent); 2) educate the public (76 percent); 3) use news for 
the social good (69 percent); 4) encourage civic engagement (67 percent); 5) serve as a voice 
for the poor (67 percent); 6) support development (64 percent); 7) transform Arab society (55 
percent); and 8) agent of change (52 percent). Only "analyze complex issues" and "support 
the Palestinian cause" do not naturally fall within the agenda-setting category. The first is an 
interpretive role and the second involves support for a long-standing Arab priority. 
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FIGURE 54: TOP 10 JOURNALIST ROLES 
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Since the founding of Al-Jazeera, its staffers have seen themselves as agents of 
democratic change in a region trapped in the grip of autocracies. 1016 That was a key reason, 
as noted earlier, that the channel's reporters have been expelled from so many Arab 
countries)°'7 So it is no surprise that they would see it as their job to drive political change. 
However, the other leading cross-border news organizations - Al-Arabiya television and the 
largest newspapers, Al-Hayat and Asharq Al-Awsat - are all controlled by Saudi interests. It is 
therefore noteworthy that 84 percent of respondents working for pan-Arab news 
organizations identified encouraging political reform as their most important journalistic 
priority (Figure 55). But it is even more significant that about the same number of journalists 
working for purely domestic media - traditionally defenders of their respective regimes - 
also said it was their job to shake up the status quo. "The role of the media in shaping public 
debate and covering politics is one of the most important concerns facing journalists today, " 
according to Saudi journalist Samar Fatany. "[It is] [o]ur mission ... to mobilize and move 
the public debate toward positive attitudes and global thinking - dire needs for the 
progress and development of our country. 1018 
This tells us that the aspiration for change is not limited to "elite" news 
organizations, those media organizations at which change fits the "corporate" agenda (be 
that driven by extra-media political factors or a business sense that 'change sells'), or those 
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organizations that reach across borders. Rather, it is an organic view that permeates Arab 
media. In this we clearly see a return to the crusading mission of Arab journalism McFadden 
reported finding in the early 1950s, before the advent of state control, and a link between the 
theory of government influence and its reality on the ground. Arab governments certainly 
have not relinquished control of the media or political life. However, the pressure for reform 
can be seen across the region. The above data indicates that Arab reporters and editors are 
among those exerting that pressure. This supports the theory that journalism is a set of 
"cultural practices" in which media in the throes of political change are "more advocate than 
impartial, interpretive than factual, and more supportive than critical. "1019 
The survey was conducted at a time when fighting raged in Gaza and the West Bank 
between Israel and the Palestinians and the US was leading an international boycott against 
the Hamas government. The fact that support for the Palestinian cause barely made it to the 
top ten self-described journalistic roles belies the perception in the West that opposition to 
Israel and US Palestine policy are the overriding priorities of Arab journalism. The Other 
may play a critical role in shaping identity, according to nationalism theory, but, as 
indicated in the data, that Other is not necessarily foreign. The survey responses tell us that 
their sense of defensiveness in the face of their own governments shapes the identity of Arab 
journalists as significantly as their defensiveness in the face of American and Israeli tanks. 
This inevitably has an impact on how Arab journalists "frame" stories about those same 
governments, which theories of media impact indicate then has a resonating effect on the 
Arab public. 1020 
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Equally noteworthy is the fact that the majority of journalists surveyed identify 
themselves politically as "democrat" - as opposed to "Arab nationalist, " "nationalist" of 
their respective countries, or "Islamist" -a label that, by definition, means they favor the 
concept of democratic political change (Figure 56), which the Bush administration was 
advocating at the time,, though the journalists were not necessarily in favor of the precise 
style of government official Washington had in mind. Here we see the journalists breaking 
out of the straightjacket of the old labels that defined much of the past century - Islamist, 
nationalist, Arab nationalist. Yet at the same time, they are identifying themselves with the 
kind of goal-based non-sectarian patriotism to which their professional ancestor Boutros al- 
Boustani aspired and implicitly endorsing the "natural freedoms" advocated by Islamic 
Modernist al-Tahtawi. It is another indicator of the blurring of psychological boundaries 
found in the new Arabism. 
FIGURE 56: POLITICAL SELF-IDENTITY 
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A number of other results together paint a portrait of a news industry intent on 
driving reforms in a region where power has long rested in the hands of an elite few. 
" "Government control" tied with "lack of professionalism" as the "greatest 
challenge" to Arab journalism (at 73 percent of all respondents); 
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" Political reform (54 percent), poverty (52 percent) and human rights (50 percent) 
were ranked as the top three issues facing the Arab world today, far ahead of 
Palestine (36 percent), Iraq (31 percent) and terrorism (33 percent); 
" "Lack of political change" effectively tied with "US policy" (at 30 percent) as the 
greatest threats to the Arab world, when the ever-present specter of Israel was 
excluded, followed by "human rights abuses" and the "economy" (Figure 57). 
While the perceived external threat presented by the US, Israel and their European 
allies remained grist for the daily news mill across the region, many Arab journalists agreed 
with Faisal Kasim, host of Al-Jazeerä s popular - and controversial - talk show Al Ittijiah al 
Mou'akes (The Opposite Direction), who decried the state of the region and its media: 
God, how our leaders deceived us over the decades - if not centuries - with 
their rotten dehumanized world view! God, how their media organs have 
cheated us all along with their alleged foreign victories and grand strategies 
while their people were suffering socially, economically, educationally, in 
health care and so on and so forth. God, how they kept our suffering and pain 
off the written and visual media for so longj102' 
FIGURE 57: GREATEST THREAT 
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2) A NEW JOURNALISTIC TYPOLOGY 
Through the years, researchers have developed a variety of typologies to categorize 
media in the Arab world and elsewhere. Rugh's typologies identified the primary trends by 
country - e. g. "mobilization" press controlled by revolutionary regimes in places like Syria 
and Iraq; the "loyalist" press in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; and the "diverse" press of 
Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen. 1022Other researchers have created typologies of the 
journalists themselves, rather than the media for which they work. For Weaver et al, those 
categories changed slightly over the decades, but by the time of their 2002 survey they had 
identified four dominant functional classifications into which US journalists were grouped: 
"Interpretative, " "Disseminator, " "Adversarial, " and "Popular Mobilizer. "1023 In a series of 
surveys conducted in the developing world by Jyotika Ramaprasad and various research 
partners, the teams developed an alternative set of functional groupings that took into 
account the "development journalism" worldview of reporters and editors in Nepal, 
Tanzania, Bangladesh and Egypt. 102* The titles changed in the various studies, but the broad 
functions included national development, education, information/analysis, entertainment, 
culture and advocacy. Arab journalists cannot easily be grouped into either of these 
classification systems. From the data emerge two new functional typologies that epitomize 
the mission of Arab journalism today as perceived by the journalists themselves. 
The Change Agent: In its "Vision and Mission Statement, " Al-Jazeera vows to "to 
support the right of the individual to acquire information and strengthen the values of 
tolerance, democracy and the respect of liberties and human rights. "1025 The survey data 
finds that commitment to be a theme running through the Arab media as a whole. In their 
ranking of the "most significant" roles, Arab journalists included seven that together 
constitute what might be considered an agenda-setting or change-agent function (Figure 58). 
These roles all involve an overtly activist approach to journalism that involves political or 
societal change on a national and pan-Arab basis. Hassan Amr, editor of Cairo's Al-Fair 
newspaper, summed up this function when he said the job of a journalist is "to change 
everything; from the president, to the government, to the regime, the rule of the ground. "1026 
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FIGURE 58: CHANGE AGENT 
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The overwhelming majority of Arab journalists surveyed believe encouraging 
political reform is their top priority (84.6%). "1 think it is in every body's mind to bring 
political change, " said Nakhle El Hage, director of news and current affairs at AI-Arabiva. 
"ßv having the debate on the television channels about democracy and about political 
parties, it gives everybody a platform to say what they think and this is promotion for 
democracy. And by covering big democratic events like elections in Iraq, elections in 
Lebanon, elections in Palestine, elections in Iran, elections in the USA, in the UK, I think 
people are viewing these elections and are admiring them and they have no problems 
having elections in Egypt. ""°°' And while the pan-Arab media concentrate on the big picture, 
some local journalists aggressively focus on internal reform. "As a journalist, it is my job to 
elevate the people, to enlighten the people, to encourage the people, " explained Al-Fajr's 
Hassan Amr. 
Another motivation is to keep my country on the right track. Egypt is a very 
great and influential country. But now, it is going down because of the 
authoritarian regime. We lost wealth, we lost position, we lost our influence; 
we lost everything. So my motivation now is to get my country on the right 
track again. IIf youI attack the apparatus ... of the authoritarian regime (you 
take fear from the people land give them thel courage to challenge the 
government. Sometimes I explain that the government lands the prime 
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minister are deceiving them. I make scandals about the government and what 
they are saying. That is my job now. 1019 
In Lebanon, according to the LBC's Tania Mehanna, that mission includes trying to 
stop the country's endemic violence. "If you do not have a mission to try to change [the 
world] around you in a positive way, you might as well work for any of the intelligence 
agencies, " she said. '= 
Other journalistic tasks in this category can all be seen as playing a supporting role to 
this mission of change. They include encouraging civil engagement (67.2%), which is a 
precursor to political change, and serving as a voice for the poor (66.7%); transforming Arab 
society (54.5%); serving as an agent of change (51.9%); and acting as an adversary of the 
government (21.1%). 
In Ramaprasad's categorizations, support for national/regional development and use 
news for the social good are natural sub-sets of his "Development" or "Loyalist" functions 
(depending on the country studied). I have chosen to include support for national/regional 
development (64.4%) and use news for the social good (68.5%) in the Change Agent 
category, since - in this context - they are both closely tied to the role of transforming Arab 
society. For example, Hussein Shobokshi, a columnist with Asharq Al Awsat who also hosts a 
business program on Al-Arabiya, saw communicating "a message of reform, a message of 
development" as a top priority for Arab journalists. 1031 While the author of this study has 
excluded "educate the public" from this category, a strong argument could be made that, in 
the context of the other journalistic priorities, "educate" was could be interpreted in terms of 
educating the public to support political and social change, as in the comments of Samir 
Khader, a senior producer at Al Jazeera, who told me it was his job to "educate the public to 
understand the world, "1032 and his colleague Ahmed Shugi, who believed it is his duty "to 
give something to the viewers, to educate them, to enlighten them. "» Shobokshi - who was 
banned from writing for several years and received death threats after publishing a column 
in the daily Okaz in which he imagined waking up in a country where the government was 
accountable to the people, citizens could vote and woman could drive - insisted that "create 
change and educate" are the inseparable missions of Arab journalism 
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because I believe there is social responsibility for media in the Arab world to 
play. People do not trust the educational system, nor do they rely on it any 
more. The social fabric of very traditional institutions, such as family, such as 
government, such as state, such as the municipalities, has all declined. But 
media is powerful and it is very effective. It is a platform to send an 
alternative message, a comparative message to a mass audienee. 10M 
Hassan Ibrahim of Al-Jazeera concurred: "We do not have the luxury of saying, 'Oh, 
my role is not to educate people. ' The masses may not like it, but our role should be basically 
to educate them a little bit about the world around [them]. We are not doing that; no one is 
doing that. "1° 
The Change Agent function far outweighed any other self-perceived set of roles and 
provides quantitative evidence that a majority of Arab journalists support Faisal Kasim's 
argument that, "Our media should be harnessed to liberate the Arab people from their 
internal gladiators. "1om This perspective reflects the heart of Arab journalism culture, which 
Hanitzsch tells us, becomes manifest in "the way journalists think and act" to "legitimate 
their role in society. " It provides both a foundation for the interpretation of news and a 
"professional worldview" through which the journalist approaches his/her job. 
The Guardian: There is an encounter in the documentary Control Room, a film 
about the relationship between Al Jazeera and the US military headquarters in the Gulf 
during the first weeks of the Iraq war, which epitomizes the sense of defensiveness 
permeating many Arab newsrooms as the Iraq war raged. In the scene, a US journalism 
professor counsels a young reporter from Abu Dhabi TV who has been assigned to the US 
Central Command media center. "Go interview the American spokesman, " the professor, 
himself a former TV correspondent, suggests. "But don't be hostile; smile, when you talk to 
him. " "Smile? " the reporter snaps back, physically bristling. "How can I smile when my 
people are dying? "1G37 
Most US journalists adopted a defensive, us-against-them, wave-the-flag posture in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It was, on some levels, a natural response to such a 
devastating attack in the heart of America's media capital. Since the autumn of 2001, Arab 
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journalists had been chronicling the ongoing deaths of tens of thousands of their fellow 
Arabs and Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. And they were likewise angry and 
defensive. As Al-Jazeera's Khader told me, "It is very hard to be objective or to pick different 
perspectives of an event when you are part of the event. "» Over on rival Al-Arabiya, they 
struggled with the same challenge. "We try to empathize without sympathizing, " explained 
Nakhle El Hage. 1039 
That was not confined just to issues involving the US, it also extended to coverage of 
the Palestinian territories and the ongoing conflicts between Israel and Lebanon. Many Arab 
journalists refused to buy into the idea that there needed to be some kind of a moral calculus 
that devoted equal time to Lebanese and Israeli suffering. The 2006 Lebanon-Israel war was 
one example. "The balance of suffering was not there. One hundred and fifty Israelis dead, a 
third of them civilians; one thousand Lebanese dead, most civilians, " says Al-Arabiya's 
Khatib. "We did stories on Israeli families suffering and Israelis in shelters but it's a totally 
different picture - the balance in terms of quantity (of coverage] would not be right because 
the suffering is not equal. "1(140 
Ahmed Mansour was Al-jazeera's correspondent inside Fallujah during the US siege 
of that Iraqi town, which claimed hundreds of civilian lives. It was an experience that 
forever shattered any illusion he may have had that journalists can always been neutral: 
A lot of times we can [make] a gap between being a human being and being a 
reporter, but sometimes you cannot. And when I was in Fallujah, every girl I 
saw, I remembered my daughter. When I try to [separate myself from what 
was happening], sometimes I cannot. I saw a child injured or die, I remember 
my son. They are Arab like you, Muslim like you. They are human people 
like you. Sometimes my colleagues [at] Al-Jazeera tell me, "Ahmed, you can 
talk more quiet and more slowly. " How I can when this plane over my head 
destroys everything? Sometimes when they contacted me, I was in the middle 
of a massacre. How can I talk quietly? Sometimes I was on the air from in the 
hospital and between bodies and people injured. You are a man in the end. 
You are not an angel or from another planet. You are from this area. So you 
cannot do this gap between you as journalist and you as human. 1041 
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Mansour believed that if American reporters had been inside Fallujah, instead of 
outside embedded with the US military, they, too, would have covered the story differently, 
just as "if I am in America and if any enemy to America comes to destroy this civilian area, I 
will cover it like Fallujah. No difference. " For Arab and US journalists, he said, it was all a 
matter of perspective. His Al-Jazeera colleague, Hassan Ibrahim, was not so sure. He said 
the fact that reporters carry with them the baggage of their culture meant that Arab viewers 
- like their counterparts in other cultures - still saw a mono-dimensional view of the region 
via their own media. "We try to be sympathetic to grief the Israeli mothers that have lost 
their children ... but do we really? Do we deal with the thing or do we, in a sense, justify it? " 
asked Ibrahim, a Sudanese-American who was one of the central figures profiled in the 
documentary Control Room. "I cannot call myself a human being if I do not have the same 
sympathy for the suffering of a human or a grieving mother whether her son was Yasser 
Arafat or Sharon. She is a mother. The pain is justified and the pain is terrible. The pain is 
there. "10 
Long before the current polarized international climate, the founder of Lebanon's An 
Nahar set out a mission statement that called for the newspaper to be non-confessional and 
"pro-Arab. "1° The survey results underline the degree to which that sentiment continues to 
shape the perspective of Arab journalists in the face of the Iraq conflict, the so-called "War 
on Terror, " and US support for Israel. This data includes. 
" Strongly negative attitudes toward the US and US policy; 
" Cynicism about US calls for democracy, a Palestinian state and even the motives 
behind humanitarian relief; 
" Concerns about the threat posed by the US to both the Arab world and Arab 
journalism. 
These coalesce into what the author has labeled the "Guardian" function (Figure 59). 
This category is the quantitative equivalent of the anecdotes related above. It involves a set 
of roles associated with the defense of Arab and/or Islamic causes and ideals which are 
unique to the region, including: "Support the Palestinian cause, - "Foster Arab culture, " °" 
"Encourage spiritual values, " "Defend Arab interests, " "Protect Islamic traditions, " and 
"Enhance pan-Arab unity. " The worldview of Arab journalists in the post-9/11 era has a 
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strong defensive aspect, in which they see themselves defending the Arab homeland at a 
time when an Arab country is being occupied by a foreign army and the Islamic world as a 
whole is, in the view of many Muslims, under siege. "Not only defending the Arab nation, 
but also defending the Arab causes, " noted Samar Fatany, a leading Saudi woman 
journalist. '° Al-Jazeerä s Mazen Ibrahim saw his role as more subtle. "I do not think that I 
have to defend or to change. All I have to do is let people see what is happening. So they 
will have to decide if they are going to defend or not defend, to change or not change, " he 
explained. "I do not feel that we need an ideological TV or an ideological newspaper. It is 
better to be more or less objective and people to decide. "1o 
Still, Rugh's "mobilization" model does continue to play a role in some Arab 
societies. One example: The 2007 Islamic World Media Conference that brought journalists 
from various Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries to Damascus under the patronage of 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to discuss "the necessity of harmony among Islamic 
world's media in supporting the oppressed Palestinian people and their struggle to free 
their homeland. ""° Meanwhile, in Palestine itself, some Palestinian journalists, like radio 
reporter Mohammed Al Amin Wail Hejazy, continued to believe that while it was important 
to "help the people, " they could best do that by reporting events in Palestine to audiences 
abroad. "Only Palestinian can transmit the real truth about the issue to all the world, " he 
told me. "Journalists in Palestine must seek assistance to all the people in Palestine. "1048 
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Figure 60 illustrates the perceived journalistic roles grouped under the two new 
proposed functional groupings, with the rest of the roles grouped within three of the 
relevant typologies proposed by other researchers. 1049 While, as noted above, supporting the 
Palestinian cause was not among the top priorities, more than half the journalists polled 
(53.6 percent) did say it was an important journalistic role, significant numbers put fostering 
Arab culture (43.8 percent) and encouraging spiritual values (42.6 percent) high on the list, 
and more than a third included as top priority the need to defend Arab interests (37.5 
percent), protect Islamic tradition (34.3 percent), or enhance pan-Arab unity (33.5 percent). 
"When you are being attacked from everything, and your culture, your principles, your 
ideas, your thoughts, you have to defend; you have to be on the defensive, " explained 
Samar Fatamy. I° 
That this category ranks second after Change Agent is significant. It demonstrates 
the degree to which the external threat continues to shape 'national' identity among Arab 
journalists. It is not the overriding influence, but it is notable - and it is a common threat that 
is evident in responses of journalist across the region. For some Arab journalists, that 
responsibility to defend extends to "balancing" the professional role of a journalist and the 
obligations of a citizen. Here we see the limited influence of the normative occupational 
ideology - what Deuze calls the "cultural cement"1051 - that theoretically links journalists 
around the world, and the greater influence of personal attitudes, organizational and extra- 
media influences as outlined in the hierarchy-of-influences model. 
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FIGURE W. FUNCTIONS 
Function/Role ! Most Important"a 
Change Agent 
Encourage political reform 84.6% 
Use news for social good 68.6% 
Support national/regional development 68.5% 
Encourage civic engagement 67.2% 
Serve as voice of the poor 66.7% 
Transform Arab society 55.4% 
Agents of change 51.9% 
Adversary of government 21.1% 
Interpreter 
Educate the public 74.6% 
Analyze 60.3% 
Disseminator 
Entertain 26.5% 
Simply Report 61.9% 
Loyalist 
Support government policies 7.2% 
Support employer 6.7% 
Guardian 
Support Palestinian cause 54.4% 
Foster Arab culture 43.9% 
Encourage spiritual values 41.2% 
Defend Arab interests 38.4% 
Protect Islamic traditions 33.2% 
Enhance pan-Arab unity 33.7% 
Watchdog 
Investigate government claims 50.6% 
°Participants were allowed to select multiple roles 
"You have a very big responsibility [as a journalist], " observed Ibrahim Hamidi, a 
Syrian who is Al-Hayat's Damascus bureau chief, "but this responsibility has two faces. I do 
not run after scoops because I know a lot of scoops that may harm the country. I might be 
not objective, but it is the country that you live in that really matters more than your job. The 
priority is the safety of your country. "1052 Magdy Samaan, a reporter for AI-Masry AI-Youm, 
an independent daily in Egypt, said he tried to separate his various identities. "First I am 
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Egyptian. Second I am a journalist. But it is not a mix. Sometimes I am a Copt[ic Christian]. 
Sometimes I go to cover Copts' conflicts. My Copts people, they were angry [about] some 
news in which I told the truth of it. I try not to mix between this. "1For Othman Mahmoud 
Al Sini, editor-in-chief of the Saudi daily Al-Watan, the functions of guardian and change 
agent went hand-in-hand. "If I want to defend Saudi faith or Islamic faith, I have to say the 
truth. But I cannot say, 'No everything is fine, everything is alright; because if I say that, I 
am not right, " he explained. "What we are doing is not to say what is in Saudi interests or 
Arab interests. We are trying to get the truth from our society, because there is no one 
truth. "1° But, said Ahmed Mansour, by definition Arab journalists present that "truth" from 
the Arab perspective. "It is my job to report for the Arab people. I am not a correspondent 
for West, for East, for anywhere, for any people. I am a correspondent for the Arab 
people. "1055 
While he agreed it is natural, Hassan Ibrahim, for one, had mixed feelings about the 
degree to which Arab journalists were wearing the word "Arab" on their sleeve. "There is a 
competition to be bold and daring. It is fashionable. And, of course, it is very tickling for any 
journalist to be described as a person with a mission. I do not know how good that is for a 
journalist, because it means that you are proud of having a slant from the news. And 
objectivity is being pushed the back further, in a sense that a lot of journalists do not mind to 
appear more patriotic to the cause. " 0% The head of the BBC's Arabic service, Hosam El 
Sokkari, worried that once causes are taken up, objectivity is abandoned. "Lots of channels 
do not hide that they are there to address what they believe are their audiences' causes. And 
that, in itself, is a position. " Al Jazeera's Maher Abdallah Ahmed agreed. "We're a means to 
exchange information, not banners for causes. If journalists are advocates of causes, they 
hurt themselves and the profession, " he told a conference in 2004.157 M'Hamed Krichen 
shared that concern, particularly when it comes to Al-Jazeera, where he is a news anchor. 
,, We should be very careful about this because we are not political party and we are not a 
leadership for this Arab nation, " said Krichen, an Algerian who has worked for the BBC, 
Radio Monte Carlo, Netherlands Radio and several Arab broadcasters. "At the end of the 
day, we are a television station ... 
We are speaking a different language [than government- 
controlled broadcasters], but we should keep our feet on the earth and not become 
propagandists. "1058 
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Hassan Ibrahim agreed that the need to choose sides even extends to religion. "We 
have a religious program on Al-Jazeera [hosted by] one Sheikh [named] Qaradawi. I have a 
lot of respect for Qaradawi. But Islam is not just Qaradawi. Islam is a religion opting for a 
lot of interpretations. So are we promoting one brand of Sunni Islam? I say we still have a 
long way to go. "° 
Following Change Agent and Guardian, the next-highest level of support went to a 
set of more neutral roles that naturally fall within what Weaver et al labeled the Interpreter 
function. For Arab journalists, this includes educating the public (76.6%) (although, as noted 
above, this could also be seen as a Change Agent role if it is being done with the goal of 
spurring the public into supporting change), and analyzing developments (61.9%). British 
columnist Robert Fisk once described his newspaper, the Independent, as a "viewpaper, " that 
was keen to print the insights of its journalists as part of its stories. It is just such an 
approach, common in the British and southern European media, that sums up the 
Interpreter function. 1060 A fourth category, also in line with Weaver et al, is the 
straightforward dissemination of news and information, which also includes just two roles 
for Arab journalists: simply reporting facts (26.5%), and entertaining (23.3%). About half the 
journalists saw it as their duty to investigate government claims, which falls within 
Weaver's Watchdog function. The final grouping is the Loyalist, first identified by Rugh and 
borrowed by Ramaprasad, which, in the Arab case, includes two roles that hark back to the 
classic mouthpiece function of Arab media. These can be found in countries in which media 
remains highly controlled, such as Sudan, where, according to Mahmoud Tanim of Al- 
Arabiya, for local journalists, "a news conference is like dictation; you write everything 
down and then you go to the newspaper and publish it as is. " He deplored this as a 
"military mentality, " adding that "if the newsmakers can impose themselves on the 
newspapers, you can say that the courage of the mass media is very bad. "1o61 
As they struggled to define their new role, Arab journalists came face-to-face with 
the question of loyalty. "To whom should loyalty be? " asked Egypt TV's Abd el-Latif el- 
Menawy. "Should the loyalty be to the receiver of information, whether it is a reader or a 
viewer? Or should the loyalty be to the society? Or should the loyalty be to the one who is 
paying the salary at the end of the month? "1 The majority of Arab journalists appeared to 
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be rejecting the old answers. The survey found that Loyalist functions now elicited only 
marginal adherence: with the roles of "support government policies" and "support 
employer" garnering just 7.2 percent and 6.7 percent respectively. Even in the most 
repressed societies, journalists were chafing at the traditional restrictions. In Tunisia, where 
the government maintained an iron grip over the media, reporters and editors "are 
embarrassed" because a country that once had a free press now required reporters "to bring 
news from the official agency and they can't change any word in this press releases about 
repugnant activities, " said Rashid Khashana, editor of a free opposition weekly. "The role of 
journalist is to criticize people who are doing bad things, who are doing against the national 
interest. And the first national interest for us now is to build democracy, to build pluralism 
and to protect the human rights in our country because it is the point that always considered 
the fundamental thing to build a new society. "1° 
There was no doubt that many Arab journalists saw their news organizations as a 
weapon to be wielded in the face of the perceived US threat. "Media, " said Palestinian 
journalist Amin Abu Wardeh, "is one of the purest forms of non-violent resistance. "1O* It is 
also, noted Rami Khouri of the Beirut Daily Star and the American University of Beirut, "the 
only arena where Arabs have been able to fight the Anglo-Americans to a draw. "1° 
Yet, the data shows that Arab journalists do not daily strap on their armor in 
preparation for another dash with the modem-day Crusaders. While they acknowledged 
that they have a journalistic responsibility to the greater Arab nation and Islamic umma, their 
priority was, as Al-Jazeera's Kasim put it, to "get liberated locally before we get liberated 
from foreign colonialists. "b0 In part, this stems from a belief among journalists, as among 
many other Arab intellectuals, that while there is little practical they can do in the face of 
130,000 US troops in Iraq or the might of Israel, they can have a real impact on how events 
unfold on a domestic political and social level. "We do not possess an army to go and 
change people, " said Osama Mirghani, deputy editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab daily Asharq 
Al-Awsat. "But you can be very effective by giving them information. By simply transmitting 
the pictures you are helping to bring about change. "1067 
As noted in Chapter VI, pan-Arab satellite television helped to drive Syrian forces 
out of Lebanon, it created the groundswell of Arab support for Hezbollah that ultimately 
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helped prompt an about-face by the Saudis during the 2006 Lebanon war, and its ongoing 
coverage of human rights violations in Egypt was feeding opposition to the Mubarak 
regime. In many ways, such coverage was far more dangerous for journalists than taking on 
the US or Israel. "You can defend" against outside interference, explained Arab News Editor- 
in-Chief Khaled al-Maenna, "but the same time you should pin point deficiencies in the 
Arab world first. If you are not brave enough to do that then you are in the wrong 
business. "'" 
Summary: The need for regional political reform was at the top of the agenda for 
Arab journalists, who - in the turbulent first decade of the new century -identified 
themselves politically with the forces of political change. The perceived external threat 
posed by US policy in the Arab world was an inescapable presence in the newsrooms of the 
region. As Samir Khader of Al Jazeera put it: "The Arab journalist, in general, has the same 
problem as the average Arab, this feeling of being under siege. And they have a mission to 
defend the nation, to defend the religion. "1069 But the data indicates Arab journalists were not 
preoccupied with antipathy toward the US, as some Western policymakers posited. On 
balance, they saw the greatest threat to the region - and to Arab journalism - coming from 
the actions of Arab governments, and each of the top issues they identified as critical for the 
future of the Arab world linked back to the authoritarian nature of the ruling status quo. 
Adel Ban Atwan, editor-in-chief of AI-Quds Al Arabi -a vocal critic of the 
governments in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as US Middle East policy - was emphatic 
when asked about his role as a journalist. "I have a mission to modernize our society, to 
promote democracy, to promote human rights, to promote independent judicial system, to 
change our society, to adopt the values which can actually put us in a different category, not 
the rotten category where we are now, " said the self-described "black sheep of Arab 
journalism, " who was based in London because he has been banned in most Arab countries. 
"Actually, I enjoy the fruit of democracy in the Western world. I try to pass this experience 
to my people. I try to enlighten them about why the Western societies are more advanced 
than us. So I am trying all the time to emphasize this, but in a very professional way. Not 
just, you know, by insulting the others and imperialism. "1o7o 
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R1 CONCLUSION: The primary mission of Arab journalism is that of fostering 
political and social change in the Arab world, with a secondary role of 
defending the Arab/Muslim people and values against outside interference. 
R1 IMPLICATIONS: This perspective goes to the core of both nationalist and 
journalism theory. Understanding how Arab journalists see their own mission is 
critical because, as Shoemaker and Reese hypothesize, "[j]ournalists' role 
conceptions affect content. " Whether journalists see their role as interpreting, 
disseminating or serving as an adversary, they wrote, will determine "how they 
define their jobs, the kinds of things they believe should be covered, and the 
ways in which they cover them. "1071 In giving priority to political and social 
reform in defining their mission, we see evidence of Reese's contention that 
"media symbolic content is connected with larger social interests. " 1072 
The Change Agent function clearly telegraphs the fact that Arab 
journalists, as a whole, generally agree on a certain set of standards or 
principles by which they believe their society should be governed. These 
include political participation, human rights, access to education and related 
political and social rights, which, they indicate, Arabs across the region are 
largely denied. 
For Arab journalism, I contend that the Change Agent function is both 
fundamental and iconic in terms of how journalists view themselves and their 
role in society; fundamental because it rests in the historic roots of Arab 
journalism; iconic because it is a self-view to which even those who cannot 
implement it aspire. 
Gellner tells us that the "feeling of anger aroused by the violation" of a 
principle, and the "feeling of satisfaction aroused by" fulfillment of that 
principle defines the very essence of "nationalist sentiment. "1073 Thus the 
shared perspective Arab among journalists that existing rulers are failing to 
offer the political and social reforms needed by the people of the region, and 
the pride in the self-view that they are, as Fatany said, "shaping public 
debate, " together become so important in relating this to an emerging 
regional sense of shared challenges and possibilities. 
Likewise, the elements of the Guardian role bind Arab journalists 
together in the face of what clearly fits Hasting's description of the "long 
struggle against an external threat" that is such a critical element in the 
development of national identity. 1074 This is so important because the resulting 
"language of self-defense" is, Anderson notes, a critical element in the 
mobilization of popular nationalism, '075 and the transnational media of the 
twenty-first century is the epitome of the "modern mass communications" 
that Smith says "amplify and broadcast" messages that bind peoples to a 
shared "ethno-history and heritage" when under threat. 1076 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 261 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: 
HOW DO THE STATED ATTITUDES OF ARAB JOURNALISTS COMPARE TO THOSE OF THEIR 
COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF 
JOURNALISTIC NORMS? 
1) OVERVIEW 
In the years since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the Aspen Institute, a US-based think 
tank, has periodically brought together a small group of elite American and Arab journalists 
to discuss their respective roles in the context of broader US-Arab/Muslim relations. 
Participants include top editors, White House and State Department correspondents, and 
columnists from news organizations such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street journal, 
USA Today and National Public Radio, along with their counterparts from Arab news 
organizations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Al-Ahram. Deep into the second day of one 
of these gatherings, discussion turned, once again, to the question of whether American and 
Arab journalists were doing their jobs. "Do we even agree on what that job is? " this writer 
asked. The organizer and moderator, himself not a journalist, quickly responded, "Of 
course, " and moved the discussion in another direction. But the reality was that not one of 
the Arabs in the room believed that they and their American counterparts had the same 
view of the mission of journalism. 
"I do not think we agree, " Jamil Mroue, publisher and editor-in-chief of the The Daily 
Star in Beirut, told me later. "And I do not think it is as simple as saying, 'you are a 
journalist in New York and I am a journalist in Lebanon or in the UAE, and that means the 
same thing. ' It does not mean the same thing. And certainly when we go further and talk 
about your institutional role as a newspaper or my role in a newspaper, or the role of the 
media industry in your society and mine, certainly we are comparing apples and oranges 
and not apples and apples. They are in the same orchard, in the sense that they are in the 
same profession, but they are not the same tree. ""° ' Hussein Shobokshi, who also 
participated in the Aspen session, was equally emphatic in his rejection of the idea that US 
and Arab journalists had the same view of their mission. "No, I do not buy that. I think it is 
part of the confusion, " he told me. "In the West, media seeks to maintain what it has 
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achieved, while in the developing country it seeks to achieve what it inspired. "1078 "Two 
places and two cultures, and everything is different, " said Al-jazeera's Ahmed Mansour, 
summing up the vast divide. 1079 
A pair of anecdotes illustrates the fundamentally different ways in which US and 
Arab journalists approach their profession. On the second anniversary of the US invasion of 
Iraq, Ahmed Sheikh, Al Jazeera's editor-in-chief, was in Baghdad interviewing Iraqis for a 
documentary. He soon found that all his high-minded ideas about "objectivity, " "balance" 
and "truth" evaporated in the face of the grim reality on the ground. "Because I was so 
horrified by the scene that I saw in the city - lawlessness, chaos, disorder, and the 
Americans were not capable of doing anything, " he found himself asking leading questions 
that were unconsciously aimed at producing the answers he wanted. "Why did I fall into 
this trap unknowingly? " he asked rhetorically: 
We are human beings, we belong to this nation, the Arab nation, because this 
is our language, we speak in Arabic ... If you are part of a society and you 
live in a society, this is going to affect objectivity. We belong to this Arab 
nation and we are there to cover from our own perspective. Sometimes it may 
prove to be very difficult to be impartial. You find yourself carried away with 
your sentiments, but you have got to work hard to keep that sort of 
essence. 108° 
One year later, during a panel discussion at the Graduate school of journalism at the 
University of California - Berkeley to mark the third anniversary of the invasion, Washington 
Post correspondent Jackie Spinner was asked how she had felt about the war before she went 
to Baghdad and how she felt about it after months spent covering the conflict. "I have a very 
platonic relationship to the war. I believe very fervently as a journalist that it's not 
appropriate for me to express my opinion about the war, " she told the gathering. "I don't 
talk about it with my friends; I don't talk about it with my family. My family members don't 
know who I voted for or if I even voted. I'm an old school journalist. I don't believe it's 
appropriate at all. I'm an observer: I went to war, I saw what I saw, I wrote about what I 
saw, and that's the extent of it. "1081 
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The anecdotes highlight the divergence in attitudes toward their roles among some 
American journalists and their Arab counterparts and offers a vivid example of Hanitzsch's 
observation that while journalists the world over share "a common theoretical denominator 
of journalism culture, " that journalism culture manifests very differently depending on 
where in the "real" world of journalism practice the reporter or editor is plying his/her 
craft. 1082 Few US reporters would go to the extreme of hiding their true feelings even from 
family members, but most do ascribe to at least an ideal of objectivity. And most US news 
organizations have rules against their journalists engaging in political activism. That often 
extends even to those who are not actually journalists. In the spring of 2007, for example, 
CBS News fired one of its military consultants, retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste, after he 
appeared in an anti-Bush television commercial. According to CBS News Vice President, 
Standards and Special Projects, Linda Mason, Batiste violated the network's regulations. 
"We ask that people not be involved in advocacy, " she said 103 For many Arab journalists, 
rules like those at CBS or public posturing such as that of Spinner are all part of a smoke 
screen that artificially masks the real views of the reporter. "I cannot be completely 
objective, " says Al-Arabiya reporter Haitham Hussein. "Truth is the most important thing, 
but it depends on the media that you are working with. If you are working with BBC, Al- 
Arabiya, or Al-Jazeera, the truth is not the same. Maybe you can share the same information, 
but not the same truth"108* 
For Arab journalists, war - particularly a war in the Arab heartland - is not 
something with which any Arab can have "a very platonic relationship. " Beyond the issue of 
whether journalists like Spinner are being honest with themselves, much less their readers, 
the contrast raises the question: If, as some scholars argue, journalism is "a set of cultural 
practices, "b0 can they be expected to translate across borders? "The way to select news and 
the way to select [quotes], the way to select the point of view, this still belongs to our 
cultural environment and background. We cannot separate ourselves from this background. 
Like the American or French or British journalists cannot do the same, " argued Al-Jazeera's 
M'Hamed Krichen, who says journalists must still strive "to be professional, even if we are 
not 100% natural. "10 
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2) JOURNALISTIC MORES 
The heart of the difference between Arab journalists and journalists elsewhere in the 
world can be found in the set of Arab journalistic approaches that involve the Change Agent 
and Guardian functions discussed earlier, which group roles associated with political/social 
change and the defense of Arab/Muslim ideals. The roles among US journalists that are most 
closely related to these functions are those of "Set the political agenda, " chosen as 
"extremely important" by just 3 percent of those polled by Weaver et al, and "Motivate 
people to get involved, " endorsed by 33 percent of the American reporters and editors. 1087 
These two roles were aggregated, along with three others, into what Weaver et al labeled the 
"Popular Mobilizer" function, which, by the time of their 2002 survey, had "established a 
foothold with a larger minority"1Ou (10.4 percent) of US journalists, in part, they speculated, 
due to increased interest in "public" or "civic journalism" (see Chapter IV). 
Yet the three other roles in the grouping all garnered relatively low support: "Let 
people express views" (39 percent, down from 48 percent in 1992); "Develop cultural 
interests" (17 percent); and "Point to possible solutions" (24 percent). The "Change Agent" 
roles identified among Arab journalists form a unique sub-set of the "Popular Mobilizer" 
category. These arc role to which American journalists do not generally subscribe. While 
"Change Agent" roles - which certainly seek to mobilize the populous - easily fall within 
the "Popular Mobilizer" function, the opposite is not the case. The public or civic journalism 
associated with the "Mobilizer" roles in the US seeks to mobilize the public to engage in the 
political process and prompt discussion of positive solutions, but American proponents of 
civic journalism are not overtly seeking to change the political and social landscape. Indeed, 
the roles at the core of the Arab "Change Agent" function are anathema to most American 
civic journalists, much less the mainstream of the profession. 
The other attitudinal clusters into which Weaver et al aggregated their data included: 
"Interpretive" (62.6 percent), "Adversarial" (18.6 percent) and "Disseminator" (15.6 percent). 
For the 2002 US results, the adversarial function had dropped in importance in comparison 
to previous surveys. u9 The interpretive function included "Investigating official claims, " 
which was the individual role that garnered the highest rating from the US reporters and 
editors (71 percent). As Weaver et al wryly observed in reporting their survey findings, "the 
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continued popularity of the government watchdog role seems ironic in view of the relatively 
strong press support the Bush administration enjoyed between the September 11 tragedy 
and the war in Iraq. ", - Only four of the individual journalistic roles mentioned by US 
reporters made it into the Arab top ten roles (Figure 61). Significantly, two of those four fit 
within the "Change Agent" function, and while Arabs rated them highly, they were well 
down on the US journalists' priority list. The "Guardian" function, meanwhile, was 
completely missing from the US and European responses, as well as those of journalists in 
the developing world. 
FIGURE 61: COMPARATIVE ROLES 
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3) ARAB AND NON-WESTERN JOURNALISTS 
Just as the US categories did not include some roles identified by Arab journalists, 
neither did the Arab data seamlessly fit the Ramaprasad functions. Nor was there a 
significant overlap in perceived roles with journalists who were studied in an assortment of 
other surveys in Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia, as evident in Figure 62. The "Change 
Agent" function outlined above forms a sub-set of a broader set of roles that together reflect 
an activist or advocacy agenda. However, as Figure 63 illustrates, even when the overtly 
agenda-setting roles favored by Arab journalists are grouped into a broader category of 
activist or "Advocacy" roles, which include those that do not overtly seek to change political 
and social structures, Arab journalists are still far more heavily committed to using their 
craft as a means to an end than other colleagues elsewhere in the world. "My real job is to 
cover stuff, but my idealistic job is to make a difference, " explained Roula Mouawad of An 
Nahar, "to really motivate people in a good cause. "1091 
Far down on the Arab journalists' priority list was the Disseminator function (Figure 
XII-11), which involves the straightforward recounting of events, It is a dominant category 
for Western journalists but less popular among developing world journalists.. The job of a 
journalist is "to inform, to be [the audiences'] eyes and ears, " according to Saudi reporter 
Samar Fatany. "As a journalist I should be objective as much as I can. Now sometimes you 
cannot be objective for different reasons. So we have to give them whatever we have if we 
can at the certain limits. There are limits for everything as you know. "1m The Arabs were in 
synch with their colleagues around the world on the importance of interpreting news for the 
viewer (Figure 65) but they strongly rejected the classic development journalism perception 
of the journalist as a defender of the government and his/her own employer, as grouped in 
the "Loyalist" function (Figure 66). Nor did they give as high a rating to the "Watchdog" 
function as US and some other journalists (Figure 68). 
The "Guardian" roles (Figure 67) so popular among Arab journalists were absent 
from the roles journalists in the US and developing world saw for themselves. Likewise, the 
classic roles of development journalism prevalent in Southeast Asia - in which "freedom" 
was often defined as "the freedom to assist the state in carrying out programs for social and 
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economic development" rather than freedom from government control")`,, - were largely 
absent from the Arab journalistic woridview (Figure 69). 
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FIGURE 65: INTERPRETER 
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FIGURE 67: GUARDIAN 
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FIGURE 68: WATCHDOG 
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FIGURE 69: DEVELOPMENT 
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As noted above, two of the functional groupings are largely unique to Arab 
journalists. The "Change Agent" function highlights the fact that political change has 
become a priority among a significant portion of the Arab journalism community. The 
"Guardian" function is an extension of the "Mobilization" and "Loyalist" roles first 
identified by Rugh, in which Arab journalists overtly sought to mobilize public opinion in 
support of national and pan-Arab causes. However, the fact that "Loyalist" functions - like 
overt support for government policies - today rank at the bottom of the perceived media 
roles is indicative of the degree to which traditional flag-waving for the state is increasingly 
being replaced by a more organic defense of Arab/Muslim causes and values. This is a 
significant shift. 
Overall, the perspective Arab journalists have of their mission is closer to that of 
journalists in the developing world, and, to a lesser extent, Europe, than that of their US 
colleagues. While they have long since abandoned the Loyalist or government mouthpiece 
role, Arab journalists do believe they are more than a simply conduit for information. As 
Ziak Talhouk, a Lebanese journalists working for the Italian news agency ANSA, put it: 
"Everyone has his own political beliefs. It is [a journalist's] right to use his political opinion 
to get feedback, but not to try to impose this point or view. " l 
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That view is shared, for example, by Bangladeshi journalists, who endorse eight of 
the top ten roles Arab journalists see for themselves (Figure 70), and by Indonesian reporters 
and editors (Figure 71), who, in the years since the overthrow of long-time dictator Suharto, 
have see their primary roles as defending the truth and serving as the public's watchdog, 1o95 
strong parallels to the overall Arab journalistic mission. 
FIGURE 70: TOP ROLES 
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FIGURE 71: INDONESIAN ROLES 
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4) ACTIVIST JOURNALISM 
As noted earlier, some leading Arab media figures wear two hats, that of a journalist 
and that of a politician. Many others blur the line between journalist and political activist. 
US-based Egyptian columnist Mona Eltahawy proudly took part in anti-regime Kifaya 
demonstrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square when she returned to her native land to cover the 
2006 elections. "I am no longer just a journalist, I have become the heart of the conflict, " Al- 
Arabiya presenter Giselle Khouri, a Lebanese national, told me in late 2005. Her husband, 
Samir Kassir, an outspoken anti-Syrian columnist for Lebanon's largest daily, An Nahar, had 
been assassinated less than six months before. The Israeli assault on Lebanon left many other 
Arab journalists sharing her pain. Rami Khouri, the Harvard-educated editor-at-large for 
Beirut's Daily Star, was out of the country when the conflict broke out. In a column entitled 
"Back to Beirut: Ready to Defy Israel, " he explained his desire to return home: "I want to 
return mainly because steadfastness in the face of the Israeli assault is the sincerest - perhaps 
the only - form of resistance available to those of us who do not know how to use a gun, and 
prefer not to do so in any case, for there is no military solution to this conflict, " he told his 
readers. 1097 
Many Arab journalists point with pride to the role the media played in forcing Syria 
to withdraw from Lebanon in the so-called "Cedar Revolution" and the media's impact on 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 274 
the broader Kifaya (Enough) movement for political change that it inspired in several other 
Arab countries. "We want independence, and always the Lebanese journalists have a role to 
play in our independence, " journalist Nayla Tueni, heir to the An Nahar dynasty, told me a 
few months before her father was murdered. Others had a more modest agenda "Every 
day you give a new hope. Always there is a bright side, a new day coming. Maybe it is very 
small, but it is a message you keep in mind and you give it to the people who are watching 
TV every day, " said Ghada Abou Adal Hassoun, host of a morning show on Lebanon's 
Future TV, owned by the Hariri family. "1098 However, the commitment to an activist agenda 
was not universal. "I think that the problem in the Middle East is that even the 
correspondents and the journalists are linked in one way or another to a political institution 
or to a certain political or ideological party and the solution lies in that the journalist is not to 
join any of these sides, " said Hussein Jamal of Kuwait TV. 10" LBC presenter Dolly Ghanem 
bemoaned the degree to which Lebanese journalists engaged in politics. "Sometimes I see 
that journalists are working politics more than journalism, " she told me. "This is what I do 
not like to see. We are here not to work politics; we are here to do our job. " 
The majority of those surveyed disagreed with Ghanem. Seventy-four percent said 
they think it is permissible for a journalist to engage in political activities, and 81 percent 
said they had no objection to a journalist taking part in political demonstrations. While 
many US journalists either refuse to register as a member of a political party or keep their 
party allegiance private, the figure of the journalist-politician is not unusual in parts of the 
developing world. When asked "how should a journalist conceive his task? " 30 percent of 
Mexican journalists surveyed chose, "politicians with other means. "11oo Similarly, a survey of 
Polish journalists found that "the bulk of them ... did not perceive a danger to impartiality 
from a journalist's engagement in political and economic activity or the assumption of 
public functions. "llol Therefore, in this issue of political engagement, Arab journalists again 
more closely resembled their colleagues in the developing world than those in the US. 
5) RELIGION 
Arab journalists are significantly less overtly religious than their respective publics. 
In this, they are similar to their US counterparts 1102 However, Arab journalists still identify 
with religion far more closely than American journalists. Where 88 percent of Arab 
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journalists surveyed identified themselves as Muslims, and one-third of those described 
themselves as "religious" vs. "secular" or undeclared, about one-third of US journalists said 
they did not practice any religion. hb03 Both groups were asked whether it is necessary or is not 
necessary to believe in God in order to have good moral values. Almost 40 percent of Arab 
journalists said it was necessary, versus just 5 percent of US journalists (Figure 72). ""o4 
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6) SUMMARY 
The core normative aspirations of journalism - objectivity, fairness, informing the 
public - are near-universal. They are espoused by journalists of every persuasion on every 
continent. But the view of the mission of journalism is deeply affected by culture, religion, 
local/regional politics and the state of development of any given society. The data indicates 
that while Arab journalists share with their US counterparts a desire to interpret and analyze 
information for their audiences, they are closer to developing world journalists in their 
desire to influence the direction of society. However, on the most important self-described 
roles, Arab journalists are unique in their desire to drive political and social change and to 
safeguard their region and culture from external threats. 
R2 CONCLUSION: Arab journalists are clones of no one. They share values 
and professional aspirations with journalists in all parts of the world, but 
identify closely with none of them. The situation in the Arab world today is 
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different from that anywhere else. As a result, Arab journalists are carving 
out their own professional path and refining their own sense of journalistic 
mission. 
R2 IMPLICATIONS: The fact that Arab journalists have sharply different views 
from both US journalists and those in other parts of the world toward the 
real world application of Western journalistic norms provides strong 
support for a key hypothesis of this dissertation: That "while Arab journalists 
share with colleagues around the world a basic set of normative 
professional values, such norms quickly fall away in the face of empirical 
challenges to their core identity of religion, nationality and ethnicity" 
(page 13). It also supports the hierarchy-of-influences model, and 
specifically the way in which Hanitzsch's and Reese's theories of about 
the role of culture fit within it. 
This evidence is seen in both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
The high level of support for activist roles and low support for disseminator 
functions among Arab journalists is in sharp contrast to the responses of 
their colleagues in other regions. The comment that the approach to news 
in Arab journalism cannot be separated from "our cultural environment 
and background"' 106 underlines the relevance of the theories of Reese 
and Hanitzsch. But the data also shows that Arab journalists remain 
conflicted about their role vis a vis Western mores as they navigate the 
shoals of societal and other extra-media pressures, the realities of the 
organizations for which they work, and their own personal perceptions, 
biases and sense of identity, a situation that closely tracks the hierarchy- 
of-influences model and reflects Hanitzsch's contention that "diverse 
professional ideologies struggle over the dominant interpretation of 
journalism's social function. "1107 
In Shobokshi's comment that Arab and US journalists operate in "the 
same orchard" but "not the same tree" is a pithy mirror of Hanitzsch's 
belief that there exists "a universe of diverse and coexisting worlds of 
journalism. "' 108 Such results would seem to strike another blow to those 
theoreticians who argue for the existence of a "universal" journalism ethic, 
and they provide further support for applicability of the Shoemaker and 
Reese model. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 3: 
HOW DO THE ATTITUDES OF ARAB JOURNALISTS COMPARE 
TO THOSE OF THE ARAB PUBLIC-AT-LARGE? 
1) BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS 
In a region with high poverty and low literacy levels, ] I- journalists are a relative elite. 
Less than 14 percent of the Arab public has a university degree versus 38 percent of the 
journalists surveyed. Likewise, their median income of $1,000-$1,500 per month - paltry 
though it may be by Western standards - is stratospheric when compared to the average in 
the region, where per capita income is estimated at $2,100-$2,300 per year. II to 
2) RELIGIOUS/SECULAR ORIENTATION 
Roughly a third of the journalists surveyed identified themselves as "religious" 
versus "secular" Muslims, while another third did not declare their religiosity (Figure 5). 
When the public in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Morocco were asked a similar question 
("Independently of whether you go to religious services, which of these describe you? 
Religious person; Not a religious person; A convinced atheist), 88 percent chose "religious" 
and 12 percent chose "not religious" (Figure 73). I11I While the majority of Arab journalists 
chose "journalist" when asked to declare their primary self-identity, the next largest group 
chose "Muslim, " which was the primary identity of the public-at-large. However, where the 
public chose national identity as the next-most popular choice, "Arab" was the next choice 
of the journalists, with less than ten per cent choosing national identity (Figure 74). 
When combined with the questions of political identity (Figure 56) and geographic 
identity (Figure 8), these five sets of responses - political identity, geographic identity, 
religiosity, primary self-identity, and national identity - together define the Arab journalist 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century. These measures serve as a litmus test for 
journalistic self-identity; through them we find that Arab journalists overall are far less 
overtly religious than the public-at-large, identify more closely with the Arab "nation" than 
the nation-state, and rank professional identity much higher than any other identification. 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 278 
FIGURE 73: RELIGIOSITY (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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Arab journalists were asked a series of questions about the role of religious 
authorities in the region, which had earlier been asked of the public as part of the World 
Values Survey. The results show that Arab journalists have far less confidence in religious 
authorities than does the public-at-large (Figure 75). Less than half as many journalists as 
members of the Arab public responded in the affirmative when asked if religious authorities 
.. n t....,,. .u I--. 
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give adequate answers to the moral problems of the individual (33% vs. 78`%), while 
substantially fewer journalists than members of the public responded positively when asked 
whether clerics provide adequate answers to the problems of family life (40%% vs. 75'%x), the 
spiritual needs of the public (49% vs. 79%) and social problems (23% vs. 79%). 
FIGURE 75: CLERICS (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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It is significant that even those Arab journalists who described themselves as 
"religious" Muslims had a relatively dim view of the role of clerics, with more than a third 
of the "religious" journalists responding negatively to the questions about religious 
authorities providing adequate answers to moral problems and needs of the individuals 
(34.4%), problems of family life (35.4), and even spiritual needs (35.1%). Most dramatically, 
just under 50 percent of the "religious" journalists said clergy were not adequately 
addressing social problems, compared to less than 20 percent of the public who felt that 
way. 
The journalists also had a vastly different view than the public of the importance of 
religion in politics. Just 26 percent of journalists agreed ("strongly agree" and "agree") that 
politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for office, as compared to 69 percent of the 
public (Figure 23). Even the "religious" journalists were substantially more liberal than the 
public on this question, with about half agreeing that irreligious politicians should not serve. 
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FIGURE 76: POLITICIANS & GOD (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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Asked to respond to the statement, "Religious figures should not influence how 
people vote, " more than 80 percent of journalists agreed (and only 7 percent disagreed), 
compared to just over 40 percent of the public (Figure 77). Even more dramatically, more 
than 60 percent of journalists agreed that laws may be enacted that contradict sharia, while 
just 10 percent of the public concurred, driving home the degree to which Arab journalists 
espouse a decidedly more secular worldview than the public about and to whom they report 
(Figure 78). 
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FIGURE 78: SHARIA (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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The answers to these questions are important not only in how they define journalists 
versus their publics when it comes to the role of religion in daily life. They also tell us much 
about the actual - versus declared - sense of religiosity of the participants. There are a variety 
of reasons why an individual might describe him/herself as "religious" or "secular, " from a 
desire to identify with characteristics they think they should embody to a reluctance to 
discuss religiosity for professional (e. g. sense of journalistic "objectivity") or personal 
reasons. The responses to the above questions would seem to both support the case for a 
"secular" identification on the part of those so-declared and indicate that the participants 
who chose not to declare their religiosity were not hiding a sense of religious purpose out of 
suspicion of other motives. 
Abdallah Schleifer, the former NBC Cairo bureau chief who more recently served as 
Washington, D. C. bureau chief for the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya satellite channel, spoke of 
the sometimes schizophrenic self-identity of Arab journalists, as exemplified by those 
working at Al-Arabiya's rival, Al-Jazeera: 
From the beginning, Al-Jazeera has exhibited a sort of dual nature, its head 
disciplined by BBC training ... and the 
desire of professional Arab journalists 
to practice free journalism and open debate, but its heart often shaped by the 
twin ideological currents of Arab nationalism and Islamism jwhich seem] to 
have best survived in the virtual Arab nation that politically-aware exiles and 
expatriates so easily inhabit abroad. "" 
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3) OPINION OF THE US 
The vast majority of journalists surveyed indicated that the US plays a negative role 
in the Middle East (Figure 33). They also rejected the idea that the Bush administration is 
serious about a Palestinian state (Figure 42) and said the US invasion of Iraq was 
unacceptable no matter what the ultimate outcome of the conflict (Figure 44). The Arab 
public agrees. A Zogby survey of five Arab nations carried out in late 2006 asked Arabs to 
assess the impact of US policy on Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, democracy and Iran on their 
overall opinion of the US. 1114 With the exception of Egypt, and, on certain questions, 
Lebanon, 1t15 the responses were overwhelmingly negative. Figure 79 compares the 
journalists' "unfavorable ("very" and "somewhat") response to the question, "My attitude 
toward US policy is... " with the average negative attitude among the Arab public to the five 
policy issues above. Journalists were in synch with their publics on the incendiary issue of 
US military presence in Iraq (Figure 80), with negative feeling toward the US occupation 
running in the 70-90 percent range among journalists and the public alike. The only surprise 
in the data, as shown in Figure 81, is that journalists actually had a marginally less overall 
unfavorable view of the US than their publics (with the exception of Lebanon, where the 
pro-US attitudes among Christians skew the data). 
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FIGURE 80: IRAQ (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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FIGURE 81: OPINION OF US (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
Opinion of the US 
100 82 83 87 90 
30 68 76 
60 
40 
20 
111 
- 0 
Jt' Qý o ý, a ýýJ 
o`oýý o`aacý coc `y Cr ý ppa , a\`' 
of 
  Unfavorable 
Source Arab attitude data: Zogby Five Nation 20061117 
However, when it came to the American people, the attitudes of Arab journalists 
were light years away from that of their publics. This is a critical finding in the context of 
Washington's criticism of alleged anti-Americanism in the Arab media. Anyone who has 
spent time in the Arab world in recent decades has a version of what I call the 'taxi driver 
story, ' in which the driver - or waitress or desk clerk, etc - offers some variation on, 'Oh, 
you're American?! I love Americans; tell your president to go to Hell. ' The story fit no matter 
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the administration in Washington. Since 9/11, that distinction has narrowed. To a great 
extent, resentment toward US policy has become resentment toward Americans. In four of 
the five countries polled by Zogby, the public had a dismal view of Americans, with just 18 
percent of Saudis reporting a "positive" attitude toward Americans, 23 percent of Egyptians, 
28 percent of Moroccans, 31 percent of Jordanians, and 44 percent of Lebanese. In stark 
contrast, fully 63 percent of Arab journalists reported a positive attitude toward the 
American people (Figure 82). "There is a difference between talking about American policy 
or the American system, " al-Sini, the editor of Al-Watan, insists. "Here in our media we 
cannot say we are pro-American or anti-American. Because if I said what America is doing 
is good, that means I am against all public feelings. If I said America is bad, this is not true, 
because in my belief, in my own opinion, America is trying to do something different, but in 
the wrong way. "'M 
In the West, Al-Jazeera is perceived as the flag-carrier of anti-Americanism. Anchor 
M'Hamed Krichen insists nothing could be further from the truth. "I think that we have 
played very, very important role to help our viewers try to understand the American point 
of view, the Israeli point of view, and it is not really easy. Most of the Bush speeches are 
broadcast live with Arab translation. We are not saying that Arab viewers are convinced by 
all, but at least we give them the opportunity to see and to listen. We are not 100% OK with 
him, but at least they can follow and try to understand. I think for Arab world this is very, 
very important thing. "1119 Samar Fatany is equally adamant that the Arab media is not on a 
vendetta against the US. "I still remember President Bush when he asked, 'Why do they hate 
us? '" she recalls. "Nobody hates them, I can assure you. "1120 The data would seem to bear 
out that assertion. 
In contrast, Arab journalists take a dim view of the state of their own region. So do 
many ordinary Arabs. Arab journalists ranked human rights abuses among the top threats 
to the Arab world (Figure 28). Human rights are also a major concern among ordinary 
Arabs. Asked by the World Values Survey, "How much respect is there for individual 
human rights nowadays, " 40 percent of Arabs in six countries responded that there is, ""not 
much respect" or "no respect at all. "1121 "I think we have to talk about this, " says columnist 
Aisha Ibrahim Sultan, who also hosts a program on Dubai TV. "Nobody talks about human 
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rights in our society. Nobody talks about political rights. All that these people were talking 
about was maybe the health service, the education service, but this is not the whole thing. 
We already have this, but we have to switch to something that is still a taboo until now. But I 
think it is time now to talk about this. "1122 
This finding comes back to the issue of Shoemaker and Reese's theory that the 
perceptions of individual journalists, and the ethos of the journalistic culture in which they 
operate, shape reporting. 
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4) DEMOCRACY 
"Democrat" is overwhelmingly the primary political identity of the journalists 
surveyed (Figure 7). That specific question was not asked of the Arab public, but a 
significant majority questioned by Moaddel and Latif said democracy was "the best" form of 
government (Figure 83) and 70 percent of Arabs in six Arab countries said having a 
democratic political system was "very good" or "fairly good. "1124 "We need life like you, we 
need democracy like you, and we need freedom like you, " insists Ahmed Mansour, host of 
the Al-Jazeera program Bela Hodood (No Limits)., 12-, The passion that some reporters bring to 
their mission of creating democratic change could be heard in the remarks of a Lebanese 
reporter at the support rally for Mai Chidiac, the LBC presenter maimed in a car bomb. His 
face lost in the sea of journalists jammed into a studio at the Lebanese Broadcasting 
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Corporation, he told his colleagues the assassination attempt must not silence the Lebanese 
media: 
We - as we have always been and will continue to be - are carrying the flags 
of freedom and sovereignty and independence and will continue to be the 
loud voice pronouncing the truth so that we can hear ourselves. 1"26 
Lebanese Christian radio producer Johnny el-Saddik told me he believes that writ 
extends beyond his country: "Lebanese workers in the media are dangerous for other 
countries' president or authorities because we are teaching liberty for all the Arab world. ", 1'' 
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But that does not mean Arab journalists, or the Arab public, endorse -- or believe - 
US calls for Arab democracy, which became a voluble element of US Middle East policy in 
early part of the second Bush administration. A series of public opinion polls in Arab 
countries coordinated by Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland consistently found 
that "fewer than ten percent of Arabs believe that the spread of democracy was a true 
American objective, with most believing that oil, Israel, and weakening the Muslim world 
drive American policy in the region. "h129 The rejection of Hamas' election victory in Palestine 
and the US refusal to deal with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after it won 150 seats in the 
2006 Egyptian parliamentary elections, only added to that skepticism. On this issue, 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 287 
journalists were in tune with their publics. In a 2007 Zogby poll, 65 percent of Arabs said 
democracy-building was not the real US objective (Figure 84); while close to 90 percent of 
Arab journalists disagreed with the suggestion that the US was sincere in its desire to foster 
democratic change. 
Just as they were cynical about US democracy-building efforts, journalists were 
likewise skeptical of the Bush administration's verbal endorsement of a Palestinian state, as 
were Egyptians in a 2007 survey (Figure 85). 
As discussed earlier, Arab journalists believe they need to balance their duties to 
inform the public and their responsibility to show respect. The Arab public agrees. Asked 
about the controversy over the publication of cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad, about 
90 percent of Jordanians and Egyptians said Western disrespect for Islamic traditions was to 
blame. 1130 While the question did not specifically ask about journalistic ethics, it does indicate 
agreement on the broader philosophy behind the journalists' view. "I am trying to say my 
ideas, to say my thoughts, not in a diplomatic way, but there is also no need to clash with 
the society or the government, " explains columnist Sultan. 1131 
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FIGURE 85: US PALESTINE (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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On the controversial issue of terrorism, more than 60 percent of journalists believe 
"terrorism" is one of the most important issues facing the Arab world. About the same 
number of Jordanians and more than half of Egyptians said they were "very concerned" 
about the rise of Islamic extremism. 1"34 Human rights was another issue high of the 
journalists' priority list, a concern mirrored in Arab society, where 40 percent of those polled 
said there was "not much respect" or "no respect at all" for human rights. ' 135 
5) SUMMARY 
On many levels, Arab journalists effectively reflect the views of the Arab public-at- 
large. But on issues of religiosity and attitudes toward the American people, Arab journalists 
are far more secular and moderate than their publics. As Samir Khader of Al-Jazeera put it: 
"We are very liberal compared to the Arab societies; and we are very conservative compared 
to the West - very, very, conservative. "1136 
R3 CONCLUSION: Arab journalists have a more secular, pan-Arab outlook 
and a far more positive view of the American people than the Arab 
public as whole - though religious identification still remains important to 
then - but otherwise largely mirror Arab society in their social and political 
attitudes. 
R3 IMPLICATIONS: These results largely bear out the central thesis of this 
dissertation: "That Arab journalists at the dawn of the twenty-first century 
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embody a woridview that combines pan-Arabism with a heightened 
sense of Muslim identity. " 
This is important because it underlines the role of the Arab media in 
creating the symbols and "mythomoteurs" that are contributing to a new 
"Arab" imagined community. That half the journalists surveyed identified 
first with their profession (Figure 73) says much about the evolution of 
journalism in the Arab world as its practitioners increasingly identify with 
the "ideology" of journalism. They do not discount their religion - of those 
who did not rank "journalist" as their primary identity, twice as many chose 
"Muslim" over any other category - but that identification with religion 
does not eclipse any other form of self-identity, as it does among the 
public. At the same time, Arab journalists also exhibit both skepticism of 
the role of the clergy in everyday life and a conviction that there must be 
separation between 'mosque and state, ' indicating a more secular 
political outlook than that of the public. This would appear to give 
credence to contention that Arab newsrooms are one of the breeding- 
grounds for the post-Islamism posited by Mandaville. 
However, these findings undermine Shoemaker and Reese's 
hypothesis that, "The more elite the medium is, the less similar its workers 
will be to the general population, "1137 since there was no significant 
difference between the way journalists working for the elite pan-Arab 
media responded on the range of questions involving political, cultural 
and professional issues when compared to their less-elite colleagues 
working for domestic news organizations. 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 290 
RESEARCH QUESTION 4: 
HOW DO ARAB JOURNALISTS COMPARE THEIR REPORTING TO THAT OF AMERICAN 
JOURNALISTS? 
1) Overview 
"jWestern medial has always bragged when comparing itself to the Russian media 
but ... it should stop comparing 
itself with the Soviet Union and start comparing itself with 
us, " Palestinian author and intellectual Mounir Shafik told a journalists' gathering in 
2005.138 
Such comments are more than hyperbole. The traditional respect the Western - and 
particularly US - media commanded in Arab newsrooms has evaporated in recent years as 
Arab journalists saw American coverage become gripped by jingoism and stereotyping, 
exacerbated by the fact that expertise on the region is lacking since few US news 
organizations now have correspondents based in the Arab world. But Arab journalists are 
not naive. Those surveyed had a high opinion of the news organizations for which they 
worked - 86 percent agreed with the statement, "My news organization is doing an 
outstanding job" - but they were far less sanguine about the state of their industry. "There is 
no comparison, to be honest, between the press in the West and the press in the Arab 
world, " according to Osama Mirghani, deputy editor-in-chief at Asharq Al-Awsat. "Having 
said that, the press in the Arab region is developing, is evolving and I think is moving 
forward. ", 1,19 
But while they are critical of themselves, many Arab journalists resent the holier- 
than-thou attitude of US journalists who, as noted in a report about the proceedings of one 
US-Arab media dialogue, "viewed themselves as more experienced and more 
knowledgeable about the standards of the profession. """40 Said journalist Khaled Hroub, a 
participant at that same gathering, "Arab media maybe has so many shortcomings and 
misgivings, but still Western media cannot lecture them and they do not have the moral 
high ground to give lessons to our media. "1141 
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Responses to several survey questions indicate that such mixed feelings about the 
state of the Arab media, when contrasted to that of the US, are common among Arab 
journalists: 
" About 30 percent disagreed both that the Arab media as a whole is becoming 
freer (Figure 17) and that they, as individual journalists, were freer to practice 
their craft. 
" Roughly half those surveyed believe the Arab and US media are equally unfair 
(Figure 87); 
" While they are not particularly impressed with the independence of the 
American media- a legacy of the Arab perception that American reporters have 
become mouthpieces for the Bush administration - almost 70 percent of Arab 
journalists describe the independence of their own media as "poor" (Figure 88); 
" The regard Arab journalists have for the professionalism of the US media far 
outstrips their view of their own industry, with more than 40 percent of 
respondents giving the Arab media a "poor" rating and almost as many 
describing the professionalism of American journalists as "very good" (Figure 
89). 
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FIGURE 87: US-ARAB INDEPENDENCE 
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FIGURE 88: US-ARAB PROFESSIONALISM 
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2) Problems facing journalism 
The harsh view Arab journalists have of the state of their industry is underlined by 
the fact that they chose "professionalism" and a lack of ethics as the top problems facing 
Arab journalism, along with press freedom issues and business pressure (Figure 90), 
demonstrating the parallel impacts of personal factors, corporate pressures and extra-media 
influences. "We have a childhood stage of media in developing countries, " says Hassan Satti 
  Arab media independent 
  LIS media independent 
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of Asharq AI Awsat. Al-Jazeera's Khader agrees. "Do you think Al-Jazeera is like CNN, Fox 
News or CBS? No, we are not. We are still babies in the world of media. We are still babies. " 
That is particularly true, he says, when it comes to professionalism. He believes part of the 
blame rests with the conflicting sense of identity among Arab journalists: 
We have three identities, while in the West you may have only one. [For 
Arabs, they are] the country where you come from; the fact of being a man or 
a woman; are you Islamist, not Islamist; are you liberal, not liberal; do you 
agree with this ideology, you do not agree? The ultimate profile is a mix of 
everything. That is very good of course. But you have to take into 
consideration that there are others in this newsroom that might disagree with 
you. So you end up with a newsroom that is half professional. Not half the 
newsroom is professional; no, the whole newsroom is half professional. Can I 
tell you now that I am a professional? No I am not 11'1 
Many top editors, particularly on the pan-Arab satellite channels, bemoan the 
shortage of experienced professionals and the relative trickle of new journalists emerging 
from the region's universities. Hisham Kassem, founder of the independent Egyptian daily 
Al Masri Al-Youm says the traditional role of the Arab media as government mouthpiece is 
also to blame for the shortage of quality journalists. So soured was he on the prevailing 
newsroom culture, that as he prepared to start yet another independent newspaper in 2007, 
Kassem vowed not to hire any reporters from the government-owned press. "It is easier to 
teach journalism to smart young people than to get journalists to unlearn the bad habits they 
have learned elsewhere, " he told me. 1143 This absence of trained professionals argues for the 
need to put substantial resources into academic journalism programs and other forms of 
training infrastructure in the Arab world. 
Giselle Khouri of A1-Arabiya, meanwhile, epitomizes the uneasy - and sometimes 
contradictory - aspirations of Arab journalists toward Western-style mores of objectivity or 
fairness and their desire to create political change. Khouri believes that the politicization of 
news - especially at rival Al-Jazeera - is among her profession's most grievous failings. 
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Just like the Western media had a lot of mistakes in its war coverage, the Arab 
media as well had a lot of mistakes. First: confusing the issues meaning that 
the issue of Iraq is not the issue of Palestine. ... Once we mix Usama Bin 
Laden with Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Meshaal, then 
we cannot, as Arabs demand a fair case. This is a major mistake that was 
practiced whether intentionally or unintentionally by one of the Arab 
channels. The second mistake is that the national dialogue refers to 
everything that comes from the West as treason and to everything that comes 
from inside the region as national. This is wrong. 
Yet at the same time, since the assassination of her husband, anti-Syrian columnist 
Samir Kassir, Khouri has been on a personal crusade: 
Before Samir [was killed], I had another role than now. Before, [as a] 
journalist, I was -I do not want to say objective - but faithful a little bit. But 
after the death of [former Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri [in a car bomb] and 
with the revolution [against the Syrian military presence in Lebanon], and 
after Samir, I think I am a fighter, a politician-fighter now with my talk show. 
I do not compromise and I push for a new reform in the Arab world. Al 
Nahda [Renaissance]. We are in a big conflict, in a big war between the 
people who have the culture of death and the culture of life. 1144 
Newspaper columnist Aisha Ibrahim Sultan, who also hosts a talk show on Dubai 
TV, says that just because Arab journalists admire some aspects of the American media does 
not mean they want to - or should - try to recreate US-style journalism in the Arab world. 
"Do you think that in the Arab world they have also to do like the American journalists? I 
think there is a difference between the American society or state and the Arab state. There is 
difference in everything. " Most fundamentally, she says, US journalism and Arab journalism 
- like the societies themselves - are at very different points in their evolution. 
"When did American people start reading the newspaper and when did we 
start reading the newspaper? The history of the newspaper in my country 
maybe is 30 years, but in America they started dashing with the government 
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from maybe 150 years. So we need to build step by step our experience, our 
history in the journalism, in everything. We need to build our experience. I do 
not want to set the American experience and say I want to be like Americans. 
I cannot. This is not logic. This is not logical at all. You can buy a chair, 
American chair or decoration and put it in your house. But you cannot buy an 
idea. [For] an idea, you need the time. " 1 
A1-Maenna of Arab News concurs: "The essence of the role of the journalist does not 
change, but the circumstances change, "1146 while Nabil Dajani, a communications professor 
at the American University in Beirut, insists that media must be judged in its cultural 
context: 
The social and moral responsibility of the media in their societies and regions 
need to be taken into account in order to provide factual and fair coverage of 
events. We cannot assume a universal model of media operation. Rather, we 
need to recognize that the structure, content, and, therefore, operation of the 
mass media are unique to the society within which they operate. "" 
All of those quoted above aspire to greater professionalism in their industry, but Satti 
says it is unrealistic to expect a sea-change overnight. "The Arab mentality is very fragile. 
When I'm talking about professionalism, I don't mean absolute professionalism. "1148 Satti's 
boss, Osama Mirghani, agrees that "it's a matter of degree. The press is free here, but there 
are influences. We know the best newspapers have restrictions laid on them. "1149 Others say 
the influences do not stop at overt corporate or government pressures. "Arab journalists, in 
general, have positions that reflect their societies, on political and other matters. We see 
religious programs that are politicized with religious flavor. All social issues are being 
presented from one dimension, " according to Diana Moukalled, senior correspondent at 
Lebanon's Future TV, owned by the family of the late Rafiq Hariri, "I don't think we've 
reached the stage where we really have high professional standards. "1150 But the debate over 
standards and ethics simultaneously takes places at multiple levels, from discussion of 
training, culture and bias to the very human challenges faced by all journalists as they cover 
conflict and violence, as in AFP correspondent Nayla Rassouk's account of how she decided 
which among many badly injured children in an Iraqi hospital ward she would profile: 
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It's a very difficult decision to make. It's an impossible decision to make. 
When you're standing there and they're all looking at you to decide which 
one you're going to speak with [but] if you take one example and write it in a 
way that [encapsulates] all the suffering that you saw that day in every single 
one of them, then you've done your duty. ' 1,51 
Two issues involving professionalism resonate with US journalists, who are likewise 
concerned about the quality of journalism along with the pressures resulting from media 
conglomeratization. However, while Arab journalists were critical of their industry-at-large, 
Arab journalists were far more enamored of their own news organization's coverage than 
were US editors and reporters (Figure 91). 
FIGURE 89: US-ARAB PROBLEMS 
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FIGURE 90: US-ARAB OWN ORGANIZATION 
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As noted in Chapter VI, a feudal corporatist model is threatening to replace state 
media control in the Arab world. New independent media ventures are dominated by 
powerful business interests closely linked - sometimes through blood - to the ruling elite. 
The largest media conglomerate in the Arab world is controlled by the brother-in-law of 
King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia; the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia owned 39 percent of the 
shares in Asharq AI-Awsat; h1M Libya's media properties are all in the hands of Muammar 
Qadaffi's son, Seif; Lebanon's Future TV is owned by - and serves as a cheerleader for - the 
son of the slain former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri; and Egypt's newest family of channels 
is being built by a powerful tycoon who controls a construction and telecommunications 
empire closely linked to the Mubarak regime. The journalists surveyed acknowledged this 
situation when they ranked "government control, " "media ownership, " and "corporate 
pressure" among the top challenges to Arab journalism. As noted earlier, even the poster- 
child for Arab media independence, Al-Jazeera, operates within red-lines. "I have 
restrictions. I am allowed to do this. And I am not allowed to do that, " the channel's senior 
producer, Samir Khader, readily concedes. "It is a game. It is really a game; a game of 
survival. ""-'-' 
Despite all that, Arab editors and reporters still gave themselves slightly higher 
marks than they gave American reporters for post-9/11 coverage of US Middle East policy 
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(Figure 92). At least some elements of the public appear to agree. While the regard 
Americans have for US journalists is at an all-time low, " a BBC/Reuters poll found that 74 
percent of Egyptians trusted their media. ']- 57 Abdulwahab Badrakhan, who left Al-Hayat in 
2006 to explore setting up a newspaper for Al-Jazeera, is skeptical of such findings. "There is 
a crisis for newspapers in the Arab world, " he says. "People think that all the papers are 
from the government and they know very well that there is no freedom. ""- Still, the 
overwhelming view is that things are constantly improving. Al-Jazeera's M'Hamed Krichen 
speaks for an increasing number of Arab journalists when he says he has realized a lifelong 
dream. "I can look to the whole word with no obstacle, with no instructions Itoj 'cover this, 
do not cover this, it is better to avoid this. ' I feel that I am a free journalist and it is a very 
happy feeling. I can work now as a free journalist; let us say, at least at 90 percent. This 10 
percent is OK. We are not always satisfied, not always 100 percent. But it is closer. ", 159 
FIGURE 91: US-ARAB POST-911 
Post-9/11 Coverage Objective 
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3) Summary 
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Arab journalism is struggling to remove the twin yokes of state control and the 
influence of powerful corporate interests close to the ruling families of the region. Arab 
journalists acknowledge this challenge. They are proud that some Arab news organizations 
are making progress toward true independence. When questioned about specific measures 
of media performance, they acknowledge that the Arab media comes up lacking. But when 
asked to rate their overall coverage in recent years, they believe they have outperformed 
r %UM 
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their American colleagues. The overall sense among Arab journalists of the state of their 
industry vis a vis media in the US is perhaps best summed up by the motto of the pan-Arab 
channel Al-Arabiya: "Closer to the Truth"11 ° Perhaps not quite the whole truth, but getting 
closer every day. 
R4 CONCLUSION: Arab journalists are brutally frank about the lack of 
independence, fairness and professionalism among their media. They 
admire the professionalism of their US counterparts, but give them low 
marks for fairness and independence. In the post-9/1 era, Arab journalists 
don't think their own media has been particularly objective, but do they 
do believe the Arab media been marginally more objective than the US 
media. 
R4 IMPLICATIONS: Implicit in this evaluation is a sense that Arab journalists, 
like those of other cultures, do aspire to some (perhaps elusive) 
benchmark of professionalism, as seen in their low regard for 
"professionalism" and "ethics" with the Arab media and high regard for 
those norms among their US colleagues. However, the responses also 
telegraph the fact that even where there is a general agreement within 
the specific national/regional journalism culture of what those norms may 
be; their achievement is dictated by the web of dueling pressures - 
individual, corporate and extra-media - outlined in the hierarchy-of- 
influences model. Mirghani of Asharq AI-Awsat might well have been 
quoting from Shoemaker and Reese when he observed, "The press is free 
here, but there are influences. " 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 5: 
IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES OF ARAB JOURNALISTS 
PROFESSING A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY AND THOSE PROFESSING A MORE SECULAR 
OUTLOOK? 
1) OVERVIEW 
Across the board, journalists responding to the survey who described themselves as 
"religious" Muslims and those who described themselves as "secular" or chose not to 
declare their religiosity demonstrated a significant measure of agreement on a broad array of 
critical issues. These included: 
" The greatest threats facing the Arab world, its most important issues and the 
most significant challenges facing Arab journalism; 
" Journalistic objectivity and ethics; 
" The fairness, independence and professionalism of the US, Arab and European 
media; 
" The need for balance between informing the public and showing respect to those 
about whom the media reports; 
" The need for Arab society to be gradually improved; and, 
" Attitudes toward the US (though, in general, "religious" journalists felt more 
negatively than the others). 
2) SELF-IDENTITY 
The points of difference primarily involved specific issues of religion and self- 
identity. Almost half the self-declared "religious" Muslims answered, "Above all, I am a 
Muslim, " but more than 40 percent joined the "secular" (52 percent) and undeclared 
participants in selecting, "Above all, I am a journalist. " A combined 25 percent of "secular" 
and 20 percent of undeclared journalists said their primary identity was Arab or Muslim 
(about the same for each). The number in all three groups identifying themselves most 
closely with their individual nation was negligible. In this, the journalists were in synch with 
the broader Arab public (Figure 93). A 2006 Pew poll found that less than a quarter of 
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Jordanians and Egyptians identified first with their individual country, while 67 percent of 
Jordanians and 53 percent of Egyptians consider religion their primary identity. ' 161 
FIGURE 92: NTL/RELIGIOUS ID (ARAB COMPARISONS) 
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Much the same was true on the issue of political philosophy, with just under 30 
percent of "religious" Muslims declaring themselves to be Islamists, while more than a third 
(35 percent) joined the "secular" (68.5 percent) and undeclared (61 percent) journalists in 
selecting "democrat" as their primary political identity. Almost as many "religious" 
Muslims (33 percent) as "secular" (39 percent) identified first with the Arab nation, while 
almost half of the "religious" Muslims (48 percent) and 31 percent of the undeclared said 
their geographic identity lay with the Muslim world. 
"Religious" journalists gave more priority to the Palestinian cause and ending the US 
occupation of Iraq, but otherwise the primary areas of divergence involved religion. 
"Religious" Muslims disagreed with their colleagues on several issues: 
. That pressure from religious groups was a significant challenge for the Arab 
media and over the role played by religious authorities. 
" That clerics do "provide adequate answers to problems of family life, " with twice 
as many "religious" journalists (60 percent) agreeing to the statement; 
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" That religious authorities "provide adequate answers for social problems, " with 
twice as many "secular" journalists answering "no" than "religious" journalists 
" answered "yes. " 
" That belief in God is necessary in order to have good moral values, with about 
the same number of "secular" (61 percent) and undeclared (68 percent) 
journalists saying "no" as "religious" journalists said "yes; " and, 
" That laws should serve the people, even if they contradict sharia, with about half 
of the "secular" and undeclared journalists strongly agreeing and about half the 
"religious" Muslims saying they disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
3) RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL ISLAM 
The survey shows that the question of pressure from religious groups is a divisive, 
but very real, issue. "You [even] have to be careful about what you say about crowd control 
in the Hajj [the annual pilgrimage to Mecca], " according to Saudi journalist Abeer 
Mishkas. 1162 Such pressure on non-conforming journalists ranges from overt attacks by 
religious militants in places like Iraq, Palestine, Yemen and Algeria, to undercover 
-infiltration" of newsrooms by Islamists in the Sudan, "63 to more subtle pressures akin to the 
lobbying the US media faces from religious lobbies. Some media even play to those biases. 
Lebanon's LBC generates the majority of its advertising revenues from the huge Saudi 
Arabian market. So in late 2006, it launched a daily Saudi news program, Aishu Mana (Live 
with Us), which employs three Saudi anchors. One of those is Mona Siraj, an outspoken 
Saudi woman who dons a head covering on-camera to placate conservatives but does not 
wear one in everyday life. "That makes it difficult for her, " another LBC staffer told me, 
"since she doesn't want to be seen in public without the veil because she knows the audience 
might react if someone publishes her picture that way. " That dual identity extends to the 
station itself, which broadcasts some programming via a terrestrial signal for the domestic 
Lebanese market and other programs via satellite for the result of the Arab world. "If you 
look at LBC-Lebanon, which is mainly a Christian station, when it goes LBC-Sat, it becomes 
a Muslim-oriented station, " according to Lebanese University Professor Mahmoud Tarabay. 
"We're talking about a dual identity - Christian in Lebanon and Muslim on satellite. "IIM* It 
part because it consciously caters to the region's Muslim viewers, MBC is well aware of the 
power of the religious conservatives. When one of its programs ran a viewer poll asking 
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whether women should appear on the air, within 90 minutes the channel received almost 
100,000 votes against. "The conservatives are so organized; the liberals are not, " one LBC 
producer told me. 
It should be no surprise that far more "religious" journalists (64 percent) chose 
"protect Islamic tradition" than did "secular" (17 percent) and undeclared (22 percent) 
journalists, or that more than half the "religious" journalists identified "encourage spiritual 
values" (Figure 94). However, it is noteworthy that 40 percent of "secular" and 30 percent of 
undeclared journalists also listed "Encourage spiritual values" as top journalistic role, while 
about half of all "religious" journalists chose "Defend Arab interests" and "Foster Arab 
culture" as the primary role, while 46 percent chose "Enhance pan-Arab unity. " For each of 
those, more "religious" journalists chose those "Arab" causes than did "secular" or 
undeclared journalists. 
FIGURE 93: ARAB/MUSLIM INTERESTS 
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That last point is worth repeating; 40 percent of self-declared "secular" journalists 
listed the defense of spiritual values as the primary job of an Arab journalist, while more 
"religious" journalists gave priority to "Arab" causes than did "secular or "undeclared 
journalists. The figures attest to the degree to which a new Arabism is rising among the 
region's journalists that is blurring the differentiation between "Arab" and "Muslim" causes 
and priorities. Marwan Matni is a Christian producer at LBC. Not only do most Lebanese 
Christians have little sympathy for Muslims causes, but many do not even consider 
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themselves Arabs. Rather, they think of themselves as "Phoenicians" or descendents of the 
Christian Crusaders. Matni says that was true of him, as well - until the 2006 Israel- 
Hezbollah war. As the conflict dragged on, he told me, "I felt myself changing. Lebanon was 
under attack. We were all Lebanese. By the end, I, too, felt myself to be Hezbollah. "1165 Matni 
is an example of the degree to which Arab journalists embody - and inspire - the new 
Arabism. He produced news and current affairs programs that drove public opinion to 
support Hezbollah during the conflict even as he was himself being influenced by the events 
playing out on the ground. 
Other factors contributing to that "Arab" identity include the shared stance toward 
US policy and Israel, the reaction to the emotive footage broadcast by the pan-Arab 
channels, the way in which pan-Arab television interacts with its audience, the emergence of 
MSA as the lingua franca of pan-Arab television, and the new genre of pan-Arab 
entertainment programs to go far beyond those traditionally produced in Egypt and Syria. 
But most important has been the rise of independent - or semi-independent - journalism. It 
is not as if pan-Arabism or a shared sense of identity did not exist before television came 
along. Gamal Abdul Nasser's fiery speeches on the Voice of the Arabs from Cairo 
galvanized Arabs across the region. And somewhat ironically, as an Egyptian blogger, who 
goes by the name "Sandmonkey, " " reminded this writer, the Arabic broadcasts of the BBC 
World Service served as the first focal point of a pan-Arab identity. 1166But four decades later, 
not only had the nature of Arab broadcasting changed, but so, too, had the nature of Arab 
broadcasters. Just as the boundaries between print, broadcast and New Media were 
blurring, so, too, were the ideological boundaries collapsing. Nasser's Arab nationalists and 
their Islamist rivals had, for the moment, morphed into a new Arabism, and the media was 
at their vanguard. 
R5 CONCLUSION: Aside from a few specific questions directly related to the 
role of religion in society, there is no significant difference between self- 
described "religious" journalists and those professing a more secular 
outlook. The clear implication is that the barriers between these two 
worldviews are breaking down within the Arab newsroom. 
R5 IMPLICATIONS: Together, these responses demonstrate that no matter 
their self-declared religiosity, Muslim Arab journalists share a broadly similar 
view on the critical political and social issues facing Arab society. Even on 
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specific questions of religion and society, the similarities of their views are 
more striking than the areas of divergence. Most notable is the fact that a 
about half the self-declared "religious" Muslim journalists gave priority to 
fostering Arab culture, defending Arab interests, and enhancing pan-Arab 
unity, while almost as many "secular" Muslim journalists listed defense of 
spiritual values as a key mission of Arab journalism. 
Here we see empirical evidence of the blurring boundaries 
between "Muslim" issues - traditionally important to political Islamists - and 
"Arab" issues, traditionally the purview of the Arab nationalists; a 
manifestation of Smith's "concentric circles of allegiance. " It can further 
be argued that it is also evidence of the "alignment" of "religious 
imaginings" and nationalist interests posited by Anderson, and the role 
that religious mythologies play in serving as "guarantor" of national 
identity, as surmised by Smith. 
The results are in line with the findings of recent studies that have 
reported a weak relationship between religiosity and social and political 
preferences in Muslim-majority countries, 11'7 and they provide evidence 
that the ideas of Mandaville's pan-Islamism are taking root in the Arab 
newsroom as well as the public-at-large. 
-0- 
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CHAPTER XIII: SIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
People are enemies of what they ignore. 
IMAM ALI' 168 
1) SIGNIFICANCE 
The survey presented in these pages is the first large-scale sampling of the 
demographics, values and attitudes of Arab journalists. It will have significance to 
researchers in a variety of fields, including Islamic studies, international relations and media 
studies. Given that approximately 90 percent of Arab journalists are Muslim and that their 
work has had tremendous influence on attitudes between the Muslim world and the West in 
the post-9/11 era, a study of Arab journalists, with an emphasis on the degree to which 
religious identity shapes their worldviews and reporting, can play an important role in 
providing empirical data to puncture stereotypes and better understand the real nexus 
between religion and political and social attitudes in a professional population that exerts 
tremendous influence over public attitudes in the Muslim world. Such a study underlines 
the relevance of Islamic studies to modem policymakers. Likewise, insights into the 
worldview of Arab journalists and a better understanding of how they see their mission will 
enable international relations scholars and Western pol. icymakers to develop knowledge- 
based policies to build an effective relationship with the Arab media. For media studies, it 
offers insight into the current state of development of Arab journalism and how the values 
and mores of Arab reporters and editors conform and contrast with those of journalists 
elsewhere in the world, enhancing the understanding of how media evolves. The survey will 
also provide an important benchmark for future studies. 
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2) LIMITATIONS 
By its very nature, this study is constrained by certain limitations. These include: 
" The online infrastructure prevented in the inclusion of open-ended questions, 
which may well have expanded the list of perceived roles and possibly raised 
important new roles the researchers did not anticipate; 
" By listing the lowest salary range as $100-$250, the researchers failed to take into 
account the fact that some journalists are making even lower salaries, as evident 
from the hand-written answers on some of the paper-and-pencil surveys. 
Knowing what percentage of respondents were earning less than $100 might 
have been useful to others using the dataset. 
" The inherent limitation of conducting a survey in authoritarian societies. The 
confiscation of 20 completed surveys at a policy checkpoint in Syria and the 
inability of associates to distribute hard-copy surveys in Bahrain, Yemen and 
several North African countries is only the most apparent indication of the 
impact on the results. It is impossible to know how many potential respondents 
opted not to participate in either the printed or online versions of the survey 
because of fear of retribution from authorities or their bosses. 
" The fact that the survey was directed by US researchers affiliated with American 
institutions is also likely to have had an impact on participation. As noted earlier, 
some potential participants indicated suspicion that the survey might have the 
work of US - or Saudi - intelligence agencies. 
" Limitations caused by the inclusion of questions considered sensitive or those 
which asked about attitudes toward political issues. A survey asking only basic 
demographic questions and questions about journalistic issues may well have 
elicited higher participation, but it would, of course, not have yielded the kinds 
of insights obtained. 
" How an individual defines himself may sometimes be at odds with the reality of 
who s/he is. The initial draft of the survey contained a number of questions 
designed as markers of religiosity, drawn largely from other comparative studies. 
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Some of these prompted the negative reaction mentioned above. One participant 
in the beta objected to question about Bush and bin Laden, whether he drank 
wine, whether he regularly attended mosque and even whether he was a 
Muslim. As a result, most of those questions were eliminated in the interests of 
eliciting participation. 
" As a result of all of the above, it was impossible to obtain a purely random 
sample. There is little doubt that a certain level of self-selection was involved, 
given that those who found some of the questions offensive or were suspicious 
about the motive of the survey opted out. These are likely to have been 
individuals with a stronger anti-US viewpoint, and possible a more conservative 
religious outlook. 
" Other sampling issues: The viral nature of the online survey means that it cannot 
be ruled out that some journalists working for other than the target media, 
including Arabs working for overtly Islamist outlets, completed the survey. In 
addition, those taking the hand-copy survey were able to scan its full content and 
refuse to participate if they saw something to which they objected, rather than 
completing questions to that point and then dropping out. This undoubtedly led 
to a higher percentage of incomplete surveys. 
3) FURTHER STUDY 
This survey provided the first broad snapshot of Arab media. It will serve as a 
benchmark for future researchers. It would be useful for a purely Arab team to repeat the 
exercise to assess whether the nationality of the survey researchers affected the results. 
Likewise, a version of the survey that does not contain political questions may well produce 
a richer data set on questions of journalist values and mores. It would also be useful to 
repeat the survey among avowedly Islamist media to allow comparison. Finally, the survey 
should be repeated in other non-Arab Muslim countries. 
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CHAPTER XIV: CONCLUSIONS 
Technology has an inherent "bias, " for it can never be 
neutral or independent of society's broader social and 
political biases. At the same time, however, its potency 
makes it invariably the site and stake of struggle, the 
outcome of which is never preordained. 
ANDREW GILLESPIE AND KEVIN ROBINS 
JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1 69 
Writing of two Palestinian notables prominent in the early twentieth century, Rashid 
Khalidi observed that they embodied a variety of loyalties: 
Among these allegiances were Islamic solidarity, Arabism, Palestinian 
patriotism, opposition to Zionism, party political affiliation, local Jerusalem 
loyalties, and family linkages, as well as a commitment to liberal 
constitutionalism, administrative reform of the state apparatus, and the 
spread of learning-"'o 
That synergy of interests between proponents of Arab nationalism, nation-state 
nationalism, Arabism and Islamism is echoed today in the attitudes of Arab journalists. The 
relatively small differences in responses among self-declared "religious, " "secular" and 
undeclared journalists to issues ranging from their shared commitment to political and 
social reform to their cynicism about the role of clerics in modem society, thus bolstering the 
core contention of this dissertation: that Arab journalists are at the forefront of a cyclical 
convergence of interests between Arab nationalism, nation-state nationalism and Islamism. 
Gellner's theory of nationalism as a "sentiment" sparked by "the feeling of anger 
aroused by the violation of principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment" 
can be seen reflected in answers to many of the survey questions. Anger at US policy, 
frustration with the region's totalitarian elites, disillusionment with the clergy, 
disenchantment with the plight of the poor and disenfranchised - these and other responses 
are empirical evidence of the existence of AbuKhalil's wihdat hal (unity of situation), 
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providing validity to the argument made by Eickelman and Piscatori that there exists an 
"implicit consciousness of common notions" among Arabs of all political and religious 
stripes that "becomes apparent when the shared assumptions are violated or attacked. "1171 
That shared agenda among those defining themselves as "Islamists" and the rest of 
the sample also provides credibility to the theory propounded by Mandaville that the world 
has entered a period of "post-Islamism, " in which "Muslim political identities are oriented 
primarily toward national or even local concerns, " the Islamist "project" is increasingly 
secular, and Muslim politics are being reconstituted "in forms more suited to a globalized 
world. "1172 The agenda of these "new Islamists, " he tells us, focuses on "progress and social 
justice, " themes in synch with those of many other Arabs who seek political change and 
social justice - including journalists questioned in the survey. 
Whether the label is Rinnawi's "McArabism" or Telhami's "New Arabism, " the data 
argues for the emergence of a Rawlian "overlapping consensus"' 173 among the various 
streams of political thought in the Arab world today, a "new" Arabism borne of a new 
electronic regional public sphere. As Marc Lynch explains: 
What makes this new Arab public "new" is the omnipresent political talk 
shows, which transform the satellite television stations into a genuinely 
unprecedented carrier of public argument. What makes it "Arab" is a shared 
collective identity through which speakers and listeners conceive of 
themselves as participating in a single, common political project. What makes 
it a "public sphere" is the existence of contentious debates, carried out by and 
before this self-defined public, oriented toward defining these shared 
interests-1174 
Equally, it demonstrates that Arab journalists have also come full circle. What they 
see as the mission of Arab journalism closely tracks the cause-based approach documented 
by McFadden in the early 1950s, a relatively laissez-faire media era, before the advent of 
draconian government control that have lasted almost a half century. 1175 The fight against 
imperialism and Zionism, and government corruption; the fight for Arab unity, and the 
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effort to drive the reform, modernization and democratization of Arab society can all be seen 
in the survey responses. 
Just as Habermas saw "the informal circuit of public communication" serving as a 
fundamental building block for the emergence of a new European identity, 176 so, too, are 
changes in the patterns and structures of Arab media having an impact on self-identity in 
the Arab newsroom, creating, in Anthony Smith's lexicon, journalistic "border guards" who 
provide the "symbols and myths, memories and values" that reinforce the "cultural profile 
and historic identity" of the Arab people "through opposition to culturally different 
neighbours and enemies. "' 177That unification in the face of the Other is seen both in 
attitudes toward US policy and in the set of roles I identified as falling with the Guardian 
typology, just as it can be seen on the region's television screens and in its newspapers on an 
almost daily basis. However, in this case, the "language of self-defense" that Anderson tells 
us frequently mobilizes popular nationalism, also takes the form of opposition to the 
autocratic leaders of the Arab world, as seen in the journalists' commitment to political and 
social change. 
For someone familiar with the revolution in the Arab media, it is hard to read 
Anderson's descriptions of the role of print media in rise of eighteenth century nationalism 
without mentally substituting "Arab television" and considering the equivalent twenty-first 
century effect. The 20-million books printed by the year 1500 helped spark "a colossal 
religious propaganda war ... a titanic 'battle for men's minds; "1178 while today, more than 
370 Arabic language satellite channels reach tens of millions of viewers even as the West and 
the Islamic world are engaged in a global "war of ideas. " In 1535, a worried Francois I 
banned the printing of any book in his realm, a move doomed by the fact that books were 
being published in the states all around him; today, Arab governments fight a losing battle 
to stem the tide of information pouring into their countries through trans-border television, 
the Internet and a host of new media. Print-capitalism created "languages-of-power, " just as 
Arab satellite television is today institutionalizing an evolving and unifying form of spoken 
Arabic; and where the French and American revolutions were "shaped by millions of 
printed words into a 'concept' on the printed page, and, in due course, into a model, "1179 
satellite television journalists and their counterparts in the region's terrestrial media are 
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today fueling opposition movements such as Egypt's Kifaya and inspiring made-for- 
television events like Lebanon's "Cedar revolution. " 
If, as Anderson believes, "[p]rint-language is what invent[ed] nationalism"""' in 
eighteenth century Europe, is it any wonder that "Arabic satellite television stations are 
causing a cataclysmic change in Arabic language patterns and cultural 
representation"? 1181And if, as he contends, print-capitalism fed the imagined communities of 
the nation-state, is it much of a leap to expect that regional broadcast-capitalism would feed 
some form of regional imagined community in the Arab world? As Anderson put it in 1983, 
just three years after the launch of CNN and almost a decade before the first Arab satellite 
channel, "we are simply at the point where communities of the type 'horizontal-secular, 
traverse-time' become possible. "118 
I 
There is another parallel to the early spread of Arab nationalist thought. As the press 
became a political force in the late nineteenth century, "all contenders of power tried to 
befriend, control, or liquidate" offending journalists 1113 With the modem Arab media 
revolution, history is, unfortunately, repeating itself. 
As Shoemaker and Reese's model tells us, an array of pressures shape the output of 
Arab news organizations. Depending on where they operate and for whom they work, the 
political economy of the Arab media means that virtually all Arab journalists operate under 
some degree of overt censorship, psychological pressure, threat of physical violence, and/or 
corporate strictures. That was evident in the debate over Darfur. Others face more basic 
challenges, like poor salaries and a lack of professional training. As Sakr points out, at the 
end of the day, "Journalists are not independent professionals, but employees. "TM Make no 
mistake, the ownership of the pan-Arab television channels - if not the journalists 
themselves - have a financial/professional stake in fostering a pan-Arab perspective but 
those same owners also answer to more domestic imperatives, be they Saudi, Qatari, 
Egyptian or Lebanese and, equally important, the majority of the respondents did not come 
from the pan-Arab media. 1115 
The data shows that pan-Arab and "domestic" journalists alike share a set of 
aspirations for their profession, whether or not they are able to achieve those in the context 
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of their current employment and whether or not those aspirations are in synch with those of 
their owners. On an elite level, their ability to adjust to circumstance can be seen in the game 
of musical chairs that is ongoing among top editors and on-air personalities at the leading 
Arabic language satellite channels, Al Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC Arabic and LBC. Objectivity 
may be "contextual, " but aspirations are not. 
The survey results also validate Shoemaker and Reese's contention that journalists 
make no pretense to objectivity when there is broad societal agreement on an issue, in this 
case US policy in the Middle East, and that how they perceive their role - in this case as 
agents of social and political change - affects how they cover the news. Hanitzsch's view 
that the professional and moral values of journalists are "inevitably culture-bound" is borne 
out in responses to questions about the professional values and mores of journalism, in 
which the Arab respondents reject many of the Western benchmark measures of journalistic 
"fairness" and responsibility in favor of their own activist approach. So, too, do they 
validate his contention that nations in transition are likely to have a "politically active" 
journalism that takes an "interventionist" approach in which journalists "participate, 
intervene, get involved, and promote change. "1186 
The satellites that transmit pan-Arab television do not recognize the lines in the sand 
imposed by colonial powers, and, in some - but certainly not all - senses, those lines are also 
being erased in the imagination of the Arab people. Nowhere are those distinctions 
becoming more blurred than in the newsrooms of the pan-Arab channels, where Egyptians 
and Syrians, Yemenis and Moroccans, Christians and Muslims, Sunnis and Shi'ites, and, of 
course, nationalists and Islamists cooperate to create the news. Crowded together with the 
journalists in the Arab newsroom are all the things that Shoemaker, Reese and Hanitzsch tell 
us affect what ultimately appears on the television screen Attitudes shaped by upbringing, 
education, politics, culture, and religion; the supposedly "universal" mores of journalism 
emerging from the West; pressures from governments, owners, and, in some cases, the 
forces of violence intent on harming journalists. That their news organizations exist beyond 
borders gives them the distance from power that the theories tell us provides them with a 
degree of freedom, while journalists loser to the center of power - on domestic media in 
places like Syria, Egypt and Yemen - find themselves in jail or worse for reporting the same 
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story in the same way. All are the product of the hierarchy of influences at work in their 
newsroom, which determines whether they are censored, self-censor or tell it like it is. 
Therein lay one of the oversights of the Shoemaker and Reese model. As noted 
above, there is no 'one size fits all' theory that fits any situation. Shoemaker and Reese 
provide us with a structure, but the data would seem to indicate the hierarchy itself may 
need to be adjusted for the Arab world. Ideology, as Shoemaker and Reese posit, certainly 
appears to trump all else, but more importance needs to be given to the culture of the 
newsroom, the state of the society in which the individual journalist operates, and the kinds 
of stories s/he covers. For this, Hanitzsch's injection of culture into the model is critical. 
"Mass media content is a socially created product, not a reflection of an objective 
reality, " according to Shoemaker and Reese. And those social pressures begin where news is 
produced. The array of nationalities in the newsrooms of pan-Arab satellite channels and 
newspapers and their decided news emphasis on the regional over the local, the emotional 
over the mundane, the touchstone "Arab" and "Islamic" issues of the day over "domestic" 
topics like jobs and sewer lines, combine to enhance the trans-border worldview of the 
journalists working there. And the reporting of those journalists, in turn, influences 
journalists working on purely domestic news organizations who admire them for the new 
style of aggressiveness and professionalism that they have introduced. Ownership, of 
course, ultimately governs how and what they report, as do government regulations; while 
the routines of media work and management structure and style all come into play, but, I 
argue, journalists' role conceptions and their personal attitudes, which are both ranked in 
the bottom level of the Shoemaker and Reese model, are far more important in the Arab 
context. 
Reese's adaptation of the model to the "global journalist" acknowledges the import 
of "national context, " but here, too, the model fails to overtly take into account two factors I 
believe are fundamental to understanding the influences that shape how a journalist 
approaches his/her job. These include: 
1) Newsroom culture as it is shaped by the background of the journalists who 
inhabit it and through the way in which they influence each other; and, 
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2) The kinds of stories covered by the news organization for which they work. 
Exposure to the perspective of colleagues from two dozen different countries and a 
focus on critical regional issues inevitably alters their worldview; through daily reporting of 
dramatic life-and-death issues of war, terrorism and societal unrest, all taking place on Arab 
soil and spilling Arab blood or impinging on the rights and freedoms of the Arab people, 
whether at the hand of a foreign Other or their own governments, just as inevitably 
produces the kind of "rally-round-the-flag" effect"&' that leaves them with a politically- 
charged, activist outlook. Such an impact must be factored in. 
These observations are not meant to obviate the value of the Shoemaker and Reese 
model, but they are a reminder of Hanitzsch's observation that there exists "a universe of 
diverse and coexisting worlds of journalism, " and thus the relative import of the model's 
constituent parts will inevitably vary according to cultural context. '1 Arab journalists 
report for news organizations in a region that is, from their perspective, constantly under 
siege. From covering the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories to reporting 
about the ongoing struggle for political reform across the region, Arab journalists are being 
challenged on a daily basis to define their role. Are they "objective" journalists or defenders 
of the Arab nation; "unbiased observers" or agents of political and social change? Activist 
journalism is what fueled America's drive to independence, with reporters and editors 
serving as Hobsbawm's "engineers" of the new national identity. A parallel can be drawn to 
the role of Arab journalists today. 
Underpinning Arab society, according to Abu-Rabi, are "a constellation of competing 
ideologies. " The sum of these forces, he says, "is different from one Arab country to another 
and might also be different over time. "1189 The same can be said of the political winds within 
Arab newsrooms from Casablanca to Sana'a. The hierarchy-of-influences in no two new 
organizations is precisely alike, just as the self-view of no two journalists is precisely the 
same. 
Arab journalists are today entering a new era They are striving for new levels of 
professionalism even as the very mission of Arab journalism shifts from that of bulwark of 
the status quo to agents of political and social change. In this, they hark back to the writers 
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of the great Arab Awakening (Nahda) of the 19th and early 20th centuries, who forged a 
tradition in which journalists acted as "witness and militant for change at the same time" 
and whose mission was "the struggle against dictatorship and for democracy. "190 
The data above indicates that the historically secular, Arab nationalist orientation of 
Arab journalists has given way to a worldview that combines a heightened sense of Muslim 
identity with a position at the forefront of the "new Arabism" - in which Arab and Muslim 
goals coincide - that has grown increasingly prominent in the region since 9/11. This new 
worldview was summed up by Al-Jazeera anchor Muhammed Krichen. Standing in the 
channel's newsroom one afternoon as he was about to go on the air, I asked this Algerian 
national to define himself. He did not hesitate: "I am an Arab, Muslim journalist, " he 
proudly replied. That multi-faceted identity is shared by countless reporters and editors in 
newsrooms across the Arab world. It is an identity unique to this particular time in the 
development of Arab journalism and this moment in the political and social evolution of the 
Arab world. 
Are Arab journalists anti-American, as some in Washington have charged? The data 
does not seem to support that view. Do they adhere to the same sense of mission as their 
American counterparts? No, they do not, that is also dear. Throughout history, media and 
politics have been partners in change, sometimes warring, sometimes cooperating. The 
American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Nahda, in these 
and countless other upheavals, journalists sought to drive change. Pretensions of 
"objectivity" would come later, at such times, journalism was a means to an end and its 
mission was to upend the status quo. 
Far from aspiring to be clones of their American colleagues, Arab journalists are 
seeking to forge their own identity. As Abdulwahab Badrakhan, then of AI-Hayat told me, 
the primary role of Arab journalists today is "to work to identify what is an Arab 
journalist. "19' Arab journalists are not, for the most part, fiery revolutionaries. But their 
responses indicate that they are committed to slow, steady political and social change. 
Achieving that - while at the same time safeguarding the region's people, religion and 
values - is, at this point in history, the overriding mission of Arab journalism, with an 
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emphasis on the word "Arab, " for as Al-Jazeera's Ahmed Sheikh told me, "We belong to this 
Arab nation and we are there to cover from our own perspective. "1192 
Meanwhile, after a historic cycle spanning the twentieth century, during which Arab 
nationalism transitioned through Ba'athism and Arab Socialism, Syrian Nationalism and 
Nasser's Arabism, at the dawn of the new century Arab nationalism has now returned to a 
form in which causes and shared ethnic, linguistic and cultural norms serve as an overlay on 
a regional map depicting nation-states that few would readily see erased. The realities of 
modem Arab politics, now as then, mean that the Arab League often cannot even muster a 
quorum for a ministerial meeting, much less reach agreement on mildly controversial issues 
of regional and international policy. A "pan-Arab" nation in which Gulf royals, secular 
autocrats and Lebanese jointly rule is almost beyond imagination. Yet satellite television and 
new media means that those disparate nations and groups are also bound together in a new 
Arab consciousness mediated by the constant mutual exposure to the very external threats 
that lay at the core of earlier waves of pan-Arab impulses. 
"At moments of intense collective crisis, this notion of common membership can 
expand dramatically, almost overnight, and erase or subordinate differences between 
members of a single national community, " Middle East historian Michael Provence has 
written. "The Syrian revolt of 1925 was such a moment of crisis. "1193 In many ways, this, too, 
is such a moment. 
The "illusion of relative homogeneity against the hegemonic foreigner" that Cole and 
Kandiyoti say contributes to "incipient 'national' cohesion" is readily apparent on the TV 
screens each day. 194 Their use of quotation marks around the word "national" to emphasize 
it as a relative term underscores its applicability in the pan-Arab context, for the new 
Arabism of the twenty-first century is not the Arab nationalism of a half-century ago. Like 
communism, the purist ideas of its early Arab nationalist ideologues were corrupted by 
opportunistic politicians and bled dry in the prisons of the authoritarian regimes they 
spawned. Today's new Arabism is an idea shorn of its Socialist Utopian pretensions, 
representing not a monochromatic political ideology, but a philosophy -a way of seeing the 
world - that at once lives within and transcends political boundaries, bringing under its 
wings Arabs from the slums of Beirut and the palaces of the Gulf who "share common 
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sentiments"1195 about Palestine, foreign hegemony and the plight of the Arabs and Muslims; 
are part of a common "cultural and linguistic heritage"ll% of which Islam forms an essential 
base; and, whether secularists or devout Muslims, are united by a sense of despair, 
frustration and anger - widhat al-masa'ib, the "unity of disasters. "1197 
At the same time, many Arab intellectuals are engaged in a reassessment; a search for 
a new definition of the Arab-Islamic cultural heritage. Arabs are anything but united on the 
form that will take. "What constitutes the Arab-Islamic heritage and who is to define it 
remain the most pressing and controversial issue[s] facing the Arab-Muslim societies, " 
according to Fauzi Najjar-1198 
Not surprisingly, these debates stretch beyond Islam itself into Arab politics. "We 
need a reformulation of the idea of Arabism, " Lebanese writer Elias Khouri told a crowd at a 
Beirut coffee house who had gathered to discuss the late Samir Kassir's book, Being Arab, in 
the spring of 2007, as Lebanon itself struggled to find a new national identity 1199 The 
"fragmentation" of the Arab identity was evident in both the nightly car bombs that sent the 
Beirut coffee house crowd scurrying home early and in the civil war between Sunnis and 
Shi'ites a thousand miles away in Iraq, with its regional reverberations. It all meant, 
journalist Rami Khouri told the same audience, that while "the spirit of being an Arab is 
very real, " the issues of identity, the norms of governance and the values of society that are 
the foundations of a true sense of being remained elusive and ill-defined. "We face the 
question of how do we construct a new national myth that grabs people, " Khouri said. 
Indeed, the chasms in the Arab world - between the haves and the have-nots, 
between the nationalists and the pan-Arabists, the secular elite and the Islamists, between 
each of the tribes with flags - run deep. Egyptians use the word "Arab" disparagingly to 
describe the rich Gulf Arabs who crowd Cairo's hotels and nightclubs to escape the summer 
heat and/or cultural rigors of Ramadan - the so-called "Saudi season" - each year, the 
resentment encapsulated in the lyrics of a popular Egyptian song: "Our daughters prostitute 
themselves in the Mercedes of filthy rich Saudis. "1200 For North African scholar Muhammad 
Abid al-Jabiri, a critic of the influence of Bedouin history on Arab-Muslim identity, the goal 
of this reassessment is 
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to articulate the components of Arab-Islamic culture and to examine them 
critically, seeking to reconstruct the Arab self on new bases, free from the 
negative paradigms of the past ... 1201 
In an earlier age, Sayyid Qutb wrote that "the idea of homeland (watan) [is] an idea in 
the consciousness (flkrab fi al-shu'ur), not a piece of land. "1202 Few today seriously speak of 
regional political unity or a realignment of borders, much less suggest that national 
identifications be shed. What Abukhalil calls the "dreamy" nationalism of Michel Aflaq has 
been abandoned. In its place is a new, many-faceted "Arab self; "1 still uncertain, still 
taking form, but one which unites Arabs in, if not in a common ideology, then a broad 
shared worldview that can be glimpsed anywhere within the "finite, if elastic 
boundaries"1204 of the Arab world. "The progress of national consciousness, " Hobsbawm 
wrote, "is neither linear nor necessarily at the expense of other elements of social 
consciousness. "1205 
Political economists Richards and Waterbury perhaps summed it up best, observing 
that, "Like the unicorn, the status quo in the Middle East is a figment of fertile 
imaginations. "1206 
As noted in the introduction, it was the central thesis of this study that Arab 
journalists at the dawn of the twenty-first century embody a worldview that combines pan- 
Arabism - stripped of the Utopian garb of Arab nationalism - with a heightened sense of 
Muslim identity. The quantitative and qualitative data bears that out. Further, it was the 
author's contention that while Arab journalists share with colleagues around the world a 
basic set of normative professional values, such norms quickly fall away in the face of 
empirical challenges to their core identity of religion, nationality, and ethnicity. This 
hypothesis, too, is supported by the data. These twin realities have important implications 
for the peoples of the region in which they report. 
In the early 1980s, describing the rise of nationalism in Latin America, Benedict 
Anderson wrote, adding his own emphasis, "[N]either economic interest, liberalism, nor 
Enlightenment could, or did, create in themselves the kind, or shape, of imagined community. 
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... In accomplishing this specific task, pilgrim creole 
functionaries and provincial creole 
printmen played the decisive historic role. "1207 
Like those provincial creole "printmen, " Arab journalists, are today playing their part 
in creating the new Arab imagined community; for it is their identity and worldview that is 
echoed in, and reinforced by, newspapers, radio stations and television channels across the 
Arab world every day, as they write the narrative of a tumultuous and intensely complex 
new chapter in the evolution of Arab consciousness. 
-0- 
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APPENDIX A: ENGLISH VERSION OF SURVEY 
This survey is being conducted by the Adham Center for Electronic Journalism at The 
American University in Cairo, in association with the Institute for Social Research at 
the University of Michigan. It is an attempt to paint a true portrait of journalists in the 
Middle East and North Africa at this important time of change, both to dispel myths 
and to serve as a benchmark to follow the ongoing evolution of journalism in the 
region. 
The model for this survey is the annual "State of the News Media" report on US 
journalism published by the Project for Excellent in Journalism (www. journalism. org). 
Numerous media organizations have agreed to cooperate, including al-Hayet, 
Asharq Alawsat, al-Arabiya, al-iazeera, the Washington Arab Journalists Association, 
and others. Financial support comes from the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, the 
Howard R. Marsh Foundation and the US Indonesia Society. There is no financial or 
other connection with any government. 
This survey consists of approximately 50 questions. It is completely confidential. 
Whether you are completing the online or paper version, there is no way for anyone 
to identify you. We do not ask for your name, contact information, or even what 
media outlet you represent. If there is a question that makes you uncomfortable, feel 
free to skip it and move on to the next question. 
And please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or comments. 
Sincerely, 
Lawrence Pintak 
Director, Adham Center for Electronic Journalism 
Publisher and senior editor, Journal of Transnational Broadcasting Studies 
The American University in Cairo 
lpintak@aucegypt. edu 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1) Type of news organization 
a) Daily newspaper 
b) Weekly newspaper 
c) Magazine 
d) English-language newspaper 
e) Private TV station 
f) Government TV station 
g) Radio station 
2) What is the ownership of your news organization? 
a) Government 
b) Private corporation 
c) Political party 
d) Individual 
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e) Other 
3) What is your job description? 
a) Reporter 
b) Assistant-editor/Producer 
c) Editor 
d) TV presenter 
e) Non-editorial 
4) Are you: 
a) full-time 
b) freelance 
c) Work for more than one media outlet 
5) Where are you based? 
a) Middle East 
b) South Asia 
c) Southeast Asia 
d) Europe 
e) US 
6) How long have you worked in journalism? 
a) Less than 1 year 
b) 1 to 2 years 
c) 3 to 5 years 
d) 5 to 10 years 
e) More than 10 years 
7) What is the highest grade of school or level of education you have completed? 
a) Primary 
b) Secondary 
c) Some university 
d) Bachelors degree 
e) Masters degree 
f) Doctorate 
8) If you attended college, did you take courses in journalism or media studies? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
9) Prior to being hired as a reporter, how much journalistic training did you have? 
a) None 
b) Less than 1 year 
c) 1 to 2 years 
d) Journalism degree 
10) Marital status 
a) Married 
b) Single 
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d) Muslim world 
e) Don't know 
B. JOURNALISM 
19) Please indicate how significant you think the following challenges are to Arab 
journalism. 
a) Government control 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
b) Corporate pressures 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
c) Pressure from religious groups 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
d) The threat of physical violence 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
e) Lack of professionalism 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
f) Threats from the US 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
g) Corruption among journalists 
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1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
h) Lack of ethics 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
i) Media ownership 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Most 
significant 
20) Complete the following sentence, "It is the job of a journalist to... " 
a) Encourage political reform 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
b) Entertain the public 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
c) Use news for the social good 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
d) Serve as voice for the poor 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
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disagree disagree agree agree 
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e) Educate the public 
9) 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
Sunnort aovemment Dolicv 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
Investigate aovemment claims 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
h) Simply report what happens 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
Suooort national/reciional development 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
Be an adversary to government 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
k) Defend Arab interests 
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1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
Encouraae sairitual values 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
disagree 
ml Represent the interests of his/her employer 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
n) Foster Arab culture 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
o)Transform society 
Pl 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
Analyze complex issues 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab Journalism/pg. 359 
q) Encourage civic engagement 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
r) Protect Islamic traditions 
2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
s) Lead political change 
2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
t) Enhance pan-Arab unity 
2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
u) Support the Palestinian cause 
2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Completely Don't know 
disagree agree agree 
Disagree 
21) How significant has been the impact of satellite television on Arab journalism? 
2 3 4 9 
Completely Somewhat Somewhat Very Don't know 
insignificant significant significant 
insignificant 
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22) Please indicate the extent to which 
statements 
a) A journalist must always be objective 
you agree or disagree with the following 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
b) A journalist should interpret events for the reader/viewer 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
c) A journalist should include his/her own opinion in stories 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
d) A journalist may actively engage in political activities 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
e) A journalist may take part in protest demonstrations 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
23) To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following? 
a) My news organization is doing an outstanding job of informing the public 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
b) The Arab media is becoming freer 
1 2 3 4 
Completely Somewhat Partly agree Completely 
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disagree disagree agree 
c) As a journalist, I Dersonally feel freer to do my job 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
d) US media coverage of post-9/11 US foreign policy has been very objective 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
e) Arab media coverage of post-9/11 US foreign Policy has been very objective 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
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24) Please indicate how well you think the media is doing in the following areas: 
a) Arab media: Fairness 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
b) US media: Fairness 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
c) European media: Fairness 
2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
d) Arab media: Independence 
2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
e) US media: Independence 
2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
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f) European media: Independence 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
g) Arab media: Professionalism 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
h) US media: Professionalism 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
i) European media: Professionalism 
1 2 3 4 9 
Poor Moderate Good Very good Don't know 
25) How do you feel about the following statement? "Journalists must balance the 
need to inform the public with the responsibility to show respect. " 
1 2 3 4 9 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
Don't know 
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26) Please indicate whether you agree or disagree about the following statements 
about journalistic practices: 
a) It is acceptable to take money to write favorable stories. It is acceptab le to take money to write favor 
1 2 3 
Never Sometimes Always 
b) It is acceptable to take travel money from people or organizations that are subjects 
of stories. 
123 
Never Sometimes Always 
c) It is acceptable to write Positive stories in return for advertising. 
123 
Never Sometimes Always 
C. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
27) Please indicate how important you think the following issues are to the Arab 
world: 
a) The economy 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
b) Political reform 
2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
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c) Human rights 
d) 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
Health 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
e) Iraq 
9? 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
Palestine 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
Terrorism 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
h) Environment 
123 14- 9 
Pintak: Islam, Nationalism and the Mission of Arab 7oumalism/pg. 366 
Not Somewhat Important Very The most 
important important important important 
i) Education 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
j) Poverty 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
k) Globalization 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
Other 
1 2 3 4 9 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
The most 
important 
28) What is the greatest threat facing the Arab world today? 
a) Economy 
b) US policy 
c) Terrorism 
d) Political instability 
e) Lack of political change 
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f) Human rights abuses 
g) Globalization 
h) None of the above 
29) Please indicate your response to the following statements: 
a) My attitude toward the US is: 
1 2 3 4 
Very 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
favorable 
b) My attitude toward the American people is: 
1 2 3 4 
Very 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
favorable 
c) My attitude toward US policies is: 
1 2 3 4 
Very 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
favorable 
30) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a) The US plays a positive role in the Middle East 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
b) The US plays a negative role in the Middle East 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
31) After the 2004 Tsunami that struck Southeast and South Asia and the 2005 
earthquake hit Kashmir, the US responded by giving economic aid. Do you recall 
media coverage of US aid? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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32) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a) The US gave aid because of a sincere desire to help the people of those regions 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
b) The US aid was an attempt to generate Muslim support 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
c) Whatever the motivation, US aid to the disaster victims was a noble and good thing 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
33) In many speeches since 9-11, President Bush has declared that US supports the 
spread of freedom and democracy throughout the Muslim world. Do you recall 
media coverage of any of these speeches? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
34) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a) The US supports the spread of democracy because of a sincere desire to help Muslims 
1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
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b) The US support for the spread of democracy partly an attempt to demonstrate that 
the US is not anti-Muslim ý--- - 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
c) Whatever the motivation, US support for the spread of democracy is a noble and 
nnnd thina. 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
35) In many speeches since he came to power in the US, President Bush has 
declared that US supports the creation of a Palestinian State. Do you recall media 
coverage of any of these speeches? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
36) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a) The US supports the creation of a Palestinian state because of a sincere desire to help 
Palestinians 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
b) The US support for a Palestinian state is partly an attempt to demonstrate that the US 
is nöt anti-Muslim 
2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
c) Whatever the motivation, US support for a Palestinian state is a noble and good thing -- - 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
d) The Bush administration is genuine in its expressed desire to create a Palestinian state 
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1 2 3 4 
Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Partly agree Completely 
agree 
D. RELIGION & VALUES 
37) If you are Muslim, which best describes you: 
a) Religious Muslim 
b) Secular Muslim 
c) Does not apply 
38) Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in the Arab world 
are giving adequate answers to: 
a) The moral problems and needs of the individual 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) Don't know 
b) The problems of family life 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) Don't know 
c) Spiritual needs of the people 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) Don't know 
d) Social problems facing the nation 
i) Yes 
i) No 
iii) Don't know 
39) Which is closer to your own views, even if neither is exactly right? 
a) It IS NOT necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good 
values 
b) It IS necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values 
c) Neither 
d) Don't Know 
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40) How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
Agree Ncithcr Strongly 
agree or disagree 
Strongly Agre disagree Disagree DK 
e 
Politicians who do not 
believe in God are unfit for 
public office 
Religious leaders should not 
influence how people vote 
in elections 
Government should make 1 
laws according to the 
wishes of the people, even 
if they contradict sharia 
23 
23 
23 
4 
4 
4 
59 
59 
41) Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 
a) The way Arab society is organized must be radically changed 
b) Arab society must be gradually improved by reforms 
c) Arab society is not in need of change 
d) Don't know 
E. WAR AND TERRORISM 
42) In your view, which of the following constitute acts of terrorism? 
a) The US assault on Fallujah 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) Don't know 
b) The bombing of the Bali disco 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
c) The execution of US contractor Nicholas Berg by Arab militants 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
d) The 2002 Israeli siege of Ramallah 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) Don't know 
59 
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43) What do you think about the idea that Arab countries have a right to act freely 
of any Western interference? 
a) Some Western interference is permitted if it leads to important benefits for the 
people of the country; 
b) It should never be allowed no matter how great the benefits. 
44) Please indicate the rough percentage of your countrymen that you believe 
would agree with the each of the following statements concerning Western 
interference. 
a) We should fight against it only if there is a reasonable likelihood of success. 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
b) We have an obligation to fight it regardless of the costs. 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
45) What do you think about the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes 
inside Israel? 
a) It can be negotiated for peace if the refugees receive appropriate financial 
compensation. 
b) It is a right that can never be given up. 
46) Please indicate the rough percentage of your countrymen that you believe 
would agree with the each of the following statements concerning the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees. 
a) We are obligated to fight for this right only if there is a reasonable likelihood of 
success 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
b) We are obligated to fight anyone who opposes the right of return regardless 
of the costs. 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
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47) What do you think about the United States occupation of Iraq? 
a) Despite all its problems it can be seen as acceptable if it results in freedom 
and democracy for Iraqis. 
b) No benefits to Iraqis can justify the occupation. 
48) Please indicate the rough percentage of your countrymen that you believe 
would agree with the each of the following statements concerning the United States 
occupation of Iraq. 
a) We are obligated to fight for the occupation only if the costs are less than 
the benefits 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
b) We are obligated to fight the occupation regardless of the costs. 
i) 0-10% 
ii) 11-20% 
iii) 21-50% 
iv) 51-75% 
v) More than 75% 
END OF SURVEY. THANK YOU. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO TAKE PART IN FOLLOW-UP 
SURVEYS, PLEASE EMAIL LAWRENCE PINTAK AT 
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Sept. 14,2007 
Dr. Gary Bunt 
School of Theology, Religion and Islamic Studies 
University of Wales, Lampeter 
Dear Dr. Bunt: 
I am writing in response to the request for a written statement regarding my role in the 
Arab media survey that is a part of Lawrence Pintak's PhD dissertation. 
Mr. Pintak and I were colleagues at the University of Michigan when he first 
conceptualized the survey. My primary field is political psychology, with a focus on the 
Middle East. As a trained survey researcher, my role was to vet Mr. Pintak's initial 
survey draft for methodological soundness and structure. In addition, I inserted into the 
survey instrument several questions on the issue of "protected values" for my own 
research purposes (not related to the dissertation) and helped oversee the coding process. 
Mr. Pintak did all of the analysis on the data used in the dissertation and, of course, all of 
the writing. While we will eventually carry out some joint analysis, we, quite literally, 
have yet to discuss the results. Please feel free to contact me if you have any further 
questions. 
Sincerely, 
r-"**" 
Jeremy Ginges, Ph. D 
Assistant Professor, Psychology 
The New School for Social Research 
65 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10003 
U. S. A 
Email: gingesj@newschool. edu 
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APPENDIX E: CAIRO DARFUR MEDIA WORKSHOP ATTENDANCE LIST 
Name Organisation Position status 
Speakers 
Dr. Lawrence Pintak American University of Cairo confirmed 
Khaled Mansour UN - WFP confirmed 
Salih Mahmoud Osman MP confirmed 
Hassan Sati AI-Sharq al-Awsat confirmed 
Albaqir Mukhtar confirmed 
Nadim Hasbani International Crisis Group Arab Media Officer confirmed 
Documentary Producer confirmed / waiting for 
Nabil Aassem (Visa & Tkt) 505290607 Director invitation 
Al Tayyeb Mustapha A-Inbbaha President of the Board confirmed 
Kamal AI-Gizouli Sudanese writers union confirmed 
AI-Hajj Warag Sudanese conned 
Fayez el Sheikh Saleik Al-Hayat Khartoum Correspondent confirmed 
Khaled Ouweis (Visa & tkt) AI-Arabiya Sudan Editor confirmed 
Mahmoud Tam im (Visa & tkt) AI-Arabiya Interview Producer confirmed 
Participants 
Zeid el Sabban Arab League Africa Counselor of Secretary General 
Al-Zahawi Ibrahim Malik Sudan Minister of Information and Communication 
Ibrahim Bairam 00961 3298849 An Nahar - Lebanon - 
(Visa & tkt) An Nahar lebanon Political Analyst confirmed 
Hassan Saber Bayouni Shahein 
(rid) AI Bayan UAE - 009714 4064208 Political Analyst confimred 
Gulf News UAE - 00971 50 625 
Duraid Al Baik (Td) 1820 Foreign Editor confirmed 
Yehya Askar (visa & Tkt)00974 
561 8732 Al Sharq - Qatar Political Analyst confirmed 
Khalfan Salem Al Watan- Oman Poltical Editor confirmed 
Ahram Center for Strategic and 
Hassan Abu Taleb Political Studies Deputy Director confirmed 
Diala Chehade 00961 03 436 
535 As Safir - Lebanon Foreign Editor confirmed 
Lana Mahdi Khaleej Times Foreign Editor Confirmed 
Roland Marchal CERI Foreign Analyst Confirmed 
Mr Bahey Eddine Hassan The Cairo Institute for Human Rights confirmed 
Mohammad Abdel Raouf Arabiya confirmed 
Al Nour Ahmad Al Nour Al Hayat Khartoum correspondent Confirmed 
Mohamad Salah Al Hayat Cairo Corrspondent confirmed 
Abdel Latif el Minnawi Al Sharq Alawsat confirmed 
Khaied Mahmoud confirmed 
Gamal Shahen 
Tahir el Mardi Al Jazzero Khartoum correspondent Confirmed 
Imad Abed el Hady (Visa & Tkt) Al Jazeera Khartoum correspondent confirmed 
Hussein Abdel Ghany Al. Jazeera Cairo Corrspondent confirmed 
Abdallah Hassan MENA news Agency Editor in Chief confirmed 
Mohamed Abdel Hady Al Ahram Deputy Editor in Chief confirmed 
Fahmi Howeidi Confirmed 
Abdallah Kamel Kuwait News Agency confirmed 
Mohammed Fal Al Jazeera Documentary film producer 
Amira Al-Tahawi Al Sharq al. Awsat confirmed 
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Faysal Mohamed Salah Al Adwa newspaper 
Amal Abbas AISahafa 
Raja el Abbassi 
Ibrahim Mohammed Ishaq 
Lana Mahdi 
Tarek el Gazouli sudaneseonline. com 
Hala Abdelhalim 
Dr. Mohammed Suleiman 
Mohammed at Hassan Ahmed Al Sharq at Awsat 
Hassan Zenati AFP France 
Alain Navarro AFP France 
Neil Mac Farcuhar New York Times 
Edmund Blair Reuters 
Donna Bryson Associated Press 
Earieen Fisher Associated Press 
Editor in Chief 
Journalist 
Journalist 
Editor-in-chief 
Democratic New Forces 
Movement 
write on Darfur 
Columnist / Analyst 
Cairo Corrspondent 
Cairo Corrspondent 
Cairo Corrspondent 
Cairo Corrspondent 
Cairo Con-spondent 
confirmed 
confirmed 
Declined 
Awaking response 
Declined 
confirmed 
confirmed 
Confirmed 
Declined 
Declined 
Declined 
Declined 
Declined 
Mohamed Barakat I "I I" lI Political Editor Confirmed 
Shaimaa Abdelhadi Al Masry Al Youm Political Editor Confirmed 
Jamal Nekroma Ahram Weekly Political Editor Confirmed 
Magdy Helmy Al Wafd Political Editor Confirmed 
Ragab AbdelAziz Al Gomhuriah Desk on Politics Confirmed 
Najwa Awad El Adwaa Political Editor Confirmed 
Ammar Fatth Al Rahman El Wehda El Sodaneya Representative Journalist Confirmed 
El Haya El Landaneya Representative Journalist Confirmed 
Khaled Mohamed All EI Eosboa Confirmed 
Rashad Kamel Sabah el Khair Confirmed 
Hamdy Rizk Akher Saaa Political Editor Confirmed 
Sausan Abu Husien Al Mussawar Political Editor Confirmed 
Prof Ibrahim El Nur AUC Declined 
Sara Hamood Ford Foundation Cairo Consukart, Darfur Initiative Declined 
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
Lawrence Pintak is a veteran of 30 years in journalism and the media business on four 
continents who now writes and lectures on America's relationship with the Muslim world and 
the role of the media in shaping global perceptions. He is director of the Kamal Adham Center 
for Journalism Training and Research at The American University in Cairo and publisher/co- 
editor of Arab Media & Society. He previously held the chair as Howard R. Marsh Visiting 
Professor of journalism at the University of Michigan. Pintak's most recent book is Reflections in 
a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam & the War of Ideas, which Middle East journal called "one of the 
best examples of contemporary journalism. " Pintak has reported from six continents for many 
of the world's leading news organizations. He covered the Lebanon conflict, the Iran-Iraq War 
and the birth of modem radical Islamist terrorism as CBS News Middle East correspondent in 
the 1980s. 
He was based in Indonesia in the 1990s, where he reported on the overthrow of 
Indonesian President Suharto for The San Francisco Chronicle and ABC News. Pintak won two 
Overseas Press Club awards for his Middle East coverage, was twice nominated for Emmys and 
has contributed to many of the world's leading news organizations. His op-eds appear in The 
Daily Star (Beirut and Cairo), Gulf News, Tempo (Indonesia), The Jakarta Post, Arab News, the 
Turkish Daily News and other newspapers in the Middle East and Muslim world, along with the 
International Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, Columbia Journalism Review, 
CommonDreams. org and a variety of US and European outlets. He is a regular commentator for 
the Al-Jazeera English media program Listening Post and he is frequently interviewed by the 
BBC, National Public Radio, Australian Broadcasting Corporation and many others. 
Pintak has also written extensively on Buddhism and Eastern religion. He holds an 
MPhil in Islamic Studies from the University of Wales, Lampeter. 
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